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Abstract 
Sri Lanka has inherited a unitary state structure and a highly centralised approach 
to government administration. Since independence in 1948, various proposals to 
restructure government, including decentralising powers to provincial and local 
levels, have been proposed, but none have been fully implemented. The Sinhala 
nationalist parties and groups which have supported successive governments have 
generally rejected all decentralisation proposals. Moreover, the political elite has 
long been oriented towards and accepting of strong leadership from the centre, 
which has largely ignored local government and local development, with serious 
implications for much of the population. 
The tsunami of 2004 and the end of the war in 2009 saw NGO support and large 
amounts of foreign funding flow into Sri Lanka to assist in the recovery. Central 
government and its leadership have controlled the whole aid management and 
distribution process, by directing foreign funds towards conducting large scale 
construction projects at the local level without considering local needs. Despite 
restrictions imposed by central government, a number of NGOs have begun to 
play an important role in promoting local development through interacting with 
local government bodies and local communities. NGOs can, thus, be found to be 
at the forefront of endeavours to address social and economic needs at the local 
level. 
This study, examines how and why local communities have been neglected in 
development initiatives in Sri Lanka, and assesses the significance of support 
from NGOs in increasing the capacity of local government and in promoting local 
development. Hypotheses derived from the literature related to post-colonial 
criticisms, government-NGO relations, and NGO interactions in the policy 
process are examined and assessed. Based on research in the southern and eastern 
provinces of Sri Lanka, this study analyses the views of national, provincial and 
local level political representatives and administrative officials, NGO officials and 
CBO representatives. 
The research revealed that while local level respondents aspired to play an active 
role in decisions about the use of foreign support for local development, they 
tended to lack the knowledge and capacity to do so. Local level respondents 
highlighted the importance of NGO guidance in these processes, particularly in 
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terms of promoting local people’s participation in local government decision 
making. This thesis concludes that NGOs can play a positive role in supporting 
local government in addressing development needs at the local level. Local 
government-NGO relations were found to have made an effective and significant 
contribution to fulfilling local level needs. NGOs can thus be seen to play a 
positive role in empowering local government and local communities and their 
involvement has potential to lead to a move away from highly centralised power 
structures. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1. Introduction 
Since obtaining independence in 1948, there have been several attempts by post-
independence rulers to alter the forms of government, particularly through 
decentralisation policies, to better align with Sri Lankan social structures. Most of 
these attempts, however, have not been successful. Instead, Sri Lankan 
government has a long history of failing to implement the proposals and 
recommendations of commissions and committees regarding decentralisation and 
local government reform. The political power structures have remained highly 
centralised, and the current tendency is to make the system even more centralised.  
Governments, political parties and national leaders have tended to reinforce such 
power structures with provincial and local levels of government playing a 
marginal role. In this context, the needs of local communities are not being 
addressed and there is very little support or encouragement for local government 
to do so. The non-implementation of recommendations for decentralisation leads 
to the question of whether proposing more of the same to a highly centralised 
government would bring positive results. This study, therefore, is concerned with 
exploring the more practical and alternative ways to empower local government 
and local communities towards local development. 
The study draws attention to two recent events which have shaped and 
strengthened the centralising tendencies, and which shows trends that can be used 
positively to prevent the negative implications of centralisation at the local level. 
The first is the tsunami disaster on 26th December 2004 which affected the entire 
northern, eastern and southern coastline and a part of the western coast in Sri 
Lanka. It is estimated that more than 30,000 lives were lost and almost 500,000 
people made homeless. 1  During the post-tsunami period, international donors 
contributed significant funds to aid recovery and reconstruction. Donor 
1 LOGO South Country Programme for Sri Lanka/Solid Waste Management of Local Government 
Bodies in Sri Lanka (2006) VNG International, The Hague, p. 5 (http://www.cities-
localgovernments.org/committees/cib/Upload/compendium/EN_38_LOGO_South_Country_Progr
amme_Sri_Lanka.pdf, accessed 21-06-2013). 
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commitments for the post-tsunami aid were estimated at US$2 billion.2 Large 
amounts of foreign aid and the involvement of large numbers of non-
governmental organisations (NGOs)3 were new issues in Sri Lanka at that time. 
There were no adequate government mechanisms at national, provincial or local 
levels to manage and distribute foreign aid and NGO support. This provided 
impetus for central government to take control of the entire foreign aid 
management and distribution,4 and saw central government increasingly impose 
limitations and restrictions on foreign aid and NGOs.5 
The second major event is the end of war between the Sri Lankan government 
forces and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The war had been 
fought for nearly 30 years and ended in May 2009 with a government victory. 
Significant foreign aid and NGO involvement in Sri Lanka were recorded from 
the post-war period.6 Central government has controlled and used foreign aid, and 
directed NGOs towards reconstruction and infrastructure development projects 
with little or no regard for local government preferences and existing social and 
economic needs, especially within local communities.7 
During the post-tsunami and post-war period, despite facing restrictions and 
constraints by central government, some NGOs began to be involved directly with 
local communities. This involvement and their contributions revealed the potential 
for NGOs to address the multiple needs at the local level. The long background of 
failure by central government to introduce genuine decentralisation and local 
government reforms, centralised power structures, and the centralised 
management of foreign aid processes, and the recent contributions of NGOs at the 
local level suggest that if NGOs were involved directly in local government and 
2 ‘Sri Lanka’s Tsunami Aid: Over $1 Billion Missing or Misappropriated’ (2009) 
http://srilankastateterrorism.blogspot.com/2009/12/sri-lankas-tsunami-aid-over-1-billion.html, 
accessed 26-05-2012.  
3 In this research, the term ‘NGO’ is used as an umbrella term to cover local NGOs that receive 
foreign aid, international NGOs, international financial institutions, and foreign government 
institutions that provide aid to Sri Lanka. Definitional issues concerning NGOs in the Sri Lankan 
context are discussed fully in chapter 6. 
4 See Performance-2005 & Future Plans-2006, Ministry of Provincial Councils and Local 
Government, Colombo-02. 
5 See Brochard, P. (2005) ‘New Regulations and Procedures Affecting the NGOs in Sri Lanka’, 
CIDA Programme Support Unit. 
6 Kadirgamar, A. (2013) ‘Second Wave of Neoliberalism: Financialisation and Crisis in Post-War 
Sri Lanka’, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 48, No. 35, http://www.epw.in/web-
exclusives/second-wave-neoliberalism-financialisation-and-crisis-post-war-sri-lanka.html, 
accessed 16-11-2013. 
7 ‘Sri Lanka’s Tsunami Aid: Over $1 Billion Missing or Misappropriated’ (2009). 
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local development, even within current constraints, there would be more progress 
than could be achieved by simply relying on central government. This study, 
therefore, pays particular attention to the involvement of NGOs at the local level 
by investigating their contributions to local government and local development. 
The central research question is: 
How are NGOs working in the Sri Lankan context able to contribute to building 
the capabilities and capacities of local government as they support local 
development and as they seek to respond to the needs of local communities? 
Given their ability and potential to address the needs at the local level, this study 
argues that NGOs are able to make a significant contribution to local government 
and to local development. The study identifies the possibilities of NGO 
involvement and their contribution to local government and local development in 
Sri Lanka. The study, therefore, covers two major areas: Sri Lankan local 
government, and NGO involvement in and contribution to, Sri Lanka. The study 
explores the ways in which local government and local development in Sri Lanka 
can be promoted with support from NGOs. 
1.2. Rationale 
There is very little literature on Sri Lankan local government. Other than the 
reports of local government reform commissions and committees, the literature on 
Sri Lankan local government is limited. The same can be said for literature on 
NGOs and their role and effectiveness in Sri Lanka. Part of the difficulty in 
studying NGOs in the Sri Lankan context arises from the inconsistent use of the 
term, and this has led to unclear data about the growth of NGOs and their activity. 
Although a number of Sri Lankan authors have attempted to discuss this field8 in 
their enquiries, those studies are limited. The gap in the literature is a major 
reason for this topic. The thesis, therefore, contributes by filling these gaps in the 
scholarship on Sri Lankan local government and NGO involvement, and in 
clarifying the activities of NGOs in the Sri Lankan context. 
8 See Fernando, L. (2003) ‘Local Governance in the Uva Province: Monaragala Pradeshiya Sabha’ 
and Thangarajah, Y. (2003) ‘Local Governance in the Eastern Province: Kaluvanchikudy 
Pradeshiya Sabha & Kattankudy Urban Council’, Local Governance and Conflict Management in 
Sri Lanka-Final Report, Sri Lanka Institute of Local Governance and Berghof Foundation for 
Conflict Studies and Leitan, G.R.T. (2001) ‘Sri Lanka’s Institutions of Local Governance: Their 
Present Status and Possibilities for the Future’, Governance, No. 1, Vol. 1, Sri Lanka Institute of 
Local Governance, Colombo-07. 
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The thesis is also motivated by a concern to examine the accuracy of criticisms by 
anti-colonial nationalist critics of NGO activity, especially foreign-originated and 
foreign-funded NGOs that work in Sri Lanka. These critics have portrayed NGOs 
as imperial agents who continue Western colonial influences in Sri Lanka.9 The 
interesting point here is that the same nationalist groups which have supported 
ruling governments, protested and are still protesting against the decentralisation 
of power. This thesis examines the roots of these anti-colonial criticisms and 
examines whether they represent a genuine refutation of foreign aid, NGO 
involvement and decentralisation, or whether they voice the hidden agendas of 
political actors. The thesis, therefore, reveals insights around the Sri Lankan 
policy debate on decentralisation, local government reform and NGO involvement. 
A further reason for this study originates from the background and interests of this 
researcher. Being raised in a rural community in Sri Lanka led the writer to 
experience first-hand and observe the many difficulties facing communities. 
While years have passed, and governments changed, the situation in rural 
communities and the lives of the people have not improved. People have voted 
during elections but they do not seem to have looked back to determine whether 
their political representatives have addressed their needs. The links between the 
government, especially local government, and the people have remained weak. 
The opportunities to study and teach in the University of Colombo in the capital 
city of Sri Lanka, and then to teach in the University of Ruhuna in the southern 
province provided a means of experiencing the differences between the people 
who live in cities and those who live in villages. Despite where they live, large 
parts of the Sri Lankan population have been neglected and their needs have gone 
unaddressed by successive governments. 
Working as a researcher in a tsunami housing support project conducted by the 
well-known German organisation (GTZ) provided this writer with the opportunity 
to identify the capacities, abilities and potential of foreign aid, and foreign-
originated and foreign-funded NGOs to make a positive change for the many Sri 
Lankan people. At the local level the attitudes of people have been very positive 
to the foreign aid and toward the personnel in the field. Opportunities to visit 
9 See Uyangoda, J. (1995) ‘NGOs, Hate Politics and Questions of Democracy’ and Jayawardena, 
K. (1995) ‘The NGO Bogey’, Pravada, Vol. 4, No. 5 & 6 (December/January) Social Scientists’ 
Association, Colombo. 
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many tsunami and war-affected areas in Sri Lanka and to talk with people who 
experienced the consequences of the tsunami and the war have proved 
advantageous to this study. Many large scale construction projects were taking 
place in these areas, and people voiced complaints about the way they had been 
neglected by central, provincial and local governments while these projects were 
being pursued. This raised questions in the writer’s mind about the outcomes of 
central government’s large scale projects which were conducted under the name 
of ‘development’. It was evident to the writer that the actual needs of the people in 
these areas were not being addressed and that many were made much worse off as 
a result of the big ‘development’ being pursued by central government. 
This background maps the reasons behind this study which seeks to understand 
the ways in which the local communities have been neglected in the development 
initiatives in Sri Lanka and why this has happened. The study seeks to identify 
how to address the needs of the people who have been disadvantaged, 
underprivileged and neglected, and to assess the contribution NGOs make to 
improving local development and providing support for local government in 
building its capacity to act effectively and contribute. 
1.3. Objectives 
Prior to 1980, as will be discussed in detail in chapter 5, local government bodies 
in Sri Lanka were comprised of municipal councils, urban councils, town councils 
and village councils. When the town councils and village councils were abolished 
in 1980 to establish district-based development councils, 85 per cent of the Sri 
Lankan population lost their local level political representation. 10  Although 
Pradeshiya Sabhas were later established as representative bodies, 85 per cent of 
the Sri Lankan population lives in rural areas and only 15 per cent in urban areas. 
There is no doubt that this major rural population has the potential to play a 
decisive role in the election of governments, but they have been politically 
neglected. This population is more likely to suffer from poverty11 and a lack of 
facilities in health, sanitation, education, water, electricity, transport, access to 
free media, means of income generation and many others. The first objective of 
10 Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Local Government Reforms 1999 (Sessional Paper No. I 
– 1999) pp. 19-20. 
11 Bandara, W.M.A. (1997) ‘Rural Poverty in Sri Lanka’, 
http://www.unescap.org/rural/doc/beijing_march97/sri_lanka.PDF, accessed 15-11-2013. 
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this study, therefore, is to establish how and why the rural population has been 
neglected. 
Throughout its history, several proposals and commissioned reports have aimed to 
introduce decentralisation and local government reforms to Sri Lanka but they 
have not been fully implemented. This has resulted in the weakening of local 
government bodies’ capabilities and capacities and the strengthening of 
centralisation. The second objective of this study is to determine why these 
proposed reforms have not been implemented. 
The third objective of this study is to determine the views of the respondents – 
national, provincial and local political representatives and administrative officials, 
officials attached to NGOs, and the representatives of community-based 
organisations (CBOs). In this way the practical reality of local development and 
the potential for NGOs to provide solutions will be assessed. 
This study maps the current local government in Sri Lanka in terms of its powers 
and functions, funding and staffing, and its politico-administrative relations 
through assessing the views and proposals of the respondents. Here the aim is to 
investigate and compare the legal procedures and their practical implementation in 
the field of local government. This is the fourth objective of this study. 
This study mainly focuses on the NGO contribution at the local level towards 
supporting local development and responding to the needs of local communities. 
The study’s fifth objective is to assess the views of officials attached to NGOs 
regarding their involvement and contributions, given the views of political 
representatives and administrative officials on completed and on-going NGO 
projects, examine the local level effects of such projects. 
Where NGOs can directly connect with the local level, especially with local 
government and local communities, there will be a positive contribution to local 
development. The sixth objective is to outline the ways in which local government 
has been, and can be, connected to NGOs and people in ways which promote local 
government and local development. 
1.4. Chapter organisation 
In examining how and why local communities have been neglected in the Sri 
Lankan development initiatives, and in assessing the actual and potential 
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contribution of NGOs to local government in Sri Lanka, this thesis consists of the 
following substantive chapters. 
Chapter 2 reviews the literature on post-colonialism with particular reference to 
Sri Lanka, government-NGO relations, and the interactions of NGOs in policy 
processes. The chapter presents a multiple theoretical framework related to post-
colonial situations and the impact of NGOs on local government and local 
development, and outlines a series of hypotheses and issues derived from the 
literature. With its long history of colonialism many of the remnants of colonial 
structures are to be found in the Sri Lankan political and administrative system. 
Despite the more than six decades which have passed since decolonisation, the 
Sinhala nationalist parties and groups in particular remain critical of foreign aid 
and NGOs as colonial influences. Whether post-colonial criticisms are able, in the 
21st century, to continue to identify and explain the complexities of former 
colonies requires a review of the literature in order to understand the complexities 
of post-colonial Sri Lankan society, and in terms of investigating to what extent 
the post-colonial criticisms can explain Sri Lanka’s contemporary problems and 
issues.  
The literature on government-NGO relations is reviewed to investigate the ways 
in which there has been collaboration and conflict between governments and 
NGOs. Chapter 2 also reviews NGO interactions in policy processes and identifies 
these interactions as a significant part of collaborative government-NGO relations. 
This review of the literature contributes to an investigation of the abilities of 
NGOs to encourage people’s participation in local government policy processes 
and the networking of all parties at the local level. 
Chapter 3 provides an outline of the research methodology which includes four 
main components: the strategy; the conceptual framework; who or what will be 
studied; and the tools and procedures to be used for collecting and analysing data. 
Due to a number of structural complexities, drawing boundaries and limitations 
around one study area on Sri Lankan government is difficult. This study as a 
single case study selects Sri Lankan local government, with its many 
interconnecting and interdepending phenomena, and examines its nature, powers, 
functions, capacities, trends, problems and potentials. It analyses and reviews the 
relevant literature and conducts interviews with a range of respondents at the 
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national, provincial and local levels of government. The study selects a range of 
foreign-funded projects at the local level to investigate the capacity, ability and 
potential of NGOs to promote local government and local development in Sri 
Lanka. 
The methodology uses the mixed method approach and draws mainly on 
qualitative methods. Within the single case study of local government there are 
two embedded units, the southern and the eastern provincial councils. Interviews, 
observations, documents and archives are data sources for this study. To examine 
the central research question, and investigate the applicability of theories, both 
deductive and inductive reasoning are used in the research data analysis and for 
testing the hypotheses. 
Chapter 4 discusses the history and political development in Sri Lanka outlining 
the constitutional evolution, development of political parties and the emergence of 
political leaders. This chapter closely scrutinises the extent to which such 
developments have been linked with ethnic divisions and conflicts in the country. 
The chapter also outlines the politics of decentralisation and the link between 
those processes and ethnic conflict. This chapter investigates the roots of the 
present socio-cultural and politico-economic issues in Sri Lanka and considers 
whether such problems are the results of colonialism or whether they have arisen 
more recently through the policies of post-independence governments and 
political leaders. 
Chapter 5 extends the discussion in chapter 4, and examines the particular history 
and development of local government in Sri Lanka. The chapter analyses the 
decentralisation process highlighting its connection with proposed local 
government reforms. This chapter investigates the reasons for the non-
implementation of proposals on decentralisation and local government reform, 
and highlights the centralising tendencies of governments and political leaders. 
The complications of the overlapping legal procedures related to political and 
administrative bodies at the local level are also analysed in this chapter. The 
chapter provides a background to understand the present situation affecting local 
government and seeks to establish whether inherent complexities have led to the 
strengthening of centralised power structures. 
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Chapter 6 sets out to review the history of NGO involvement in the country. It 
discusses the ambiguities related to the term ‘NGOs’ in the Sri Lankan context, 
and identifies reasons for the lack of clarity about NGO data and assesses the 
implications of the different forms of relations between NGOs and the Sri Lankan 
government. This chapter explores the criticisms of Sinhala nationalist parties and 
groups that have portrayed NGOs as imperial agents. The views of the respondent 
officials attached to NGOs regarding government-NGO relations are included 
providing a base for the analysis presented in subsequent chapters. 
Chapters 7, 8 and 9 present the research data and analyse the views of the 
respondents. Chapter 7 presents the perspectives of respondents on local 
development and people’s participation, and investigates the ways in which local 
government is affected by national and provincial politics. This chapter 
investigates differences in the ways in which central government and local 
government identify development, and looks at how the results of central 
government-controlled large scale construction projects affect the local people. 
People’s participation in local policy processes is identified and the methods local 
government uses in promoting such participation are examined. 
Chapter 8 outlines a number of problems in Sri Lankan local government and 
assesses the proposals put forward by respondents for solutions.  It explores the 
differences between the proposals of national and local level respondents. Finally 
the chapter investigates ways to address local level problems and the potential of 
NGOs to provide solutions. 
Chapter 9 analyses a number of NGO projects at the local level, examining the 
features of NGO involvement and their contribution to local government and to 
local development in Sri Lanka. These projects are assessed in terms of the ways 
in which the NGOs are involved at the local level, whether their project aims 
match local needs, and to what extent such aims have been fulfilled. This chapter 
identifies as a special issue the large amounts of foreign aid and significant 
support from NGOs which flowed into Sri Lanka to assist in recovery in the post-
tsunami and post-war situations. The chapter explores how the effects of this 
support have shaped the Sri Lankan government’s behaviour toward foreign aid 
and NGOs. The chapter investigates NGO involvement at the local level, and 
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highlights collaborative local government-NGO relations which support and 
promote local development. 
Chapter 10 concludes by drawing together the literature and research data 
providing an overall analysis centred on exploring the hypotheses in light of the 
conclusions derived from the data. It also assesses the contribution being made, 
and which is still to be made, of NGOs in serving to strengthen and enhance local 
government’s role in addressing the needs of communities and promoting 
effective local development. 
As will be discussed in the following chapters, it is clear that certain legal powers 
have been allocated to local government in Sri Lanka by several legislative 
documents. But it is also clear that such powers are not exercised for various 
reasons. First, the extensive centralised powers of the central government prevents 
local government from acting as a self-governing body. Second, most local 
government representatives do not have sufficient knowledge about their powers. 
Third, local government lacks the capabilities, capacities and resources to enhance 
local development towards responding to the needs of local communities. This 
research finds that NGOs have the knowledge and resources to build the 
capabilities and capacities of local government to support local development.  
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Chapter 2 
Literature review and hypotheses 
2.1. Introduction 
Sri Lankan politics occur within the context of a unitary state structure where 
power is concentrated at the centre. Local and provincial government bodies have 
long been dominated by central government controls. Decentralisation proposals 
and local government reforms have not been supported or implemented due to the 
influence on successive government of the nationalists.12 As will be discussed in 
chapter 6, NGOs within Sri Lanka have tended to be viewed by nationalists as 
imperial agents and threats to the sovereignty of the country. Therefore, in the 
contemporary Sri Lankan setting, the role played by NGOs in promoting social 
and economic development is both political and controversial. 
After the tsunami disaster of December 2004, and with the end of war13 in May 
2009, large amounts of foreign aid flowed into Sri Lanka for relief, reconstruction 
and rehabilitation. With central government overseeing the administration of this 
aid, its role in controlling the direction of social and economic development has 
increased significantly, while provincial and local government have had less 
influence. The aid, resources and technologies of the NGOs have typically been 
used for the government’s large scale construction projects14 under the name of 
12 Some authors such as Uyangoda, Kloos and Jayawardena use the term ‘chauvinists’ for these 
nationalists (see Uyangoda, J. (1995) ‘NGOs, Hate Politics and Questions of Democracy’, 
Pravada, Vol. 4, No. 5 & 6 (December/January) Social Scientists’ Association, Colombo; Kloos, 
P. (1999) The Sri Lankan Government and the NGO’s: An Ambivalent Relationship, Vrije 
Universiteit, Amsterdam; and Jayawardena, K. (1995) ‘The NGO Bogey’, Pravada, Vol. 4, No. 5 
& 6 (December/January) Social Scientists’ Association, Colombo). Other authors such as Walton 
call them hard line nationalists (see Walton, O. (2008) ‘Conflict, Peacebuilding and NGO 
Legitimacy: National NGOs in Sri Lanka’, Conflict, Security & Development, Vol. 8, No. 1, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14678800801977146, accessed 27-05-2011). In some of his writings 
Uyangoda also calls them hard line nationalists (see Uyangoda, J. (2010) ‘Sri Lanka Post the 
LTTE’, http://www.india-seminar.com/2010/605/605_jayadeva_uyangoda.htm, accessed 27-03-
2012). In this research, such nationalists are referred to as anti-colonial, Sinhala, or Tamil 
nationalists. 
13 The war between the government forces and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 
lasted nearly 30 years in Sri Lanka and ended in 2009 with victory to the government. 
14 Large scale construction projects include the reconstruction and infrastructure development 
projects such as roads, highways, bridges, airports, harbours, government buildings, tourist hotels, 
factories, and sports complexes. These projects are mostly foreign-funded and controlled fully or 
partly by the central government. 
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‘reconstruction and infrastructure development projects’. As this has happened the 
aspirations and needs of the local communities have been neglected.15 
As will be outlined later, despite these centralising tendencies, NGOs have played 
an important role in supporting local government and local development16 and 
have influenced central government decisions on local policy, supporting the 
implementation of local policy effectively, and encouraging people’s participation 
in the local policy process. Although the role of NGOs has not been highlighted as 
a major issue in the literature, their involvement in local government and their 
contribution in local development indicate their potential role working as 
intermediaries to promote effective local governance. 
Given the limitations imposed on local government and NGOs by central 
government in Sri Lanka, questions arise about the actual and potential 
contribution of NGOs to local government and to local development. This 
concerns questions about whether local communities have been neglected in 
development initiatives in Sri Lanka, and if so, why. In the post-colonial context 
in Sri Lanka, where NGOs play an important role in supporting development 
initiatives, questions arise about the role of NGOs and their potential to act as 
facilitators of local development. This includes questions about whether such 
actors can strengthen local policy processes by encouraging people’s participation, 
and the extent to which they can collaborate with local government bodies in 
designing local policies and programmes. Additionally, within the context of a 
country where central government has been the dominant level of administration 
in the post-independence era, there are questions about whether NGOs can act 
effectively as intermediaries in networking between national, provincial and local 
levels of government, and communities. In exploring these questions, this study 
contributes to understanding the roles of NGOs in local government and local 
development in Sri Lanka. This chapter reviews theories 17  related to local 
15 See ‘Tsunami Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Programme’ (n.d.) http://www.acdi-
cida.gc.ca/acdi-cida/ACDI-CIDA.nsf/eng/NAT-215111822-M5J, accessed 21-06-2013. 
16 In this research, the term ‘local development’ refers to locally-led, community-oriented 
development. This development strategy addresses the needs of local communities and stresses the 
development of human resources over physical infrastructure (Kleymeyer, C.D. (ed) (1994) 
Cultural Expression and Grassroots Development: Cases from Latin America and the Caribbean, 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, London, pp. 4-6). Issues related to local development in the Sri Lankan 
context are discussed in chapter 7. 
17 Waltz defines theory as a picture, mentally formed, of a bounded realm or domain of activity. A 
theory depicts the organisation of a realm and the connections among its parts. The infinite 
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government and the role of NGOs with the potential to inform the approach to 
answering these questions. 
No single theory explains all of the issues related to local government and the role 
of NGOs. This chapter, therefore, reviews a group of theories related to post-
colonial situations and assesses the impact of NGOs on local government and 
local development. In so doing, it draws on a multiple theoretical base. According 
to Sabatier, using multiple theories provides advantages,18 particularly in terms of 
enhancing knowledge of theories and their application in empirical research.19 
The chapter, first, examines the literature on post-colonialism, neo-colonialism 
and NGOs, government-NGO relations, and the policy process and the 
interactions of NGOs. It, therefore, starts with an historical colonial background 
and moves to contemporary issues related to government, NGOs and the policy 
process. The chapter concludes by outlining a series of hypotheses from this 
relevant literature. 
2.2. Post-colonialism, neo-colonialism and NGOs 
The history of colonialism changed the economic, political, social and cultural 
structures of many colonised countries, leaving them with no chance of returning 
to their pre-colonial states. However this has not meant that former colonies have 
lost their old social structures or have fully adopted new colonial structures. 
Instead, many former colonised countries are left with complex arrangements, a 
hybrid of new colonial settings and old societal structures. 
materials of any realm can be organised endlessly in different ways. Reality is complex; theory is 
simple. Waltz further suggests that theory isolates one realm from all others in order to deal with it 
intellectually (Waltz, K.N. (1997) ‘Evaluating Theories’, American Political Science Review, Vol. 
91, No. 4, American Political Science Association, p. 913). Theories are needed in answering 
questions however theories always are simplifications of reality, and there is no reason to suggest 
that there are domains or disciplines that a priori demand a specific theory. The boundaries of 
theory depend on the assumptions the theorist makes. Theories which deal with more or less the 
same issues can be considered to form a discipline – yet there will always be borderline cases, 
questions that can only be answered by integrating theories pertaining to different disciplines 
(Weenink, A. (2001) ‘The Relevance of Being Important or the Importance of Being Relevant? 
State and Non-State Actors in International Relations Theory’, in B. Arts; M. Noortmann and B. 
Reinalda (eds) Non-State Actors in International Relations, Ashgate Publishing Limited, England, 
pp. 83, 90). These ideas indicate the problematic of applying such theories. 
18 The advantages of using multiple theories are, first, that this provides some guarantee against 
assuming that a particular theory is the valid one. Second, it leads to an appreciation that different 
theories may have comparative advantages in different settings. Third, knowing other theories 
makes one more sensitive to some of the implicit assumptions in one’s favoured theory. (Sabatier, 
P.A. (1999) ‘Fostering the Development of Policy Theory’, in P.A. Sabatier (ed) Theories of the 
Policy Process, Westview Press, UK, p. 270). 
19 Ibid. 
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Sri Lanka has been under Portuguese, Dutch and British colonial rule for more 
than four centuries. As will be outlined in later chapters, Sri Lankan pre-colonial 
society was characterised by much complexity, arising from the many different 
ethnic, religious and caste systems and the existence of many related cultures. 
When colonial social and political structures were introduced into this 
environment, the complexities associated with governing only increased. For 
example, when the colonial rulers promoted Western religions, a considerable 
number of Buddhist and Hindu adherents converted to Christianity, while those 
who remained as Buddhists imitated the new Protestant system of education and 
started Buddhist schools aimed at competing with Catholic schools. It was within 
the context of such complexities that colonial administrative and governing 
structures were established and the traditional society transformed. 
Following independence in 1948, the ruling power shifted from colonial masters 
to post-colonial rulers who have since been faced with the need to address the 
enduring complexities resulting from the history of colonialism. The multiple 
layers of colonial and pre-colonial social, political and economic structures have 
left post-independence rulers facing many difficulties. For example, with the 
British education system and the temple-based, ancient Buddhist education system 
(Piriven), both have remained and co-exist. Alongside the British-based system of 
administration and government, ethnic, religious, caste and social class hierarchies 
have remained. Additionally, alongside an export-oriented economy designed to 
meet the needs of former colonial powers, the pre-colonial, traditional agricultural 
system remains. And while the indigenous cultures have been combined with and 
influenced by Western culture, those cultures have not been demonstrably altered. 
There is a significant connection between the complexities of post-colonial Sri 
Lanka and the growing role of NGOs. As will be discussed in subsequent chapters, 
most post-independence rulers have been unable to address the complexities of 
government effectively. The inability of post-independence rulers in Sri Lanka to 
govern effectively and promote positive development has been interpreted by anti-
colonial nationalists as a consequence of the earlier period of colonialism. A 
complicating factor is that post-independence rulers have had to continue to 
depend on former colonial masters, especially in the area of the economy. This 
dependency has provided a path for NGOs to become involved in the 
development problems facing Sri Lanka. 
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The growing involvement of NGOs, however, has also been criticised by anti-
colonial nationalists in Sri Lanka. Some of their arguments can be found in post-
colonial theory. Moreover, post-colonial theory offers a set of ideas that help 
identify and explain the difficulties of governing in a post-independence 
environment. Due to its relevance to this study, this section reviews post-colonial 
theory and the concepts of post-colonialism and neo-colonialism. The section 
provides an outline of the contending approaches to understanding such concepts. 
2.2.1. Addressing post-colonial complexities 
The term ‘post-colonial’ refers to a period after the end of colonialism and the 
experiences of countries formerly under the control of the Western/European 
colonial powers. It focuses on the impact of colonial acquisition and control20 
over resources, territories and cultures. For Moore-Gilbert, post-colonial societies, 
cultural formations and movements emerge at different times, in different forms 
and in different places around the globe. Therefore, to refer to the post-colonial is 
to recognise heterogeneity. As colonialism has taken many forms and has many 
histories, decolonisation has been similarly multiform and complex.21 
In another way, post-colonial is a dialectical concept that marks the broad 
historical facts of decolonisation and the determined achievement of sovereignty, 
but also highlights the realities of nations and peoples entering into a new 
imperialistic context of economic, and sometimes, political domination.22 Young 
further notes that the experience of that new sovereignty typically encouraged the 
development of a post-colonial culture which radically revised the ethos and 
ideologies of the colonial state and, at the same time, re-oriented the goals of the 
independence movement towards the very different conditions of national 
autonomy. Post-colonial also specifies a transformed historical situation, and the 
cultural formations that have arisen in response to changed political circumstances, 
in the former colonial power.23 Therefore, it identifies that there is a continuation 
of colonialism, albeit through different or new politico-economic, socio-cultural 
20 Childs, P. and Williams, P.R.J. (1997) An Introduction to Post-Colonial Theory, Prentice Hall, 
London, pp. 1, 10. 
21 Moore-Gilbert, B. (1997) Postcolonial Theory: Contexts, Practices, Politics, Verso, New York, 
p. 203. 
22 Young, R.J.C. (2001) Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction, Blackwell Publishers, UK, p. 
57. 
23 Ibid. 
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relationships of the former colonies. The key points that emerge from the post-
colonial literature reveal it is used to explain both past and present consequences 
of colonialism and the complex societal needs and structures of former colonies. 
Post-colonial theory seeks to understand and explain these post-colonial situations. 
For Ashcroft, post-colonial theory was never conceived of as a grand theory but as 
a methodology: first, for analysing the many strategies by which colonised 
societies have engaged imperial discourse; and second, for studying the ways in 
which many of those strategies are shared by colonised societies, re-emerging in 
very different political and cultural circumstances. 24  For Prasad, post-colonial 
theory and criticism represents an attempt to investigate the complex and deeply 
fraught dynamics of modern Western colonialism and anti-colonial resistance, and 
the on-going significance of the colonial encounter for people’s lives both in the 
West and elsewhere.25 According to Rukundwa and Aarde, post-colonial theory 
formulates its critique around the social histories, cultural differences and the 
political discrimination practised and normalised by colonial and imperial 
machineries.26 
Young notes that post-colonial theory constitutes a body of knowledge that can be 
deployed against the political and cultural hegemony of the West. It offers a way 
to explain, and challenge, the ideological heritage of colonialism not only in the 
decolonised countries, but also in the West itself.27 Post-colonial theory provides a 
framework which encourages former colonies to utilise, strengthen and develop 
the resources of their own histories and political and intellectual traditions.28 As 
Young argues, post-colonial theory involves a conceptual re-orientation towards 
the perspectives of knowledge, as well as needs, developed outside the West.29 He 
observes that when national sovereignty or independence was finally achieved, 
countries moved from colonial to apparently autonomous, post-colonial status. In 
many ways, however, this represented only a beginning, a relatively minor move 
24 Ashcroft, B. (2001) Post-Colonial Transformation, Routledge, London, p. 7. 
25 Prasad, A. (2003) ‘The Gaze of the Other: Postcolonial Theory and Organizational Analysis’, in 
A. Prasad (ed) Postcolonial Theory and Organizational Analysis: A Critical Engagement, 
Palgrave Macmillan, New York, p. 5. 
26 Rukundwa, L.S. and Aarde, A.G. (n.d.) ‘The Formation of Postcolonial Theory’, 
http://www.ajol.info/index.php/hts/article/viewfile/41235/8623, accessed 16-04-2012. 
27 Young, (2001), p. 65. 
28 Ibid., p. 66. 
29 Young, R.J.C. (2003) Postcolonialism: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford University Press, 
New York, p. 6. 
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from direct to indirect rule, a shift from colonial rule and domination to a position, 
not so much of independence, as in-dependence.30 Post-colonial theory recognises, 
therefore, that although formerly colonised territories gained their political 
sovereignty, they remained subject to the effective control of the major world 
powers, which constituted the same group as the former imperial powers.31 
Sharp observes that this dependency is evident in the way former colonial masters 
homogenised former colonies under an umbrella label such as the ‘Third 
World’. 32  Post-colonialism, therefore, tends to be associated with third world 
countries33 which gained independence after the 2nd World War.34 The majority of 
the world’s population live in the third world countries, with their relatively low 
per-capita incomes, high rates of illiteracy, limited development of industry, 
agriculture-based economies, short life expectancies, low degrees of social 
mobility, and unstable political structures. Due to these characteristics, third world 
countries have also been called developing, underdeveloped or less developed 
countries. Many third world countries have subsequently come to depend more on 
foreign aid, with such aid being regarded as necessary to help kick start 
industrialisation and economic growth in these countries. 35  Such economic 
dependency on international organisations (IOs) and on former colonial powers 
has been identified by neo-colonial critics as a new form of colonialism. Some, 
such as Slemon, argue that nothing has really changed through decolonisation. 
Slemon describes this political condition in which the old regulatory practices of 
direct colonialism are continued by new forms of foreign domination and 
manifested by the manipulation of national economies through the production and 
30 Ibid., p. 3. 
31 Young, (2001), p. 45. 
32 Sharp, J.P. (2009) Geographies of Postcolonialism, Sage Publications, London, pp. 109-132. 
33 Third world countries always had many more divergences than similarities in their historical, 
cultural, demographic and geographic issues. Equally they had great variations in their capacities, 
attitudes, customs, living standards, and levels of modernisation. This was the key reason for the 
heterogeneity and unevenness of post-colonialism. During the cold war these countries were seen 
as potential allies by both the first and second worlds. They received economic and military 
support offered by the capitalist United States and the socialist Soviet Union. By the end of the 
cold war, many third world countries had adopted capitalist or communist economic models and 
continued to receive support from the side they had chosen (‘Third World – Origins, Theories of 
“Third World” Development, the Future of the Third World, Bibliography’ (n.d.) 
http://science.jrank.org/pages/8117/Third-World.html, accessed 05-04-2012). 
34 Shohat, E. (1992) ‘Notes on the “Post-Colonial”’, Social Text, No. 31/32 (Third World and Post-
Colonial Issues) Duke University Press, p. 102 (http://www.jstor.org/stable/466220, accessed 23-
09-2012). 
35 Mehmet, O. (1999) Westernizing the Third World: the Eurocentricity of Economic Development 
Theories, Routledge, New York, pp. 1-3. 
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administration of ‘Third World debt’. Kwame Nkrumah, the first President of 
independent Ghana, coined the term “neo-colonialism”36 to capture this process.37 
Young argues that neo-colonialism denotes a continuing economic hegemony that 
means that the post-colonial state remains in a situation of dependence on its 
former masters, and that the former masters continue to act in a colonialist manner 
towards formerly colonised states.38 
The critique of neo-colonialism which focuses on aid programmes, argues that the 
economic object of neo-colonialism has been to keep the living standards of the 
less developed countries depressed in the interests of the colonial masters. 
Moreover, the critique sees international aid and NGOs in the third world 
countries as forms of colonialism. For Nkrumah, neo-colonialism is the use of 
foreign capital to sustain the economic exploitation of former colonies rather than 
for the development of the less developed parts of the world.39 In this way, ‘aid’ 
to a former colony is merely a form of revolving credit, paid by the neo-colonial 
master, passing through the neo-colonial state and returning to the neo-colonial 
master in the form of increased profits.40 Nkrumah also draws attention to the way 
such processes of exploitation are evident in the control of technology; the 
increasing number of often unsupervised NGOs, frequently funded by US 
foundations; pressures for population control; the relocation of production so as to 
escape Western environmental controls; the targeting of third world countries for 
the export not of surplus Western consumer production, but of products regarded 
as unhealthy or more risky than the natural alternative – such as cigarettes and 
36 The colonial powers were still intent on maintaining maximum indirect control over erstwhile 
colonies, via political, cultural and above all economic channels, a phenomenon which became 
known as neo-colonialism (Childs and Williams, (1997), p. 5). Neo-colonialism is a term that 
came into use after the period of decolonisation – a period that began during the middle of the last 
century and, within a few decades, led to the formal political independence of almost all of the 
erstwhile colonies of Europe. The achievement of political independence marked an important 
victory for the various anti-colonial movements waged in the non-West. However, these newly 
independent countries found that, despite political independence, they continued to be 
economically dependent on their ex-colonial masters because of the far-reaching restructuring of 
their economies during the colonial era. Such continued economic dependence of the ex-colonies 
implied that their formal independence was often of only somewhat limited political value. Neo-
colonialism is a term that refers to the continuation of Western colonialism by non-traditional 
means. Frequently, neo-colonialism is seen as having not only economic and political dimensions, 
but a dimension of Western cultural control as well (Prasad, (2003), p. 6). 
37 Slemon, S. (2001) ‘Post-Colonial Critical Theories’, in G. Castle (ed) Postcolonial Discourses: 
An Anthology, Blackwell Publishers, UK, p. 102. 
38 Young, (2001), p. 45. 
39 Nkrumah, K. (1965) Neo-Colonialism, the Last Stage of Imperialism, 
http://www.marxists.org/subject/africa/nkrumah/neo-colonialism/introduction.htm, accessed 25-
10-2012. 
40 Ibid. 
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powdered baby milk – and the gross imbalance of the consumption of global 
resources between the West and the rest. 41  These criticisms of international 
involvement in former colonies, and in particular that of NGOs, raises a number 
of significant questions, such as whether injections of foreign capital leads to 
processes which result in the on-going exploitation of the former colonies and, in 
turn, how the difficulties of government in post-independence contexts are related 
to the legacy of colonialism. Questions also arise as to how these relate to the 
inadequacies of post-independence political leadership and to corruption, 
nepotism, and the over-centralisation of authoritative power,42 and what role the 
provision of foreign aid plays in explaining problems in development and on-
going impoverishment in former colonies. Ensuring foreign aid is delivered so 
that it does not hinder development is another issue. 
In addressing the balance of payment problems experienced by third world 
countries, the development of IOs such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and World Bank (WB) have sought to promote the survival of vulnerable 
economies. 43  The IMF and WB policies under the structural adjustment 
programmes (SAPs) of the 1980s and 1990s involved providing loans to the third 
world countries to ‘help them adjust’. However these loans were tied to strict 
conditions and only granted when the countries agreed to the adoption of a 
comprehensive programme of macro-economic ‘stabilisation’ and structural 
economic reform.44 Critics of the SAPs have emphasised the severe economic and 
social consequences of these conditions, and have suggested these interventions 
by IOs further exemplifies a new form of colonialism.45 This leads to questions 
about the nature of the impact of such interventions by NGOs and the extent to 
which they represent new forms of colonialism, and about how post-independence 
rulers have responded to these types of conditions. The interest is in whether they 
41 Cited in Young, (2001), p. 48. 
42 See Korten, D.C. (1990) Getting to the 21st Century: Voluntary Action and the Global Agenda, 
Kumarian Press, USA, pp. 50-52. 
43 In the midst of the 2nd World War, the Bretton Woods system of monetary management 
established the rules for commercial and financial relations among the world’s major industrial 
states. This system was the first example of a fully negotiated monetary order intended to govern 
monetary relations among newly independent nation-states.  
44 Sarkar, A.K. (ed) (2008) NGOs and Globalization: Developmental and Organizational Facets, 
Rawat Publications, India, p. 9. 
45 See Lugalla, J.L.P. (2005) ‘Globalization and Structural Adjustments in Sub-Saharan Africa (A 
New Dimension of Neo-Colonialism)’, 
http://www.unh.edu/discovery/sites/unh.edu.discovery/files/dialogue/2005/pdf/lugalla.pdf, 
accessed 23-08-2013. 
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have led to improved forms of governance, greater protection of human rights, the 
decentralising of powers and the strengthening of democracy, or whether they 
have resulted in sustaining dysfunctional systems of government.  
It is not only IOs which are considered as the vehicles for neo-colonial processes 
by anti-colonial nationalists. NGOs which constitute the ‘Third Sector’ 46 have 
begun to play an increasing role in third world countries, mainly through various 
aid programmes. NGOs who provide aid are, however, seen by Nkrumah as a 
means by which former colonial style relationships are sustained, and this raises 
the question of whether it is possible for NGOs to serve less developed countries 
in a way that does not reinforce their dependence on former colonial powers, and 
whether NGOs are an appropriate means to reach vulnerable sections of former 
colonial societies in contexts where there is dysfunctional government. 
Neo-colonialist critics, such as Nkrumah, argue that former colonial powers are 
still responsible for the underdevelopment of former colonies. But this picture of 
third world countries has changed over the years. A significant number of Asian, 
African and South American countries, which were former colonies, have been 
able to achieve remarkable economic growth and are being referred to as part of a 
category of newly industrialised countries (NICs). 47 The category of NIC is a 
socio-economic classification applied to several countries around the world by 
political scientists and economists. NICs usually share some other common 
features such as, increased social freedoms and civil rights, a switch from 
agricultural to industrial economies, especially in the manufacturing sector, an 
increasingly open-market economy, allowing free trade with other nations in the 
world, large national corporations operating in several continents, strong capital 
investment from foreign countries, political leadership in their area of influence, 
and rapid growth of urban centres and population.48 For NICs, colonialism is not 
the barrier it was earlier as former colonies pursue development. The experience 
of these countries raises the question of whether the historical experience of 
colonialism is a barrier to development as implied by post-colonial theory. 
46 Sarkar, (2008), p. 8. 
47 For examples, from Asia, Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, China, India, Malaysia, 
Philippines and Thailand; from Africa, South Africa; and from South America, Brazil have been 
identified as NICs. 
48 See Bozyk, P. (2006) Globalization and the Transformation of Foreign Economic Policy, 
Ashgate Publishing Limited, England. 
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Post-colonial theory points to the more pressing and difficult issues involved in 
the West’s current dealings with formerly colonised regions. 49  It tends not, 
therefore, to identify productive and positive aspects of the relationships between 
former colonies and colonising powers. It is clear that post-colonial theory 
provides a background to identify and explain complexities of the post-colonial 
third world societies. But it also draws a negative picture of Western influences on 
former colonies which leads to the question of whether post-colonial and neo-
colonial criticisms are able to capture the positive influence of former colonial 
powers in addressing the complexities of the former colonies through NGOs. 
Within the context of addressing these questions that emerge from this brief 
review of post-colonial literature, and in recognition of the complexities of 
governing in post-colonial Sri Lankan society, this research seeks to understand 
the potential for NGOs to contribute to positive development. The next section 
reviews literature that has examined government-NGO relations. 
2.3. Government-NGO relations 
The capacities of NGOs to contribute towards effective governance in post-
colonial third world societies has been widely discussed with critical scholars 
arguing that they do represent a new form of imperial agency and constitute a new 
form of colonialism,50 with a tendency to undermine the sovereignty of the state.  
Many of these critiques are based on the relations between governments and 
NGOs. While some governments are found to collaborate effectively with NGOs 
in the pursuit of socio-economic development, others are more wary of the 
implication that NGO involvement suggests governments are neglecting their 
responsibilities. Still others are found to try to control the way NGOs administer 
foreign aid, and seek to direct that in a way that reflects favourably on the 
government. Against this background, government-NGO relations can be seen to 
take various forms, both within countries over time, and across countries.51 
49 Moore-Gilbert, (1997), p. 156. 
50 Lewis, D. and Opoku-Mensah, P. (2006) ‘Policy Arena: Moving Forward Research Agendas on 
International NGOs: Theory, Agency and Context’, Journal of International Development, Vol. 18, 
pp. 668, 670 (www.interscience.wiley.com, accessed 01-10-2012). 
51 See Appadurai, A. (2003) ‘Grassroots Globalization and the Research Imagination’, in A. 
Appadurai (ed) Globalization, Duke University Press, London. 
21 
 
                                                 
NGO involvement and government responses have taken many forms over time52 
in different situations and different policy areas in Sri Lanka. Sri Lankan society 
is complex, and after more than six decades of independence it has continued to 
have many problems leading to and resulting in internal conflict and political 
disorder. Over this period, ethnic conflict has been an important driver of state 
policy. During and in the immediate aftermath of the recently-ended war, which 
had consumed the full attention of the central government, the needs of local 
communities were basically neglected. 53 In this context, attempts by NGOs to 
support the war-affected people and local communities, including encouraging 
their participation in local policy processes, has been significant. 54  The post-
tsunami and post-war environments, therefore, have opened new and additional 
opportunities for NGO involvement in the country. As will be outlined later, some 
of these attempts have been criticised by anti-colonial nationalists as continuing 
imperial-like influences on Sri Lanka.  
The central research question concerns the contribution of NGOs to local 
government and to local development in Sri Lanka. In the context that central 
government plays a dominant role, NGOs have not been encouraged to become 
involved in local government and local development. The following section 
reviews research on government-NGO relations and the significance of NGO 
involvement in post-colonial third world societies. 
2.3.1. Governments and NGOs: conflicts and collaborations 
The relations between governments and NGOs are sometimes conflictual and 
sometimes collaborative. Appadurai notes: 
NGOs concerned with mobilising highly specific local, national, and regional 
groups on matters of equity, access, justice, and redistribution … have complex 
relations with the state, with the official public sphere, with international civil 
society initiatives, and with local communities. Sometimes they are 
uncomfortably complicit with the policies of the nation-state and sometimes they 
are violently opposed to these policies. Sometimes they have grown wealthy and 
powerful enough to constitute major political forces in their own right and 
52 Wickramasinghe, N. (2001) Civil Society in Sri Lanka: New Circles of Power, Sage Publications, 
New Delhi, p. 84. 
53 ‘Economic Impacts of Sri Lanka’s Civil War’ (n.d.) 
http://www.asiaecon.org/special_articles/read_sp/12556, accessed 23-10-2013. 
54 See Perfomance-2005 & Future Plans-2006, Ministry of Provincial Councils and Local 
Government, Colombo-02 and Progress Report 2009, Future Plans 2010, Ministry of Local 
Government and Provincial Councils, Colombo-02. 
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sometimes they are weak in everything except their transparency and local 
legitimacy.55 
The above statement reflects many of the dimensions and complexities of NGOs 
and their national and international relations. The main point highlighted here is 
that the relations between government and NGOs depend on the strengths and 
weaknesses of both parties, but does not indicate why government-NGO relations 
are at times conflictual and collaborative at other times. 
According to Fitzduff and Church the fear held by some governments of losing 
control of their own agendas is one reason to exclude NGO involvement in policy 
matters. 56  Furthermore, such governments tend to be concerned that NGOs 
introduce values or working practices, such as greater consultative democracy, 
that can erode the often narrower practices of the state. Such governments fear 
that NGOs question existing rules and suggest alternatives to the habitual 
traditions of governments, and worry that they will slowly force change on the 
political system, and this often causes resistance to cooperation with NGOs.57 
Moreover, such governments fear that politically sensitive issues can be 
transmitted to the wider public through NGOs and that this can lead to political 
pressure.58 This leads some governments to put in place restrictions over NGOs. 
Bratton notes:  
Because NGO activities can involve a wide range of sensitive political actors – 
donors in the international arena, neighbouring countries in the region, and social 
groups within its own territory – a government may even come to view NGOs 
through the lens of state security. Where leaders are confident of their grip on 
power, they will not fear a populace mobilised in autonomous organisations. The 
more fragile a government’s sense of political legitimacy, the less permissive it is 
likely to be toward the institutionalisation of a strong voluntary sector. Therefore, 
the amount of space allowed to NGOs in any given country is determined first 
and foremost by political considerations rather than by any calculation of the 
contribution of NGOs to economic and social development.59  
While many government leaders express hostile attitudes to NGOs, even in 
broadly democratic societies, Willetts comments that virtually all government 
55 Appadurai, (2003), pp. 16-17. 
56 Fitzduff, M. and Church, C. (2004) ‘Stepping up to the Table: NGO Strategies for Influencing 
Policy on Conflict Issues’, in M. Fitzduff and C. Church (eds) NGOs at the Table: Strategies for 
Influencing Policies in Areas of Conflict, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, pp. 9-10. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid., p. 10. 
59 Bratton, M. (1989) ‘The Politics of Government-NGO Relations in Africa’, World Development, 
Vol. 17, No. 4, Pergamon Press, Great Britain, p. 576. 
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leaders, including those who have expressed hostility, will work with NGOs when 
they see them as allies in support of their current political goals.60 NGOs have to 
determine whether they can work within restrictions put on them by government, 
and work in accordance with government agendas, or whether to do so would 
undermine the NGO role in addressing actual needs at the local level. 
Pentland observes that it is the capacities NGOs bring to situations that is the basis 
of their significance to governments. A wide range of economic, social, and 
technical problems outstrip the capacities of most national governments,61 and in 
this context the capacities of NGOs to solve such problems has become significant. 
These capacities are based on resources such as expert information, finances, 
decision making capacity, popular support or legitimacy, enforcement capabilities, 
and diplomatic skills.62 According to Bratton, governments see the strength of 
NGOs as a great weakness of government, but tend to value the NGOs largely 
because of the additional flows of development capital they attract. 63  While 
reporting the issues raised in the symposium on ‘Development Alternatives: The 
Challenge for NGOs’ held in London in March 1987, Drabek points that the 
governments sometimes try to maintain control over NGOs precisely because of 
the NGOs’ access to funds.64 Fisher reports that acceptance of NGOs grew during 
the 1980s because of their capacity to deliver support and services.65 According to 
Ripinsky and Bossche, governments often lack the resources and specific 
expertise necessary and NGOs are frequently of help, increasing the resources and 
expertise available.66 
Fisher pays attention to Asia, Africa and Latin America67 claiming that narrow 
political coalitions in many countries continue to exclude the public from decision 
making. The failure of governments to even begin to meet the escalating 
60 Willetts, P. (2002) ‘What is a Non-Governmental Organization’, UNESCO Encyclopaedia of 
Life Support Systems, Oxford, UK, http://www.staff.city.ac.uk/p.willetts/CS-NTWKS/NGO-
ART.HTM#Part7, accessed 24-02-2012). 
61 Pentland, C. (1991) ‘International Organizations and Their Roles’, in R. Little and M. Smith 
(eds) Perspectives on World Politics (2nd edition) Routledge, London and New York, p. 244. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Bratton, (1989), p. 584. 
64 Drabek, A.G. (1987) ‘Development Alternatives: The Challenge for NGOs – An Overview of 
the Issues’, World Development, Vol. 15 (Supplement) Pergamon Journals Ltd., UK, p. xiv. 
65 Fisher, J. (2003) Nongovernments: NGOs and the Political Development of the Third World, 
Rawat Publications, Jaipur, p. 48. 
66 Ripinsky, S. and Bossche, P.V.D. (2007) NGO Involvement in International Organizations: A 
Legal Analysis, British Institute of International and Comparative Law, London, p. 11. 
67 Latin America refers to South America. 
24 
 
                                                 
challenges of sustainable development 68  has opened up unprecedented 
opportunities for NGOs to radically alter the way that people in most of the world 
are governed. 69 According to Meyer, Sollis and Vivian, NGOs are viewed by 
many official agencies and members of the public as more efficient and cost-
effective service providers than governments. 70 Drabek reports that NGOs are 
perceived to be able to do something that national governments cannot or will not 
do. 71  For Willis, NGOs are often regarded as the answer to the perceived 
limitations of the state. NGOs have been able to provide services for local 
communities when government assistance is not forthcoming or appropriate. 72 
Willis further notes that without NGO involvement the living conditions and 
quality of life for many people would not be improved.73 NGOs act as facilitators 
or catalysts of local development efforts.74 There is a growing interest in the rural 
development field in the role of NGOs as innovators of new technologies and 
approaches to working with the poor.75 One of the earliest examples of the pro-
NGO case is Michael Cernea’s report, written in 1988 for the WB, which cites the 
NGOs’ main contributions as strengthening local organisational capacity. He 
notes that the NGO priority on first organising the people embodies a philosophy 
that recognises the centrality of people in development policies and action 
programmes and the importance of self-organisation.76 
The role of NGOs is recognised as including the organisation of people to make 
better use of local productive resources, create new resources and services, 
promote equity, alleviate poverty and influence government actions towards these 
same objectives while establishing new institutional frameworks to sustain 
68 Sustainable development refers to a mode of human development in which resource use aims to 
meet human needs while preserving the environment so that these needs can be met not only in the 
present, but also for generations to come. It is development that meets the needs of the present 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs (United Nations 
General Assembly Resolution 42/187, 11th December 1987). 
69 Fisher, (2003), p. 30. 
70 Cited in Edwards, M. and Hulme, D. (1996) ‘Too Close for Comfort? The Impact of Official 
Aid on Nongovernmental Organizations’, World Development, Vol. 24, No. 6 (June), Elsevier Ltd., 
Amsterdam, p. 961. 
71 Drabek, (1987), p. xiii. 
72 Willis, K. (2005) Theories and Practices of Development, Routledge, London, pp. 98-100. 
73 Ibid., p. 100. 
74 Drabek, (1987), p. x. 
75 Lewis, D. (2005) ‘Individuals, Organisations and Public Action: Trajectories of the ‘Non-
governmental’ in Development Studies’, in U. Kothari (ed) A Radical History of Development 
Studies, Zed Books Ltd., London, p. 202. 
76 Cited in Lewis, D. (2001) The Management of Non-Governmental Development Organizations: 
An Introduction, Routledge, New York, p. 77. 
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people-centred development. According to Cernea, many NGOs have been found 
to possess a comparative advantage over government agencies in four main areas: 
1) NGOs reach the poor in remote areas where government assistance does 
not exist or is ineffective; 
2) NGOs operate at a lower cost due to the voluntary nature of their activities 
and lower technological overheads; 
3) NGOs promote local participation by working with community groups as 
partners emphasising self-help initiatives and local control of programmes; 
4) NGOs innovate and adapt to local conditions and needs.77 
For Lewis, Cernea’s analysis of NGOs serves as a useful benchmark.78 Kloos 
points out four reasons for government’s collaboration with NGOs: 
1) NGOs can carry out activities such as local level development and services 
with greater efficiency and more know-how than government; 
2) NGOs can carry out tasks that cannot be carried out by government for 
political reasons (for example, carrying out medical tasks in militarily 
uncleared areas); 
3) NGOs can tap foreign financial and other resources that for them are more 
easily accessible than for government;  
4) The existence of NGOs is a legitimation of government’s democratic 
intentions.79 
This literature identifies NGOs as potentially significant partners with the 
capacities to fill gaps created by government limitations and failures. Bratton 
reports from his study on Africa, that governments were organisationally ill-
equipped to deliver services and respond to needs at the rural community level. 
Centralised agencies also lacked information about, and the flexibility to adapt to, 
local conditions. As a consequence, a phalanx of NGOs with programmes in relief 
and rural development arose to fill the gaps left by governments.80 According to 
Seffrin, by focusing on specific missions and drawing on the support of local 
communities, NGOs are able to address issues that organisations in other sectors 
cannot or will not address. Despite massive investment in social programmes, 
77 Ibid. 
78 Lewis, (2001), p. 77. 
79 Kloos, (1999), pp. 25-26. 
80 Bratton, M. (1990) ‘Non-Governmental Organizations in Africa: Can They Influence Public 
Policy?’, Development and Change, Vol. 21, SAGE, London, p. 88. 
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governments have never been able to address fully the multiple needs of their 
citizens. NGOs, in other words, have emerged in large part to bridge the gap 
between what governments can do and what society needs or expects.81 
Fitzduff and Church note that the policies and programmes set up at the official 
level may have little chance of successful implementation if they are not 
adequately tailored to people’s needs at the local community level. Policy makers 
often find it difficult to access and address local needs and conditions unless these 
are established within an identifiable framework. NGOs can bring contextually 
relevant, locally sourced knowledge to the policy table which is a necessary 
dimension for successful policy making. Such interaction expands the democratic 
scope of the decision making process by making it more representative and 
inclusive, thus increasing chances of success.82 For Lewis and Opoku-Mensah, 
NGOs are believed to work effectively with local communities through organising 
and service delivery and to develop innovative solutions to local problems.83 This 
literature suggests that NGOs are the most appropriate actors to address actual 
needs at the local level. 
For DeMars, NGO activism may become, on some issues, an alternative to 
governmental responsibility rather than a hindrance to policy. International NGOs 
can relieve governments of political responsibilities while appearing to hold them 
responsible.84 A government may ignore their responsibilities by handing such 
responsibilities to NGOs. On the other hand, Fitzduff and Church argue that 
NGOs need to consider the potential loss of independence that may result from 
cooperating too closely with government.85 Furthermore, NGOs may not want to 
be limited or constrained by state or other official concerns, but the very process 
of joint decision making, and the relationships developed therein, may mean that 
NGOs find it increasingly difficult to criticise governments and others. NGOs can 
lose their credibility as independent and neutral actors in the eyes of those they are 
seeking to work with on the ground, resulting in a significant loss, as trust and 
81 Seffrin, J.R. (n.d.) ‘United States Nongovernmental Organizations’, Gale Encyclopaedia of 
Public Health, http://www.answers.com/topic/non-governmental-organization, accessed 24-02-
2012. 
82 Fitzduff and Church (2004), pp. 13-14. 
83 Lewis and Opoku-Mensah, (2006), pp. 666-667. 
84 DeMars, W.E. (2005) NGOs and Transnational Networks: Wild Cards in World Politics, Pluto 
Press, London, p. 60. 
85 Fitzduff and Church, (2004), pp. 12-13. 
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goodwill are the crucial features of an NGO’s attractiveness to local people.86 For 
Badu and Parker, although it is necessary for the NGOs to cooperate with and 
complement the efforts of the government, they must not subject their operations, 
finances, and activities to governmental control and manipulation. 87  Whether 
governments are able to share their responsibilities with NGOs, or collaborate 
with NGOs in addressing local needs without undermining each other are further 
issues to examine in later chapters. 
Bratton’s work based on Africa, suggests that government-NGO relations are 
likely to be most constructive where a confident and capable government with 
populist policies meets an NGO that works to pursue mainstream development 
programmes. These relations are more controversial where a weak and defensive 
government with a limited power base meets an NGO that seeks to promote 
community mobilisation,88 giving rise to questions as to the consequences when 
an authoritative government seeks to control the operations, finances and 
activities of NGOs. 
The literature highlights the great potential for NGOs to contribute to and address 
the local level in a way that meets the actual needs of local communities. Such 
communities have been and are neglected mostly by post-colonial third world 
governments.89 The literature also opens up ways to examine different relations 
between government and NGOs in Sri Lanka. In addressing such questions, this 
research seeks to understand how to positively utilise the contribution of NGOs in 
local government and local development. The next section reviews the theories 
and literature related to the policy process and the interactions of NGOs. 
2.4. Policy process and the interactions of NGOs 
Government policy can be thought of as emerging from a ‘policy process’ that 
consists of various stages 90  and includes several actors. 91  Although there is 
86 Ibid. 
87 Badu, Y.A. and Parker, A. (1994) ‘The Role of Non-governmental Organisations in Rural 
Development: The Case of the Voluntary Workcamps Association of Ghana’, Journal of Social 
Development in Africa, Vol. 9, No. 1, p. 38. 
88 Bratton, (1989), p. 585. 
89 DeMars, (2005), p. 51. 
90 Hogwood and Gunn identify nine stages of policy process: 1) issue search or agenda-setting; 2) 
issue filtration; 3) issue definition; 4) forecasting; 5) setting objectives and priorities; 6) options 
analysis; 7) policy implementation, monitoring, and control; 8) evaluation and review; and 9) 
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potential for multiple actors to be involved, the government is generally seen as a 
prominent and dominant actor in all stages of the policy process.92  
As discussed above, in the Sri Lankan government context, authoritative power is 
strongly centralised93 and the local level is neglected. Local communities remain 
voiceless even in the local government policy processes, leaving many needs at 
the local level remain neglected and unaddressed. 
The potential contribution of NGOs in addressing the needs at the local level is 
significant. NGOs are seen as appropriate actors to encourage people’s 
participation and to build networks among various policy actors at the local 
level.94 This opens a way to address post-colonial complexities and to strengthen 
government-NGO relations. This section draws special attention to people’s 
participation in the local policy processes and reviews the literature related to 
NGOs and their interactions in the policy process and the relevance of policy 
network theory in addressing such issues related to the local policy processes. 
2.4.1. NGOs as policy actors: promotion of people’s participation 
A government-centric view of the policy process is a significant matter. 
According to Sabatier, the policy process seeks to take account of the manner in 
which problems get conceptualised and brought to the government for solution; 
the governmental institutions and processes by which alternatives are formulated 
and policy solutions selected; and the implementation, evaluation, and revision of 
those solutions.95 For Colebatch, policy is of major concern at the highest levels 
policy maintenance, policy succession and policy termination (Hogwood, B.W. and Gunn, L.A. 
(1984) Policy Analysis for the Real World, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 7-10).  
91 For Howlett, Ramesh and Perl, these policy actors can be divided into two major parts as 
domestic policy actors and international policy actors (Howlett, M.; Ramesh, M. and Perl, A. 
(2009) Studying Public Policy: Policy Cycles and Policy Subsystems (3rd edition) Oxford 
University Press, New York, pp. 61-75). For Anderson, there are two major categories of actors – 
the official policy makers and the non-governmental participants. The official policy makers are 
legislatures, the executive, administrative agencies and the courts. The non-governmental 
participants are interest groups, political parties, research organisations, communications media, 
and individual citizens, who join with the official policy makers in the policy process (Anderson, 
J.E. (2003) Public Policymaking: An Introduction (5th edition) Houghton Mifflin Company, New 
York, pp. 46-57). 
92 See Birkland, T.A. (2005) An Introduction to the Policy Process: Theories, Concepts, and 
Models of Public Policy Making (2nd edition) M.E. Sharpe, New York, Sabatier, (1999) and 
Colebatch, H.K. (2002) Policy (2nd edition) Open University Press, UK. 
93 Uyangoda, (2010). 
94 See Fernandez, A.P. (1987) ‘NGOs in South Asia: People’s Participation and Partnership’, 
World Development, Vol. 15 (Supplement) Pergamon Journals Ltd., UK. 
95 Sabatier, (1999), p. 3. 
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of government, and the work of the executive – the prime minister, or president, 
and cabinet – is dominated by policy decisions.96 There are many voices within 
government, each viewing the issue from its own perspective and each seeking to 
turn policy making to its advantage.97  
Howlett, Ramesh and Perl emphasise that in most democratic states, policy 
decisions are taken by representative institutions that empower specialised actors 
to determine the scope and content of public policies, but these institutions do not, 
as a matter of course, provide mechanisms through which the public can directly 
determine policy.98 It follows that the public’s role in policy making cannot be 
taken for granted as either straightforward or decisive. But neither should it be 
ignored. Elections rarely provide focused public input on specific policy 
options.99 But for Howlett et al., political parties can connect people and their 
government in ways that affect policy.100 However Anderson concludes that most 
people do not take the opportunities to engage directly in shaping public policy. 
Many people do not vote, engage in political party activities, join pressure groups, 
or otherwise display much interest in politics.101 This raises the issue of whether 
determining policy without the direct involvement of the public leads to 
inappropriate policies which do not address the actual needs of communities at the 
local level, and raises the issue of whether the policy process would be more 
successful if it took into account the ideas and needs of the people subjected to 
such policies. Moreover, a question arises about whether different political parties 
and their representatives represent people’s needs at all.  
Dunleavy and O’Leary say that building public participation into the decision 
making process can mean a broader range of policy considerations can be met. 
Participation procedures are special modes for representing citizens’ views, 
supplementary to normal representative government mechanisms. They focus on a 
single, discrete issue area, unlike representative politics, which bundles up 
disparate issues into unconnected bundles, such as election manifestos or 
96 Colebatch, (2002), p. 40. 
97 Ibid., p. 125. 
98 Howlett, Ramesh and Perl, (2009), pp. 63-64. 
99 Ibid., p. 65. 
100 Ibid., p. 67. 
101 Anderson, (2003), pp. 65-67. 
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legislative programmes. 102 Consequently, Colebatch argues that it is easier for 
some people, and more difficult for others, to take part in the policy process. A 
critical question is how people with little standing can challenge the existing order 
and participate in the policy process. 103  Schattschneider argues that it is not 
necessarily true that people with the greatest needs participate in politics most 
actively. 104 Bachrach and Baratz conclude that those with power can exclude 
issues and problems from the policy making agenda.105 This non-decision making 
suggests that policy makers with power have the capacity to keep issues off the 
agenda which they control.106 This gives rise to the questions of how the people’s 
actual needs can be represented in the policy process and who can organise the 
people towards participating in the policy process. 
In policy making processes, expertise becomes an important way of organising 
policy activity.107 The different levels of expertise and finance that IOs can deploy 
often turn out to be crucial determinants of the impact that international actors can 
have on domestic policies. 108  Osman pays special attention to developing 
countries and refers to IOs and NGOs as donor agencies and voluntary agencies 
and notes how the scarcity of financial resources in developing countries has 
made donor agencies another dominant policy actor. 109  According to Bratton, 
NGOs have useful ideas to offer to rural development planners. By demonstrating 
alternative methods of getting things done at the village level, they can offer 
policy suggestions on questions of local resource mobilisation, recurrent cost 
recovery and programme sustainability.110 Furthermore, NGOs have an important 
role to play in political development to the extent that they can offer ordinary 
102 Dunleavy, P. and O’Leary, B. (1987) Theories of the State: The Politics of Liberal Democracy, 
Macmillan, London, pp. 312-313. 
103 Colebatch, (2002), p. 27. 
104 Schattschneider, E.E. (1960) The Semisovereign People, Hollt, Rinehart & Winston, New York, 
p. 105. 
105 Bachrach, P.S. and Baratz, M.S. (1963) ‘Decisions and Non-Decisions: An Analytical 
Framework’, American Political Science Review, Issue 57, pp. 641-651. 
106 Non-decision making is a means by which demands for change in the existing allocation of 
benefits and privileges in the community can be suffocated before they are even voiced, kept 
covert, killed before they gain access to the relevant decision making arena, or failing all these 
things, are high jacked by powerful interests in the decision implementing stage of the policy 
process. Problems may be kept off a systemic or institutional agenda in various ways (Anderson, 
(2003), pp. 94-95). 
107 Colebatch, (2002), pp. 28-29. 
108 Howlett, Ramesh and Perl, (2009), p. 76. 
109 Osman, F.A. (2002) ‘Public Policy Making: Theories and Their Implications in Developing 
Countries’, Asian Affairs, p. 47 (http://www.cdrb.org/journal/2002/3/3.pdf, accessed 23-09-2012). 
110 Bratton, (1989), pp. 582-583. 
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people an opportunity to participate in decisions and represent local interests.111 
Therefore, other than their primary contribution to improve the delivery of 
economic and social services to poor populations, NGOs have an important 
contribution to make to the policy process where the content of rural development 
policies is shaped and decided.112 This leads to questions as to whether NGOs can 
provide expertise in assisting people and government towards policy negotiations 
and how NGOs might contribute to mechanisms to organise people at the local 
level to participate in the policy process. 
We might think of NGOs as being a part of the policy networks in which public 
and private actors interact. Policy networks are recognised as consisting of a 
bounded set of actors and one or more sets of relations that connect these 
actors.113 They may be informal or rule-governed.114 Policy network theory, to a 
greater or lesser degree, recognises that ideas as well as interests bind together the 
groups and individuals in a policy sector.115 In seeking to address a policy issue 
related to a specific community, a policy network will bring together government 
representatives, community-based organisations (CBOs), intellectuals, NGOs and 
others. In sharing ideas in policy networks people gain an understanding of 
various problems and how to encourage participation in policy networks. For 
example, participatory rural appraisal (PRA) can be identified as a networking 
approach used by NGOs to incorporate the knowledge and opinions of rural 
people in the planning and management of development projects and 
programmes.116 
This leads to the question of how the policy networks continue functioning. 
Moreover, this raises issues of whether there is a need for intermediate actors to 
organise and continue the smooth functioning of networks, and if so, whether 
there are possibilities for NGOs to work as intermediate actors. According to 
Knoke, NGO and IO involvement in creating policy networks helps in mobilising 
111 Ibid., p. 585. 
112 Bratton, (1990), p. 116. 
113 Knoke, D. (2011) ‘Policy Networks’, in J. Scott and P.J. Carrington (eds) The SAGE Handbook 
of Social Network Analysis, SAGE, London, pp. 210-211. 
114 Scharpf, F.W. (1998) Games Real Actors Play, Actor Centred Institutionalism in Policy 
Research, Westview Press, Boulder, pp. 116-151. 
115 Fischer, F. (2003) Reframing Public Policy: Discursive Politics and Deliberative Practices, 
Oxford University Press, New York, p. 32. 
116 Chambers, R. (1997) Whose Reality Counts? Putting the First Last, Intermediate Technology 
Publications, London, p. 106. 
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local activists, social movements, and other civil society organisations which can 
pressure governments to change their policies and practices.117 For DeMars, most 
third world countries are unable to raise the living standards of their populations 
and this was the reason to build NGO-mediated networks between societies and 
governments. 118  According to DeMars, NGOs are the constitutive actors of 
networks: no NGOs, no network. DeMars further claims that without NGOs, other 
actors with the potential to participate in a network may be present, but the 
leadership of NGOs is required to activate the network. NGOs are, in his view, the 
most influential actors in networking in these contexts.119 This raises the issue of 
whether there are possibilities for NGOs to be involved in the policy process 
especially at the local level through networking with the people, especially local 
organisations and local government. 
This literature opens up ways to investigate the potential of NGOs to be involved 
in the policy process in Sri Lanka. The literature also highlights the possibilities of 
NGOs in obtaining peoples participation in the local policy processes and local 
development. In addressing the issues that emerge from this literature, this 
research seeks to ascertain the contribution of NGOs in the local policy processes 
in Sri Lanka. 
2.5. Summary 
Guided by the central research themes, this chapter reviewed the literature under 
three major sections and raised several questions which lead to a number of 
hypotheses. First, the chapter has reviewed the key insights from post-colonial 
theory, particularly in the way this literature focuses on foreign aid and NGOs as 
contemporary forms of colonialism. This literature also recognises the potential 
for NGOs to act as agents in addressing the complexities of the post-colonial 
governance. Two contrasting hypotheses emerge from this literature: first, that the 
involvement of NGOs in governance and development maintains the exploitative 
relations of colonialism; second, that the involvement of NGOs leads to improved 
forms of governance and development. 
117 Knoke, (2011), p. 215. 
118 DeMars, (2005), p. 51. 
119 Ibid., p. 52. 
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These hypotheses lead to the related issues such as whether the historical 
experience of colonialism is a barrier to development as proposed by post-colonial 
theory; whether the provision of foreign aid hinders local development in former 
colonies; whether, and to what extent, post-independence rulers respond to and 
work with NGOs; how effectively NGOs work with vulnerable sections of former 
colonial societies in contexts where there is dysfunctional government; and how 
foreign aid might be delivered in a way that does not reinforce dependence and 
hinder development. 
Second, the chapter also focused on the government-NGO relations and the ways 
in which they are in conflict or collaborate. The literature suggests that 
government’s response to NGOs is the decisive factor in determining whether 
there is benefit from such relations. Furthermore, the literature suggests that the 
government-NGO relations diverge according to the differences in governments 
and NGO agendas. The literature identifies the fear government may hold about 
NGOs, suspecting they might undermine the government’s decisive power. The 
literature also suggests two hypotheses: first, that the need to maintain strong 
leadership in Sri Lanka leads to authoritative government responses and 
undermines the capacity to build collaborative relations with NGOs which 
enhance local government and local development. Second, that central 
government can maintain strong leadership without undermining the development 
of collaborative relations with NGOs which enhance local government and local 
development. 
The issues related to these hypotheses include the capacities of NGOs to 
contribute towards effective governance in post-colonial third world societies; the 
sources of both conflict and collaboration in government-NGO relations; the 
extent and influence of government restrictions on the work of NGOs; the extent 
to which working according to government agendas undermines NGOs in 
addressing actual needs at the local level; whether governments ignore 
responsibilities by leaving development work to NGOs; how governments and 
NGOs collaborate in addressing local needs without undermining each other; and 
the consequences of authoritarian government control over the operations, 
finances and activities of the NGOs. 
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Third, the literature reviewed in this chapter emphasised the potential to neglect 
the actual needs of the people in government-centric policy processes, along with 
an observation that NGOs can promote people’s participation in the policy 
processes at the local level by facilitating networks of policy actors. This literature 
leads to two hypotheses: first, that NGOs do not encourage people’s participation 
in the local policy processes or promote local development; and second, that 
NGOs play a positive role in encouraging people’s participation in the local policy 
processes and local development. 
Further, these hypotheses lead to questions such as whether NGOs encourage 
people’s participation in the local policy processes and promote local 
development; how NGOs contribute to mechanisms to organise people at the local 
level to participate in the policy process; and what the possibilities are for NGOs 
to be involved in the policy process especially at the local level through 
networking with the people, especially CBOs and local government. 
In summary, this research examines the way local communities have been 
neglected in development initiatives in Sri Lanka, why that has occurred and how 
best to respond. It explores the role of NGOs in promoting local development and 
in strengthening people’s participation in local governance. Given the limitations 
imposed on local government and NGOs by central government in Sri Lanka, it 
seeks to understand the actual and potential contribution of NGOs in local 
government and local development. The literature is, therefore, selected to 
highlight the understanding of each related part of this research, particularly the 
influences of colonialism and NGO involvement in policy processes. The 
literature is used in this research to derive hypotheses and to examine them in 
light of the research data. 
The next chapter sets out the methodology to examine these questions within the 
Sri Lankan context. 
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Chapter 3 
Research design 
3.1. Introduction 
Following the key points and questions outlined and discussed in the previous 
chapter, this chapter outlines the research design 120  and how the research 
questions will be answered. It does so by referring to specific sites, persons, 
groups, institutions, and bodies of relevant interpretive material, including 
documents and archives.121 
The design of this research includes four main components. First, the strategy;122 
second, the conceptual framework; third, who or what will be studied; and fourth, 
the tools and procedures to be used for collecting and analysing data.123  
3.2. Research strategy 
This section compares and contrasts the quantitative and qualitative research 
strategies, and establishes the relevance of both strategies for this particular study. 
3.2.1. Quantitative and qualitative research 
Quantitative and qualitative research strategies are employed in this study. 
Quantitative researchers typically deal with numerical data,124 whereas qualitative 
120 Three uses of the term ‘research design’ can be distinguished in the literature, roughly ordered 
from the general to the specific. At the most general level, it means all the issues involved in 
planning and executing a research project – from identifying the problem through to reporting and 
publishing the results. By contrast, at its most specific level, the design of a study refers to the way 
a researcher guards against, and tries to rule out, alternative interpretations of results (Punch, K.F. 
(1998) Introduction to Social Research: Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches, SAGE 
Publications, London, p. 66). Between these two designs, there is the general idea of design as 
situating the researcher in the empirical world, and connecting research questions to data (Denzin, 
N.K. and Lincoln, Y.S. (1998) ‘Entering the Field of Qualitative Research’, in N.K. Denzin and 
Y.S. Lincoln (eds) The Landscape of Qualitative Research: Theories and Issues, SAGE 
Publications, Thousand Oaks, California, pp. 28-29). 
121 Ibid. 
122 Strategy and methodology are similar terms. Researchers follow these in gaining knowledge. 
Quantitative and qualitative research strategies are examples. The strategy or methodology 
includes method or methods, which refers to the ways data is collected. Method refers to the 
research tactics that are used in the conduct of a research effort. Examples include drawing 
samples, conducting questionnaire surveys, engaging in participant observation, and the like 
(McNabb, D.E. (2004) Research Methods for Political Science: Quantitative and Qualitative 
Methods, M.E. Sharpe, New York, p. 341). Moreover, a method refers to the steps taken by the 
researcher to carry out the research.  Methodology is the study of method. 
123 Punch, (1998), p. 66. 
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researchers typically document lived events, recording what people say (with 
words, gestures, and tone), observing specific behaviours, studying written 
documents, or examining visual images.125 At times, qualitative researchers use 
quantification in their data. 126 Neuman argues that any numerical evidence is 
supplementary to the textual evidence. 127  In this way both quantitative and 
qualitative research strategies work together. 
In quantitative research, the researcher can be distant and uninvolved with the 
subject whereas the qualitative researcher seeks close involvement with the people 
being investigated. 128  Neuman emphasises that qualitative research is about 
looking at the depth of the information involved, as seen by the research 
participants themselves. 129  When the research is people-centred and people-
related, it is necessary to obtain their in-depth views through qualitative strategies. 
The suggestion that quantitative research is solely concerned with the testing of 
ideas that have previously been formulated is not always correct. Equally, 
qualitative research can be used in relation to the testing of theories.130 
Quantitative research is frequently portrayed as presenting a static image of social 
reality with its emphasis on relationships between variables,131 while qualitative 
research is portrayed as being attuned to the unfolding of events over time and to 
the interconnections between the actions of participants in social settings, 132 
which makes qualitative research such a valuable approach. Quantitative research 
is typically highly structured so that the investigator is able to examine the precise 
concepts and issues that are the focus of the study: in qualitative research the 
approach is invariably unstructured, so that the possibility of getting at actors’ 
meanings and of concepts emerging out of data collection is enhanced.133  Smith 
and Bowers-Brown argue that qualitative research can be useful for evaluating 
124 Bryman, A. (2001) Social Research Methods, Oxford University Press, New York, p. 284. 
125 Neuman, W. L. (2000) Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches (4th 
edition) Allyn and Bacon, USA, p. 145. 
126 Bryman, A. (2012) Social Research Methods (4th edition) Oxford University Press, Oxford, p. 
621. 
127 Neuman, (2000), p. 148. 
128 Bryman, (2001), p. 284. 
129 Neuman, (2000), p. 148. 
130 Bryman, (2012), p. 621. 
131 A variable is a characteristic, number, or quantity that increases or decreases over time, or takes 
different values in different situations. The independent variable can take different values and can 
cause corresponding changes in other variables: the dependent variable that can take different 
values only in response to an independent variable. 
132 Bryman, (2001), p. 285. 
133 Ibid. 
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projects through investigating people’s experiences of that project, for 
consultations on proposed policy implementations as well as in the development 
of new strategies or policies.134 
Given these observations, qualitative and quantitative research strategies have 
been identified as most appropriate for this study. The research draws heavily on 
qualitative data, and also numerical evidence, and can thus be identified as a 
mixed methods approach.135 
3.2.1.1. Case study approach 
The case study is commonly used in qualitative research,136 but defining the case 
study approach is complex given it has various forms. The writings of Robert K. 
Yin are widely considered to be an authoritative contribution in the development 
and use of the social and political science case study. Yin defines the case study as 
an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-
life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are 
not clearly evident.137 The case study approach works best when the researcher 
wants to investigate an issue in-depth and provide an explanation that can cope 
134 Smith, M. and Bowers-Brown, T. (2010) ‘Different Kinds of Qualitative Data Collection 
Methods’, in L. Dahlberg and C. McCaig (eds) Practical Research and Evaluation: A Start-to-
Finish Guide for Practitioners, SAGE, London, p. 115. 
135 The term ‘mixed methods research’ is used as a simple shorthand to stand for research that 
integrates quantitative and qualitative research within a single project. Mixed methods research has 
increasingly become the preferred term and in many ways better expresses the fact that, in many 
cases, using both quantitative and qualitative research should involve a mixing of the research 
methods involved and not just using them in tandem. In other words, the quantitative and the 
qualitative data deriving from mixed methods research should be mutually illuminating (Bryman, 
(2012), p. 628). Moreover, finding a pure, ideal quantitative or qualitative research might be 
difficult. The dividing point of these two strategies lies on the proportion of characteristics of each 
strategy in a research. According to Neuman, most researchers mix the two logics, but the 
proportion of each varies (Neuman, (2000), p. 122). 
136 McNabb points out that, although the case study is dominant in qualitative research, it is also 
prevalent in quantitative research (McNabb, (2004), p. 358). For Bryman, although there is a 
tendency to associate case studies with qualitative research, such an identification is not 
appropriate. Case studies are frequently sites for the employment of both quantitative and 
qualitative research (Bryman, (2012), pp. 67-68). Therefore the case study strategy should not be 
confused with qualitative research. For Yin, case studies can be based on any mix of quantitative 
and qualitative evidence (Yin, R.K. (2003a) Case Study Research: Design and Methods (3rd 
edition) Applied Social Research Methods Series, Vol. 5, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, 
California, p. 15). In practice, the use of the case study approach (or method) has been aligned 
with qualitative research far more than it has with quantitative research (Denscombe, M. (2010) 
The Good Research Guide: For Small-Scale Social Research Projects (4th edition) Open 
University Press, England, p. 55). However, it is significant that the attributes of the case study 
method are much related to qualitative research. 
137 Yin, R.K. (1994) Case Study Research: Design and Methods (2nd edition) Applied Social 
Research Methods Series, Vol. 5, SAGE Publications, Thousand Oaks, California, p. 13. 
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with the complexity. In particular, it lends itself to the study of processes and 
relationships within a setting.138 The real value of a case study is that it offers the 
opportunity to explain why certain outcomes might happen – more than just 
finding out what those outcomes are.139  
Case studies can be approached in a number of ways.140 Yin states that there are 
four possible designs: 1) single-case (holistic) designs; 2) single-case (embedded) 
designs; 3) multiple-case (holistic) designs; and 4) multiple case (embedded) 
designs.141 This study employs the single-case (embedded) design. Here, the same 
case study may involve more than one unit of analysis. 142 This occurs when, 
within a single case, attention is also given to a sub-unit or sub-units. When these 
sub-units are selected, the resulting design is an embedded case study design.143 
In this research, Sri Lankan local government has been selected as the single case 
study and the main unit of analysis, with two sub-units or embedded units – the 
southern provincial council and the eastern provincial council.  For Yin, such sub-
units can serve as an important device for focusing a case study inquiry.144 When 
a single case incorporates sub-units of analysis, a more complex – or embedded – 
design is developed. Yin further adds that the sub-units can often add significant 
opportunities for extensive analysis, enhancing the insights into the single case.145 
A frequently heard criticism on the case study method is that it does not provide a 
basis for generalising. According to Yin, however, case studies are generalisable 
to theoretical propositions, but not to whole populations. A case study does not 
represent a ‘sample,’ and in using a case study, a researcher’s goal will be to 
138 Denscombe, (2010), p. 55. 
139 Ibid., p. 53. 
140 Ibid., p. 20. 
141 Yin, (1994), p. 38. 
142 The main unit of analysis is likely to be at the level being addressed by the main study 
questions (Yin, (2003a), pp. 24-25). An embedded unit is a lesser unit than the case itself, for 
which numerous data points have been collected (Yin, (1994), p. 119). This unit would not 
necessarily be a single organisation or initiative (Yin, R.K. (2003b) Applications of Case Study 
Research (2nd edition) Applied Social Research Methods Series, Vol. 34, Sage Publications, 
Thousand Oaks, California, p. 11). Some authors call the main unit and sub-units as the primary 
unit and within-units respectively. Within-unit cases consist of all cases that lie at a lower level of 
analysis relative to the inference under investigation. For example, if the primary unit of analysis is 
the nation-state, then within-unit cases might be constructed from provinces, localities, groups, or 
individuals. Although the primary unit of analysis is usually clear, within-unit cases are often 
multiple and ambiguous (Gerring, J. (2004) ‘What is a Case Study and What is it Good for?’, 
American Political Science Review, Vol. 98, No. 2, p. 344). 
143 Yin, (1994), pp. 41-42. 
144 Ibid., p. 42. 
145 Ibid., p. 44. 
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expand and generalise theories (analytic generalisation),146 where the investigator 
is striving to generalise a particular set of results to some broader theory. 147 
According to McNabb, for both the single case and multiple case approaches, the 
purpose of the study is not to be a representative picture of ‘the world’, but rather 
simply to represent the specific case or cases. 148  So a case study does not 
represent a sample or a generalisable reality, but it may represent a particular 
reality which can be generalised to a theory or theories. 
Typically, cases are not randomly selected. Rather, they are selected on the basis 
of known attributes, and on the basis of their distinctive features. For Denscombe, 
the criteria used for the selection of cases needs to be made explicit and needs to 
be justified as an essential part of the methodology.149  
Based on these propositions, the case study and the embedded units selected in 
this particular research are as set out in Figure 3.1. 
Figure 3.1: The case study and the embedded units 
 
Of the nine provincial councils in Sri Lanka,150 the southern provincial council 
and the eastern provincial council have been selected as the embedded units. The 
three districts in the southern province included in this research are Galle, Matara 
146 Yin, (2003a), p. 10. 
147 Yin, (1994), p. 36. 
148 McNabb, (2004), p. 358. 
149 Denscombe, (2010), pp. 56-57. 
150 A provincial map of Sri Lanka is included in Appendix II. 
41 
 
                                                 
and Hambantota. 151 The southern province is an area with a Sinhala majority, 
which is the ethnic majority of the country (see Table 3.1). 
The eastern province also consists of three districts: Trincomalee, Batticaloa and 
Ampara. The eastern province is a post-war area with many ethnic, religious and 
cultural differences. It is the most diverse province in Sri Lanka. Tamils comprise 
the majority of the population, with Muslims152 the second main population group 
(see Table 3.1). The country majority of Sinhala is a provincial minority in the 
eastern province. Between 1988 and 2006 the province was temporarily merged 
with the northern province to form the north-east province. 
The embedded units in this research – southern and eastern provincial councils – 
were selected according to the clear ethnic differences between the southern and 
eastern provinces. The northern province has a clear ethnic majority of Tamils but 
at the time of this research the northern provincial council had still to be 
established and activated after the war and so was not included in this research.153 
Table 3.1: Population: southern and eastern provinces 
Ethnic group 
 
Population  
Sri Lanka 
(%) 
Population 
Southern province 
(%) 
Population 
Eastern province 
(%) 
Sinhala 74.9 95.25 23.15 
Tamil 15.4 1.63 39.79 
Muslim 9.2 2.6 36.72 
Other 0.5 0.5 0.34 
Source: Census – 2012, Department of Census and Statistics, Sri Lanka. 
The southern and eastern provinces are connected along the coastal areas and 
were severely affected by the tsunami disaster in December 2004. Several NGOs 
came to support the post-tsunami rehabilitation bringing large amounts of foreign 
aid into these provinces. The significant foreign aid which came to Sri Lanka has 
been used for large scale construction projects in the north and the east. 
Although the southern province was not directly affected by the war, large scale 
construction projects are taking place in the south as well. These projects are 
conducted through the direct involvement of the central government. Huge 
amounts of foreign aid flowed to the southern province for such projects, and have 
151 A district map of Sri Lanka is included in Appendix III. 
152 Muslim is considered an ethnic group in Sri Lanka. 
153 The northern provincial council was established and activated in September 2013. 
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been seen as a special treatment which other provinces with a Sinhala majority do 
not have. 
The selection of southern and eastern provincial councils as embedded units will 
allow the investigation of the limitations of local government and local 
development in contexts where there are clear majority and minority ethnic 
groups and, on-going large scale construction projects. Moreover, the contribution 
of NGOs to overcome such limitations has been investigated within these 
different contexts. 
After contacting154 the provincial commissioners of local government (CLGs)155 
in the south and the east, 12 local government bodies156 were selected for this 
research. Two municipal councils (MCs), two urban councils (UCs) and two 
Pradeshiya Sabhas (PSs) were selected from each province and altogether a total 
of six local government bodies from each province (see Figure 3.1). Two local 
government bodies were selected at each level from each province, based on 
ethnic differences, foreign aid and support, and large scale construction projects 
which affect local government and local development in each local government 
area. 
3.3. The conceptual framework 
The conceptual framework or paradigm that informs this research recognises the 
value of both qualitative and quantitative strategies, although it draws more 
heavily on qualitative methods. For Janesick, qualitative research design is an act 
of interpretation from beginning to end.157 Most qualitative research emerges from 
the interpretivist paradigm158 due to its appropriateness to social inquiry related to 
154 The provincial commissioners of local government were contacted by letters and phone to 
arrange appointments. The commissioners subsequently sent letters to the local government bodies 
requesting the officials to help the researcher in obtaining relevant information. 
155 The provincial commissioner of local government is the main administrative official 
responsible for the local government issues in each province. 
156 Local government bodies in Sri Lanka are found at three levels – municipal councils, urban 
councils and Pradeshiya Sabhas. 
157 Janesick, V.J. (2000) ‘The Choreography of Qualitative Research Design: Minuets, 
Improvisations, and Crystallization’, in N.K. Denzin and Y.S. Lincoln (eds) Handbook of 
Qualitative Research (2nd edition) Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, California, p. 395. 
158 Interpretivism is a term that usually denotes an alternative to positivism which is an 
epistemological position that advocates the application of the methods of the natural sciences to 
the study of social reality and beyond. Interpretivism shares a view that the subject matter of the 
social sciences – people and their institutions – is fundamentally different from that of the natural 
sciences. The study of the social world therefore requires a different logic of research procedure, 
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people.159 The meanings that people assign to social phenomena are in constant 
flux and very much context-laden.160 McNabb suggests that interpretive research 
is particularly important for the study of government organisations and 
agencies161 as it allows for informal and often unstated meanings and practices to 
be captured. 
Capturing the meanings people assign to phenomena relies heavily on methods 
such as interviewing, observation and analysis of existing texts. These methods 
are mostly derived from qualitative research and require an in-depth dialogue 
between the researchers and those with whom they interact.162  
In this approach, meanings emerge from the research process and generate 
theoretical propositions.163 On the basis of the literature reviewed in chapter 2, 
this research draws on a multiple theoretical framework which aims to generate 
and examine the research questions. 
3.4. Respondents 
To examine local government and local development and to determine the 
contribution of NGOs, this study sought the views of key people in several 
government and non-government sectors. Respondents in this research can be 
divided into four groups: the national, provincial and local political 
representatives and administrative officials, the officials attached to NGOs, and 
the representatives of the community-based organisations (CBOs) (Figure 3.2). To 
obtain the views of the local government and local development and the views of 
the contribution of NGOs, political representatives were drawn from the selected 
local government bodies. In Sri Lanka, local government operates under 
provincial councils and the views concerning local government, local 
development and the contribution of NGOs were sought from provincial political 
representatives from both the south and the east. There is a central government 
ministry of local government and provincial councils in Sri Lanka and this 
one that reflects the distinctiveness of humans as against the natural order (Bryman, (2012) op.cit., 
p. 28 and p. 30). 
159 ‘Common Paradigms’ (n.d.) http://www.qualres.org/HomePhil-3514.html, accessed 08-02-
2013. 
160 Moon, J.D. (1975) ‘The Logic of Inquiry: A Synthesis of Opposed Perspectives’, Political 
Science: Scope and Theory, Vol. 1, Addison-Wesley, Melon Park, California, pp. 131-228. 
161 McNabb, (2004), p. 345. 
162 ‘Common Paradigms’ (n.d.). 
163 Ibid. 
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research sought to obtain the views of the responsible minister, and also the views 
of the parliamentary opposition, regarding local government, local development 
and the contribution of NGOs. 
Figure 3.2: Selection of respondents 
 
In Sri Lanka, district and divisional administration operates under central 
government which handles projects, aid and funds. To investigate limitations in 
the relationships between the local political and administrative bodies, and to 
obtain information about the flow of funds, the views of the national, provincial, 
district and divisional level administrative officials was sought. The 
administrative officials were selected from district and divisional secretariats 
situated in the selected local government areas as case studies. Provincial and 
national level administrative officials were selected through snowball sampling.164 
164 Snowball sampling is a sampling technique in which the researcher samples initially a small 
group of people relevant to the research questions, and these sampled participants propose other 
participants who have had the experience or characteristics relevant to the research. These 
participants will then suggest others and so on (Bryman, (2012), p. 424). For Swanborn, in 
selecting key persons in case studies, we do not proceed randomly, but generally focus – for 
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When selecting the NGOs, the main concern was to determine the different types 
of NGO contributions in local government and local development. Lists of NGOs 
and their contributions at the local level were obtained from the Ministry of Local 
Government and Provincial Councils. From these lists, NGOs that had been 
involved in on-going projects in the south and east areas were selected. Some of 
the officials responsible for such projects had worked in country offices and some 
of them had been attached to area offices.165 Some of these officials were selected 
through snowball sampling as well. All of the selected NGOs were foreign-funded, 
mainly from American (United States of America), Australian, Canadian and 
European sources. 
Representatives of CBOs were also selected using snowball sampling. Selection 
of respondents and the further research processes followed closely the established 
principles of human research ethics approved by the Faculty of Arts and Social 
Sciences. Consent of the respondents was carefully taken into account and the 
researcher did not follow any forceful attempt to obtain data. In preparation for 
this research a pilot survey was devised and implemented. 
3.4.1. Pilot survey 
A pilot survey was carried out in May 2011, in the Galle district from the southern 
province and Trincomalee district from the eastern province. The Galle MC, Galle 
district secretariat, Baddegama PS and Baddegama divisional secretariat from 
Galle district and the Trincomalee MC, Trincomalee district secretariat, Kinniya 
PS and Kinniya divisional secretariat from Trincomalee district were visited. 
From these local government offices, contact information of the political 
representatives of each local government area was obtained. The selection of these 
representatives for the pilot survey was carried out according to a form of 
purposive sampling.166 
instance by means of a snowball procedure and an accidental initial contact – on well-informed 
individuals (Swanborn, P.G. (2010) Case Study Research: What, Why and How?, SAGE 
Publications, London, p. 74). 
165 Most of the time, higher officials attached to country offices or area offices directed the 
researcher to project coordinators of the specific projects. 
166 Sometimes it is appropriate for the researcher to select a sample on the basis of his or her own 
knowledge of the population, its elements, and the nature of the research aims: in short, based on 
the researcher’s judgement and the purpose of the study. This is called purposive or judgemental 
sampling (Babbie, E. (1998) The Practice of Social Research (8th edition) Wadsworth Publishing 
Company, Belmont, p. 195). 
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The pilot survey revealed that most local political representatives were not aware 
of the existing local government laws and regulations. Furthermore, accessing 
some of the local political representatives was difficult because many lived in 
remote areas without proper road access. It became clear that most of the time the 
political representatives from the same area talked of their common experiences 
and there was much unnecessary repetition. Therefore it was decided to aim to 
contact only two political representatives from each local government body,167 
those representing the governing party and the opposition party. Where there was 
a second opposition party, this representative was also interviewed. 
Discussions with administrative officials revealed that in district and divisional 
secretariats, there were specific officers with responsibility for local development 
planning and maintaining NGO contacts. Therefore, only one administrative 
officer from each district or divisional secretariat was interviewed, usually this 
officer was either the NGO coordinating officer of the district secretariat or the 
assistant director-planning of the divisional secretariat. 
The pilot survey provided the opportunity to talk with some of the people in 
selected local government areas and learn that they were not aware of, or not 
concerned about, their local government other than voting in the local government 
elections. Also, they had little or no idea of any NGO contribution or its support 
in their areas.168 The lack of awareness of local government representatives and 
people on issues such as legal procedures, local government mechanism and 
donor aid, were noted as issues to be investigated further. 
After contacting the officials attached to NGOs it was found that most of the NGO 
projects at the local level had their offices in Colombo, the country capital. A very 
few of these projects had area offices in southern and eastern provinces. 
The pilot survey, therefore, helped in guiding the field research. Overall, it was 
found that, the respondents were very interested in sharing their ideas and 
experiences with the researcher. 
167 In this research local political representatives are the local government representatives. 
168 Many researchers emphasise positive data and ignore what is not explicitly in the data, but for 
Neuman, being alert to absences is also important. He quotes Lewis and Lewis, who provided 
seven kinds of negative evidence to consider: 1) events that do not occur; 2) events about which 
the population is unaware; 3) events the population wants to hide; 4) over-looked commonplace 
events; 5) effects of a researcher’s pre-conceived notions; 6) unconscious non-reporting; and 7) 
conscious non-reporting (Neuman, (2000), pp. 436-437). 
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3.4.2. Field research 
The field research was conducted in two phases. The first was carried out from 
May to September 2011 in the selected local government areas by interviewing 
local government representatives, local administrative officials, CBO 
representatives and officials of the area offices of NGOs. The second phase was 
carried out from June to September 2012 when national and provincial political 
representatives and administrative officials were interviewed, together with 
officials of the country offices of NGOs.  
This research included 47 respondents, including 22 national, provincial and local 
political representatives. There were 17 national, provincial and local 
administrative officials, seven officials attached to NGOs, and one CBO 
representative. Of the 47 respondents, six were women and two were Buddhist 
priests.169 
The local government representatives and administrative officials responded 
promptly to the request letters and the phone calls of the researcher. They spent 
considerable time responding to the researcher during interviews. But when trying 
to contact some of the local government representatives and administrative 
officials in the eastern province through phone calls, the researcher was unable to 
communicate with them because they only spoke and understood Tamil.170 While 
officials attached to NGOs, and CBO representatives were very interested in 
responding, national and provincial political representatives, especially those who 
represented the central governing party, were less likely to respond positively to 
the request letters and the phone calls of the researcher. Most of the time they 
were not in their offices and their secretaries informed the researcher that these 
political representatives were very busy. Such secretaries also attempted to direct 
the researcher to certain administrative officials who could talk on behalf of these 
political representatives. However, the researcher rejected such attempts. Despite 
this, national and provincial administrative officials were interested in responding. 
During the field research, in the aftermath of the war, the eastern provincial 
council and a few selected local government bodies of the eastern province were 
dissolved by the central government and fresh elections called. The dissolution of 
169 A detailed list of respondents is included in Appendix IV. 
170 The researcher does not speak or understand Tamil language. 
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those elected bodies outside of the normal cycle of elections, meant there were no 
opportunities to interview these representatives. 
3.5. Methods of data collection and analysis 
This section outlines the tools and procedures used in this research to collect and 
analyse data. 
3.5.1. Sources of data 
Figure 3.3: Sources of data 
 
The case studies drew on a variety of sources and a variety of types of data.171 
This research obtained its data through interviewing, observing, and document 
analysis.172 
3.5.1.1. Interviews 
Primary data was collected using unstructured interviews173 and semi-structured 
interviews.174 Unstructured interviews allowed the interviewees to tell their story 
in their own way and order, in response to the researcher. The interviews were 
171 The case study method allows the use of a variety of methods depending on the circumstances 
and the specific needs of the situation. For example, observations of events within the case study 
setting can be combined with other sources such as documents from official meetings and informal 
interviews with people involved (Denscombe, (2010), p. 54). 
172 Denzin and Lincoln, (1998), p. 29. 
173 In unstructured interviews, the researcher uses a brief set of prompts to deal with a range of 
topics. There may be just a single question that the interviewer asks, and the interviewee is then 
allowed to respond freely, with the interviewer simply responding to points that seem worthy of 
being followed up. Unstructured interviewing tends to be very similar in character to a 
conversation (Bryman, (2012), p. 471). Unstructured interviewing is recognised as useful for 
studying sensitive issues like racial or ethnic prejudice, or hot political topics (Bernard, H.R. (2006) 
Research Methods in Anthropology: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches (4th edition) Rawat 
Publications, Jaipur, p. 213). 
174 In semi-structured interviews, the researcher has a list of questions or fairly specific topics to be 
covered, often referred to as an interview guide, but the interviewee has a great deal of leeway in 
how to reply. Questions may not follow on exactly in the way outlined on the schedule. Questions 
that are not included in the guide may be asked as the interviewer picks up on things said by 
interviewees. By and large, all the questions were asked and in similar wording used with all 
interviewees (Bryman, (2012), p. 471). 
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guided by a schedule of issues to be covered, but there was a good deal of 
freedom to include topics considered important to the interviewee.175 According 
to Bernard, unstructured interviewing is excellent for building initial rapport with 
people, particularly informants who would not tolerate a more formal 
interview. 176  Semi-structured interviews allowed the researcher to change the 
order and wording of the questions in order to achieve a more natural style of 
conversation. 177  In situations where the researcher got only one chance to 
interview someone, and where the researcher dealt with high-level bureaucrats, 
semi-structured interviews worked well.178 
In this research, most of the political representatives, administrative officials, 
officials attached to NGOs, and CBO representatives showed much interest in 
responding to the researcher without strictly following the scheduled questions. 
Therefore, most of the time, the interviews flowed flexibly in a middle path 
between unstructured and semi-structured methods. However the question areas 
were different from respondent to respondent according to their specific areas of 
expertise.179  
When interviewing some of the local government representatives in the eastern 
province, the support of translators was obtained. However some respondents did 
not like to have a translator, saying that they could speak Sinhala. But their 
Sinhala knowledge was limited and therefore they were unable to explain some of 
their ideas. Therefore some of the interviews conducted in the eastern province 
were fewer and shorter than the interviews conducted in the southern province. 
During the interviews, some respondents, especially the political representatives 
had shown an interest in wanting to know the political views of the researcher, 
which was avoided. Also some respondents tried to avoid talking about 
contemporary debatable topics such as the decentralisation of power. Further, a 
lack of a widely accepted definition of NGOs in Sri Lanka was a setback which 
resulted in vague and unclear responses by some respondents.  
175 Smith and Bowers-Brown, (2010), p. 121. 
176 Bernard, (2006), p. 213. 
177 Smith and Bowers-Brown, (2010), p. 119. 
178 Bernard, (2006), p. 212. 
179 Interview schedules have been included in Appendix V. 
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3.5.1.2. Observation 
Observation180 was another method followed in this research, carried out during 
field research and during interviewing. 181  Smith and Bowers-Brown note that 
direct observation as a research method is most appropriate in open, public 
settings where anyone has a right to be or congregate.182 During this research, 
construction projects and other areas were observed in the southern and eastern 
provinces, together with the routines of government offices. 
3.5.1.3. Documents and archival data 
An effective way to get to grips with a case study subject is to study any relevant 
documentation,183 and in this research, the study of documents and archival data 
was undertaken to supplement the information acquired by interviews and 
observations. Secondary data for this research includes governmental184 and non-
governmental 185  documents such as constitutions, acts, gazettes, circulars, 
commission reports, sessional papers, annual reports, project reports and progress 
reports. Books, journals, newspapers and certain web sites were also used as 
secondary sources of data. Archives are also a good source of information186 to 
establish an understanding of the circumstances that characterised an event or 
period.187 Although some published commission reports were obtained from the 
Sri Lanka National Archives, they did not release unpublished commission reports 
saying that those were closed and restricted archives. 
180 Observations can be quantitative (observing the number of times something occur), as well as 
qualitative (looking at the detail such as temporal and spatial influences in what is happening) 
(Smith and Bowers-Brown, (2010), pp. 122-123). 
181 Swanborn, (2010), pp. 73-74. 
182 Smith and Bowers-Brown, (2010), pp. 122-123. 
183 Swanborn, (2010), p. 73. 
184 The state is the source of a great deal of information of potential significance for social 
researchers. It produces a great deal of statistical information. In addition to such quantitative data, 
the state is the source of a great deal of textual material of potential interest, such as Acts of 
Parliament and official reports (Bryman, (2012), p. 549). 
185 Official documents deriving from private sources are a very heterogeneous group of sources, 
but one type that has been used a great deal is the company document. Companies (and indeed 
organisations generally) produce many documents. Some of these are in the public domain, such 
as annual reports, mission statements, press releases, advertisements, and public relations material 
in printed form and on the World Wide Web. Other documents are not (or may not be) in the 
public domain, such as company newsletters, organisational charts, minutes of the meetings, 
memos, internal correspondence, manuals for new recruits, and so on (ibid., p. 549-550). 
186 Swanborn, (2010), p. 73. 
187 McNabb, (2004), p. 109. 
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Care was taken to ensure that such documents and texts were studied in their 
social context. As Punch notes, an understanding of the social production188 and 
context of the document affects its interpretation.189 
3.6. Methods of data analysis 
Data analysis involved examining, sorting, categorising, evaluating, comparing, 
synthesising, and contemplating the coded data as well as reviewing the raw and 
recorded data. 190  In general, it involved searching for patterns in the data – 
recurrent behaviours, objects, or a body of knowledge. Analysis went beyond 
description to interpreting what had been said in terms of the research questions 
and existing literature.191 
Figure 3.4: Deductive and inductive approaches to the relationship between theory and 
research 
Source: Bryman, (2012), p. 26. 
 
As noted above, this research is based on an embedded case study design and 
qualitative data, these being approaches that are very closely related. Cases are not 
given pre-established empirical units or theoretical categories apart from the data, 
and they are defined by data and theory. By analysing a situation, the researcher 
organises data into categories on the basis of themes, concepts, or similar features, 
and applies theories simultaneously to create or specify a case. Creating a case, or 
188 The social production of an archive means: what is kept, where and for how long, and what is 
thrown away. 
189 Punch, (1998), p. 231. 
190 Neuman, (2000), p. 426. 
191 Smith, K. and Davies, J. (2010) ‘Qualitative Data Analysis’, in L. Dahlberg and C. McCaig 
(eds) (2010) Practical Research and Evaluation: A Start-to-Finish Guide for Practitioners, SAGE, 
London, p. 155. 
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casing, brings the data and theory together.192 As discussed earlier, generalisation 
in case study approach is oriented towards theory. 
There are no hard and fast rules about how qualitative data should be analysed. 
The researcher has the freedom to choose the approach which suits the purposes 
of the study and the readership.193 In the inductive approaches, 194 theories are 
developed from the analysis of research data. And in the deductive approaches,195 
research is used to test theories196 (see Figure 3.4). Dahlberg and McCaig suggest 
that the chosen (inductive or deductive) approach does not determine which 
strategy should be used in a research. Neither does it determine whether the 
strategy should be qualitative or quantitative.197 Relying totally on either inductive 
or deductive analysis is not practical for this study and the methods used cannot 
be simply seen as qualitative or quantitative, this research has sought qualitative 
data to examine the research questions derived from the literature. This research 
sees the significance of using deduction to analyse data and the applicability of 
certain theories in interpreting conclusions derived from the data. Thus, this 
research draws on both induction and deduction. 
It is important to note that, when analysing a single case study with embedded 
units, the method of analysis differs. According to Yin, any analysis of the 
embedded units is done within each case and this analysis cannot be the sole 
analysis but must be augmented by some other analytic technique at the level of 
192 Neuman, (2000), p. 420. 
193 Bernard, (2006), p.158. 
194 Induction also called analytic induction, an approach to the analysis of data in which the 
researcher seeks universal explanations of phenomena by pursuing the collection of data until no 
cases that are inconsistent with a hypothetical explanation (deviant or negative cases) of a 
phenomenon are found (Bryman, (2001), p. 389). Moreover, induction is usually described as 
moving from the specific to the general. Induction is generally future-oriented, and informally 
called a ‘bottom-up’ approach (‘Deduction and Induction’ (n.d.) 
http://www.socialresearchmethods.net/kb/dedind.php, accessed 07-01-2013). 
195 In a deductive conception of theory development the theorists begin with a set of fundamental 
axioms and definitions and logically derive from them a more elaborate set of propositions, some 
of which are falsifiable (Sabatier, P.A. (1999) ‘Fostering the Development of Policy Theory’, in 
P.A. Sabatier (ed) Theories of the Policy Process, Westview Press, UK, p. 265). Deduction begins 
with the general and ends with the specific. Deduction is generally past or present-oriented. It 
draws from general information then extracts a specific conclusion which proves the past or 
present truth. Deduction is informally called a ‘top-down’ approach (‘Deduction and Induction’ 
(n.d.)). 
196 Babbie, (1998), p. 64. 
197 Dahlberg, L. and McCaig, C. (2010) ‘Introduction to Research and Evaluation Basics’, in L. 
Dahlberg and C. McCaig (eds) Practical Research and Evaluation: A Start-to-Finish Guide for 
Practitioners, SAGE, London, p. 21. 
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the main case. 198  Therefore in this research, first, the data collected from 
embedded units using multiple sources has been categorised manually under 
themes related to the research questions. Second, the data has been incorporated to 
the main unit of analysis for the purpose of analysis. 
3.7. Summary 
Under four main components, this chapter outlined the methodology to examine 
the research questions raised in chapter 2. This research used the mixed method 
approach relying more heavily on qualitative methods, especially on the case 
study approach and therefore the single-case (embedded) design. Sri Lankan local 
government was selected as the single case, and the southern and eastern 
provincial councils were selected as the embedded units. From the two provinces, 
12 local government bodies were selected and there were 47 respondents in this 
research including national, provincial and local political representatives, 
administrative officials, officials attached to NGOs, and CBO representatives. 
Primary and secondary data were collected using a variety of sources such as 
interviews, observation, and documents and archives. To examine research 
questions and to investigate the applicability of theories in interpreting 
conclusions derived from the data, this research relied on both deductive and 
inductive reasoning respectively as the methods of data analysis. 
The following chapters draw the background of this research within the Sri 
Lankan context.  
198 Yin, (1994), p. 120. 
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Chapter 4 
History and political development in Sri Lanka 
4.1. Introduction 
Sri Lankan society is a complex mixture of ancient traditional politico-economic 
and socio-cultural structures and colonial structures. For nearly 450 years Sri 
Lanka was under Portuguese, Dutch and the British colonial rule with many 
generations living through changes made by colonial rulers. Sri Lankan society 
faced contradictions and confrontations between national and colonial elements 
and was transformed numerous times through those processes. To identify the 
changes relevant to the current political situation, this chapter outlines the 
background to contemporary Sri Lankan history and political development. It also 
sets the context for the following chapter, which presents the particular history 
and development of local government in Sri Lanka. A wide range of literature has 
been examined including details from various legal documents such as 
constitutions, acts and commissioned reports. Included also is material from 
several online news reports, newspaper articles, and web sites. The authors offer 
different perspectives about the same historical events, with some seeing 
colonialism as the main reason for certain failures within the Sri Lankan 
governing structure,199 while others point to other reasons for such failures.200 
This chapter begins by reviewing ancient Sri Lankan political history, and moves 
on to discuss colonial and post-colonial political development, especially the 
constitutional developments, development of political parties and the emergence 
of political leaders. The politics of decentralisation is outlined alongside the 
consequences of ethnic conflict. This chapter also addresses the extent to which 
199 See Christopher, A.J. (1988) ‘Divide and Rule: The Impress of British Separation Policies’, 
Area, Vol. 20, No. 3, Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The Royal Geographical Society (with the 
Institute of British Geographers), http://www.jstor.org/stable/20002624, accessed 15-02-2012 and 
DeVotta, N. (2003) ‘Ethnolinguistic Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka’, in M.E. 
Brown and S. Ganguly (eds) Fighting Words: Language Policy and Ethnic Relations in Asia, 
Belfer Centre for Science and International Affairs, Georgetown University, Centre for Peace and 
Security Studies, Pacific Basin Research Centre, MIT Press, 
http://books.google.co.nz/books/about/Fighting_words.html?id=fcoDezu1ABoC, accessed 17-02-
2012. 
200 See Lee, J. (2011) Sri Lanka, Department of Political Science, Florida State University and 
Farmer, B. H. (1963) Ceylon: A Divided Nation, Oxford University Press, London. 
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colonialism is the main reason for the difficulties of political leadership and 
government in the post-colonial context. 
4.2. Sri Lankan origins 
Numerous stories surround the ancient history of Sri Lanka and the origins of the 
Sinhalese people. Most believe that the Sinhalese are the descendants of Indo-
Aryans who came to Sri Lanka from northern India during the 6th century BC. 
Some 300 years later, Buddhism arrived from the Indian sub-continent and spread 
rapidly throughout the country. Ancient Sinhalese kingdoms had a close 
relationship with Buddhism in all matters of government. Buddhism and the 
sophisticated system of irrigation were the pillars of classical Sinhalese 
civilisation (200 BC-1200 AD) that flourished in the north-central part of the 
island.201 The kings who supported the spread of Buddhism and the development 
of agriculture have been highlighted in Sri Lankan history. South Indian invasions 
from 993 AD resulted in internecine strife and pushed Sinhalese kingdoms 
southward. In addition to these invasions, many outsiders were brought into 
contact with the island. For example, Roman sailors called the island ‘Taprobane’, 
and Arab traders knew it as ‘Serendip’, the root of the word ‘serendipity’.202 
Beginning in 1505, Portuguese traders in search of cinnamon and other spices 
seized the island’s coastal areas and introduced Catholicism. The Dutch 
supplanted the Portuguese in 1658, but were themselves ejected by the British in 
1796.  Roman-Dutch law remains an important part of Sri Lankan jurisprudence. 
In 1815 the British defeated the King of Kandy (the last kingdom of Sri Lanka), 
the last of the native rulers,203 and created the Crown Colony of Ceylon.204 They 
established a plantation economy based on tea, rubber, and coconuts, resulting in 
the decline of the self-sufficient agricultural economy. 
4.3. Political developments: constitutions, political parties and leaders 
Constitutional developments in Sri Lanka during the British colonial period drove 
the country towards a new political structure quite apart from the ancient 
201 ‘The World Factbook’ (n.d.) https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/ce.html, accessed 06-01-2012. 
202 ‘U.S. Relations with Sri Lanka’ (n.d.) http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5249.htm, accessed 10-
01-2012. 
203 ‘The World Factbook’ (n.d.). 
204 Sri Lanka was called as Ceylon till 1972. 
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kingdoms. These constitutional developments were continued by post-colonial 
rulers and resulted in a number of controversial decisions regarding the 
continuation of colonial structures. However the constitutional developments 
opened up a path to establish representative institutions, to obtain universal 
franchise, to the emergence of political parties and to the development of political 
leadership. 
4.3.1. Constitutional developments: colonial era 
During the British colonial period, a number of constitutional reforms with far 
reaching consequences were introduced. This constitutional development process 
started in 1829 when the British colonial office conducted a Royal Commission of 
Eastern Inquiry – the Colebrooke-Cameron Commission – to assess the finances, 
administration and judicial system of the island.205 The commission worked to 
end the system of rajakariya,206 the forced administrative division of the country 
along ethnic and cultural lines. The commission proposed instead that the country 
be put under one uniform administrative system, divided into five provinces. The 
same principle applied to the judicial system which was to be unified into one 
system and extended to all classes of people, offering everyone equal rights in the 
eyes of the law.207 
The exclusively British character of the administrative services ended in 1833 and 
the civil service was opened up to include local citizens, which required that a 
new emphasis be placed on English education, which contributed to the creation 
of a Westernised elite, whose members would go on to spearhead the drive for 
independence in the twentieth century. The Colebrooke-Cameron Commission 
also emphasised the standardisation of the educational curriculum and advocated 
the substitution of English for local languages from which an English-educated 
Ceylonese middle class emerged.208 
The commissioners also favoured the decentralisation of government executive 
power. They stripped away many of the autocratic powers vested in the governor, 
205 ‘A Country Study: Sri Lanka’ (n.d.) http://www.country-studies.com/sri-lanka/, accessed 12-
01-2012. 
206 The performance of service to the king, or to his successors the British government, in return 
for land tenure. 
207 ‘The British in Sri Lanka’ (n.d.) http://www.lankalibrary.com/geo/British/history4.htm, 
accessed 11-01-2012. 
208 ‘A Country Study: Sri Lanka’ (n.d.). 
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replacing his Advisory Council with an Executive Council which appointed the 
members of the Legislative Council. The Legislative Council functioned as a 
forum for the discussion of legislative matters and included membership which 
represented low-country Sinhalese, Burghers, and Tamils, respectively.209 
The Westernised elite and the English-educated Ceylonese middle class drove the 
constitutional reforms process forward, and demanded more Ceylonese 
representation in the Legislative Council. The Legislative Council was reformed 
in 1910, leading to an increase in membership,210 following the Crewe-McCallum 
Reforms.211 The most notable aspect of the Crewe-McCallum reforms was the 
introduction of elected members.212 A financial committee was also established to 
control the revenue. There were more Europeans than Ceylonese in the 
Legislative Council, and due to the strong caste divisions, both Sinhala and Tamil 
political elites were in competition to obtain more seats in the Legislative 
Council.213 
William Henry Manning, the British Governor in Ceylon during the period 1918-
1925, enacted major reforms in 1920 further increasing membership of the 
Legislative Council. 214  A notable change was the introduction of territorial 
constituencies 215  with Governor Manning actively encouraging the idea of 
‘communal representation’, creating the reformed Legislative Council in 1921 
with its first election returning 13 Sinhalese and three Tamils, a significant loss in 
representation for the Tamils when compared to the previous Council based on 
direct appointment by the governor. 216  Following this, the Tamils began to 
209 Ibid. 
210 Membership of the Legislative Council was increased from 18 to 21, of which 11 were official 
and 10 were non-official. Of the non-official members, six were appointed by the governor and the 
remaining four members were elected. 
211 The Secretary of State for the Colonies, the Earl of Crewe and the British Governor of Ceylon 
at that time, Henry Edward McCallum, were involved in these reforms. 
212 Fewer than 3,000 people (4%) could vote, as the right to vote was based on education and 
assets. 
213 Wickramasinghe, N. (2006) Sri Lanka in the Modern Age: A History of Contested Identities, 
University of Hawai’i Press, Honolulu, pp. 141-142. 
214 Membership of the Legislative Council increased from 21 to 37, of which 14 were official and 
23 were non-official. Of the non-official members, four were appointed by the governor and the 
remaining 19 were elected. Three non-official members were selected to be a part of the Executive 
Council. 
215 Of the 11 territorial constituencies, three were from the western province and one each from the 
other eight provinces. 
216 De Silva, K.M. (1972) ‘The Ceylon National Congress in Disarray, 1920-1921: Sir 
Ponnambalam Arunachalam Leaves the Congress’, Ceylon Journal of Historical and Social 
Studies, Vol. 2, No. 1, p. 114. 
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develop a communal consciousness and to think of themselves as a minority 
community. They focused on communal representation in the Council rather than 
national representation, and decided that their delegates should be leaders from 
their own community.217 Consequently, the previous demands for special status 
for certain castes began to change along communal lines. 
The Second Manning Reforms of 1923 again increased membership of the 
Legislative Council.218 The head of the Legislative Council had been the governor, 
but the new reforms created the post of president of the Legislative Council, 
which was held by the governor on a nominal basis. However, the governor still 
retained most of the authority in the country.219 The 1924 Manning Constitution 
was considered by the later Donoughmore Commission to be ‘an unqualified 
failure’ because it did not provide a strong, credible executive body of 
representatives.220  
The Donoughmore Commission gained its name from the Royal Commission 
under the Earl of Donoughmore in 1927. The commission proposed universal 
franchise, territorial representation and an experimental system of government to 
be run by executive committees. The commission’s recommendations led to 
Ceylon gaining limited self-government and the replacement of the Legislative 
Council with the State Council of Ceylon in 1931. The State Council functioned 
in both an executive and legislative capacity. Executive duties were performed by 
seven committees. 221  Commentators have described the Donoughmore 
Constitution as a unique document that provided Sri Lankans with valuable 
training for self-government. However, the Donoughmore Constitution reserved 
the highest level of responsibility for the British governor, whose assent was 
necessary for all legislation.222 The system of executive committees did not lead 
to the development of national political parties. Instead, a number of splinter 
political groups evolved around influential personalities who usually followed a 
vision too limited, or an agenda too communally partisan, to have an impact on 
217 De Silva, K.M. (2005) A History of Sri Lanka, Penguin, p. 448. 
218 Membership increased from 37 to 49, of which 12 were official and 37 were non-official. Four 
non-official members were selected to be part of the Executive Council. 
219 De Silva, (2005), p. 448. 
220 ‘A Country Study: Sri Lanka’ (n.d.). 
221 Abeysinghe, W.A. (1995) Government System in Sri Lanka (translated from Sinhala), Godage 
Publishers, Colombo-10, pp. 40-41. 
222 ‘A Country Study: Sri Lanka’ (n.d.). 
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national politics. The Great Council of the Sinhalese (Sinhala Maha Sabha), 
which was founded by S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike in 1937, was prominent among 
these groups. The other groups included the Burgher Political Association in 1938, 
the Ceylon Indian Congress (CIC) in 1939, and the All Ceylon Tamil Congress 
(ACTC) in 1944.223 These groups have shaped Sri Lankan politics and forged its 
political development resulting in continuing governing difficulties. 
The introduction of the universal franchise and territorial representation in 1931 
completely changed the character of Ceylonese politics, where Tamil politicians 
found it very difficult to accept that they would become a minority.224 A major 
problem was the emergence of political leaders who strongly backed and widened 
ethnic nationalism causing divisions between the main ethnic groups. 225  This 
resulted in the struggle for independence against British rule centred around a 
struggle amongst ethnic groups within the country. 
During the 2nd World War (1939-1945), Sri Lanka committed itself to the allied 
war effort. Although the island was put under military jurisdiction during the war, 
the British and the Ceylonese maintained cooperative relations. Ceylonese 
pressure for political reform continued during the war and increased as the 
Japanese threat receded and the war neared its end. The British eventually 
promised full participatory government after the war.226 
Sri Lanka, thus, benefitted from its role in the 2nd World War.227 In July 1944, 
Lord Soulbury was appointed head of a commission charged with the task of 
examining a new constitutional draft that had been proposed by the Sri Lankan 
board of ministers headed by D.S. Senanayake.228 It is evident that the struggle for 
223 Ibid. 
224 Russell, J. (1982) Communal Politics under the Donoughmore Constitution: 1931-1947, Tisara 
Publishers, Colombo, p. 308. 
225 ‘A Country Study: Sri Lanka’ (n.d.). 
226 ‘Sri Lanka: World War II and the Transition to Independence’ (n.d.) http://www.country-
studies.com/sri-lanka/world-war-ii-and-the-transition-to-independence.html, accessed 13-01-2012. 
227 When Singapore fell to the Japanese in February 1942, Sri Lanka became a central base for 
British operations in Southeast Asia, and the port at Trincomalee recaptured its historically 
strategic importance. As an indispensable strategic bastion for the British royal navy, Sri Lanka 
was an irresistible military target for the Japanese. The British fought several desperate air battles 
over Colombo and Trincomalee and lost 36 aircraft and several ships. The Japanese carrier force, 
however, suffered such high aircraft losses over Sri Lanka – more than 100 warplanes – that it 
returned to Japan for refitting rather than press the attack. In returning to Japan, the force had lost 
its opportunity for unchallenged supremacy of the Indian Ocean (ibid.). 
228 D.S. Senanayake was the leader of the ‘constitutionalist’ wing of the Sri Lankan independence 
movement and began to develop a Ceylonese vision, through the cooperation of all the ethnic and 
religious groups. 
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independence in Ceylon had been fought on ‘constitutionalist’ lines rather than on 
the strongly confrontational approach that had developed in British India.229 But 
in widening the scope of the commission to consult with various interests, 
including the minority communities, the ethnic disparities were again brought into 
the arena. 
The Tamil Congress, led by G.G. Ponnambalam, spearheaded the demand for 
balanced representation for the minority communities (known as ‘fifty-fifty’); this 
implied a communally-based legislature with 50 per cent of the seats for all the 
minorities – Ceylon Tamils, Indian Tamils, Muslims, Malays, Burghers and 
Europeans – and 50 per cent for the Sinhalese. However, this was not supported 
beyond a large section of the Ceylon Tamils of the Jaffna peninsula and Colombo. 
The eastern province Tamil representatives in the State Council were not in favour 
of it, and the Indian Tamils were definitely not committed. The Muslims under the 
leadership of T.B. Jayah, 230 expressed qualified approval, but other prominent 
Muslim leaders did not accept the formula as a solution.231 
The 1945 Soulbury Report stated that any attempt by artificial means to convert a 
majority into a minority is not only inequitable, but doomed to failure.  
Ponnambalam’s schemes for securing the status of Tamils were completely 
contrary to the ‘one man-one vote’ concept widely accepted in European 
liberalism, and met with severe disapprobation by the commissioners. 
Ponnambalam’s proposals were considered to be a means of conferring a minority 
supremacy amounting to virtual majority rule, and ‘denial of the democratic 
principle’.232 The commission’s responses to these demands were based on the 
principles that the state would not identify with any ethnic or religious community 
and that special opportunities to underprivileged minorities would not be 
accommodated in the constitution.233 Lord Soulbury wrote in B.H. Farmer’s book, 
Ceylon: A Divided Nation that,  
229 De Silva, K.M. (1981) A History of Sri Lanka, Oxford University Press, p. 560. 
230 T.B. Jayah was a prominent Sri Lankan Muslim leader who entered politics in 1924 and was 
elected to the Legislative Council to represent the minority communities. He was appointed the 
Minister of Labour and Social Services. He worked in unison with the members who represented 
other communities. From 1936 to 1947, he served in the State Council. 
231 Wilson, A.J. (1994) S.J.V. Chelvanayakam and the Crisis of Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalism, 
1947-1977: A Political Biography, C. Hurst & Co. (Publishers) Ltd., UK, p. 12. 
232 Russell, (1982), p. 311. 
233 Wickramasinghe, (2006), p. 169. 
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A Commission, of which I had the honour to be the Chairman, was appointed by 
the British Government in 1944, to examine and discuss proposals for the 
constitutional reform of Ceylon. It did not take long to discover that the relations 
of minorities to majorities and particularly of the Tamil minority in the northern 
and eastern provinces to the Sinhalese majority further south, were in the words 
of the commission’s report ‘the most difficult of the many problems involved’.234 
Nonetheless, Ponnambalam’s demands were rewarded by the commissioners with 
the introduction of a provision for multi-member constituencies in suitable areas, 
allowing for greater representation for ethnic minorities like Tamils, Muslims and 
other groups. The commissioners also recommended the inclusion of provisions 
relating to communal discrimination.235 Other than the demands of the Tamils, the 
Kandyans proposed a federal scheme where the up-country region, the low-
country, and the north would become three federal states. 236  However, their 
suggestions were rejected by the commissioners who found no merit in the federal 
proposals. According to commentators, the visit of the Soulbury Commission and 
the final Soulbury Report did much to reconcile the minority communities237 with 
the Sinhala leadership under D.S. Senanayake. 
As the end of the 2nd World War approached, the constitution was amended to 
incorporate a provision giving Sri Lanka dominion status. In 1945 the Free Lanka 
Bill was passed. The Soulbury Commission’s recommendations led to a new 
constitution. British constitutional principles served as a model for the Soulbury 
Constitution of an independent Sri Lanka, which combined a parliamentary 
system with a bicameral legislature. Members of the lower House of 
Representatives were directly elected by popular vote. Members of the Senate, or 
upper House, were elected partly by members of the House and partly by the 
governor, who was primarily a figurehead. The British monarch appointed the 
governor on the advice of the most powerful person in the Sri Lankan government 
– the prime minister. 238  Thus Ceylon became independent on 4th February 
1948.239 
234 Farmer, (1963), p. vii. 
235 The Soulbury Report (1945), p. 101. 
236 ‘Federal Solution to Ethnic Conflict Proposed by the Liberal Party of Sri Lanka’ (2007) 
http://www.asiantribune.com/node/4370, accessed 12-08-2013. 
237 Article 29 of the Soulbury Constitution provided protective provisions for the minorities. 
238 ‘Sri Lanka: World War II and the Transition to Independence’ (n.d.). 
239 The British government made the official announcement on 18th June 1947 that Ceylon would 
receive ‘fully responsible status within the British Commonwealth of Nations’. 
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The constitutional reforms which had taken place during the colonial era led to 
significant developments: first, following several constitutional reform 
commissions appointed by the British colonial government, the constitutions and 
the representative institutions that eventuated followed the British political and 
administrative structures; and second, the ruling power was transferred from 
colonial rulers to post-colonial rulers. The emergence of rivalries among 
Ceylonese political leaders along caste and ethnic nationalist lines was aimed at 
gaining more representation for their groups in the legislative bodies and can be 
identified as a limitation which undermined the unity of national political leaders 
in their quest to obtain independence. Because the ruling power had been 
concentrated among the Westernised elite and the English-educated Ceylonese 
middle class, it had been their interests which had been mostly connected with 
promoting the Western institutional structures rather than efforts to address the 
actual needs of the country. 
4.3.2. Constitutional developments: post-colonial era 
An independent Ceylon governed under the Soulbury Constitution lasted until 
1972. After independence, there were long-lasting debates in the legislature about 
how to address Sri Lankan societal needs through new constitutional provisions 
and laws. Maintaining colonial institutional structures was identified by post-
colonial rulers as a barrier to this because they did not reflect wider Sri Lankan 
societal values. Post-colonial governments attempted to bring changes to colonial 
political and administrative structures, but a new constitution was not drafted until 
1970. 
The 1970 election manifesto of the United Front (coalition) sought a mandate 
from the people to convert the elected parliament into a Constituent Assembly240 
with the drafting of a new constitution. In 1972 Sirimavo Bandaranaike’s United 
Front government introduced a new constitution consisting of 134 articles 
grouped into 16 chapters and proposed that the country’s name be changed from 
Ceylon to the Republic of Sri Lanka. The constitution contained several new 
features. It declared Sri Lanka be a free, sovereign and independent Republic 
240 Warnapala, W.A.W. (1973) ‘The New Constitution of Sri Lanka’, Asian Survey, Vol. 13, No. 
12, University of California Press, p. 1179 (http://www.jstor.org/stable/2642676, accessed 13-01-
2012). 
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pledged toward the objectives of a socialist democracy. The constitution derived 
its authority from the people of Sri Lanka and not from the power and authority 
assumed and exercised by the British Crown, and thus was based upon the 
principle of popular sovereignty. The sovereignty of the people, an inalienable 
right according to the constitution, was to be exercised through a National State 
Assembly of elected representatives of the people. The National State Assembly 
was a unicameral legislature set up under the constitution, and was the supreme 
instrument of state power of the Republic.241 
Despite such founding principles the new constitution, however, continued to 
follow long-established and strong policies of the centralisation of power and ill-
treatment of ethnic minorities, especially Tamils. The National State Assembly 
exercised executive power through the President as the head of state and the 
cabinet of ministers, and the judicial power through courts and other institutions 
created by law. The functions and powers of the President indicated that there had 
been no departure from those exercised by the governor under the previous 
constitution. 242  The exponents of the separation of powers criticised the 
concentration of power in the National State Assembly as a dangerous feature of 
the constitution. The opposition wanted at least a partial separation of powers, but 
the framers of the constitution had not agreed on this.243 Several further criticisms 
emerged of the constitutional provisions, including the status of language, religion 
and the unitary structure of the state. Several amendments were proposed which 
sought to provide ‘parity of status’ for both Sinhala and Tamil, but the framers 
opposed those. The constitution stated that the administration of justice shall be in 
Sinhala throughout Sri Lanka, which prompted an angry response from the 
English-educated propertied classes and the lawyer class of the Tamil 
community. 244  The Tamils were especially disturbed because the 1972 
Constitution contained no elements of decentralisation.245  
The constitution declared Sri Lanka to be a unitary state and that Buddhism was to 
be given the prime religious status. A two-thirds majority was required to amend 
241 Ibid., p. 1182. 
242 Ibid., p. 1191. 
243 Ibid., p. 1184. 
244 Ibid., pp. 1190-1191. 
245 ‘A Country Study: Sri Lanka’ (n.d.). 
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these sections. 246  The newly conferred status for Buddhism replaced the 
provisions for minorities provided by Article 29 in the Soulbury Constitution. The 
constitution also sanctioned measures that discriminated against Tamil youth in 
university admissions. Tamil youth were particularly irked by the ‘standardisation’ 
policy that Bandaranaike’s government introduced in 1973. The policy made 
university admissions criteria lower for Sinhalese than for Tamils. The distinct 
lack of protection for the rights of minorities in the 1972 Constitution dismayed 
many sectors of the population.247 Even the section on fundamental rights in the 
constitution was not enforceable by any courts.248 
Under the 1972 Constitution, the economic policies were highly socialist and 
included land reform, increased rice subsidies, and nationalisation of large tea and 
rubber plantations, local and foreign banks, and other private industries. 249 In 
foreign policy, Bandaranaike’s United Front government followed a non-aligned 
path, opposed imperialism, colonialism, and racism, and supported national 
liberation movements.250 In these ways the central government’s strong control 
over the economy and foreign relations was confirmed and continued. 
However, the 1972 Constitution existed for only five years. In 1977, the United 
National Party (UNP) under J.R. Jayewardene was returned to power. 
Jayewardene opened the economy and directed the re-writing of the constitution 
based on the French model.251 It changed the country’s name to the Democratic 
Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, with the new Constitution of 1978 drastically 
altering the nature of government. It replaced the previous Westminster 
parliamentary government with a new presidential system with a powerful chief 
executive. A proportional representation electoral system was introduced. The 
President was to be elected by direct suffrage for a six-year term and was 
empowered to appoint, with parliamentary approval, the prime minister and to 
preside over cabinet meetings.252 The Parliament remained unicameral consisting 
246 Warnapala, (1973), p.1192. 
247 ‘A Country Study: Sri Lanka’ (n.d.). 
248 Warnapala, (1973), p. 1184. 
249 ‘U.S. Relations with Sri Lanka’ (n.d.). 
250 ‘A Country Study: Sri Lanka’ (n.d.). 
251 This refers to the French model of semi-presidential system which a popularly elected fixed-
term president exists alongside a prime minister and a cabinet of ministers. 
252 ‘A Country Study: Sri Lanka’ (n.d.). 
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of 225 members; 196 elected members 253  and 29 through the national lists 
allocated to the parties and independent groups in proportion to their share of the 
total valid votes.254 Parliament members were elected for a six-year term. 
A chapter on fundamental rights, enforceable by the Supreme Court, was 
introduced to the 1978 Constitution which also included substantial concessions to 
Tamil sensitivities. Jayewardene’s UNP255 offered other concessions in a bid to 
secure peace. Sinhala remained the official language and the language of 
administration throughout Sri Lanka, but Tamil was given a new ‘national 
language’ status. Jayewardene also eliminated a major Tamil grievance by 
abrogating the ‘standardisation’ policy of the United Front government, which 
had made university admission criteria for Tamils more difficult. Moreover, he 
offered many top-level positions, including that of minister of justice, to Tamil 
civil servants.256 
The 1978 Constitution could be amended by passing a bill with a two-thirds 
majority of Parliament. By 2012 it had been amended 18 times, with the most 
recent amendment being passed in 2010. The 18th amendment has been more 
controversial in its provision to remove the two-term limit on election to the office 
of the President, and the Constitutional Council under the 17th amendment.257 
Commentators argue that the removal of the two-term limit could lead to 
authoritarianism mainly due to the tendency of the incumbent to be re-elected 
253 According to the 1978 Constitution, 36 of the 196 seats were allocated to the nine provinces 
with four seats for each province, and 160 seats allocated to the 22 multi-member electoral 
districts. The constitution limits the number of electoral districts to between 20 and 25. All but two 
of the electoral districts are coterminous with their namesake administrative district. The two 
exceptions are Jaffna (which covers the administrative districts of Jaffna and Kilinochchi) and 
Vanni (which covers the administrative districts of Mannar, Mullaitivu and Vavuniya). The first 
general election which used these electoral districts was in 1989. 
254 Each party and independent group contest Parliamentary elections have to submit a national list 
including 29 names to the Electoral Commission prior to the election. The aim of the national lists 
was to get service of the professionals in various fields such as lawyers, university lecturers, and 
economists who do not prefer contesting elections. 
255 Jayewardene became the first President under the new constitution and assumed direct control 
of the government machinery and party. 
256 ‘A Country Study: Sri Lanka’ (n.d.). 
257 The Constitutional Council has been replaced by a new Parliamentary Council. Therefore the 
President seeks the ‘observations’ of the Parliamentary Council in making appointments to key 
government posts. However where the Parliamentary Council fails to communicate its 
observations to the President within the specified time, the President can proceed to make 
appointments solely at his discretion. All members of the Parliamentary Council must be the 
members of the Parliament. According to commentators, the Parliamentary Council is inadequate 
in representing diverse opinions (‘The 18th Amendment to the Constitution: Process and Substance’ 
(2010) http://groundviews.org/2010/09/02/the-18th-amendment-to-the-constitution-process-and-
substance/, accessed 02-09-2011). 
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consecutively which would consequentially lead to the loss of democracy in Sri 
Lanka. 258  Moreover, the 18th amendment restricts the role of the Electoral 
Commission. Commentators argue that reducing the powers of the Electoral 
Commission will undermine the future of free and fair elections.259 
The 1972 Constitution existed for a short period compared with the longer-lasting 
1978 Constitution. Both constitutions reflect the policies of Sri Lankan rulers 
involved in the constitutional developments. The 1972 Constitution was 
introduced by a left-wing coalition and the 1978 Constitution by a right-wing 
political party. Despite their leftist or rightist preferences, both constitutions 
indicate a common feature of power concentration at the centre, the 1972 
Constitution at the legislature, the National State Assembly, and the 1978 
Constitution at the executive, the President. When closely scrutinised, it is evident 
that most Sri Lankan rulers involved in those constitutional developments 
attempted to strengthen and protect their powers and positions260 rather than build 
mechanisms to address societal needs and empower people. In summary, Sri 
Lankan rulers have continued with colonial political and administrative structures, 
but it can be argued they have gone beyond the power centralisation of colonial 
rulers. 
4.3.3. Development of political parties and the emergence of political leaders 
Sri Lanka’s political party development and the emergence of political leaders 
highlight several political phenomena that have occurred in the country from time 
to time. The Donoughmore Commission introduced the universal franchise to Sri 
Lanka, but there was no developed party system for a long time. Political 
scientists have criticised the Donoughmore Constitution regarding this matter. But 
during the Donoughmore period of political experimentation, several leftist parties 
were formed.261 Unlike most other Sri Lankan parties, these leftist parties were 
258 Ibid. 
259 The privately owned media has been obliged to comply with guidelines issued by the Electoral 
Commission. This undermines the free flow of information during election time and allows the 
ruling party to manipulate all media during election time (ibid.). 
260 Abeysinghe, (1995), pp. 29-34. 
261 The first important leftist party was the Labour Party, founded in 1931 by A.E. Gunasinghe. 
Three Marxist-oriented parties – the Ceylon Equal Society Party (Lanka Sama Samaja Party, 
LSSP), the Bolshevik-Leninist Party, and the Communist Party of Sri Lanka (CPSL) – represented 
the far-left. All three were divided on both ideological and personal grounds (see Alexander, R.J. 
(1991) International Trotskyism 1929-1985: A Documented Analysis of the Movement, Duke 
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non-communal in membership and largely represented the numerically small 
urban working class. Partly because these parties operated through the medium of 
trade unionism, they lacked the wider mass appeal needed at the national level to 
provide an effective extra-parliamentary challenge to the central government.262 
The UNP, led by D.S. Senanayake, was a partnership of many disparate groups 
formed during the Donoughmore period including the Ceylon National Congress 
(CNC), the Sinhala Maha Sabha, and the Muslim League. Although the UNP 
represented the business community and the landed gentry, Senanayake also 
adopted populist policies that made the party accepted at the local level. The UNP 
easily won the 1947 general elections, challenged only by a collection of small, 
primarily leftist parties. Senanayake became the first Prime Minister and he 
followed a pro-West, anti-Communist foreign policy. In 1952, Prime Minister 
Senanayake died from a riding accident and his son became Prime Minister.263 
Later the UNP attempted to reduce the rice ration and there was a Hartal,264 
which caused the younger Senanayake to resign.265 
S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, a Buddhist nationalist leader, who was known for his 
centre-left views, quit the UNP to found the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) in 
1951 as a balancing force between the UNP and the far-leftist groups.266 The party 
was generally considered as having a centre-left economic agenda and has often 
been associated with Sinhala nationalist parties. There was growing disaffection 
with the UNP particularly because of its support of minority religious groups, 
most notably Catholics, to the consternation of the predominantly Buddhist 
Sinhalese. Bandaranaike was able to take advantage and lead the SLFP to victory 
University Press, http://www.marxists.org/history/etol/writers/alex/works/in_trot/cey1_1.htm, 
accessed 16-09-2013). 
262 ‘A Country Study: Sri Lanka’ (n.d.). 
263 The UNP also won the general elections held in June 1952, and Dudley Senanayake continued 
as Prime Minister without a re-appointment. 
264 Hartal is a term in many Indian languages for strike action, used often during the Indian 
independence movement. It is mass protest often involving a total shutdown of workplaces, offices, 
shops, courts of law as a form of civil disobedience. In addition to being a general strike, it 
involves the voluntary closing of schools and places of business. It is a mode of appealing to the 
sympathies of a government to change an unpopular or unacceptable decision. Hartal 1953 was a 
country-wide demonstration, held in Sri Lanka on 12th August 1953. It was organised to protest the 
policies and actions of the incumbent UNP government. It was the first mass political action in Sri 
Lanka. 
265 Dudley Senanayake was replaced by his cousin, Major John Kotalawala (‘The United National 
Party’ (n.d.) http://unitednationalparty.tripod.com/, accessed 20-01-2012). 
266 ‘The Sri Lanka Freedom Party’ (n.d.) http://www.mahinda-peoplespresident.com/our-
leader/slfp/, accessed 20-01-2012. 
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in the 1956 elections in a landslide, at the head of a four-party coalition with a no-
contest pact with the LSSP and the CPSL. 267  In 1959 Prime Minister 
Bandaranaike was assassinated.268 Eventually the leadership of the SLFP fell to 
Bandaranaike’s widow, Sirimavo Bandaranaike, who was soon appointed a 
Senator. She became Prime Minister269 when another coalition led by the SLFP 
won elections in July 1960.270 
The UNP again came to power in 1965 in a coalition led by Dudley 
Senanayake.271 This government lost in a 1970 landslide to the SLFP, which had 
formed an electoral alliance with leftist parties (LSSP and CPSL) known as the 
United Front. Sirimavo Bandaranaike again became Prime Minister.272 From 1956 
to 1977, coalition governments can be identified as a prominent feature in Sri 
Lankan politics. 
The UNP was returned to power in 1977 under the leadership of J.R. 
Jayewardene.273 The UNP won the largest landslide in Sri Lankan history, 140 out 
of 168 seats in the Parliament274 which marked a five-sixths (5/6) Parliamentary 
majority for a single party. For the first time, a Tamil party, the Tamil United 
Liberation Front (TULF) won the second-highest number of seats in Parliament 
and became the official opposition.275 Jayewardene became the Prime Minister 
and was elected Executive President by the Parliament in 1978 and by nationwide 
election in 1982. 276  In 1982, a national referendum extended the life of the 
Parliament for another six years.277 
267 Weerakoon, B. (2004) Rendering unto Caesar: A Fascinating Story of One Man’s Tenure 
under Nine Prime Ministers and Presidents of Sri Lanka, Vijitha Yapa Publications, Sri Lanka, pp. 
17-19. 
268 Bandaranaike died due to wounds received after being shot by Talduwe Somarama a Buddhist 
monk. After his death Wijayananda Dahanayake, Minister of Education and the Leader of the 
House, took over as care-taker Prime Minister after being appointed by the Ceylonese parliament. 
269 She was the world’s first female Prime Minister. 
270 Weerakoon, (2004), pp. 61-75, 96. 
271 Leftist Mahajana Eksath Peramuna (MEP), the Sri Lanka Freedom Socialist Party (SLFSP), and 
the Tamil ethnic Federal Party were in this coalition (ibid., p. 139). 
272 Ibid., pp. 162-165. 
273 J.R. Jayewardene was a strong supporter of free market policies and a pro-American foreign 
policy. There was a UNP leadership battle between the populist Dudley Senanayake and the more 
conservative J.R. Jayewardene prior to his appointment as the UNP leader (ibid.). 
274 It should be noted that the legislature was yet called as National State Assembly during this 
time till the 1978 Constitution came in to being. 
275 The TULF gained a majority of the votes in the north and east, won 18 seats. A. Amirthalingam 
became Leader of the Opposition (‘TULF Leader Passes Away’ (2002) 
http://www.hinduonnet.com/2002/06/06/stories/2002060603761100.htm, accessed 18-01-2012). 
276 Jayewardene remained in power until 1988 when his two terms of presidency ended. 
277 ‘The United National Party’ (n.d.). 
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In the 1988 Presidential elections, the UNP’s Ranasinghe Premadasa, Prime 
Minister in the Jayewardene government, narrowly defeated Sirimavo 
Bandaranaike (SLFP). The UNP also won an absolute majority in the 1989 
Parliamentary elections. Premadasa was assassinated on 1st May 1993 by the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), and the presidency was replaced by 
then Prime Minister D.B. Wijetunga. He appointed Ranil Wickremasinghe as the 
new Prime Minister.278 
By this time the SLFP had become part of the People’s Alliance (PA) coalition 
headed by Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga. Kumaratunga went on to win a 
landslide victory in Parliamentary elections in August 1994,279 and later won the 
November 1994 Presidential elections.280 President Kumaratunga won re-election 
to another six-year term in December 1999. The PA also won the Parliamentary 
elections in October 2000. But less than a year after being re-elected, the PA lost 
its majority. The United National Front (UNF) coalition, led by UNP leader Ranil 
Wickremasinghe, won the 2001 Parliamentary elections with 109 seats while the 
President’s PA came second with 77 seats, which led to an arrangement of 
political cohabitation between two rival parties, with the PA’s leader as President 
and the UNP’s leader as Prime Minister.281 
In November 2003, President Kumaratunga sacked three key ministers, taking 
over their portfolios (including defence), and declared a state of emergency on the 
grounds of national security. No agreement on working arrangements was reached 
between the President and Prime Minister and, in January 2004, the SLFP signed 
an alliance with the People’s Liberation Front (Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna, JVP) 
forming the United People’s Freedom Alliance (UPFA). 282  In February, the 
President dissolved Parliament and called general elections in April, which 
produced a new political order with a victory for the UPFA. Support for the 
278 ‘U.S. Relations with Sri Lanka’ (n.d.). 
279 ‘Straining Consensus: Government Strategies for War and Peace in Sri Lanka 1994-98’ (n.d.) 
http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/sri-lanka/straining-consensus.php, accessed 12-01-2012. 
280 Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga appointed her mother (former Prime Minister Sirimavo 
Bandaranaike) to replace her as Prime Minister. But in August 2000, Sirimavo Bandaranaike 
resigned as Prime Minister for health reasons, and Ratnasiri Wickramanayake was appointed to 
take her place. 
281 ‘Country Profile: Sri Lanka’ (n.d.) http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/travel-and-living-abroad/travel-
advice-by-country/country-profile/asia-oceania/sri-lanka?profile=all, accessed 11-01-2012. 
282 ‘New Blow for Sri Lankan Peace Pact’ (2004) http://articles.cnn.com/2004-01-
20/world/slanka.peace_1_peace-process-prime-minister-ranil-wickremesinghe-government-and-
force?_s=PM:WORLD, accessed 13-01-2012. 
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traditional parties dropped, and smaller parties gained a significant numbers of 
seats. While it did not win enough seats to command a majority in Parliament, the 
UPFA formed a government and appointed Mahinda Rajapaksa as Prime 
Minister.283 
In November 2005, Mahinda Rajapaksa (UPFA) was elected President with 50.3 
per cent of the vote. The LTTE enforced a boycott of the poll in key Tamil areas 
which resulted in extremely low voter participation in the north and east of the 
country. Ranil Wickremasinghe, UNP Presidential candidate and Leader of the 
Opposition, won 48.4 per cent. In January 2007 a number of UNP MPs joined the 
government side giving it a Parliamentary majority.284 
President Rajapaksa stood for re-election two years before the end of his term, in 
January 2010, and was re-elected by a margin of 18 per cent over the opposition 
candidate, retired Army General Sarath Fonseka who was supported by a number 
of opposition parties including the UNP, JVP and Tamil National Alliance (TNA). 
Both candidates’ campaigns focussed on their respective roles in the military 
defeat of the LTTE in May 2009. The Presidential elections were soon followed 
by a large victory for Rajapaksa’s UPFA coalition in April 2010 Parliamentary 
elections, where it captured 144 out of a possible 225 seats,285 just shy of a two-
thirds majority. 286 Fonseka contested the 2010 Parliamentary elections under a 
new political alliance, the DNA formed under his leadership. He won more DNA 
preferential votes and was elected to the Parliament. But, as a result of the prison 
sentence,287 he lost his seat as an MP.288 
283 ‘Agreements that Betrayed Sri Lanka: Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure (P-
TOMS)’ (2013) http://www.lankaweb.com/news/items/2013/04/08/agreements-that-betrayed-sri-
lankapost-tsunami-operational-management-structure-p-toms/, accessed 16-09-2013. 
284 ‘Country Profile: Sri Lanka’ (n.d.). 
285 The remaining Parliamentary seats were secured by the UNP (60), the TNA (14), and the 
Democratic National Alliance (DNA) (7). 
286 ‘U.S. Relations with Sri Lanka’ (n.d.). 
287 Following the Presidential election, Fonseka was arrested on charges of campaigning whilst in 
uniform and corruption over military procurement contracts. Courts martial found Fonseka guilty 
on both charges and he was dishonourably discharged and sentenced to 30 months in prison. He 
contested the 2010 Parliamentary elections from prison. Many observers regarded Fonseka’s 
prosecution and conviction as politically motivated. In May 2012, Fonseka was granted a 
Presidential Pardon and released from the prison. But despite the presidential pardon granted 
Fonseka, it is conditional and he cannot vote or contest election for the next seven years 
(Radhakrishnan, R.K. (2012) ‘Fonseka Released with Strings Attached’, 
http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/article3442726.ece, accessed 26-05-2012). 
288 ‘U.S. Relations with Sri Lanka’ (n.d.). 
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Overall, since independence two major political parties, the UNP and the SLFP, 
have alternated as government. Sometimes these parties, especially the SLFP 
entered into coalition with other parties. In the beginning there were clear 
divisions among the policies of the two major parties, but these divisions have 
become blurred with capitalist, liberal democratic policies being highlighted by 
both parties. Throughout their history, the far-leftist parties remained as minor 
political parties. However, from time to time they entered into coalitions with the 
major political parties and supported newly formed governments. At the present, 
some of the far-leftist parties and leaders support the UPFA government. They 
represent Parliament by contesting under the UPFA banner. At a glance, a two-
party system exists in Sri Lanka but there are many other political parties which 
from time to time control the stability of the existing governments, leading some 
commentators to say that there is a multi-party democracy in Sri Lanka. 
4.3.3.1. The role of ethnic-based/nationalist political parties 
Other than the main political parties, Tamil and Sinhala nationalist parties and 
Muslim parties have had a history of transforming the political structure in Sri 
Lanka. The ACTC under the leadership of G.G. Ponnambalam was popular 
among Tamils because it promoted the preservation of Tamil identity.289 In 1948 
Ponnambalam decided to merge the ACTC with the ruling UNP,290 but this was 
not supported by the entire congress and ended up splitting the ACTC in half, 
with one faction merging with D.S. Senanayake’s UNP 291  and the other 
developing  a new Tamil party, called the Federal Party (Ilankai Tamil Arasu 
Kachchi, ITAK), led by S.J.V. Chelvanayakam. The ITAK gained popularity 
among the Tamil people because it advocated Tamil rights. 292  It decided to 
demand a separate, autonomous Tamil state293 and merged with the other Tamil 
289 Wilson, A.J. (2000) Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalism: Its Origins and Development in the 
Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, University of British Columbia Press, pp. 1-12. 
290 The ACTC advocated a ‘fifty-fifty’ policy but, as discussed earlier, this proposal was rejected 
by the Soulbury Commission, and the ACTC developed a new policy of ‘responsive cooperation’ 
with ‘progressive-minded Sinhalese’ (ibid.). 
291 ‘Opinion’ (2003) http://www.island.lk/2003/02/09//opinio02.html, accessed 14-09-2013. 
292 ‘Indian Plantation Tamils Disenfranchised; Federal Party Formed’ (n.d.) http://pact.lk/18-
december-1948/, accessed 14-09-2013 and ‘Thanthai Chelva Statue in Trinco Beheaded’ (2011) 
http://www.tamilguardian.com/article.asp?articleid=3809, accessed 14-09-2013. 
293 ‘Tamil Alienation’ (n.d.) http://countrystudies.us/sri-lanka/71.htm, accessed 18-01-2012. 
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political parties in 1975 to become the TULF.294 At the 1977 election, the TULF 
became the first Tamil nationalist party to run on a separatist platform. Later, due 
to this, TULF members were expelled from Parliament.295 After this expulsion, 
militants ruled the Tamil political movement. Of the many groups involved, the 
LTTE has been highlighted as the most solidly nationalistic Tamil resistance 
organisation.296 
While the Tamil nationalist parties were developing in the north, Sinhala 
nationalist parties simultaneously developed in the south. The JVP was founded in 
1965 with the aim of providing a leading force for a socialist revolution in Sri 
Lanka. Rohana Wijeweera, the founder of JVP, was not satisfied with the 
remaining leftist parties and decided to launch a revolutionary new party. In the 
period that followed the cadres engaged themselves in political activities that 
consisted mainly of trying to increase the political awareness of the working 
class.297 The party soon took a patriotic nationalistic turn and was involved in two 
armed uprisings against the ruling governments in 1971 (SLFP-led coalition) and 
1987-89 (UNP). After 1989, JVP entered into democratic politics by participating 
in the 1994 Parliamentary election.298 
294 The TULF was formed when the Tamil political parties merged and adopted the Vaddukoddai 
Resolution, named after the village, Vaddukoddai, where it was developed. This resolution called 
for the creation of an independent Tamil state of Eelam (Wilson, (2000), pp. 1-12). 
295 The 6th amendment to the 1978 Constitution was passed in 1983, requiring Tamils in 
Parliament and other public officers to take an oath of allegiance to the unified state of Sri Lanka. 
It forbade anyone advocating for a separate state, resulting in TULF members being expelled from 
Parliament for refusing to take the oath (Wilson, A. J. (1988) The Break-up of Sri Lanka: The 
Sinhalese-Tamil Conflict, C. Hurst & Co. Publishers, Sydney, p. 228). 
296 Wilson, (2000), pp. 131-132. 
297 ‘A Brief History of the JVP (Peoples Liberation Front) Sri Lanka’ (n.d.) 
http://www.jvpsrilanka.com/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=119&Itemid=2
7, accessed 14-09-2013. 
298 As mentioned above, following the 2004 Parliamentary election, JVP signed an alliance with 
the SLFP to form the UPFA. The JVP later broke with the SLFP and left the government, but often 
supported it from outside. In June 2005, the JVP left the government after the President decided to 
sign a post-tsunami funding arrangement with the LTTE (‘Agreements that Betrayed Sri Lanka: 
Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure (P-TOMS)’ (2013) op.cit.). Again in the 2005 
Presidential election, JVP supported the UPFA Presidential candidate Mahinda Rajapaksa, but 
later broke with him. This caused the JVP to divide into factions, and one faction representing 
Sinhala nationalism formed a separate political party, the National Freedom Front (NFF) and 
started supporting the present UPFA government. The rest of the JVP supported the Presidential 
candidate General Sarath Fonseka in the 2010 Presidential election. This faction represents 
Parliament under the DNA (‘Anoma to UNP: Come Join Us’ (2010) 
http://www.dailymirror.lk/print/index.php/news/front-image/4446-anoma-to-unp-come-join-us-
.htm, accessed 18-01-2012). 
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The other significant Sinhala nationalist party is Jathika Hela Urumaya299 (JHU) 
led by Buddhist monks. The JHU was launched in 2004 by the lay-based, secular 
Sinhala nationalist political party Sihala Urumaya. Some Sri Lankan Buddhists, 
including the All Island Clergy Organisation, denounced the decision by monks to 
enter politics. The party drew some support from the middle class conservatives 
and the Buddhist youth.300 The JHU contested its first Parliamentary election in 
2004 with all of its candidates Buddhist monks.301 At the election the party won 
nine out of 225 seats.302 
Other than these political parties, contemporary Tamil and Muslim parties have a 
significant role in the Sri Lankan political arena. From time to time these minority 
parties have supported coalition governments and obtained bargaining power with 
respect to minority demands. The TNA, a powerful Sri Lankan Tamil political 
alliance, was formed in 2001 as an amalgamation of moderate Tamil parties as 
well as a number of former rebel groups.303 It has participated in elections since 
2001. The TNA supported negotiations with the LTTE to resolve the war in Sri 
Lanka, and with the other opposition parties supported General Sarath Fonseka in 
the 2010 Presidential elections. 
In 2006 the Karuna faction of the LTTE304 registered a political party, the Tamil 
People’s Liberation Tigers (Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal, TMVP) under the 
leadership of Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan, alias Karuna Amman. 
299 The English meaning of this is ‘National Sinhala Heritage’. 
300 Deegalle, M. (2006) ‘JHU Politics for Peace and a Righteous State’, in M. Deegalle (ed) 
Buddhism, Conflict and Violence in Modern Sri Lanka, Routledge, London, p. 236. 
301Ibid. 
302 Since the election, the party has been involved in a number of controversial issues. One 
significant action was introducing a bill to prohibit ‘unethical’ conversions, a reaction against 
proselytism systematically carried out by Christian fundamentalist groups operating under many 
guises, some of whom happened to be foreigners affiliated with NGOs (Owens, A. (2007) ‘Using 
Legislation to Protect against Unethical Conversions in Sri Lanka’, 
http://law.hamline.edu/files/Owens.pdf, accessed 14-09-2013). 
303 These included TULF, Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) (this faction 
also known as the Suresh wing) and Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO). The TULF has 
since left the TNA. Some members of the TULF who wanted to remain in the TNA have 
resurrected the ITAK which is now a constituent party of the TNA (‘Tamil National Alliance’ (n.d.) 
http://tnapolitics.org/en/, accessed 14-09-2013). 
304 In 2004, Eastern Tiger commander Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan, alias Karuna Amman, 
broke with the LTTE and went underground with his supporters. He took around 5,000 cadres with 
him and formed what was then referred to as the ‘Karuna faction’. The LTTE reacted to his 
defection by launching attacks against Karuna’s forces, and heavy clashes ensued. They claimed to 
have fully evicted his forces from the area he controlled in mid-2004. The Karuna faction then 
took a lower profile, maintaining a number of small camps in the southern end of the eastern 
province. Given covert backing by the Sri Lankan military, they carried out regular attacks against 
the LTTE throughout the east of the island. 
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Sivanesethurai Chandrakanthan, alias Pillaiyan, broke away from the LTTE along 
with Karuna and became the deputy leader of the TMVP. Internal cohesion within 
the TMVP has been a problem, particularly disagreements between Karuna and 
Pillaiyan over finance. This internal rift in the TMVP led to Pillaiyan replacing 
Karuna as the party leader in 2007.305 In the following year, local government 
elections were held in the Trincomalee and Batticaloa districts, eastern province. 
Pillaiyan led the TMVP in the Batticaloa district to wins in all local government 
bodies which it had contested,306 some of which had not had elections for many 
years due to the war. Also in the same year, provincial council elections were held 
to fill the newly created eastern provincial council. After discussions, the TMVP 
and the ruling UPFA announced that they would jointly contest the polls under the 
UPFA banner.307 Although opposition parties308 alleged widespread vote-rigging, 
the government’s UPFA-TMVP coalition secured the majority in the new eastern 
provincial council, and Pillaiyan who won the most number of preferential votes 
in the Batticaloa district was sworn in by President Rajapaksa as Chief 
Minister.309 Karuna was appointed as a national list MP for the ruling UPFA and 
sworn in as Minister of National Integration and Reconciliation in 2009 when he 
and many of his fighters officially joined the SLFP. 310  President Rajapaksa 
appointed Karuna as a vice president of the SLFP. This reflected a new trend of 
absorbing former LTTE cadre into the leading ruling party. 
The Eelam People’s Democratic Party (EPDP),311 another Tamil political party 
and a pro-government paramilitary organisation in Sri Lanka, is led by its founder 
Douglas Devananda. 312  Devananda and the EPDP entered politics when it 
contested the 1994 Parliamentary election as an independent group in the Jaffna 
305 Karuna was arrested in London in 2007 on immigration charges and after his release from a 
British jail, he returned to Sri Lanka and recommenced political work. Tensions between TMVP 
leaders Karuna and Pillaiyan intensified after Karuna joined Parliament in 2008. But related 
clashes broke out between their factions in the east, including killings and disappearances. 
306 ‘Local Authorities Elections 2006/2008: Official Results – Batticaloa’ (2008) 
http://www.slelections.gov.lk/localAuthorities/batticaloa.html, accessed 14-09-2013. 
307 ‘All the Parties in UPFA, Including TMVP to Contest under Betel Symbol – Basil Rajapaksa’ 
(2008) http://www.asiantribune.com/?q=node/10096, accessed 14-09-2013. 
308 The opposition UNP and Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC), the largest Muslim party in the 
country, also formed a coalition to contest the elections, providing the main challenger to the 
UPFA. 
309 ‘U.S. Relations with Sri Lanka’ (n.d.). 
310 ‘Conflict Histories: Sri Lanka’ (n.d.) http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/key-issues/research-
resources/conflict-histories/sri-lanka.aspx, accessed 11-01-2012. 
311 EPDP is a faction of EPRLF which is a faction of Eelam Revolutionary Organisation of 
Students (EROS). 
312 ‘EPDP News’ (n.d.) http://www.epdpnews.com/, accessed 18-01-2012. 
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district.313 In 2000, President Kumaratunga appointed Devananda as Minister of 
Development, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of the North, and Tamil Affairs, 
North and East. Since the end of the war in May 2009 the EPDP has contested 
local and national elections under the UPFA banner rather than on its own.314 
Another minority party, the Ceylon Workers Congress (CWC), which has 
traditionally represented Indian-origin Tamils working in the plantation sector of 
the economy, was formed by Saumiamoorthy Thondaman as an Indian Estate 
Workers Trade Union in 1950.315 Thondaman had been the dominant trade union 
leader of the Indian-origin Tamil workers for nearly four decades. Thondaman’s 
political organisation staged a non-violent Satyagraha 316  campaign against the 
implementation of citizenship laws and boycotted them for a period of time. Since 
1952 the Indian-origin Tamils could not elect any representative to the parliament 
as their voting strength had been drastically reduced. At times, Thondaman 
supported the existing governments and explained that he owed his position to the 
CWC, and the CWC’s policy was to get citizenship for the stateless and better 
working conditions for estate labour. Thondaman did not want to subscribe to the 
separatist policy of the TULF. Since 1978 Thondaman has served as a cabinet 
minister under Presidents J.R. Jayewardene, R. Premadasa and since 1995 under 
President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga.317 At the present, Thondaman’s 
son Arumugam holds the CWC leadership and supports the ruling UPFA.318 It can 
be identified the affiliation of many Tamil parties with the ruling UPFA at the 
present. 
313 Most of the district was under LTTE control and people did not get a chance to vote, allowing 
the EPDP to win nine Parliamentary seats with just 10,744 votes (0.14%), of which 9,944 votes 
came from the Jaffna district (‘General Election’ (1994) 
http://www.slelections.gov.lk/pdf/Results_1994%20GENERAL%20ELECTION-SM01.PDF, 
accessed 18-01-2012). 
314 At the 2010 Parliamentary election three EPDP members were elected on the UPFA ticket, all 
in the Jaffna district (‘Parliamentary General Election’ (2010) 
http://www.slelections.gov.lk/parliamentary_elections/province.html, accessed 14-09-2013). 
315 It was an outgrowth of the CIC, formed in 1939. In 1950 the CIC changed its name to the CWC 
and became the largest trade union in the country. 
316 Satyagraha, a Sanskrit word, loosely translated as ‘insistence on truth’ or ‘truth force’ is a 
particular philosophy and practice within the broader overall category generally known as non-
violent resistance or civil resistance. The term Satyagraha was conceived and developed by 
Mahatma Gandhi. He deployed Satyagraha in the Indian independence movement and also during 
his earlier struggles in South Africa. 
317 Jeyaraj, D.B.S. (2013) ‘Saumiamoorthy Thondaman: Pragmatic Plantation Tamil Patriarch 
Who Emancipated His Disempowered People’, http://dbsjeyaraj.com/dbsj/archives/25330, 
accessed 14-09-2013. 
318 Arumugam Thondaman holds the ministership of livestock and rural community development 
in the current UPFA government. 
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The SLMC is another significant political party which represents the Muslim 
minority in Sri Lanka.319 In November 1986, the SLMC was formally inaugurated 
as a political party with M.H.M. Ashraff its leader. The main aim of SLMC has 
been to safeguard the rights of Muslims in the north and the east. The SLMC has 
never stood in the way of the Tamil aspirations. The stand of the SLMC was that 
in a political solution to the ethnic problem the position of the Muslims has to be 
safeguarded.320 
From time to time, the CWC and the SLMC supported UNP and SLFP-led 
governments and also contested under the candidate lists of these two major 
parties. The SLMC contested under their own lists especially in the eastern 
province where there is a significant Muslim population. CWC and SLMC played 
the role of influential controlling partners at times. 
According to the department of elections, there are 64 registered political parties 
in Sri Lanka.321 But most of them are minor parties and not significant in the 
political arena. Other than their leftist or rightist policies, a variety of political 
parties represent nationalist and revolutionary views and ethnic minorities. 
Complexities of the development and existence of political parties in Sri Lanka 
reflect the diversities of the society and the needs and aspirations of different 
groups of people. Most political parties are full of factions which have led to the 
development of new parties. Building several alliances aimed at to forming 
coalition governments is a significant trend in Sri Lankan politics. In coalition 
politics the policies of the political parties or leaders have not been of great 
concern. Yet, it can be said that most of the time, Sri Lankan politics have been 
controlled and shaped by a few political leaders and their families according to 
their individual desires rather than according to the policies of the political parties 
they have represented. The absorption of many political parties and leaders 
including the former LTTE leaders into the ruling UPFA coalition is a major trend. 
When closely scrutinised the development of political parties, the emergence of 
political leaders, as well as constitutional developments, and Sri Lankan party 
politics can be identified as mostly being about the impact of a few 
319 The party was formed at a meeting held at Kattankudy in 1981 by a small study group of 
eastern province local political leaders. 
320 ‘Sri Lanka Muslim Congress’ (n.d.) http://www.slmc.org.uk/index.html, accessed 18-01-2012. 
321 ‘Political Parties’ (2013) http://www.slelections.gov.lk/pp.html, accessed 18-09-2013. 
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personalities 322  who have consistently neglected the needs of the majority of 
people in the country. 
4.4. Decentralisation politics 
Debates about the decentralisation of power in Sri Lanka are closely linked with 
ethnic politics. Problems between the ethnic majority and minorities, especially 
the conflicts between Sinhalese and Tamils, have long historical roots. The 
Mahavansa323 discusses the great battle between Dutugemunu (161-137 BC), the 
Sinhala King and the Tamil King, Elara, in the ancient capital, the sacred city of 
Buddhism, Anuradhapura. Dutugemunu became the great warrior-hero who 
protected the unity of the country and Buddhism.324 The Mahavansa emphasises 
the Sinhala kings who unified the country and protected Buddhism by defeating 
the South Indian Tamil settlers. 
From the first appearance of the British in Ceylon, certain Kandyan chiefs had 
been covertly working against their King, Sri Wickrama Rajasinghe, who was of 
Tamil descent. 325  The background reasons behind the Kandyan Convention 
1815326 lay in the unwillingness of Sinhala chiefs to work under a king of Tamil 
descent. The British colonial rulers divided the country for their administrative 
convenience, and brought the whole country under one unique law, which gave 
rise to the criticism that there were no separate laws to protect the minority rights, 
different cultures and various social structures. The Tamil minority has been 
uneasy with the country’s unitary form of government and apprehensive that the 
Sinhalese majority would abuse Tamil rights. 
322 See Uyangoda, J. (n.d.) ‘Working and Outcomes of Democracy in Sri Lanka’, Social Scientists’ 
Association, Colombo, http://www.democracy-asia.org/qa/srilanka/Jayadeva%20Uyangoda.pdf, 
accessed 31-10-2013. 
323 The Mahavansa ‘The Great Chronicle’ otherwise known as ‘The Great Dynasty’ is the single 
most important work of Sri Lankan origin (written in Pali language). It describes the period from 
6th century BC to 4th century AD. A companion volume, the Choolavansa (‘lesser chronicle’), 
covers the period from the 4th century AD to the British take-over of Sri Lanka in 1815. The 
Mahavansa itself is actually comprised of three parts, all written at different times in Sri Lankan 
history. It provides a continuous historical record of over two millennia and can be considered as 
the world’s longest unbroken historic record. 
324 Farmer, (1963), pp. 9-11. 
325 Ibid., pp. 34-35. 
326 On 2nd March 1815, a convention was held at Kandy between the British governor and the 
Kandyan chiefs – the Kandyan convention – under which the rights of the chiefs were guaranteed, 
and it was declared that the Buddhist religion, so vital part of Sinhalese tradition, was to be 
maintained. The Kandyan system of administration through principal chiefs was retained and the 
dynasty of a straight line for nearly 2,300 years was ended. 
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The story of the decentralisation of power in Sri Lanka has its origins in the long-
term clashes between the minority and the majority, as well as in the British-led 
constitutional reforms. During the colonial and post-colonial eras, the demands of 
the minorities, especially of the Tamils, changed from demands for higher 
representation in the legislature to demands for devolving powers, and later to a 
demand for a separate Tamil state which resulted in driving the country towards a 
prolonged war. Following independence, ethnic conflict became the major force 
shaping the decentralisation process. However during the period from mid-1910s 
to early-1980s, a direct connection between the decentralisation process and local 
government reforms can be identified in Sri Lanka which is discussed in the 
following chapter. The following section outlines the major decentralising 
attempts in Sri Lanka which were not directly aimed at local government reforms. 
The section examines the significant issues, complexities, background reasons and 
the consequences of decentralisation politics in Sri Lanka. 
4.4.1. Constitutional reforms and decentralisation: demands and resistances 
As discussed earlier, the 1833 Colebrooke-Cameron Reforms set a path towards 
the decentralisation of the executive power of government. The governor’s 
autocratic powers were reduced and distributed to the Executive Council and to 
the Legislative Council, and the country was put under a uniform administrative 
system executed through five provinces. 327 The reformed Legislative Council, 
introduced in 1921 by the British through the Manning Reforms, was based on 
principles of communal representation. In response to this, there was a growing 
realisation by Tamils of their status as a minority ethnic group and leading to 
initiatives to be represented by members of their own community. Through this 
period, Tamil national awareness developed and led to demands for an increase in 
the number of representatives in the legislature. In 1927 the Donoughmore 
Commission brought in the possibility of universal franchise, which gave a vote to 
everyone, irrespective of caste, creed or ethnicity, and threatened the strong 
political position of the Tamil community. At first opposition to the 
Donoughmore Commission, especially from the Colombo Tamils, was based on 
327 ‘A Country Study: Sri Lanka’ (n.d.). 
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caste elitism but this was rapidly replaced by ethnic paring between the Tamil and 
Sinhala leaders.328 
The Soulbury Commission attempted to introduce a unique law to Sri Lanka in 
the form of constitutional safeguards to protect the rights of the minorities. As 
discussed earlier, the Soulbury Commission rejected the proposal of Tamils on 
‘fifty-fifty’ representation in parliament and the proposal of Kandyan Sinhalese to 
establish three federal states to the regions of up-country, low-country and north. 
According to Lee, while British colonialism helped to solidify ideas of nationality 
in Sri Lanka it did not overtly favour any of them.329 
Following independence, the fears of the Tamils were reinforced when S.W.R.D. 
Bandaranaike triumphed in the 1956 elections after appealing to Sinhala 
nationalism. Through the Sinhala Only Act, Bandaranaike declared Sinhala as the 
country’s official language and downgraded the official status of English. 330 
Tamils felt this was a denigration of their own tongue and became the first in a 
series of steps over the following decades that appeared discriminatory to Tamils 
resulting in the communal clashes of 1958. Tamils also protested government 
education policies and agriculture programmes that encouraged Sinhala farmers 
from the south to move to newly irrigated lands in the east. The decades following 
1956 saw intermittent outbreaks of communal violence and growing radicalisation 
among Tamil groups. Fernando mentions that the communal riots in 1958 did 
disturb relations between the two major ethnic communities in the country.331 
After the general election of 1970, the ITAK proposed a federal form of 
government with an autonomous Tamil state, an autonomous Muslim state and 
three autonomous Sinhala states. They also demanded language rights for Tamil. 
The ITAK withdrew from the legislature in June 1971 after its proposed 
amendment on parity of status for the Tamil and Sinhala languages was 
defeated.332 By the mid-1970s Tamil politicians were moving from support for 
federalism to a demand for a separate Tamil state in northern and eastern Sri 
328 ‘Vavuniya Today’ (n.d.) http://www.vavuniyatoday.com/, accessed 17-01-2012 
329 Lee, (2011), p. 24. 
330 ‘Indictment against Sri Lanka’ (n.d.) http://tamilnation.co/indictment/indict004.htm, accessed 
17-09-2013. 
331 Fernando, L. (2010) ‘The Insurrection that Turned Sri Lanka’s Political Culture Violent’, 
http://www.asiantribune.com/news/2010/04/04/insurrection-turned-sri-lanka%E2%80%99s-
political-culture-violent, accessed 19-01-2012. 
332 Satyendra, N. (2001) ‘A Record of Broken Pacts & Evasive Proposals’, 
http://tamilnation.co/conflictresolution/tamileelam/index.htm, accessed 10-01-2012. 
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Lanka, areas of traditional Tamil settlement. In the 1977 elections, the TULF won 
all the seats in Tamil areas on a platform of separatism. Other groups, particularly 
the LTTE, sought an independent state by force.333 However these Tamil military 
groups were marginal until they ambushed and killed 13 soldiers in the northern 
town of Jaffna in 1983, provoking Sinhala nationalists to unleash pogroms in 
Colombo and other Sinhalese majority areas.334 The LTTE initiated a guerrilla 
war and bombing campaign on central government targets and began to capture 
territory in the north and east. The government responded with killings and the 
‘disappearance’ of Tamils.335 
4.4.1.1. Indian mediation 
When the Sinhala-Tamil communal riots began in 1983, and following the 
capturing of additional territory in the north and east by the LTTE, the Indian 
Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi sent her representative to discuss a scheme for 
decentralisation with both the government and the TULF. New proposals to 
decentralise power were prepared and the government of Sri Lanka agreed to 
convene an all party conference to consider these proposals. The proposals were 
submitted as an annexure to a statement submitted by President Jayewardene to 
the all party conference and came to be known as the Annexure ‘C’ proposals.336 
But these proposals were not implemented after the government proposed 
extending the scheme of decentralisation at the district level to the provincial level 
with limited coordination.337 The TULF rejected these proposals and the all party 
conference collapsed. 
333 ‘U.S. Relations with Sri Lanka’ (n.d.). 
334 Over 1,000 Tamils were killed, tens of thousands fled their homes and the state failed to stop 
the violence. Support for numerous Tamil militant groups flourished and hundreds of thousands of 
Tamils emigrated in the following few years, creating an international support base for Tamil 
separatism. 
335 ‘Conflict Histories: Sri Lanka’ (n.d.). 
336 Satyendra, (2001). 
337 In Annexure ‘C’ proposals, the unit of devolution was the district, not the province. Further, 
there was no executive power to district councils and the limited legislative power to enact 
subsidiary legislation was made subject to the control and approval of the President. The funds to 
be placed at the disposal of a district council were to be determined at the discretion of a 
commission appointed by the President. 
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These proposals were discussed further at the 1985 Thimpu talks,338 but these 
talks collapsed due to disagreements.339 In 1986, after the collapse of the Thimpu 
talks, India attempted ‘indirect negotiations’ with Indian officials talking to the Sri 
Lankan government and the TULF separately. The LTTE and the other militant 
groups were not involved in these negotiations. Finally the Sri Lankan 
government presented a working paper which, found agreement with the 
government of India, to serve as a basis for further negotiations. The working 
paper envisaged the creation of separate provincial councils for the northern and 
eastern provinces by amending the Sri Lankan Constitution. In mid-December 
1986, Indian Ministers, Natwar Singh and P. Chidambaram, visited Colombo and 
fresh proposals were developed. 340  These were known as the ‘December 19 
Proposals’. These proposals involved the formation of a new eastern province by 
excising Sinhalese majority areas from the existing eastern province, and the 
creation of two Tamil provincial councils in the northern and the reconstituted 
eastern province. The Sri Lankan government agreed to consider a proposal for a 
second stage of constitutional development which would provide for the merger 
of the two provinces. However, soon after the return of the Indian Ministers, the 
Sri Lankan government expressed reservations and resiled the December 19 
Proposals.341 
Throughout this process, the fighting between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan 
government forces continued. By mid-1987 India intervened in the conflict by air-
dropping supplies to prevent what it felt was harsh treatment and starvation of the 
Tamil population in the Jaffna peninsula caused by an economic blockade by 
Colombo. In July 1987 the Indo-Lanka Peace Accord was signed by Indian Prime 
Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Sri Lankan President Jayewardene. This peace accord 
was a turning point in the decentralisation process in Sri Lanka. Under this accord, 
the Sri Lankan government made a number of concessions to Tamil demands, 
which included the decentralisation of power to the provinces, merger of the 
338 In July and August 1985 the leaders of the Tamil armed resistance, together with the TULF, 
participated in talks with the government of Sri Lanka. The talks, sponsored by India, were held in 
Thimpu, the capital of Bhutan with a view to resolving the ethnic conflict. 
339 Satyendra, (2001). 
340 Ibid. 
341 Ibid. 
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northern and eastern provinces,342 and official status for the Tamil language. India 
agreed to establish order in the north and east with an Indian Peace Keeping Force 
(IPKF) and to cease assisting Tamil insurgents. 343  In August 1987, the 13th 
Amendment to the Sri Lankan Constitution and the ancillary Provincial Councils 
Act, No. 42 of 1987 followed by the Indo-Lanka Peace Accord, were passed in 
the Parliament. 
The IPKF soon became embroiled in war with the LTTE. Anti-Indian nationalist 
sentiment in the south fuelled a JVP youth insurrection344 which was met with 
brutal government repression. The motivation of the youth for this insurrection 
was drawn from patriotic feelings against the IPKF stationed in the country345 and 
against the 13th amendment. The Indo-Lanka Peace Accord was taken by JVP as 
an Indian intervention in the state policy. The frequently used JVP youth slogan, 
‘Mavubima Nethnam Maranaya’ 346  clearly indicated their Sinhala patriotic 
position against any decentralisation of power. Although the JVP youth slogans 
did not exhibit anti-Tamil sentiments directly, their strong opposition to the 
decentralisation of power indirectly signified an anti-Tamil position. 
The decentralisation of power to the provincial councils was promulgated through 
the 13th amendment to the constitution under three lists: the provincial councils list, 
342 This was subjected to a later referendum. But later the northern and eastern provinces were 
merged without creating the proposed new eastern province. 
343 ‘U.S. Relations with Sri Lanka’ (n.d.). 
344 Out of two, this was the second JVP youth insurrection. The first one happened in April 1971 
when the JVP, a primarily rural Sinhala youth movement claiming a membership of more than 
10,000, began a ‘blitzkrieg’ operation to take over the government ‘within 24 hours’. The purpose 
of the insurrection was to capture state power. The JVP threatened to take power by extra-
parliamentary means. Fierce fighting erupted in the north-central, south-central, and southern rural 
districts of the island, causing an official estimate of 1,200 dead. Unofficial tallies of the number 
of dead were much higher. The JVP came perilously close to overthrowing the government but the 
military finally suppressed the movement and imprisoned JVP’s top leadership, Rohana 
Wijeweera, and about 16,000 suspected insurgents (‘A Country Study: Sri Lanka’ (n.d.) ). The 
second JVP youth insurrection lasted for around two years from 1987 to 1989. The second 
insurrection was different from the first one in several aspects. The second one, more than being 
an insurrection, was a long-lasting armed struggle over two years. The total killings during the 
period are reported to have been over 50,000 being mainly the youth of rural origins (Fernando, L. 
(2002) ‘Youth and Politics: Why They Rebel?’, in S.T. Hettige and M. Mayer (eds) Sri Lankan 
Youth: Challenges and Responses, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Colombo-04, pp. 119-120). The 
Presidential Commission on Youth 1990, appointed after the second JVP youth insurrection, 
aimed to find the reasons for such insurrection (see Report of the Presidential Commission on 
Youth 1990 [Sessional Paper No. I – 1990]).  
345 Fernando, (2002), pp. 119-120. 
346 The literal meaning of this slogan is; ‘Motherland or Death’. JVP youth threatened the 
government saying that they never retracted and that they prefer death if they cannot protect Sri 
Lanka. Protecting Sri Lanka here meant ending the Indian mediation and the decentralisation 
process. 
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the reserved list and the concurrent list. Accordingly, local government became a 
subject under provincial councils. 347  Although an administrative reforms 
committee suggested there be a clear cut demarcation of subjects between the 
centre and the provinces, 348  critics have highlighted the powerlessness of the 
provincial councils, particularly over the lack of executive power for provincial 
ministers while a provincial governor, appointed by the executive president of the 
country, would exercise executive power in respect of provincial matters. Further, 
as the administrative head of the provincial public service, the provincial governor 
had control of the provincial fund. 349  Tamil critics further point out that the 
architects of the 13th amendment refused to break away from the path trodden by 
successive Sinhala governments which had sought to divide the Tamil people into 
smaller units and so eventually assimilate and integrate them into a homogeneous 
Sinhala nation.350 The proposal for provincial councils was rejected by both north 
and south but for different reasons. The north always expected more 
decentralisation of power but the south never struggled for decentralisation. The 
JVP-led Sinhala youth in the south worked against Indian mediation on strong 
nationalist lines to protect the unitary structure of the country. 
In 1990 President Premadasa, hoping to pave the way for a negotiated settlement, 
ordered the IPKF to leave and opened negotiations with the LTTE. India 
withdrew its forces from Sri Lanka, and fighting between the LTTE and the Sri 
Lankan government forces resumed. The LTTE soon broke from talks, captured 
additional territory and stepped up the violence, including increased use of suicide 
bombs, used to murder Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in May 1991 and 
President Premadasa in May 1993.351 
4.4.1.2. Conflict and peace negotiations: devolution of power as a solution 
The withdrawal of the IPKF and failures of the peace negotiations resulted in a 
continuation of the war between the LTTE and government forces. From time to 
time, peace negotiations had taken place under facilitation of some of the 
347 Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Local Government Reforms 1999 (Sessional Paper No. 
I – 1999) p. 21. 
348 Report No. 6 of the Administrative Reforms Committee, Administrative Changes in Support of 
Devolution (Sessional Paper No. III – 1988) p. 1. 
349 Satyendra, (2001). 
350 Ibid. 
351 ‘Conflict Histories: Sri Lanka’ (n.d.). 
84 
 
                                                 
European countries. Although these negotiations collapsed (see Table 4.1), the 
connection between decentralising attempts and the ethnic conflict continued. 
In 1993 President D.B. Wijetunga tried to address the question of the devolution 
of power through a Parliamentary select committee, which sat for two years, and 
issued an interim report and then a final report. Its proposals sought to impose a 
nine province federal structure on the island. But critics called this ‘pseudo’ 
federal because, according to the chairman of the select committee, the report 
envisaged ‘devolution of power’ without using the term ‘federal in any manifest 
sense’.352 Sinhala-Buddhist groups were concerned about references to federalism 
because they saw this as indicating possible moves to divide the country and 
destroy the unitary structure of the state. According to Ghai, the requirements that 
the state should be ‘unitary’ have often retarded the acceptance and 
implementation of meaningful devolution. It is often more accepted to grant 
autonomy to certain regions under the label of ‘decentralisation’ or ‘devolution’ 
than under the label of federalism, as this might imply splitting sovereignty. The 
introduction of the provinces and the devolution of power to these units made 
autonomy more palatable to the Sinhala community in Sri Lanka.353 Federalism 
was always perceived as a first step towards ‘dividing the country’ and therefore 
the term was avoided in the political debate.354 Although, neither devolution nor 
decentralisation would ‘divide the country’, the efforts of devolving and 
decentralising were also inserted into the same federal account and intentionally 
ignored. 
In 1995 President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga brought new proposals 
under the name of a ‘Devolution Package’. According to critics, these new 
proposals once again, rejected an asymmetric approach, and continued to treat all 
the provinces in the same way and to insist on a unitary state. 355  In 1995 
Velupillai Prabhakaran, the leader of LTTE, declared in an interview with the 
BBC that:  
…giving pledges and implementing those pledges are two different things. In the 
past the Tamil people have been betrayed by previous Sinhala regimes. 
352 Satyendra, (2001). 
353 Ghai, Y.P. (2000) Autonomy and Ethnicity: Negotiating Competing Claims in Multi-Ethnic 
States, Cambridge University Press, UK, pp. 1-24. 
354 Wilson, (2000), p. 104. 
355 Satyendra, (2001). 
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Agreements were made but not implemented. Pacts were signed and abrogated. 
This is our history. Chandrika’s government is not an exception...356 
This reflects the suspicious and questioning perspective of the LTTE and the 
Tamils towards the decentralising attempts of the Sri Lankan government. The 
regional councils (RCs) and the union of regions, proposed in the Devolution 
Package, were questioned as these institutions lacked legislative power. 
According to critics these institutions of political decentralisation were utterly 
irrelevant to conflict resolution emptying the devolution terminology of any 
significant political or constitutional meaning.357 In 1997 the government released 
some chapters of a new constitution based on the proposals of the Devolution 
Package but held back on the provisions relating to devolution.358 In both the 
1987 13th amendment to the constitution and the 1997 draft constitution, the 
substance of devolution was missing. 
During the peace negotiations in 2002 (see Table 4.1), the LTTE and government 
agreed to explore a settlement based on extensive autonomy for the north and east 
under a federal system. According to Bigdon, since the breakthrough in the peace 
talks between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE in Oslo towards the end 
of 2002, where the LTTE for the first time publicly agreed to the option of a 
federal solution to the ethnic conflict under the condition of far-reaching 
autonomy for the north-east, the term federalism suddenly re-entered the public 
discourse in Sri Lanka.359 However in the same year, the LTTE unveiled its own 
proposals for a transitional arrangement in the form of an interim self-governing 
authority (ISGA). 360 Uyangoda argues that this proposal envisaged an interim 
framework of regional autonomy which exceeded any known form of federalism 
anywhere in the world. It was in fact a confederal proposal. If the interim solution 
was a confederal one, the LTTE’s concept of a final settlement would have been 
356 Ibid. 
357 Sathananthan, S. (1997) ‘Chandrika’s Devolution Proposals: 1997 Draft Constitution in Sri 
Lanka-Whither Devolution of Power?’, 
http://tamilnation.co/conflictresolution/tamileelam/cbkproposals/971203satha.htm, accessed 10-
01-2012. 
358 Satyendra, (2001). 
359 Bigdon, C. (2003) ‘The Nexus between Decentralization, Good Local Governance and Conflict 
Management in Democratic Systems’, Local Governance and Conflict Management in Sri Lanka-
Final Report, Sri Lanka Institute of Local Governance and Berghof Foundation for Conflict 
Studies, p. 13. 
360 The ISGA was a proposal issued by the LTTE for power sharing in the north and east of Sri 
Lanka. The proposals were made in-lieu of the LTTE renouncing its claim for an independent 
country called Tamil Eelam for the minority Sri Lankan Tamil people (see ‘Full Text: Tamil Tiger 
Proposals’ (2003) http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3232913.stm, accessed 19-09-2013). 
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independence. In both military and political terms the LTTE continued to show a 
commitment to maximalist options of a separate state. Therefore a political 
compromise to accept devolution, which LTTE saw as minimalist regional 
autonomy, would have diluted the commitment to their maximalist goal.361 Table 
4.1 presents the direction of conflict and peace negotiations in Sri Lanka under 
different government leaders during the period from 1995 to 2009. 
Table 4.1: Conflict and peace negotiations: significant issues 
Time period Government leaders 
involved 
Actions and outcomes 
January 1995 President Chandrika 
Bandaranaike 
Kumaratunga 
The Sri Lankan government and the LTTE agreed 
to a cessation of hostilities. After three months the 
LTTE unilaterally resumed hostilities. The 
government then adopted a policy of military 
engagement with the LTTE. 
Mid-1996 President Chandrika 
Bandaranaike 
Kumaratunga 
Government forces liberated Jaffna from LTTE 
control and moved against LTTE positions in the 
northern part of the country called the Vanni. 
October 1999 –  
May 2000  
President Chandrika 
Bandaranaike 
Kumaratunga 
An LTTE counter offensive reversed most 
government gains and threatened government 
forces in Jaffna. Heavy fighting continued. 
February 2002 Prime Minister Ranil 
Wickremasinghe 
The government negotiated a ceasefire agreement 
under Norwegian facilitation, temporarily easing 
tensions. The peace talks were held in Oslo. 
April 2003 Prime Minister Ranil 
Wickremasinghe 
The LTTE withdrew from peace negotiations. 
October 2003 Prime Minister Ranil 
Wickremasinghe 
The LTTE presented proposals for an ISGA as the 
basis for new negotiations. 
March 2004 Prime Minister Ranil 
Wickremasinghe 
The LTTE’s eastern military commander, Karuna, 
split from the LTTE. Violent clashes between the 
two factions and Karuna’s growing collaboration 
with the Sri Lankan military further undermined 
trust between government and the LTTE and 
contributed to the ceasefire’s eventual collapse. 
June 2005 President Chandrika 
Bandaranaike 
Kumaratunga 
The government and LTTE reached an agreement 
to share US$3 billion in international tsunami aid. 
The agreement was challenged in court and was 
never implemented. Parliament passed a state of 
emergency regulation that has been renewed 
every month since then. 
November 2005  During the Presidential election, the LTTE 
enforced a voting boycott in areas under its 
control and helped secure victory of Mahinda 
Rajapaksa. Rajapaksa won by a narrow margin. 
Late-2005 – 
early-2006 
President Mahinda 
Rajapaksa 
The LTTE launched waves of attacks on police 
and army in the north and east.  The government 
quietly began brutal counter insurgency efforts, 
361 Uyangoda, J. (2010) ‘Sri Lanka Post the LTTE’, http://www.india-
seminar.com/2010/605/605_jayadeva_uyangoda.htm, accessed 27-03-2012. 
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while the Karuna faction, continued guerrilla 
attacks on the LTTE in the east. 
February 2006 President Mahinda 
Rajapaksa 
Talks in Geneva failed to salvage the battered 
ceasefire and violence between the LTTE and 
government forces escalated. In the meantime 
assassinations of MPs and bomb explosions 
continued in various places in Sri Lanka. 
April 2006 President Mahinda 
Rajapaksa 
An LTTE suicide bomber attacked the main army 
compound in Colombo, killing eight soldiers and 
seriously wounding the army commander, 
General Sarath Fonseka. 
November 2006 President Mahinda 
Rajapaksa 
The LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran declared 
the ceasefire ‘defunct’ and called for a renewed 
‘freedom struggle’ for an independent state. 
Late-2006 – 
July 2007 
onwards 
President Mahinda 
Rajapaksa 
Conflict intensified with both sides suffering 
heavy casualties. The fall of LTTE camps in 
Thoppigala in July 2007 gave government forces’ 
control over the whole of the eastern province. 
Military activity then shifted north, as the 
government opened fronts on four sides of the 
LTTE controlled Vanni region. 
January 2008 President Mahinda 
Rajapaksa 
The government formally withdrew from the 
ceasefire with the LTTE. Fighting intensified 
during the first months of the year, and 
conventional battles were accompanied by 
continuing rights abuses from both sides. 
September 2008 President Mahinda 
Rajapaksa 
The conflict entered a new phase when 
government forces initiated an offensive against 
the LTTE. 
September 2008 
– May 2009 
President Mahinda 
Rajapaksa 
The government continued to capture territory in 
northern Sri Lanka, when fighting became 
confined to a small area of land near Mullaitivu, 
where thousands of civilians were forcibly held 
by the LTTE in a government-designated ‘no fire 
zone’.  The LTTE forcibly conscripted civilians 
and prevented others from fleeing LTTE-
controlled areas by firing at them, killing many. 
Government repeatedly bombed and shelled 
densely populated areas, including its own 
unilaterally declared ‘no fire zone’. The UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights expressed grave 
concerns over credible evidence of war crimes by 
both sides. The government rejected any pause in 
the fighting. 
May 2009 President Mahinda 
Rajapaksa 
The government declared victory over the LTTE 
as they reported the capture of remaining LTTE-
held territory and the death of LTTE leader 
Velupillai Prabhakaran. The entire LTTE 
leadership seemed certain to have been killed. 
The end of the military conflict resulted in nearly 
300,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs). 
Conditions in IDP camps failed to meet 
international standards, with poor sanitation, 
insufficient water supplies and inadequate food 
and medical care. 
Sources: ‘U.S. Relations with Sri Lanka’ (n.d.), and ‘Conflict Histories: Sri Lanka’ (n.d.). 
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As indicated in the preceding Table 4.1, both the LTTE and the government held 
rigid positions and each was fully committed to winning its own self-interested 
goals. During the peace negotiations which occurred from time to time, there were 
attempts to decentralise power, but these attempts largely failed. Tamil critics 
point to the Sinhala people’s rejection of an asymmetric approach. They argued 
that whatever ‘devolution’ or ‘decentralisation’ offer was made to the Tamil areas 
in the north and east of Sri Lanka, should be equally available to the Sinhala 
provinces. Their question was that the Sinhala people had never struggled or 
demanded ‘devolution’ or ‘decentralisation’, so why did the governments try to 
offer equal power to all? They further argued that the reality was that devolution 
of power towards a federal or, ideally, a confederal alternative, was the only basis 
for a viable and lasting political settlement to the ethnic conflict within a united 
Sri Lanka. 362  This position of Tamil critics was somewhat similar to ISGA 
proposals which the LTTE brought in 2002 during peace negotiations (see Table 
4.1). 
The Tamil critics further claimed that the Sinhala nationalists and the Buddhist 
clergy had painted a scenario where a federal solution would divide the country 
and destroy the Sinhala race. This mentality of ‘danger to the Sinhala nation’ has 
driven the rejection of the devolution of power and the federal alternative.363 This 
can be interpreted in two ways. First, the unitary structure of the state has long 
been a feature of Sri Lankan government and the leaders who supported and 
protected the unitary structure, and Buddhism, were mostly valued by the people 
for the part they played. Most of the coalition governments in the post-
independence era had obtained the support of the Sinhala nationalist parties to 
protect their power. These leaders had a fear of losing the Sinhala-Buddhist 
majority’s support if they promoted decentralisation attempts. Second, these 
nationalist parties intentionally ignored finding a political solution to the ethnic 
problem in Sri Lanka by minimising the problem, and categorising it as one of 
‘terrorism’. Their interpretation was that there was no ethnic problem in Sri Lanka 
and there was only a ‘terrorist problem’. They further argued that the majority 
Sinhalese and the minority ethnic groups lived together peacefully in other areas 
362 Sathananthan, (1997). 
363 Ibid. 
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in Sri Lanka. In the north and east there was a terrorist problem led by the 
LTTE.364 
There remain several requests from the Indian government and the Tamil political 
parties, especially the TNA, to fully implement the decentralisation provisions of 
13th amendment to the constitution. The final report of the Lessons Learnt and 
Reconciliation Commission (LLRC)365 recommended there be a political solution 
for land issues, demilitarisation, resettlement of civilians, disarming of 
paramilitary groups, reference to the media, assistance to IDP families and several 
other issues.366 The discussions between TNA and the government lasted long 
after the war and the TNA demanded the full implementation of the 13th 
amendment to the constitution, and that the full implementation of land and police 
powers be vested with the provincial councils as envisaged in the 13th amendment. 
But the government has still not given a positive response to this request.367 The 
JHU and the NFF, the Sinhala nationalist parties that support the government, 
have interpreted their unwillingness regarding such implementation.368 So it is 
evident that the government is not politically willing to implement the existing 
decentralisation policies.  
According to Uyangoda, the current Sri Lankan government is a coalition of 
Sinhala nationalists (Uyangoda calls them hard line nationalists) who constitute 
the core of a broader coalition369 which President Rajapaksa put together earlier to 
back his war effort. This coalition continues to have a strong influence on public 
policy, country agendas and state-society relations. One key reality in post-war Sri 
364 See Hennayake, S. (n.d.) ‘Tamil Ethnonationalism and Terrorism’, 
http://www.lankaweb.com/news/items01/tamile&t1.htm, accessed 01-11-2013. 
365 The LLRC was a commission of inquiry appointed by Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa 
in May 2010 after the long-lasting war in Sri Lanka. The commission was mandated to investigate 
the facts and circumstances which led to the failure of the ceasefire agreement made operational on 
27th February 2002, the lessons that should be learnt from those events and the institutional, 
administrative and legislative measures which need to be taken in order to prevent any recurrence 
of such concerns in the future, and to promote further national unity and reconciliation among all 
communities. After an 18 month inquiry, the commission submitted its report to the President on 
15th November 2011. The report was made public on 16th December 2011, after being tabled in the 
Parliament. 
366 ‘Govt.’s Double Speak on 13 Plus’ (2012) http://sundaytimes.lk/120122/Columns/political.html, 
accessed 23-01-2012. 
367 ‘Govt. to Amend 13th Amendment’ (2012) http://www.srilankabrief.org/2012/01/govt-to-
amend-13th-amendment-land.html, accessed 23-01-2012. 
368 ‘Govt.’s Double Speak on 13 Plus’ (2012). 
369 Included in that broad and powerful war coalition were the military, the bureaucracy, the media, 
nationalist intelligentsia, political elites of the anti-LTTE Tamils as well as non-Tamil minorities, 
Sri Lankan diaspora and the Buddhist and Catholic religious establishments. 
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Lanka, however, is that the same coalition that was formed to fight the LTTE 
militarily cannot be the vehicle for a fair and just political solution that can satisfy 
at least some of the key Tamil political demands. President Rajapaksa’s hesitation 
to implement any devolution framework is largely rooted in this complex political 
problem. The government is acutely aware of the fact that extreme polarisation of 
politics along Sinhala and Tamil nationalist projects continues to prevent any 
significant political reform in Sri Lanka.370 According to Viyangoda, there is no 
public opposition to the decentralisation of power. The government hesitation 
about implementing decentralisation policies is more about their reluctance to 
give strong centralised powers to other levels of government.371 
In summary, decentralisation politics in Sri Lanka have many facets and are 
connected to conflicts between majority and minority ethnic groups, especially 
between Sinhalese and Tamil groups. Several attempts to decentralise power have 
been made by the Sri Lankan government, from time to time, together with 
foreign government-facilitated peace negotiations. Most of these attempts have 
emerged as solutions to the ethnic problem. Both Sinhala and Tamil nationalist 
elements have interrupted the decentralisation process, each with demands for 
polarised solutions which would empower one group over the other. While the 
Sinhala nationalists identify any move to decentralisation, whether or not that is 
linked to any federal idea, as a threat to the country’s unitary structure, the Tamil 
nationalists have continued to demand a separate state. There are, therefore, no 
chances to implement a solution located in a middle path within these two 
extremes. The full implementation of 13th amendment to the constitution is still 
pending due to the unwillingness of the government and its allied Sinhala 
nationalist political parties to implement it. 
4.5. Summary 
This chapter has explored the history and political development in Sri Lanka in 
terms of its constitutional development, political party developments and the 
emergence of various political leaders. It has also examined the history of 
decentralisation politics in the context of ethnic conflict. Although anti-colonial 
370 Uyangoda, (2010). 
371 Viyangoda, G. (2012) ‘Merry-go-round is Circling around 13’ (translated from Sinhala), 
Ravaya, 22nd January 2012, p. 4. 
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critics assert that divisions between ethnic groups have been created by colonial 
rulers, from the pre-colonial era Sri Lankan society has had several divisions and 
conflicts related to ethnic rivalries. In both colonial and post-colonial eras, these 
divisions and conflicts have been evident in times of constitutional change and 
political party formation. These developments reflect the diversity of Sri Lankan 
society as well as the emergence and influence of leaders in shaping the political 
system in Sri Lanka. In most of these developments, the centralisation of 
authoritative power has been a significant feature. 
The next chapter addresses the issue of local government, the lowest level of 
government, because it is at this level that provisions for decentralisation are 
directed. It is also here that over time, there have been impediments toward 
potential agreements to address the actual needs of the people. Later chapters 
examine the specific issues of local government and decentralisation in Sri Lanka 
and its impact at the political and social level. 
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Chapter 5 
History and development of local government in Sri Lanka 
5.1. Introduction 
Sri Lanka has a long history of local government stemming from the traditional 
village governing system based on the ancient Sri Lankan kingdoms. During the 
colonial era traditional structures were changed to accommodate political interests, 
with various attempts made by national rulers to restructure local government in 
the context of Sri Lankan social needs. As discussed in chapter 4, these attempts 
were, from time to time, directly connected with initiatives to promote 
decentralisation. 
There is little written about Sri Lankan local government and what does exist 
consists mainly of reports from the commissions and committees appointed by 
successive governments suggesting changes to the Sri Lankan local government 
system. Among these, two lengthy descriptive reports are significant: the 1955 
Report of the Commission on Local Government, better known as the Choksy 
Commission, 372  and the Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Local 
Government Reforms 1999.373 Both reports discuss the evolution of Sri Lankan 
local government, highlighting problems and proposing recommendations. Other 
accounts of Sri Lankan local government are based on research by those involved 
in local government reforms concerning the implications of local development 
and funding issues. For example, Fernando, Thangarajah, Hettige and Leitan 
include in their research findings and suggestions for local government reforms.374 
These documents, though not extensive, help to fill the gap in the literature. 
This chapter extends the discussion in chapter 4 and scrutinises the 
decentralisation process highlighting its connection with local government 
reforms. The chapter identifies the main issues shaping the structure and purpose 
of local government in Sri Lanka, and investigates the various endeavours which 
372 Report of the Commission on Local Government (Sessional Paper No. XXXIII – 1955). This 
commission is known as the Choksy Commission. 
373 Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Local Government Reforms 1999 (Sessional Paper No. 
I – 1999). 
374 See Local Governance and Conflict Management in Sri Lanka-Final Report, Sri Lanka Institute 
of Local Governance and Berghof Foundation for Conflict Studies and Governance, No. 1, Vol. 1, 
Sri Lanka Institute of Local Governance, Colombo-07. 
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have had an impact on Sri Lankan local government. These themes will be 
revisited in chapter 8 where the research findings on the problems in local 
government are presented and discussed. 
5.2. Historical background 
This section outlines the pre-colonial and colonial local government structures in 
Sri Lanka paying attention to the ways in which these have been transformed into 
their present form consisting of a mixture of both pre-colonial and colonial 
structures according to the political interests of both colonial and national rulers. 
5.2.1. Pre-colonial era 
As mentioned in chapter 4, Sri Lankans consider themselves to be descendants of 
the Indo-Aryans, as set out in the Mahavansa. The establishment of Aryan 
settlements, which commenced with Vijaya,375 were village-based. These villages 
(grama or gam) grew and developed into larger villages (mahagam), and some of 
these were selected as the seat of government and became cities (nagara).376 For 
several centuries the basic village administration system continued to operate in 
the same form. After the arrival of Vijaya, the concept of kinship developed as 
King Pandukabhaya (377 BC to 307 BC) marked the boundaries of all villages in 
the country. These villages were recognised as minor in terms of the larger 
kingdom and were independently administered. The stone inscriptions of the 
period from the 3rd to the 1st century BC refer to the village leaders who held their 
positions and enjoyed special privileges. 377  Village administration, the lowest 
level of government, was based on the principle of autonomy and was connected 
to the central administration through regional administrative units. 
From the 6th to the 12th centuries AD the country was divided into three 
autonomous regions (Ratas) 378  which were further divided into sub-divisions. 
With these three main regions, the country was called Tri-Sinhale. 379  The 
Mahavansa points out the plan of the city of Anuradhapura as the country’s 
375 The first Aryan who arrived accidently in Sri Lanka and became the first king of the Sri Lankan 
written history (483 BC to 445 BC). 
376 Sessional Paper No. I – 1999, p. 3. 
377 Ibid., pp. 3-4. 
378 These three autonomous regions (Ratas) were: Ruhunu Rata (southern region), Maya Rata 
(central region) and Pihiti Rata (northern region). 
379 Sessional Paper No. I – 1999, p. 4. 
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capital, and describes zonal divisions, reservoirs, special reserves, palace 
complexes, religious sites, parks, hospitals, and cemeteries. There are indications 
that in Anuradhapura there were designations of mayor, town planner and 
municipal commissioner similar to current roles.380 However, the capital city was 
under the direct control of the sovereign, and the ancient inscriptions refer to royal 
laws for commerce and city administration. 381  With an agricultural economy, 
many villages were based on markets and trading centres. Others were named 
with regard to their specialities. For example, villages where the main activities 
were based on acquiring resources such as gem stones were called mining 
villages.382 
The king’s supreme responsibilities were the preservation of unity in the country, 
defence of the territory, development of the economy, promotion of agriculture 
through major irrigation works, and the establishment of religious monuments.383 
The king would tour the villages and towns to examine the work of his 
administration. The king also had ministers to execute his authority performing a 
kind of decentralised administration.  
The administration of the traditional village was very simple. A group of villagers 
were treated as the representatives in charge of the village administration, and 
these village organisations performed agro-economic functions such as the 
collection of irrigation dues, the issue of water for cultivation, the settlement of 
minor disputes, and also, the organisation of religious activities, assistance in 
hospital services, protection of national parks, direction of popular community 
activities and the apprehension of criminals. The code of village administration 
was centred around a framework of established customs and traditions.384 In some 
villages there were judicial panels responsible to village officers and subject to the 
king’s jurisdiction.385 
380 Ibid., p. 5. 
381 Ibid., p. 7. 
382 Ibid., p. 5. 
383 Ibid., p. 6. 
384 Ibid. 
385 Ibid., p. 7. 
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5.2.2. Colonial era 
In the Portuguese era (1505-1658), 386 the traditional administrative units were 
preserved. However, the ancient Portuguese documents used for regular updates 
of revenue collection (Thombus) indicate that the Portuguese rulers decentralised 
administrative authority whenever possible.387 
Dutch rule started from 1658, with several laws relating to local government 
being enacted in Colombo, Galle, Jaffna and Matara which had come under their 
control.388 In 1681 Robert Knox389 described village administration as operating 
through councils which functioned at the village level (Gam Sabhas) to organise 
agricultural activity and to fulfil other common needs of rural life. All community 
activities were performed according to customs and conventions with a sense of 
unity. Every chief householder was a member of the Gam Sabha. Appeals from 
the Gam Sabhas could be referred up to the regional council (Rata Sabha).390 
The British administration in Sri Lanka commenced in 1796 with the take-over of 
areas under Dutch rule. After taking control of the whole island in 1815391 the 
British colonial rulers enacted numerous changes to government institutions by 
moulding the local administration to suit the requirements of colonial 
administration. 392  According to Wanasinghe, local government in the colonial 
386 In the Portuguese era the development of cinnamon cultivation as a commercial crop and the 
formulation of laws for the cultivations were special features. 
387 Sessional Paper No. I – 1999, p. 9. 
388 Ibid. 
389 Robert Knox was an English sea captain who served the British East India Company. He faced 
a storm while sailing and accidently put ashore on Sri Lanka. He and his crew were taken captive 
by the troops of the Kandyan King forbidden to leave. Finally he escaped and returned home by an 
English vessel. During his voyage he wrote the manuscript of An Historical Relation of the Island 
Ceylon, an account of his experience on Ceylon which was published in 1681. It is one of the 
earliest and most detailed European accounts of life in Ceylon and is today seen as an invaluable 
record of the island in the 17th century (‘Knox’ (n.d.) http://lakdiva.org/knox/, accessed 26-01-
2012). 
390 Sessional Paper No. I – 1999, p. 10. 
391 The Kandyan Kingdom which was located in the central portion of the island remained as the 
sole independent native polity until it was absorbed into the British Empire in 1815 as a 
protectorate. Over the 1590s the Kandyan Kingdom survived the colonial and the South Indian 
invasions. According to the historical evidence, the Kandyan kings used a combination of hit-and-
run tactics and diplomacy to keep European colonial forces especially the British distant (‘History: 
Grade 8 – Chapter 1’ (n.d.) 
http://www.edupub.gov.lk/History%20Gr%208(E)/chapter%20%2001.pdf, accessed 20-03-2012). 
The geographical location of the kingdom as well supported its survival. The area of the central 
highlands in which the Kandyan Kingdom was situated, had the natural protection of rivers, water 
ways, hills and rocky mountainous terrain. After failures of several attempts of British forces to 
enter Kandyan lands, they sought diplomatic solutions and therefore signed an agreement with the 
Kandyan chiefs, the 1815 Kandyan Convention, which is outlined in chapter 4. 
392 Sessional Paper No. I – 1999, pp. 10-11. 
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period developed as a response to specific needs centred on the delivery of public 
goods and services. 393 In 1818 the Gam Sabha system was discontinued and, 
therefore, the reference to customs and traditions in the settlement of disputes 
relating to paddy cultivation ceased to have relevance. Although made inoperative 
by law, the traditional village administration by cultural convention and social 
customs continued in some areas.394 
As mentioned in chapter 4, under the Colebrooke-Cameron Reforms, the country 
was divided into five provinces and brought under the administration of 
government agents (GAs) and assistant government agents (AGAs). The 
Colebrooke-Cameron Commission suggested re-organising the former Gam 
Sabhas. 395  They mentioned Gam Sabhas as village committees 396  in their 
proposals 397  which could be established by the governor and the Legislative 
Council at the request of 10 residents of the area.398 Its functions were similar to 
the previous Gam Sabhas.399 
The success of the village committees led the British rulers to extend their 
functions to other matters such as cultivation, fisheries, and the maintenance of 
rural roads. 400  These arrangements were the elementary steps in the re-
organisation of local government during the British colonial period. It is evident, 
therefore, that the British retained traditional village administration processes by 
providing legal recognition of local traditions. The Village Communities 
Ordinance was amended several times. At the time of independence the village 
committees functioned as effective institutions of local administration and also 
393 Wanasinghe, S. (2003) ‘Building Local Capacities for Conflict Management: The Potential of 
Local Governance in Sri Lanka’, in M. Mayer; D. Rajasingham-Senanayake and Y. Thangarajah 
(eds) Building Local Capacities for Peace: Rethinking Conflict and Development in Sri Lanka, 
Macmillan India Ltd., in association with South Asia Institute, University of Heidelberg and Jaffna 
Rehabilitation Project (JRP)-GTZ Colombo, p. 91. 
394 Sessional Paper No. I – 1999, p. 11. 
395 Under the Paddy Lands and Irrigation Ordinance, No. 9 of 1856, the provisions were made to 
implement the traditional practices relating to agriculture and irrigation.  The village committees 
were re-organised under the Village Communities Ordinance, No. 26 of 1871, making it possible 
to follow the traditional forms of resolving disputes under the Paddy Lands and Irrigation 
Ordinance (ibid., pp. 11, 13-14).  
396 Some refer to village committees as village councils. 
397 Sessional Paper No. I – 1999, p. 11. 
398 The GA was the chairman in the village committee. Provision was available for the 
appointment of not less than six members who possessed special qualifications. The village 
committee framed its by-laws. 
399 Sessional Paper No. I – 1999, p. 13. 
400 Wanasinghe, (2003), p. 91. 
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provided opportunities for people to participate in government.401 This indicates 
the effectiveness of village committees, and the importance and relevance of the 
traditional village administrative institutions in addressing the needs of the 
villagers. 
Until the end of colonial rule in 1948, the British introduced a number of changes 
to the local government system through new legislation. Under the Road 
Committees Act, No. 10 of 1861, provincial and district road committees were 
established under the chairmanship of the GAs and AGAs respectively.402 The 
road committees403 functioned during the period from 1861 to 1951, and were 
later transferred to the Public Works Department.404 
Under the Municipal Councils Ordinance, No. 17 of 1865,405 municipal councils 
were established in Colombo and Kandy. The ordinance was validated for Galle 
in 1866 when the Galle municipal council was established.406 These institutions 
were originally under the GAs and consisted of councillors elected by 
householders. The electorate consisted of adult males with a property, income or a 
high literacy qualification.407 
Under Ordinance, No. 18 of 1892, the sanitary boards408 were established for the 
provision of services in minor towns. The governor nominated two to four people 
401 Sessional Paper No. I – 1999, p. 14. 
402 The other members of the provincial road committee were the provincial chief engineer and 
three to five persons appointed by the governor. The district road committee which headed by the 
AGA, included an official of the public works department and three members representing the 
main community groups elected by popular vote (Sessional Paper No. I – 1999, p. 12). Every male 
over 18 years of age had a right to vote at the election of a district committee (Sessional Paper No. 
XXXIII – 1955, p. 6). 
403 The charge and maintenance of rest houses, control and supervision of the work done on private 
and estate roads (the roads maintained partly by contributions from estates and partly by grants 
from government), prevent encroachments, remove obstructions on public roads, prevent 
nuisances thereon and the maintenance and improvement of roads and ferries in their charge were 
the responsibilities of the road committees (ibid.). 
404 Sessional Paper No. I – 1999, p. 12. 
405 A series of amendments were made to the Municipal Councils Ordinance since 1866. To 
maintain the compatibility, the Municipal Councils Ordinance and the Colombo Municipal 
Council (Constitution) Ordinance were consolidated, and the Municipal Councils Ordinance, No. 
29 of 1947 was enacted. 
406 These municipal councils consisted of members appointed by the governor and members 
elected through limited franchise (discussed later in this chapter). The term of the office was three 
years (Sessional Paper No. I – 1999, pp. 12-13). 
407 Sessional Paper No. XXXIII – 1955, pp. 15-16. 
408 These boards were responsible for public health, scavenging services, electricity, drainage, 
public conveniences, markets, dairies, laundries and water supply. These boards could acquire 
further authority through by-laws. 
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and the GA was the chairman.409 The Local Boards Ordinance, No. 13 of 1898 
was enacted in towns which were larger than those under sanitary boards. These 
were known as local health and sanitation boards and their composition was 
similar to the sanitary boards.410 
After introducing the universal franchise to Sri Lanka in 1931, reforms were 
slowly introduced to elect all local government members through popular vote. 
Under the Urban Councils Ordinance, No. 61 of 1939, urban councils were 
established. The conversion of 27 towns into urban councils with a specified 
membership of between six and 12 members, and the election of a chairman from 
elected members by majority vote, formed part of later reforms.411 In the Town 
Councils Ordinance, No. 3 of 1946, the state council provided for the 
establishment of town councils for small towns with an urban character. As a 
consequence, the sanitary boards and local boards were abolished and 24 town 
councils were established. 412  These had a membership of three to eight 
representing wards into which the council area was divided.413 
According to Wanasinghe, these early local administration initiatives provided for 
a network of organisations situated at the local level for the discharge of functions 
that were appropriate to public need. But it is important to recognise that these 
initial interventions were not necessarily conceived as being democratic 
institutions as understood in today’s terms. They were essentially bureaucratic in 
nature and therefore this initiative has to be viewed more as an exercise in 
administrative decentralisation rather than as the introduction of a system of local 
governance.414 
Similarly, British attempts to mould local organisations to suit the colonial 
administration led to greater complexity. According to Leitan, local government 
bodies became limited in their functions and scope and ended up functioning in a 
much more centralised manner.415 Neither the British local administration, nor the 
ancient local administrative system, were established to govern the villages 
409 Sessional Paper No. I – 1999, p. 14. 
410 Ibid. 
411 Ibid., p. 16. 
412 Their responsibilities and functions included thoroughfares, public health, common amenities, 
physical planning and the collection of revenue. 
413 Sessional Paper No. I – 1999, pp. 14-15. 
414 Wanasinghe, (2003), p. 91. 
415 Leitan, G.R.T. (1979) Local Government and Decentralized Administration in Sri Lanka, Lake 
House Investments Ltd., Colombo-02, pp. 229-231. 
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politically. Both systems were administration-oriented and centrally-controlled. 
Wanasinghe notes that these colonial administration structures failed to respond to 
the socio-economic needs of the local communities.416 
5.2.2.1. Proposals on district-based local government bodies 
Over time various enquiries proposed the re-organisation of local government. As 
mentioned in chapter 4, from mid-1910s there was a direct connection between 
local government reforms and a decentralisation process aimed at establishing 
district-based local government bodies. The emphasis on these decentralising 
attempts fluctuated between administrative and political changes and, were 
subject to a variety of critiques. 
In 1916 the governor of Ceylon appointed a local government commission under 
the chairmanship of the GA of the western province to establish what steps were 
desirable to improve the sanitation, education, and communications of the local 
government machinery. The Local Government Ordinance, No. 11 of 1920, soon 
followed417 and provided for the establishment of district councils for all parts of 
the country other than municipal areas. But the country had not been divided into 
areas for the carrying out of the provisions of such an ordinance, and methods for 
financing district councils were not mentioned in the ordinance. Thus, the 
ordinance could not be implemented although the need to set out the areas in 
respect of district councils was highlighted418 and this initiative can be identified 
as the first attempt in a lengthy process to establish district-based local 
government bodies in Sri Lanka. 
In 1926 the government appointed a select committee on local government to 
consider the working of the ordinances relating to local government, and to make 
recommendations to extend local government bodies throughout the country. But 
the recommendations of the committee remained in abeyance until the 
Donoughmore Commission on constitutional reform. 419  In 1928 under the 
Donoughmore Reforms, one of the seven executive committees of the State 
Council, centred on local administration. A department of local government was 
416 Wanasinghe, (2003), p. 91. 
417 Sessional Paper No. XXXIII – 1955, pp. 9-10.  
418 Ibid., pp. 10-11. 
419 Ibid., pp. 11-12. 
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also established under a commissioner of local government.420 The Donoughmore 
Commissioners proposed creating coordinating bodies to oversee the activities of 
local government and called for provincial councils which, they envisaged: 
…might result in a large part of the administrative work now carried out in the 
Legislative Council coming into the hands of persons permanently resident in the 
country districts and thus more directly in contact with their needs…421 
The intention was to relieve the executive committees of much detailed 
administrative work which could be delegated to and carried out by provincial 
councils and thereby leave the executive committees free to devote their time to 
larger problems. 422  The proposed provincial councils were intended to 
decentralise administration but was also another attempt to establish district-based 
local government bodies. The government considered and, in 1940, debated 
whether to give immediate effect to the recommendation of the Donoughmore 
Commission with regard to the establishment of provincial councils. 423  The 
functions of provincial councils were to be of three main classes, namely: 1) 
supervisory (including controlling, coordinating, and default powers); 2) directive 
(executive); and 3) advisory, 424 and were to be set up in the various revenue 
districts of the island.425 Outcomes included the reduction of the functions of GAs, 
and the ultimate elimination of the Kachcheri426 system of administration. The 
proposed provincial councils can be identified as administrative bodies rather than 
political bodies. However the 2nd World War and its exigencies delayed the 
further pursuit of the subject.427 
The bureaucratic nature and the colonial characteristics of local government were 
criticised by national politicians at that time, and the country’s development 
through local government were debated frequently in the State Council. In 1946, 
420 Sessional Paper No. I – 1999, pp. 15-16. 
421 Quoted in Sessional Paper No. XXXIII – 1955, p. 30. 
422 Sessional Paper No. XXXIII – 1955, p. 30. 
423 Quoted in Sessional Paper No. XXXIII – 1955, p. 30. 
424 Sessional Paper No. XXXIII – 1955, p. 30. 
425 Ibid. 
426 Kachcheri is a Hindi word initially used for the revenue collector’s office in the early years of 
the British colonial administration in Sri Lanka. Revenue collection was a main feature of the 
Dutch pattern of colonial administration. In the first half of the 19th century, the British colonial 
administrators were able to move towards a more organised form of government with civil and 
revenue administration. Thus, the collector’s office, which continued to be locally known as the 
Kachcheri was converted into the GA’s office. Even after independence, Kachcheri was retained 
as the district administrative centre and focal point of the provincial administration and was placed 
under a GA. 
427 Sessional Paper No. XXXIII – 1955, p. 31. 
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the government decided to take away the supervision and control of village 
committees from the GAs, and to hand them over to local government 
departments and assistant commissioners of local government who were 
appointed for this purpose under the Local Government Administrative Regions 
Ordinance, No. 57 of 1946.428 
S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike429 was the principal advocate of a system of provincial 
councils (modelled on the British county councils) as the apex of the island’s 
modern local government system.430 In 1947 Bandaranaike noted the trends in 
local government, the ways and means of making use of the local government 
system for imperialistic requirements, and its potential for local economic and 
administrative improvements. He made particular reference to the transition from 
a colonial system of administration and economic development to self-
government and national economic policies.431 Speaking in the budget debate in 
December 1947, Bandaranaike proposed establishing provincial councils with a 
view to coordinating, supervising and controlling the work of local bodies in the 
district or province concerned.432 
The draft bill, however, was set aside by the cabinet claiming that more time was 
required to explore the proposal further and agreement was reacted to consider it 
at a later date. 433  According to De Silva, although interest in the scheme of 
provincial councils was revived after independence, the consensus over the 
proposal in the 1940s had evaporated in the face of new and more urgent concerns, 
and in any case, the first cabinet of post-independence Sri Lanka gave it a very 
low priority. Inevitably the establishment of these provincial councils called for a 
reduction in the powers of ministries under the control of Bandaranaike’s cabinet 
colleagues, none of whom showed much willingness to accept diminution of their 
428 Ibid., p. 19. 
429 S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike was the Minister of Local Administration from 1936 to 1947, and the 
Minister of Health and Local Government from 1947 to 1951. 
430 Bandara, A.M.N. (2009) ‘The First Debate on the Establishment of Provincial Councils (1928-
1940)’, http://groundview.wordpress.com/2009/12/02/the-first-debate-on-the-establishment-of-
provincial-councils-1928-1940/, accessed 17-02-2012. 
431 Sessional Paper No. I – 1999, pp. 17, 445. 
432 Quoted in Proposals for the Establishment of District Councils under the Direction and 
Control of the Central Government (1968) p. 3. 
433 Bandara, (2009). 
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own political and administrative authority. 434  This reflects the intentional 
negligence of the centre towards decentralising administrative and political 
powers. 
When considering the development of local government in both pre-colonial and 
colonial eras, legal recognition of the pre-colonial local government structures by 
the British colonial rulers is significant. For example, they largely structured these 
bodies according to their needs with little concern for the obligations at the local 
level. Nonetheless, they did introduce a more systematic and legalised 
institutional mechanism to local government processes, although it should be said 
that while the national rulers identified the need to restructure local government 
their unwillingness to decentralise powers to the local level resulted in a low 
priority status being given to the decentralisation process and local government 
reforms. 
5.3. Post-colonial developments 
Following independence, colonial administrative and local governing structures 
continued in Sri Lanka with post-independence rulers intermittently attempting to 
restructure these colonial structures by appointing several commissions and 
committees. The recommendations of these commissions and committees were 
rarely implemented. This section explores the recommendations, successes and 
failures of implementation, and the reasons for non-observance. 
5.3.1. Commissions, committees and recommendations 
With independence in 1948, the number of provinces was increased to nine and 
divided into 19 districts. The types of local government bodies in operation were 
municipal councils, urban councils, town councils and village committees. 
According to the Choksy Commission report, there were seven municipal councils, 
36 urban councils, 38 town councils, and 403 village committees functioning.435 
434 De Silva, K.M. (1996) ‘Decentralisation and Regionalism in the Management of Sri Lanka’s 
Ethnic Conflict’, in P.A. Groves (ed) Economic Development and Social Change in Sri Lanka: A 
Spatial and Policy Analysis, Manohar Publishers, New Delhi, p. 289. 
435 Their functions, powers, and duties were set out in the Municipal Councils Ordinance, No. 29 
of 1947, the Urban Councils Ordinance, No. 61 of 1939, the Town Councils Ordinance, No. 3 of 
1946, and the Village Communities Ordinance, chapter 198 (Sessional Paper No. XXXIII – 1955, 
p. 19). 
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After independence, national politicians tried to restructure local government 
bodies in a way that would dismantle the colonial administrative structure, given 
the continuing need for district-based local government bodies. A key proposal 
was to establish a single tiered arrangement for regional councils, one for each of 
the 19 administrative districts. The election of members to these councils was to 
have seen each local government body in the regional area returning a certain 
number of members, dependent on the population within its limits.436 But the 
government hesitated to establish regional councils. One of the principal 
objections was that regional councils were likely to interfere with the autonomy of 
local government bodies. 437  In response, the Minister of Local Government, 
S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike appointed an official committee under the chairmanship 
of the commissioner of local government, V.C. Jayasuriya, to report on the 
existing methods of taxation and the sources of revenue of local government 
bodies. The committee made its report in 1949.438 
In 1950 Bandaranaike proposed reducing the functions and powers of regional 
councils, and the significant powers of exercising statutory supervision and 
control over village committees, in particular, were dropped.439 Regional councils 
were to be composed entirely of members elected by the people.440 But no final 
decisions were taken by the government on the recommendations of the 1949 
committee report 441  or on the proposed regional councils. Bandaranaike’s 
resignation from the ministership, and then from the governing party, the UNP, 
explains this non-implementation.442 
The Local Authorities (Enlargement of Powers) Act, No. 8 of 1952, has been 
highlighted as the most important change in the post-independence period.443 
Through this act, the government granted local government bodies further 
436 Ibid., p. 31. 
437 Ibid., p. 33. 
438 Ibid., p. 18. 
439 Ibid., p. 33. 
440 These members elected on the same qualifications as were prescribed for village committee 
members under the Local Authorities’ Elections Ordinance, with a minimum of 18 members and a 
maximum of 30 members, the exact number of members being determined on the basis of village 
committee areas within each region (ibid.). 
441 Ibid., p. 18. 
442 In 1952 the then Prime Minister Dudley Senanayake took the office of the Local Government 
Minister as well. He resigned in October 1953. John Kotelawala took the office of the Prime 
Minister after that, and C.W.W. Kannangara was appointed as the Local Government Minister. 
443 Sessional Paper No. XXXIII – 1955, p. 19. 
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opportunities to function on their own, independently of central government.444 
Furthermore, through this act, the powers vested in the local government minister 
were transferred to local government bodies. According to the commentators, with 
the passing of this act, local government bodies became more independent entities 
with wider powers for the utilisation of funds for development projects in their 
area of administration.445 This move was highlighted in the Choksy Commission 
report as an indication of the increasing importance attached by government to the 
proper development of local government bodies, and of their place in the life of 
national politics. 446 Further, this can be interpreted as a limited devolution of 
power which strengthened local government bodies and supported the break from 
the colonial bureaucratic structures to some extent. 
In October 1953, district and divisional coordinating committees were established. 
Each district coordinating committee consisted of representatives of the 
departments functioning in the district (exclusive of the judiciary), divisional 
revenue officers, and members of parliament of the district who were invited to be 
members of the committee. The GA or the AGA was the chairman of the 
committee.447 The function of the committee was to coordinate all governmental 
activities in the district, and to facilitate the carrying out of government 
programmes. Village committees were represented by the assistant commissioner 
of local government functioning in the area. 448  Divisional coordinating 
committees were presided over by divisional revenue officers with other officials 
in the division. According to the Choksy Commission report, the set-up of district 
and divisional coordinating committees by the central government arose from the 
explicit need for a body to coordinate all governmental activity within the district 
and to help facilitate the implementation of the government’s programme in the 
district. 449 Although they reflected a decentralisation effort, these coordinating 
committees were effectively administrative bodies.  
In December 1953, the Governor Lord Soulbury appointed a commission on local 
government headed by N.K. Choksy, to examine the nature and scope of local 
444 Ibid. 
445 Overview of the Local Government System: Towards Participatory Democracy in Sri Lankan 
Society (2011) Marga Institute, Ethul Kotte, Colombo, p. 8. 
446 Sessional Paper No. XXXIII – 1955, p. 19. 
447 Ibid., p. 37. 
448 Ibid., p. 38. 
449 Ibid. 
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government in the country, to investigate the changes needed, and to make 
recommendations on the functions, powers and duties of the local government 
bodies. In addition, the brief was to examine the supervision and control of central 
government over local government bodies, by looking at the ways and means of 
providing revenue to local government bodies in tandem with the recruitment of 
employees of local government bodies.450 The commission observed: 
If the business of government is always to continue to remain in the hands of 
officials, controlled from the centre, then the gap that has existed in the past 
between those who are governing and the governed will remain as wide as it has 
been.451 
The commission’s view was that whilst the Kachcheri system may have been 
appropriate in colonial days, it was completely out of place in the democratic set-
up of modern times. Not only did it detract from the authority and prestige of local 
government bodies but the continuance of the hierarchical system of the 
Kachcheri, with its divisional revenue officers and headmen, tended to perpetuate 
the allegiance of the local populace to the GA, as the representative of the central 
government. The commission recommended that local government bodies should 
be made the executive agency of the government instead of the Kachcheries,452 
and that the Kachcheries were anachronistic and should be abolished.453 So again, 
the need for district-based local government bodies to eliminate existing district-
based administrative structures, was proposed. 
A major recommendation of the commission was to establish an independent 
autonomous set of local organisations, in the form of regional councils,454 similar 
to the bodies earlier proposed by Bandaranaike in 1950. But the commission did 
not follow through on this because at that time local government bodies did not 
have either the finances, or the opportunity of gaining first-hand experience in the 
discharge of these various duties by direct contact with them. The commission 
instead proposed that representatives of the local population take part in the 
discharge of some of the duties and functions of Kachcheries, in association with 
government officials, by utilising and expanding the existing set-up of the district 
450 Ibid., pp. iii-iv. 
451 Ibid., p. 401. 
452 Ibid., p. 35. 
453 Ibid., pp. 39, 401. 
454 Ibid. 
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coordinating committees.455 The commission also recommended that the district 
coordinating committees in the Kachcheries be reconstituted into regional 
committees, 456  to carry out the responsibilities of the Kachcheries, and to 
coordinate functions.457 Regional committees were to provide for social welfare 
and relief of distress policies, the settlement of people on peasant and middle class 
allotments other than colonisation schemes, rural development, coordination of 
agricultural activity, minor irrigation and food production, organisation and 
supervision of public health measures, and road development and regional 
planning. 458  The Choksy Commission wanted to drive local political 
representatives towards the future potential of establishing regional councils by 
transferring responsibilities to them through regional committees. 
Although the UNP government had not fully implemented the recommendations 
of the Choksy Commission report, the district development committees were 
established in 1955 for the coordination of government activities within the 
district. These committees provided the opportunity for local government bodies 
to be aware of the government’s programmes in the district and also to forward 
their requests to the central government.459 The district development committees 
reflected similar features of the recommended regional committees. But the UNP 
was defeated in the 1956 general election, 460  and the implementation of 
recommendations on regional councils did not happen. 
In May 1957 the government of S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, published a draft bill for 
the establishment of regional councils and for matters connected therewith. Under 
this draft bill regional councils would be established to cover the whole or part of 
455 Ibid., p. 37. 
456 Regional committees should be composed of the local heads of government departments 
(exclusive of the judiciary), and include officials and others. The officials should be represented by 
the GA or AGA, the assistant commissioner of local government of that district, nominees of the 
department directors, the officials such as divisional land officer, superintendent of surveys, 
divisional agricultural officer, and divisional revenue officers. The non-officials should be one 
representative of each municipal council, urban council, and town council in the area of authority, 
one representative elected from each of several groups of village committees (each group consists 
three-four village committees) had been recommended. Every member of parliament in each 
regional committee area should be an ex-officio member of that regional committee, the chairman 
should be the GA, and in no case should the total number of officials (including the chairman) 
exceed the total number of non-official members (ibid., pp. 41-43). 
457 Ibid., pp. 401-402. 
458 Proposals for the Establishment of District Councils under the Direction and Control of the 
Central Government (1968) pp. 4-5. 
459 Sessional Paper No. I – 1999, p. 18. 
460 In the 1956 general election, SLFP won and S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike became the Prime 
Minister. 
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an administrative district, or the area consisting of the whole or part of two or 
more administrative districts. It also provided for the election of regional 
councillors by local government bodies, for ex-officio regional councillors among 
whom would be members of parliament, the election of a chairman by the council, 
the appointment of a regional commissioner who was to be the chief executive 
officer of the council, and for the transfer or delegation to the council of powers, 
duties, and functions461 which could be exercised by ministers.462 However the 
draft bill faced unexpected impediments when the proposal for establishing 
regional councils merged with the major decentralisation process of the country. 
Some of the documents published by later governments state that the concept of 
district-based councils always followed the ‘principles of democratic 
decentralisation’ until 1957, when S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike sought to amend his 
Regional Councils Bill of 1957 to accommodate some of the requirements of the 
Federal Party’s463 policy of federalism.464 But it is not clear what the ‘principles 
of democratic decentralisation’ referred to prior to 1957. This highlights the 
situation which occurred when the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam pact was signed. 
The joint statement read:  
At this stage the Prime Minister suggested an examination of the government’s 
draft Regional Councils Bill to see whether provision could be made under it to 
meet reasonably some of the matters in this regard which the Federal Party had in 
view.465 
In 1957 the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam pact was signed and provisions made 
for direct elections to regional councils which also laid out that the subjects 
covered by regional councils include agriculture, cooperatives, lands and land 
development, colonisation and education. The pact however did not survive the 
opposition of sections of the Sinhala community led by Buddhist priests and 
which included the opposition led by the UNP. Bandaranaike’s election campaign 
461 In addition to these powers the regional council could establish public utility services; promote, 
develop, and assist in the development of agriculture and food production; exercise certain 
supervisory powers over local bodies; and advise the minister in regard to the exercise of his 
powers over them. The regional council had also the right to appoint its own staff, to create its own 
funds, impose taxes, and raise loans. The central government had the power to suspend or dissolve 
regional councils (Proposals for the Establishment of District Councils under the Direction and 
Control of the Central Government (1968) p. 5). 
462 Ibid. 
463 Tamil ethnic-based political party (this is discussed in chapter 4). 
464 Proposals for the Establishment of District Councils under the Direction and Control of the 
Central Government (1968) p. 9. 
465 Quoted in Proposals for the Establishment of District Councils under the Direction and 
Control of the Central Government (1968) p. 9. 
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in 1956 was strongly based on the Sinhala-Buddhist groups. But his later act of 
devolution of power to the Tamils through regional councils was not accepted by 
these Sinhala-Buddhists. Here, as mentioned, the main opponents were the 
Buddhist priests, with the UNP mainly aiming to regain public opinion by 
supporting them. Although Bandaranaike feared the loss of the Sinhala-Buddhist 
support, the provisions of the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam pact were not 
implemented. So another attempt to establish district-based local government 
bodies – regional councils – failed. Although the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam 
pact did not succeed, the attempts to restructure the local government were 
directly connected with the decentralisation process. The pact was clearly aimed 
at decentralising power to the minorities, a proposal which was not acceptable to 
opponents. 
In July 1963 the Sirimavo Bandaranaike’s government announced in the throne 
speech that “early consideration would be given to the question of the 
establishment of district councils to replace the Kachcheries.”466 The government 
appointed a committee which later forwarded its report to the Minister of Local 
Government in February 1964, 467 recommending the creation of district councils 
to replace the Kachcheries and suggesting ways of decentralising some of the 
functions performed by government departments in revenue districts for the 
purpose of establishing these councils. The report also contained a draft of a bill 
to make provision for the establishment of district councils.468 
In a throne speech from government in 1964 it was stated: “A draft bill to 
implement the proposals to establish district councils will be placed before you for 
consideration.” 469  But the consideration never came and nothing happened 
immediately as the government expected that the previous Sinhala-Buddhist 
opposition would lead to the defeat of the SLFP at the 1965 general election. 
However, the UNP was returned in 1965 against predictions.  
466 Ibid., p. 7. 
467 The Minister of Local Government was Mahanama Samaraweera from 1960 to 1965. 
468 Proposals for the Establishment of District Councils under the Direction and Control of the 
Central Government (1968) p. 7. 
469 Quoted in Proposals for the Establishment of District Councils under the Direction and 
Control of the Central Government (1968) p. 7. 
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The Dudley-Chelvanayakam pact was signed in March 1965 with the government 
declaring that it would give ‘earnest consideration’ to the establishment of district 
councils. In April 1965 the Prime Minister stated: 
My government will examine the existing structure of the machinery of local 
government with a view to increasing its efficiency and harnessing the 
cooperation of all classes of citizens in the administration. With this objective in 
view, earnest consideration will be given to the establishment of district councils 
which will function under the control and direction of the central government.470 
This policy statement was repeated in 1966 and 1967.471 In 1968 a draft bill was 
presented as a white paper, providing for the establishment of district councils. 
They would not be local government bodies but would be extensions of central 
government taking over some of the functions performed by the Kachcheries.472 
The draft bill proposed that these councils should function under the control and 
direction of central government. Such functions 473  would be vested in these 
bodies by the ministers in charge of the functions, and the ministers would have 
the power to direct and control the councils in the exercise of the powers vested in 
the councils by them.474 These proposals were an attempt to further strengthen the 
central government through taking over some of the administrative functions of 
the Kachcheries.  
As envisaged by Bandaranaike the regional councils would have been empowered 
to amalgamate with each other. Furthermore the regional councils would have the 
authority to select settlers for the colonisation schemes in the areas under their 
administration, and powers over land development and colonisation 
programmes. 475  But the 1968 white paper stated that no such powers of 
amalgamation would be vested in the proposed district councils. All these 
functions were excluded from the subjects allocated to district councils, and 
district councils would have no ‘district services.’476 Moreover a district council 
470 Ibid. 
471 Proposals for the Establishment of District Councils under the Direction and Control of the 
Central Government (1968) p. 7. 
472 Sivanayagam, S. (1987) ‘From a 40 Year Chronology 1946-1986’, 
http://tamilnation.co/conflictresolution/tamileelam/68districtcouncils.htm, accessed 15-02-2012. 
473 Subjects of the district councils: 1) Agriculture and food; 2) Animal husbandry; 3) Industries 
and fisheries; 4) Rural development; 5) Works, housing and regional planning; 6) Education; 7) 
Cultural affairs; 8) Ayurveda; 9) Social welfare; and 10) Health services (District Councils – Draft 
Bill (1968) pp. 35-38). 
474 Proposals for the Establishment of District Councils under the Direction and Control of the 
Central Government (1968) p. 9. 
475 Ibid. 
476 Ibid. 
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was to consist of ex-officio councillors and nominated councillors.477 There were 
no directly elected councillors. Every district council would function under the 
general direction and control of the government. The draft bill did not provide for 
any powers to be exercised by these councils over local government bodies.478 
These points further clarify that the draft bill did not provide provisions to 
decentralise powers but did extend centralisation. 
However, again the Sinhala-Buddhist campaign against district councils arose by 
connecting the Dudley-Chelvanayakam pact together with the proposed district 
councils. It is alleged that the bill was a ‘device to divide the country to the 
detriment of the Sinhala people’. The leading Buddhist priests as well as a 
deputation of the All Ceylon Buddhist Congress meet the Prime Minister to make 
known their opposition to the proposed district councils and to demand that the 
government should give up the proposal. Some of the Tamil politicians also 
opposed the white paper. The most vehement attack on the district council 
proposals came from a Tamil member on the government side, G.G. 
Ponnambalam, the leader of the Tamil Congress who argued that the 
establishment of district councils would lead to the eventual segregation of the 
Sinhalese and the Tamils.479 Finally, the Prime Minister declared that the district 
council proposals would be abandoned if a majority of the people did not want 
them.480 The Dudley-Chelvanayakam pact, like the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam 
477 A district council shall consist of the following councillors: ex-officio councillors, namely, (a) 
elected members of the House of Representatives for the electoral district which lies within such 
administrative district; (b) appointed members of the House of Representatives; and (c) mayors of 
municipalities and chairmen of local bodies within the administrative district. There will also be 
not more than three nominated councillors. The council shall elect the chairman. There shall also 
be an executive committee for each district council consisting of not more than seven councillors 
elected by the council. The GA of the district shall, in addition to his own duties, be the 
commissioner, the chief executive officer of the council (ibid., p. 8). 
478 Ibid. 
479 Sivanayagam, (1987). 
480 The opposition walked out of the House burning and tearing copies of the white paper within 
the chamber as Dudley Senanayake rose to initiate the debate on the white paper. The members, 
who had earlier walked out, led by the Leader of the Opposition Sirimavo Bandaranaike, gathered 
outside the precincts of the parliament building and made a bonfire of the copies before they 
dispersed.  They pointed to the possibility of the division of the island into two or three parts by 
establishing district councils. Dudley Senanayake lashed out at the opposition for carrying its false 
propaganda and spreading communal hatred. He quoted from the speeches of opposition leaders 
and pointed out how they had earlier favoured the establishment of district councils and even 
incorporated the idea in numerous throne speeches. He also blamed the Tamil politicians by saying 
that the tragedy of the Tamil race was the existence of a set of self-seeking sycophants making the 
sweet speech of saviours. If the Tamils were ever to regain their birth right in Ceylon, they should 
send the present saviours of the Tamil Congress and the Federal Party away (ibid.). 
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pact, was never implemented.481 The Dudley Senanayake government withdrew 
the District Councils Bill in 1968. Then the Federal Party, which supported the 
government at that time, withdrew from the government. According to Bandara, 
although the original idea of establishing a second-tier of government was used in 
formulating the legislation for the setting up of regional councils in 1957, and 
later district councils in 1967, both efforts failed in the face of the opposition.  In 
1957 the UNP opposed it and in 1967 the opposition led by the SLFP, LSSP and 
CP coalition opposed it.482 
These attempts and failures reflect two political dimensions. First, when 
Bandaranaike tried to devolve power to the minorities through regional councils, 
the Sinhala nationalists identified regional councils as an attempt to divide the 
country. Because of this, later efforts to establish district councils were labelled as 
attempts to divide the country, even when many were clearly concerned simply 
with decentralisation. Second, the political leadership from time to time was 
reluctant to lose the support of the Sinhala nationalists, and therefore decided not 
to establish the regional or district councils. 
In 1970 the then Local Government Minister R. Premadasa 483  appointed a 
committee of inquiry on local government to examine and report on several 
matters.484  On 26th February 1970 the report of the committee was submitted to 
the Local Government Minister. The committee suggested new sources of revenue 
for local government bodies. But the UNP was defeated in the general election in 
May 1970 so that although the report came out as Sessional Paper No. 7 – 1972, 
the SLFP-led coalition government did not implement the recommendations that 
were put forward. 
481 Wilson, A.J. (2000) Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalism: Its Origins and Development in the 
Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, University of British Columbia Press, pp. 1-12. 
482 Bandara, (2009). 
483 From 1965 to 1968, the local government minister of the Dudley Senanayake cabinet was M. 
Tiruchelvam. But he resigned in 1968 and then R. Premadasa was appointed as the local 
government minister for the period from 1968 to 1970. 
484 These included the adequacy of the present sources of revenue of local government bodies, the 
existing financial relations between government and local government bodies, what new sources of 
revenue should be made available to local government bodies to enable them to perform their 
functions more efficiently, whether any changes should be made in the present method of election 
of mayors/chairmen of local government bodies and, whether or not any changes should be made 
in the distribution of powers and functions among mayors/chairmen, the councils and the officers, 
for the more efficient functioning of local government bodies; and any other matters that may be 
referred to the committee (Report of the Committee of Inquiry on Local Government (Sessional 
Paper No. VII – 1972) p. 1). 
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In 1975, S. Sittampalam headed the committee on local government revenue. This 
committee also investigated the revenue sources and the ways of increasing the 
financial bases of local government bodies. 485  However there are no further 
details or evidence of implementation of the recommendations of the committee 
other than the mention of this committee in the report of the 1999 Commission of 
Inquiry. The government change in 1977 was one reason for such non-
implementation. 
5.3.2. Establishment of district development councils 
As discussed in chapter 4, after 1977 the UNP government transformed the whole 
politico-economic structure of the country. Until 1977 governments were usually 
elected for five-year terms, with parliament the supreme body and the prime 
minister-led cabinet exercising the powers of government. The new constitutional 
arrangements from 1977 created a high powered executive presidency leaving the 
Parliament, cabinet and the prime minister powerless. For this reason 
governments after 1977 have not changed as frequently as before. 486  This 
development has led to a centralisation and, it could be argued, misuse of power.  
In 1979 A.E. Moragoda headed the committee on delimitation for the 
establishment of rural councils, appointed on a recommendation of President J.R. 
Jayewardene’s cabinet487 on the premise that the then existing town councils and 
village councils were unable to meet their establishment expenses and provide a 
satisfactory service. 488  The committee recommended the establishment of 269 
rural councils to replace 632 town and village councils. The area of authority of 
each rural council was to be roughly an AGA’s division.489 
In 1979 President Jayewardene also appointed a commission on development 
councils to inquire into and report on the existing structure of local government 
485 Sessional Paper No. I – 1999, p. 18. 
486 For example, the UNP government remained in power for 17 years (from 1977 to 1994) and the 
UPFA government is still in power from 2004. 
487 According to the 1978 Constitution, the executive president is the head of the executive and of 
the government (The Constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka-1978, p. 19). 
R. Premadasa was the Prime Minister and the Local Government Minister of the J.R. 
Jayewardene’s government. 
488 Sessional Paper No. I – 1999, p. 19. 
489 Report of the Presidential Commission on Development Councils (Sessional Paper V – 1980) p. 
28. 
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with a view to ascertaining a wide range of issues.490 The commission found that 
although the island was covered by a network of democratically elected councils, 
most were not effective local government bodies. Some were so small that they 
could not generate the financial resources required for any important changes in 
the living standards of the people.491 The commission stressed that the system of 
local government imposed by the British in their colonial territories was not 
designed for economic development in such territories. Therefore additional 
powers and functions should be vested with the local government bodies to enable 
them to undertake economic development activities.492 
The commission recommended establishing development councils as district 
coordinating bodies to connect the national economic development with the local 
areas. Development councils should consist of ex-officio members, and of elected 
members. 493 It was suggested that the elected group would form a committee 
deciding upon local government matters, subsequently to be ratified by the whole 
council sitting in local government sessions, and proposing that the whole council 
would deal with development matters. 494  The commission recommended 
establishing political bodies at the district and divisional levels with the 
development councils and the rural councils respectively. 
As the commission was proceeding, the government decided to establish 
development councils to replace the town and village councils, and advised the 
chairman of the commission on 13th November 1979. This decision was against 
the recommendations of both the Moragoda Committee and the Commission on 
Development Councils. The commission report argued against the government 
decision. The government letter of 13th November 1979 argued: 
Since a plethora of councils would not be conducive to development, especially in 
the rural areas, it was decided to have development councils at the rate of one for 
each district instead of a large number of rural councils as envisaged earlier. The 
development councils will also replace the existing town councils and village 
councils.495 
490 Ibid., pp. iii-iv. 
491 Ibid., p. 15. 
492 Ibid., pp. 16-17. 
493 Ex-officio members should be members of parliament, and heads of municipalities and urban 
councils. Elected members should be a group elected from the rural areas of the district. 
494 Sessional Paper No. V – 1980, p. 31. 
495 Quoted in Sessional Paper No. V – 1980, p. 50. 
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The government had decided to have municipal councils, urban councils and 
development councils as local authorities. 496  The commission said that their 
deliberations proceeded on the assumption that there would be an infrastructure of 
local government bodies covering the whole country. 497  According to the 
commission report, the units of local government must be composed of persons 
elected by the people who are close to and who know the problems of the area.498 
The commission report also argued that a development council was a concomitant 
or an adjunct of the district minister and a part of the scheme of decentralisation 
of the central executive through the district ministers. Thus the development 
council was an integral part in a central government exercise and not part of an 
exercise in decentralisation through local government bodies.499 According to the 
commission, development councils were not intended to have, and could not be 
given, powers to supply continuous public utility services.500 If the development 
council was to be the local authority in the rural areas, it would imply an invidious 
distinction between the rural areas and the urban areas.501 The commission did not 
consider it desirable or even reasonably practicable to mix central government and 
local government in one person or authority.502 
The commission requested the President not convert the development councils 
into local authorities. 503  Against the recommendations of the commission the 
government passed the Development Councils Act, No. 35 of 1980, under which 
15 development functions504 performed by 11 ministries were transferred to the 
development councils.505 The development councils consisted of both ex-officio 
members and elected members.506 The Development Councils Act stated: 
The development council shall exercise, perform and discharge such powers, 
duties and functions as were exercised, discharged or performed by a town 
council or a village council constituted for any town or village area situated 
496 Sessional Paper No. V – 1980, p. 28. 
497 Ibid. 
498 Ibid., p. 29. 
499 Ibid., p. 30. 
500 Ibid. 
501 Ibid., p. 31. 
502 Ibid. 
503 Ibid. 
504 1) Agrarian services; 2) Agriculture; 3) Animal husbandry; 4) Cooperative development; 5) 
Cultural affairs; 6) Education; 7) Employment; 8) Fisheries; 9) Food; 10) Health services; 11) 
Housing; 12) Irrigation works; 13) Land use and land settlement; 14) Rural development; and 15) 
Small and medium scale industries (Development Councils Act, No. 35 of 1980, p. 37). 
505 Sessional Paper No. I – 1999, op.cit., p. 19. 
506 Act, No. 35 of 1980, p. 2. 
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within the administrative district for which a development council has been 
constituted…507 
The development councils established under the Development Councils Act were 
totally different from the recommendations of both the Moragoda Committee and 
the Commission on Development Councils. The government was seeking to 
reduce its expenditure by maintaining a few development councils rather than 
maintaining several local government bodies as recommended by the committee 
and commission. Also it can be identified that through establishing development 
councils, the whole control of such councils was supposed to remain under the 
central government and through this the central government may had expected to 
expand and strengthen its authoritative power. 
The development councils elections were held in 1981,508 and commenced their 
term of office in 1981, together with the abolition of 83 town councils and 549 
village councils and their functions transferred to 24 development councils. A 
direct consequence of this process was that the town councils and village councils 
representing about 85 per cent of the population ceased to function. Only 12 
municipal councils and 39 urban councils in operation at the time remained as the 
democratically elected local government bodies. 509 With the town and village 
councils abolished, questions emerged about the extent to which local government 
became disconnected from local communities. Finally, the development councils 
were established, but the long-lasting expectations of establishing district-based 
local government bodies to replace colonial administrative bodies were not 
fulfilled. So the Kachcheri administration system remained and continued to 
function. The report of the 1999 Commission of Inquiry states that when the 
development councils were in operation there would be two streams of authority 
in the district – under the district minister and the district administrative 
officials. 510  Establishment of development councils can be interpreted as the 
beginning of the complex relationship between two streams of administrative and 
507 Ibid., p. 8. 
508 Development councils consisted of members elected on the list system of proportional 
representation by the voters of the district, as well as the MPs of the central legislature whose 
constituencies came within the district. The head of each development councils’ executive 
committee was the district minister appointed by the President from among the MPs of his party 
(Leitan, G.R.T. (1990) Political Integration through Decentralization and Devolution of Power: 
The Sri Lankan Experience, Department of History and Political Science, University of Colombo, 
Sri Lanka, p. 10). 
509 Sessional Paper No. I – 1999, pp. 19-20. 
510 Ibid. 
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political authorities. Through development councils the centralisation process was 
strengthened. 
Later the cabinet appointed a committee on the primary level people’s 
participation in development councils – the Gramodaya Mandala Committee. The 
newly established development councils were distanced from the people and were 
not able to address local needs. Therefore the cabinet sought the recommendations 
of a committee on people’s participation for representative government. The 
cabinet requested that the committee make recommendations for the 
establishment of Gramodaya Mandalas, composed of the chairmen of the non-
political voluntary organisations at the level of the Grama Niladhari (GN) 
division.511 The number of GN divisions increased greatly from 4,712 to 14,700. 
The Gramodaya Mandalas, assigned statutory status by an amendment to the 
development councils law,512 were set up from 1981 onwards.513 The Gramodaya 
Mandalas, in turn, were components of larger Pradeshiya Mandalas 514 which 
were established at the AGA level division. 515  It is clear that development 
councils, Pradeshiya Mandalas and Gramodaya Mandalas were established 
following the administrative divisions, the district, the AGA’s division and the 
GN division respectively. However there was no procedure to link Pradeshiya 
Mandalas and Gramodaya Mandalas to development councils and this led to a 
political vacuum between these local authorities.516 
The report of the 1999 Commission of Inquiry notes that in practice, 517  the 
Gramodaya Mandalas were unable to provide the community service at village 
level which the government expected them to do. The working of the Gramodaya 
Mandalas was considered unsatisfactory from the beginning518 because they were 
unable to fill the gap created by the abolition of former town and village councils. 
511 Grama Niladhari division is the lowest level of the government administration in Sri Lanka. 
512 Gramodaya Mandalas established under section 17A of the Development Councils Act, as 
amended by Act, No. 45 of 1981. 
513 Sessional Paper No. I – 1999, p. 20. 
514 Pradeshiya Mandalas were composed of the chairmen of Gramodaya Mandalas in each AGA’s 
division. 
515 Matthews, B. (1982) ‘District Development Councils in Sri Lanka’, Asian Survey, Vol. 22, No. 
11, University of California Press, p. 1122 (http://www.jstor.org/stable/2643983, accessed 30-04-
2013). 
516 Ibid., pp. 1122-1123. 
517 Gramodaya Mandalas were thus not elected, but were designed as genuine local level bodies 
which could voice village opinion; subsequently they were also vested with functions which could 
strengthen the village economy (Leitan, (1990), p. 26). 
518 Sessional Paper No. I – 1999, p. 20. 
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Also the chairmen of the voluntary organisations and the GN were not elected by 
the people. The Gramodaya Mandalas did not have a direct responsibility for the 
people. Moreover, in many village areas, voluntary organisations which were 
‘anti-government’ generally did not present themselves for inclusion of their 
chairmen in the Gamodaya Mandalas, through a conviction that ‘it would serve 
no purpose’.519 
5.3.3. Decline of district development councils 
The performance of development councils and Gramodaya Mandalas was not 
successful and in 1986 a ministerial sub-committee was appointed to report on 
how to organise for people’s participation. A draft law on Pradeshiya Sabhas was 
subsequently submitted to the Parliament. When the Pradeshiya Sabhas Act was 
debated in Parliament the merits of the former Gam Sabha system were recounted 
and the system of elections for Pradeshiya Sabhas – the proportional 
representation – was emphasised as unsuitable520 (discussed later in this chapter). 
The Pradeshiya Sabhas Act was passed as Act, No. 15 of 1987,521 with the newly 
established Pradeshiya Sabhas very similar to the rural councils recommended by 
the Moragoda Committee in 1979. 
As discussed in chapter 4, 1987 was remarkable in the Sri Lankan local 
government and decentralisation process. Under the 13th amendment to the 
constitution, local government gained constitutional recognition and became 
subject to provincial councils. Clause 4 in the 9th schedule of the 13th amendment 
includes references to local government as follows: 
4. Local government –  
4:1 Local authorities for the purpose of local government and village 
administration, such as municipal councils, urban councils and Pradeshiya 
Sabhas, except that, the constitution, form and structure of local authorities shall 
be determined by law; 
4:2 Supervision of the administration of local authorities established by law, 
including the power of dissolution; 
4:3 Local authorities will have the powers vested in them under existing law. 
Municipal councils and urban councils will have the powers vested in them under 
519 Leitan, (1990), pp. 26-28. 
520 Sessional Paper No. I – 1999, pp. 20-21. 
521 Pradeshiya Sabhas have been established at the level of AGA’s division by mostly following 
demarcations of the AGA’s divisions. 
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the Municipal Councils Ordinance and the Urban Councils Ordinance. 
Pradeshiya Sabhas will have the powers vested in them under existing law. It will 
be open to a provincial council to confer additional powers on local authorities 
but not to take away their powers; 
4:4 Gramodaya Mandalas will have the powers vested under existing law. It will 
be open to a provincial council to confer additional powers on Gramodaya 
Mandalas.522 
When local government was placed under the provincial councils, the previous 
direct relationship with the central government Ministry of Local Government 
was de-linked. According to the 1999 Commission of Inquiry, under clause 4.1 in 
the 9th schedule of the 13th amendment, the control and supervision of local 
government was a power vested in the minister of local government of the 
province523 and, accordingly, local government came under provincial councils. 
The Department of Local Government at the national level was discontinued and 
provincial commissioners and assistant provincial commissioners of local 
government (CLGs and ACLGs)524 were appointed for each provincial council.525 
An administrative reforms committee was appointed to consider administrative 
changes in support of devolution of power which brought proposals to implement 
the Provincial Councils and Pradeshiya Sabhas Acts. The committee emphasised 
that the functions at the three levels (the centre, the province and the Pradeshiya 
522 The 13th Amendment to the Constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka-1978, 
14th November 1987, pp. 18-19. 
523 Each provincial council functions through a provincial governor in whom executive power is 
vested, and a board of ministers. The board of ministers for each province comprise five ministers 
including the chief minister. The subjects and functions are organised within seven groups as 
follows: 1) Provincial administration and personnel; 2) Law and order; 3) Local government and 
rural institutions; 4) Finance and planning; employment and labour; 5) Agriculture and fisheries; 
trade and tourism; industry; 6) Economic infrastructure (power, irrigation, construction, roads and 
transport); and 7) Education, youth affairs, and culture; health and social services. Of these, the 
first three groups would be handled by the chief minister and each of the others by an individual 
minister (Report No. 6 of the Administrative Reforms Committee, Administrative Changes in 
Support of Devolution (Sessional Paper No. III – 1988) p. 3). 
524 Provision is made for a provincial public service in each province while the powers of 
recruitment, promotion and disciplinary control of officers within such service are vested in the 
provincial governor. A provincial public service commission is also to function in each province, 
to which the governor is able to delegate these powers (Provincial Councils Act, No. 42 of 1987, 
pp. 12-13). The head of the provincial public service is the provincial governor. With the 
establishment of provincial councils, all staff of local government bodies were absorbed into the 
provincial public service and all matters previously dealt with by the local government service 
commission were transferred to the provincial public service commission (Sessional Paper No. I – 
1999, p. 22). Under the Constitution, the President appoints the governor (for a five-year term) and 
the chief secretary of the province. In addition most of the key officials such as secretaries of 
provincial ministries and provincial commissioners are seconded from the centre to the provincial 
public service (‘Country Paper: Sri Lanka’ (n.d.) 
http://www.unescap.org/huset/lgstudy/country/srilanka/srilanka.html#top, accessed 29-12-2011). 
525 Sessional Paper No. I – 1999, p. 21. 
119 
 
                                                 
Sabha) would vary.526 At each level responsibility for implementing the assigned 
tasks and functions would rest with the centre, the province or the Pradeshiya 
Sabha. 527  The committee wanted to decentralise much of the power to the 
provinces and Pradeshiya Sabhas, and to avoid centre influences on provincial 
and local levels of government. It particularly wanted to avoid use of the system 
of financial relationships as a mechanism of control of the periphery.528 
In 1988 both provincial councils and Pradeshiya Sabhas came into operation but 
the government did not accept many of the recommendations of the committee529 
and government control over provincial and local levels continued. The 
development councils were abolished and while the Gramodaya Mandalas were 
not abolished they were de-activated. The efforts to establish district-based local 
government bodies declined. The Kachcheri administration functioned further 
without any replacement. The Kachcheries and the GAs were renamed as district 
secretariats and district secretaries respectively and the complicated twin streams 
of politics and administration continued. In 1990s this was introduced to the 
divisional level under divisional secretaries. 530  Due to this the complications 
extended to divisional level and problems occurred between divisional secretariats 
and Pradeshiya Sabhas as well (as discussed later in this chapter). 
526 The Pradeshiya Sabha level would focus on project implementation and delivery of services, 
while at the provincial level the emphasis would be on the formulation of operational policies, 
programmes and budgets, the provision of technical guidance to the Pradeshiya Sabhas and on 
monitoring and evaluation of programme implementation. At the centre, the emphasis would be on 
macro-planning, formulation of national policies, setting of standards as well as on the evaluation 
of policies, plans and standards (Sessional Paper No. III – 1988, p. 1). 
527 Ibid. 
528 Ibid. 
529 The committee recommended that each Pradeshiya Sabha should convert itself into a planning 
council for the purpose of appraising the annual development plan and its constituent projects as 
well as for monitoring. Furthermore the committee recommended that the Pradeshiya Sabha 
should have authority over all those who serve in its geographical area of operation. There should 
be no duality of supervision both by the provincial authorities and by the Pradeshiya Sabha 
authorities. The chairmen and the three vice chairmen should form the executive committee of the 
Pradeshiya Sabha. The administrative head of the Pradeshiya Sabha should be designated 
commissioner and should have supervision over its entire staff (ibid., pp. 2-4). It was proposed that 
the total governmental administration should be conducted at the level of Pradeshiya Sabha for 
which the chief executive officer should be designated commissioner and that development plans 
at divisional level should be formulated by this institution (Sessional Paper No. I – 1999, p. 21). 
530 These divisions are former AGA’s divisions. The position of AGA has been renamed as 
divisional secretary. 
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5.3.4. Recent attempts to restructure local government 
In 1994 the UNP was defeated and the PA came to power. In 1999 President 
Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga appointed a commission on local 
government reforms,531 which brought many proposals and recommendations for 
restructuring the Sri Lankan local government system, including a greater degree 
of local autonomy, more people’s participation in the affairs of local government, 
public accountability, self-reliance and equity, greater responsiveness to the needs 
of the local constituents, developmental role of local government, efficiency, 
effectiveness and productivity, development of a new local government culture, 
and a rate-payers’ charter.532 Yet again, the recommendations of the commission 
were not implemented. In 2001 the PA government was defeated and President 
Kumaratunga, who appointed the 1999 Commission of Inquiry, was later joined 
by the Sinhala nationalist JVP and JHU in coalition politics to defeat the UNP in 
2004. As a result, the proposed local government reforms were devalued. Also 
there were no demands or influences from the local level for implementing the 
reforms. 
Since the 1999 Commission of Inquiry, no more commissions have been 
appointed to restructure the local government system in Sri Lanka. In 2007 the 
Ministry of Local Government and Provincial Councils published the national 
policy declaration for local government. The preamble cites a part of 2010 
Presidential election manifesto of Mahinda Rajapaksa 533  on local government 
which aimed to adopt immediate changes to strengthen local government. It 
further aimed to introduce practical solutions to address the current deficiencies of 
local government. It accepted the need to broaden the power of the existing local 
government bodies towards effective local self-government. 534  The national 
policy declaration, published in the Gazette No. 1632/26 (18th December 2009), 
proposed a strategy but failed to set out how it could be implemented. It proposed 
adopting a structure and practices which would result in an ‘optimum divisional 
531 This commission was headed by H.A.P. Abeyawardana. He was the head of the previous 
Gramodaya Mandala Committee in 1980. 
532 Sessional Paper No. I – 1999, p. 353. 
533 Mahinda Chintanaya (Mahinda thinking). 
534 National Policy Declaration for Local Government, 17th July 2007, Ministry of Local 
Government and Provincial Councils, Sri Lanka. 
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decentralisation and devolution.’ 535  It also mentioned the need of local 
government to receive constitutional status as an integral part of representative 
government in Sri Lanka. Local government bodies would thus be transformed 
from the status of ‘dependent institutions’ to ‘self-governing partners’ of the other 
two tiers of government, the central and the provincial. The national policy aimed 
to establish Jana Sabhas at the village level. 536  The national policy further 
suggested strengthening the image of local government bodies and also 
safeguarding their powers537 as stipulated in clause 4.3 of the 13th amendment to 
the constitution. 538  But again the policy does not mention how it should be 
implemented.  The major problem here is the different statements in the policy 
and in the gazette. 
In summary, after independence, many attempts to establish district-based local 
government bodies failed and more centralised development councils were 
established. Development councils and later established Gramodaya Mandalas 
and Pradeshiya Mandalas were not successful. These bodies, especially the 
development councils were executive agencies which were ill-equipped to 
perform functions in relation to local development. 539 Moreover, these bodies 
were established following administrative divisions rather than political divisions. 
Later, after the decline of district-based development councils, the local 
government bodies were subject to newly established provincial councils. 
Alongside all these political bodies, the colonial district-based administrative 
structures also remained, and later these administrative structures were extended 
to divisional level as well. The governments’ ignorance of most recommendations 
of the commissions and committees, led to implementation failures in establishing 
local government bodies away from the colonial structures. The political 
ambitions of the post-independence rulers together with the nationalist elements 
led to the centralisation of power and the neglect of people’s needs. 
535 National Policy on Local Government (Gazette No. 1632/26) 18th December 2009, pp. 3-5. 
536 Ibid., p. 3. 
537 These include the powers vested in municipal councils, urban councils and Pradeshiya Sabhas 
under the Municipal Councils Ordinance, Urban Councils Ordinance and the Pradeshiya Sabhas 
Act respectively. 
538 Gazette No. 1632/26, 18th December 2009, pp. 3-4. 
539 Leitan, (1990), p. 28. 
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5.4. Local government electoral systems 
This section outlines the transformation of local government electoral systems in 
Sri Lanka from colonial to present time. This section investigates the ways in 
which the changes to local government electoral system from time to time have 
served to strengthen or weaken local government. 
5.4.1. Transformation of local government electoral systems 
As mentioned earlier, in 1931 British colonial rulers introduced universal 
franchise to Sri Lanka through the Donoughmore Reforms. The electoral system 
introduced was based on constituencies, especially single-member constituencies, 
similar to those in Britain.540 The province was the unit adopted for demarcation 
of constituencies and each province was divided into certain constituencies.541 At 
the end of every decade a delimitation commission revised constituency 
boundaries. The number of such constituencies varied in the densely-populated 
and ethnically diversified provinces which received additional constituencies. 
Elections were conducted under a first-past-the-post system. In 1945, through the 
Soulbury Reforms, multi-member constituencies were introduced with the aim of 
better representing ethnic, religious, and caste minorities.542 From 1931 to 1980, 
elections to the national legislature and local government bodies were fought 
under the first-past-the-post electoral system. 
In the case of local government bodies, prior to the introduction of the universal 
franchise in 1931, there was limited franchise in the municipal council areas.543 
The other members of the municipal councils were appointed by the governor. 
Village committees consisted of members appointed by the governor and the 
national legislature. By 1935, chairmen and all members were elected by a wider 
franchise and were introduced to municipal councils. Amendments made in 1932, 
540 ‘Electoral System’ (n.d.) http://www.parliament.lk/about_us/electoral_system.jsp, accessed 21-
03-2012. 
541 The criteria of demarcation were that one constituency for 75,000 persons (from 1975 this was 
raised to 90,000) and, in addition, there would be an additional constituency for every 1,000 square 
miles of an area (De Silva, K.M. (n.d.) ‘Electoral Systems: The Sri Lankan Case’, 
http://nesac.org.np/main/pdf/desa_11_ESTSLC.pdf, accessed 21-03-2012). 
542 Ibid. 
543 The male residents over 21 years of age who held property with an annual value of over 10 
pounds were entitled to vote at the election of a few municipal council members. The property 
qualification for candidates was 50 pounds (Sessional Paper No. I – 1999, pp. 12-13). 
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1933 and 1938, to the Village Communities Ordinance, had the effect of replacing 
their official membership with elected members.544 
As noted above, prior to the introduction of development councils in 1981, there 
were four types of local government bodies – municipal councils, urban councils, 
town councils and village committees. The respective areas of these local 
government bodies were divided into wards with each party and independent 
group nominating individual candidates for particular wards. The counting of 
votes was done by the presiding officer at the polling station and the result was 
declared there.545 The candidate who obtained the highest number of votes was 
declared elected. 
In 1978, the proportional representation system was introduced under the new 
constitution and this electoral system was later extended to local government as 
well.546 The ward system, used to elect members to local government bodies, was 
changed to a system of proportional representation under the Local Authorities 
Elections (Amendment) Act, No. 20 and No. 24 of 1987. 547 The entire local 
government area was considered as one electoral unit and the elected members 
accordingly represented the total area of the local government. The party or group 
with the highest number of votes is entitled to two ‘bonus’ seats. Any party or 
group that received less than one-eighth (1/8) of the number of votes cast is not 
entitled to any representation. 548  The commissioner of elections decides the 
number of seats each party will get based on the election results.549 The political 
party or independent group winning the highest number of votes will nominate 
members for the positions of mayor, deputy mayor (municipal council) or 
chairman, vice chairman (urban council or Pradeshiya Sabha). A significant 
feature in local government elections is the regulation that 40 per cent of the 
544 Wanasinghe, (2003), p. 92. 
545 Sessional Paper No. I – 1999, p. 311. 
546 Proportional representation was first used in 1981 development council elections under the 
Development Councils Elections Act, No. 20 of 1981. Then proportional representation was used 
in 1988 provincial council elections and then in 1989 parliamentary elections and later in 1991 
local government elections for the first time (‘Handbook of Parliament: Election Dates’ (n.d.) 
http://www.parliament.lk/handbook_of_parliament/election_dates.jsp, accessed 26-03-2012). 
547 Sessional Paper No. I – 1999, p. 21. 
548 Ibid., p. 312. 
549 ‘Country Paper: Sri Lanka’ (n.d.). 
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candidates on the nomination list should be between 18 and 35 years of age, 
which gives an opportunity for youth representation in local government.550 
The composition of the membership of each local government body is stipulated 
in section 5 of both the Municipal Councils and Urban Councils Ordinances and 
in section 4 of the Pradeshiya Sabhas Act. 551  The term of office of a local 
government is four years, although the local government minister has the power to 
extend this period by a further year. 552  There is no term limitation for local 
government members either by law or by political party regulations.553 Depending 
on an enquiry, 554  the provincial local government minister has the power to 
suspend the mayor or the chairman and direct the deputy to carry on with the 
business of the council. However, the powers given to the provincial local 
government minister on local government have to be exercised in a lawful 
manner.555 
The system of proportional representation has been criticised frequently as an 
unsuitable system. According to Fernando, proportional representation has created 
much distortion in Sri Lankan local government because of the abolition of ‘wards’ 
and the introduction of preferential voting. Without direct responsibility to a 
particular ward, the representatives can easily evade duty and commitment. 
Preferential voting has also given rise to much undue competition and electoral 
violence. 556  According to Leitan, when the entire local government area is 
regarded as one electoral unit, there is no guarantee that all areas within the area 
of operation of the local government will be represented.557 But the Sri Lankan 
society is multi-ethnic in character and there is no particular guarantee in the ward 
system on minority representation. Leitan’s argument on guaranteeing 
550 Ibid. 
551 According to these provisions the local government minister has to determine and prescribe the 
number of members of local government bodies, after considering the land area and the population. 
But there are no accepted criteria on this and it appears that the number of members is decided on 
ad-hoc basis at the minister’s discretion (Sessional Paper No. I – 1999, p. 37). 
552 Ibid., p. 312. 
553 Ibid., p. 37. 
554 This enquiry, conducted by a retired judicial officer, has the power of a commission of enquiry 
appointed under the Commission of Inquiry Act. 
555 ‘Country Paper: Sri Lanka’ (n.d.). 
556 Fernando, L. (2011) ‘Potential of the Local Government System in Contributing to Ethnic 
Reconciliation in Sri Lanka’, http://www.asiantribune.com/news/2011/07/10/potential-local-
government-system-contributing-ethnic-reconciliation-sri-lanka, accessed 29-12-2011. 
557 Leitan, G.R.T. (2001) ‘Sri Lanka’s Institutions of Local Governance: Their Present Status and 
Possibilities for the Future’, Governance, No. 1, Vol. 1, Sri Lanka Institute of Local Governance, 
Colombo-07, p. 88. 
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representation in all areas disregards the assurance of representing all ethnic 
minorities given that one reason for introducing proportional representation was to 
give recognition to minority views.558 Both Fernando and Leitan highlight area 
representation and neglect the issue of minority representation. 
Some critics argue that proportional representation creates a gap between people 
and local government. For Wijesinghe, the political member-voter relationships 
have been weakened because there is no responsible member to represent the 
people in a particular ward. 559  Hettige argues that a wide gap between local 
government bodies and ordinary voters has been created due to the diverse socio-
economic circumstances. 560  Furthermore, there have been cases where some 
people could not go to the Pradeshiya Sabha chairmen due to various socio-
political reasons such as political party partisanship, religion, race, caste and 
occupation.561 It is evident then that proportional representation is not the only 
factor creating gaps between people and local government bodies. 
Other commentators point to the advantages of proportional representation at the 
local level in which representation is based on the total population of a local 
government area and not on a ward basis. It permits political members to pay 
attention to the local government area as a whole rather than to a ward that 
consists only of a few settlements with a small population. Under the ward-based 
electoral system, the services rendered or infrastructure constructed was generally 
of a small size due to the fact that these needs were generally limited to a smaller 
geographical area. Instead of such limitations, the political members are able to 
look at a broader spectrum and a larger geographical area, since they have to look 
up to and depend on a larger population for victory at elections.562 
While mentioning the defects and also desirable features of the present 
proportional representation, the 1999 Commission of Inquiry proposed to re-
introduce the ward system. Hettige, a member of the commission, proposed the 
re-introduction of the ward system to strengthen people’s active participation, 
558 De Silva, (n.d.). 
559 Wijesinghe, P. (2004) ‘Withering of Local Government in Sri Lanka’, Governance, No. 4, Vol. 
4, Sri Lanka Institute of Local Governance, Colombo-07, p. 70. 
560 Hettige, S. T. (2001) ‘Empowering Local Communities through Devolution of Power in Sri 
Lanka: The Unfinished Agenda’, Governance, No. 1, Vol. 1, Sri Lanka Institute of Local 
Governance, Colombo-07, p. 23. 
561 ‘Country Paper: Sri Lanka’ (n.d.). 
562 Ibid. 
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arguing that in a ward system, voters in a particular ward could maintain a close 
relationship with their representative. 563  Hettige’s prediction of people’s 
participation is quite uncertain because the long term lack of participation cannot 
be improved through an electoral system solely. The 1999 commission report and 
also Hettige give several reasons for low participation, including the open 
economic system introduced in 1977, the diverse socio-political populations, the 
free and independent life style of the people, and the argument that their lives 
were so full of economic and commercial activities that they had little time to 
devote to public affairs.564  
Proposals were also made to combine the ward system and the proportional 
representation system. Leitan proposes a system which is a combination of both 
the ward system and proportional representation system under which the voter is 
able to vote for a candidate from his area as well as for candidates on the list.565 
The most recent effort to restructure the local government electoral system was 
the Local Authorities Elections (Amendment) Bill, presented to the Parliament in 
August 2010, which introduced a hybrid local government election system; a 
combination of both first-past-the-post and proportional representation systems, 
known as the mixed member system of proportional representation.566 
The TNA opposed the proposed bill because it was concerned that where there 
were mixed communities the majority would easily wipe out the minority voices. 
In this case the two-party system would be further strengthened.567 Also there 
were several defects with the proposed bill. 568  Although the bill was being 
introduced as a panacea to address a range of problems blamed on the current 
electoral system, commentators pointed out that the bill could only partially 
563 Hettige, (2001), p. 27. 
564 Sessional Paper No. I – 1999, p. 240. 
565 Leitan, (2001), p. 88. 
566 This followed the steps of the German model. 
567 ‘Sri Lanka’s Tamil National Alliance Oppose the New Local Government Elections Bill’ (2010) 
http://www.asiantribune.com, accessed 21-10-2010. 
568 The proposed bill had several defects such as its cut-off point of five per cent at the level of the 
ward, so where a candidate polls less than five per cent in a ward then those votes are not counted. 
Furthermore, the proposed bill sought to make the youth and woman quota discretionary, so 
political parties could easily ignore both these sectors of society when choosing candidates 
(Raheem, M. (2012) ‘LG Elections Bill: Need for Amendments’, 
http://www.dailymirror.lk/opinion/172-opinion/22522-lg-elections-bill-need-for-amendments.html, 
accessed 09-03-2013). 
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address some of these issues.569 The Minister of Local Government and Provincial 
Councils proceeded to appoint a five-member committee to oversee re-
demarcation of ward boundaries which, according to the TNA, was not an 
independent committee.570 Without considering these objections, in October 2012, 
the Local Authorities Elections (Amendment) Act, No. 22 of 2012 passed with no 
debate either inside or outside Parliament. 
As mentioned earlier, the advantage of a hybrid system was that it sought to 
promote the benefits of both systems while limiting the problems of doing so.  But 
the new legislation called for 30 per cent of seats to be decided using proportional 
representation and 70 per cent using first-past-the-post. So it is clear that the first-
past-the-post system dominates the new legislation resulting in minority parties, 
whose supporters are spread relatively thinly across the country, being badly 
affected.571 
Commentators stress that both the UPFA and the UNP do not want to depend on 
the minorities and want to eliminate any minority impact during elections.572 With 
the government’s 2/3 majority of the Parliament, the voices of the opposition have 
been devalued and disregarded. Despite the end of long-term war, continuing 
militarisation of the country prevents and suppresses the free media, civil society 
movements and minority groups who could conceivably drive the society in 
favour of implementing useful political reforms. As a consequence, the majority 
of the country however remained silent when the local government electoral 
reforms were being developed and still no elections have been held under the new 
system. 
In summary, when the Sri Lankan electoral system was transformed from first-
past-the-post to proportional representation, simultaneously, the local government 
569 For instance, reducing or even eliminating violence between candidates from the same political 
party during campaign periods, could not be addressed in such a bill to deal with the larger 
problem of a violent political culture. The bill provided significant power to the minister in 
appointing the committees and making the final decision on boundaries. As the delimitation 
process has significant implications for political, ethnic and social representation, the 
commentators pointed that such a process needed to be transparent and consultative (ibid.). 
570 ‘Sri Lanka’s Tamil National Alliance Oppose the New Local Government Elections Bill’ 
(2010). 
571 Noble, K. (2012) ‘The Deafening Silence on Electoral Reform’, 
http://www.srilankaguardian.org/2012/10/the-deafening-silence-on-electoral.html, accessed 20-10-
2012. 
572 ‘Sri Lanka’s Tamil National Alliance Oppose the New Local Government Elections Bill’ 
(2010). 
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electoral system was also transformed. However, later critiques emerged on the 
unsuitability of the proportional representation system to elect local government 
representatives, and the proposals highlighted a mixed member system connecting 
both systems. Nonetheless the government introduced an electoral system which 
relies more heavily on first-past-the-post system. Critics continue to point out that 
this will not fulfil the expected aims from a mixed member system but that, 
instead, it will undermine the minor political parties and strengthen the major 
political parties by centralising more powers to the central governing party. 
5.5. Local government – current  
Although the number of Sri Lankan local government bodies has increased, the 
complexities of the local government mechanism are widening. This section looks 
into the current local governing mechanism in Sri Lanka. 
5.5.1. Local governing mechanism 
Local government in Sri Lanka presently consists of municipal councils for cities 
and large towns, urban councils for less urbanised areas or smaller towns, and 
Pradeshiya Sabhas for rural areas.573 As mentioned, these councils operate under 
the Municipal Councils Ordinance, Urban Councils Ordinance and Pradeshiya 
Sabhas Act respectively. 
Municipal councils and urban councils have been functioning for a long period of 
time but Pradeshiya Sabhas are relatively new. The demarcation over the degree 
of urbanisation is not absolute and precise. There is no formal definition of the 
terms ‘rural’ and ‘urban’, nor is there an accepted standard of the characteristics 
on which it is determined. There are some Pradeshiya Sabhas which are more 
urbanised than urban councils. 574  Most of the time, the demarcation and the 
positions of local government bodies have been decided not according to the 
population, land or resources, but according to the political discretion of the local 
government minister. The 1999 Commission of Inquiry recommended that as the 
needs of people in rural areas are different from those in urban areas, a correct 
573 Leitan, G.R.T. (2004) ‘The Role of Local Government in Citizen Participation’, Governance, 
No. 4, Vol. 4, Sri Lanka Institute of Local Governance, Colombo-07, p. 51. 
574 Sessional Paper No. I – 1999, pp. 27, 39. 
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demarcation was needed for these local government bodies to serve the people of 
their respective areas in a more effective manner.575 
Since the establishment of Pradeshiya Sabhas in 1988, the number of local 
government bodies in Sri Lanka has grown (see Table 5.1). The entire land area, 
with the exception of the free trade zones of Katunayaka, Biyagama and Koggala, 
falls within the areas of authority of the local government bodies.576 
The municipal councils are headed by mayors with deputy mayors and members 
of the councils making policy and policy implementation decisions. The mayor is 
the chief executive and is assisted by the municipal commissioner, who is a senior 
public official. There are several departments under the administration of a 
municipal commissioner, depending on size, complexity, staff availability and 
resources of the municipality.577 Under the urban councils and Pradeshiya Sabhas 
the chief executive is the chairman. Moreover, there is a vice chairman and also a 
secretary to assist the work of the council. 
Table 5.1: Growth of the number of local government bodies 
Year Number of 
municipal 
councils 
Number of 
urban 
councils 
Number of 
Pradeshiya 
Sabhas 
Total 
1988 12 39 257 308 
1997 14578 37 258 309 
2010 18 42 270 330 
Sources: Sessional Paper No. I – 1999, op.cit., pp. 22, 451 and Essential Information on Provincial 
Councils and Local Government 2010, Ministry of Local Government and Provincial Councils, 
Colombo-02. 
Although there is no single legislative enactment in relation to local government 
in Sri Lanka, all three types of local government bodies have almost similar 
powers.579 Local government bodies are given powers to formulate their own by-
575 Ibid., p. 39. 
576 In the free trade zone areas the local government functions are attended to by the Board of 
Investment (BoI) of Sri Lanka (ibid., p. 22). 
577 ‘Country Paper: Sri Lanka’ (n.d.). 
578 This happened as a result of creating a new Pradeshiya Sabha and upgrading two urban 
councils into municipal council status. 
579 These are generally routine administrative powers, such as recruitment of officials, acquisition 
of assets, licensing, instituting legal actions, budgeting and supplementary budgeting. Local 
government bodies have to be careful about unauthorised constructions in their area of authority 
and they have power to demolish unauthorised buildings. They provide public infrastructure 
services and are authorised to acquire land for public purposes. The law gives extensive powers to 
local government bodies to meet their responsibilities. This includes making it mandatory for the 
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laws in accordance with the provisions of the statutes. 580  All three local 
government legislations provide for the creation of a municipal fund, a local fund 
and a Pradeshiya Sabha fund for the municipal councils, the urban councils and 
the Pradeshiya Sabhas respectively. In addition, legislation empowers local 
government to take necessary action to ensure that revenue generation takes place 
according to the wishes of the local government body.581 
Many other government institutions are engaged in local government functions in 
addition to the local government bodies. Therefore contradictions occur from time 
to time when implementing laws. The Urban Development Authority Act, No. 41 
of 1978, was passed to deal with the physical planning problems of the urban 
areas of Sri Lanka. Previously, physical planning was a function of local 
government bodies particularly of municipal councils. This change was made 
given the limited capacity of manpower and economic resources of local 
government bodies to prepare and implement development plans, and the 
problems associated with the acquisition of land. The Urban Development 
Authority (UDA) law has extensively superseded the relevant laws and 
regulations made under the Urban Councils Ordinance and the Pradeshiya Sabhas 
Act as well.582 
Over time the utility functions of local government bodies have been taken over 
by central government decision making. For example, water supply was taken 
over by the National Water Supply and Drainage Board, electricity supply and 
police to help local government bodies in enforcing their regulations. A majority of functions, such 
as health and sanitation activities, solid waste disposal, greening of the areas under their control 
and development of parks, could all be categorised as environmental activities. Market facilitation 
and regulation in their areas of authority is another important power (see Municipal Councils 
Ordinance, Urban Councils Ordinance and Pradeshiya Sabhas Act, No. 15 of 1987). 
580 By-laws adopted by the respective local government bodies under the powers vested with them 
are enforceable only after notifications have been gazetted for public information. In order to 
maintain uniformity and adherence to the provisions of the law, standard by-laws have been 
introduced. Such by-laws shall be brought before the provincial council and shall not be 
disallowed.  It should be noted that through passing by-laws, some municipal councils enjoy more 
powers than the other local government bodies (‘Country Paper: Sri Lanka’ (n.d.)). 
581 Generally the following sources could be considered as the base of the funds: all rates, taxes, 
duties, fees and other charges levied by the council; all fines levied and penalties received under 
the authority of the council or under any enactment specified or in respect of any offense to which 
the President extends the jurisdiction of the council; the amount of all stamp duties and fees 
specified in the ordinances and acts; all sums realised by sales, leases or other transaction of the 
councils; all revenue derived by the councils from any property vested in the council or by the 
administration of any public service; all sums and all revenues regularly appropriated or 
transferred to the council by Parliament; all grants allocated to the council; all sums otherwise 
accruing to the council in the course of the exercise of its powers and duties. 
582 Sessional Paper No. I – 1999, pp. 30-31. 
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street lighting were taken over by the Ceylon Electricity Board (CEB), Lanka 
Electricity Company and the UDA. Rest houses were taken over by the Tourist 
Board. In defense, the government argued that there was a lack of resources and 
professional expertise within local government bodies to manage these utility 
services profitably. According to the 1999 commission report, this take-over was 
a severe blow to the financial resources of local government bodies.583 
As mentioned earlier, the divisional secretariats at the divisional level were 
established according to President R. Premadasa’s wish to extend the public 
administration to the village level. Leitan notes that the expected objectives of the 
local government have not been fully realised since the Transfer of Powers 
(Divisional Secretaries) Act, No. 58 of 1992 placed the emphasis once again on 
administrative agencies rather than on the institutions of local government. In 
accordance with the provisions of this act, the divisional secretariat, rather than 
the elected Pradeshiya Sabha, has become the focal point of the administrative 
structure in each division. 584  To avoid overlaps, Leitan proposed to merge 
Pradeshiya Sabha with the divisional secretariat to enable the divisional 
secretariat to function as the administrative arm of local government body, the 
Pradeshiya Sabha, and so strengthen the Pradeshiya Sabha.585 But Hettige notes 
that early in the development of the divisional secretariats, a decision to make the 
divisional secretary the executive officer working with the Pradeshiya Sabha was 
aborted due to resistance from administrative officers. 586  The administrative 
officers who were appointed through the Sri Lanka administrative service (SLAS) 
rejected working with the local political representatives because of significant 
differences in the educational qualifications of the administrative officers which 
were higher than the low educational qualifications of most of the local political 
representatives. In effect, administrative officers were not willing to obey the 
rules of the local political representatives. However, when employed by the 
central government, these administrative officers obeyed the national politicians 
without any resistance. 
583 Ibid., p. 31. 
584 Leitan, (2004), pp. 51-52. 
585 Leitan, (2001), p. 85. 
586 Hettige, S. (2008) ‘Local Democracy: The Sri Lankan Experience’, in D.N. Gellner and K. 
Hachhethu (eds) Local Democracy in South Asia: Microprocesses of Democratization in Nepal 
and its Neighbours: Governance, Conflict and Civic Action, Vol. 1, Sage Publications, India, p. 
429. 
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The 1999 Commission of Inquiry brought the same proposal in a different way to 
debates by suggesting the desirability of combining these two agencies operative 
at the divisional level into one authority answerable to the local body in the area. 
The institutional arrangement would mean the services of the divisional secretary 
would function as the commissioner of Pradeshiya Sabhas and provide 
bureaucratic support through the one agency at the divisional level, namely the 
local body supported by the divisional secretary.587 This proposal is encouraging, 
but the problem is the unwillingness of the administrative officials to engage and 
continue links with the Pradeshiya Sabhas. 
Figure 5.1 outlines the political and administrative structure in Sri Lanka. There 
are several political and administrative bodies at the national, provincial, district, 
divisional and village level. The thick arrows indicate the central government-
controlled administrative power flow. Ministries, departments, boards and 
authorities connect with the provincial council and also with the local government 
bodies. But they have many connections with the central government-controlled 
administrative bodies. The dashed arrows indicate weak and uncertain relations 
between political and administrative bodies at the provincial, district and 
divisional levels. 
As discussed above, the divisional level is complex with many bodies operating 
and therefore, clashes between central government-controlled bodies and local 
government bodies frequently occur. Local government bodies are influenced by 
central government-controlled bodies and also by the provincial council. However, 
the provincial council and local government bodies have direct relations with the 
central government Ministry of Local Government and Provincial Councils. 
Further, Figure 5.1 indicates the provincial council’s direct involvement in local 
government. In Figure 5.1, the line authorities are central government-controlled 
bodies such as the UDA, Road Development Authority (RDA), CEB and Tourist 
Board that work at the district and divisional levels together with district and 
divisional secretariats. The President, MPs, provincial council members and local 
government representatives are elected by popular vote. The rest of the positions 
indicated in Figure 5.1 are appointed. 
587 Sessional Paper No. I – 1999, p. 138. 
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Figure 5.1: Political and administrative structure in Sri Lanka 
Source: Leitan, G.R.T. (2010) Overview of Decentralization and Local Governance in Sri Lanka, 
Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation (SDC), Colombo, Sri Lanka, p. 21. 
 
Current local government mechanisms in Sri Lanka reflect certain gaps and 
overlaps. Here the influences of central government over local government are 
significant. Decisions of the local government minister on the demarcation and the 
positions of local government bodies and take-over of local government powers 
by certain central government-controlled bodies have resulted in the undermining 
and weakening of local government in Sri Lanka. But local government bodies 
still have powers to formulate their own by-laws towards strengthening their 
powers. Although there were proposals to combine the complicated twin streams 
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of local political and administrative authorities together, the unwillingness of 
administrative officers to engage with local political bodies resulted in further 
conflictual overlaps between separate political and administrative power 
structures at the local level.  
5.6. Summary 
Overall, from the ancient kingdoms to the present the history of Sri Lankan local 
government has been evolutionary. The pre-colonial and colonial local 
government systems mostly reflect administrative features of earlier regimes. 
However, during the last decades of the colonial period, and later after 
independence, several attempts were made to restructure local government bodies 
away from colonial administrative structures. A succession of commissions and 
committees were appointed from time to time by the ruling governments to make 
recommendations for restructuring the local government system. A prominent 
recommendation put forward was the need to establish district-based local 
government bodies to replace the colonial administrative bodies. The attempts 
taken to implement such recommendations were directly connected to the major 
decentralisation process in the country at that time and had arisen from certain 
obstacles ending up with the establishment of more centralised development 
councils which failed to address the local needs. The established provincial 
councils which evolved later resulted in interests being transferred to the 
provincial level rather than to district level. Accordingly local government became 
a subject for provincial councils. The colonial administrative structures which 
have not been abolished and the newer established government institutions 
weakened local government. These led to several complications in local 
government governing processes. As a consequence, the decentralisation process 
and local government reforms in Sri Lanka reflect the unwillingness and inability 
of ruling governments to decentralise power to the local level and have hindered 
efforts towards addressing the actual needs of the people. This failure to devolve 
has strengthened the centralisation of authoritative power.  
Subsequent chapters closely scrutinise the problems in Sri Lankan local 
government, politics and investigate ways of driving local government towards 
addressing the local community interests. The next chapter analyses the issues 
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relating to NGOs in seeking the possibilities for NGO involvement in supporting 
local governance and local development in Sri Lanka. 
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Chapter 6 
NGOs in Sri Lanka 
6.1. Introduction 
NGOs in Sri-Lanka have, since the 1970s, played a key role in addressing 
problems including human rights violations, and issues with decentralisation, 
local government and community-led development. The relationship between the 
Sri Lankan government and the NGOs has similarly been both contradictory and 
collaborative. Various documents, reports and booklets published by NGOs, on 
both completed and on-going projects, are drawn upon in this chapter to provide 
an account of their role in the field of conflict resolution, peace building, relief, 
rehabilitation and reconstruction work, humanitarian assistance, human rights, 
policy advocacy and local development. This chapter provides an account of the 
growth of NGO involvement in Sri Lanka, particularly from the mid-1970s where, 
as a consequence of the internal conflicts and insurrections, much of the 
commentary on the role of NGOs can be classified as critiques and counter 
critiques of their practices. The chapter begins by addressing issues of definition 
and character that have arisen as a consequence of the growth in number and 
variety of NGOs in Sri Lanka. It goes on to outline the growth in the number of 
NGOs and review their evolving relationship with the Sri Lankan government. 
This chapter also draws on the views of respondents who were officials attached 
to NGOs. The chapter raises themes that are addressed further in chapter 9 which 
outlines features of the involvement of NGOs in local government and local 
development in Sri Lanka. 
6.2. NGOs: conceptual confusions 
The ambiguities caused by the term NGO in the Sri Lankan context are evident in 
the literature, requiring an examination of the various definitions and explanations 
on the position of NGOs in the Sri Lankan context. 
In writing on NGOs in Sri Lanka, most authors quote Uyangoda’s definition: 
NGOs are precisely what the long description of the acronym suggests: non-
government organisations. They are voluntary bodies formed by groups of 
citizens for specific purposes of social service or social and policy intervention. 
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They can be neighbourhood associations, pensioner’s clubs or temple 
development societies, with a limited scope of interest and activity. They can also 
be human rights bodies or economic development and environmental 
organisations or women’s associations with a concern for national issues and 
therefore a wider scope of interest and activism. Indeed, the range of NGO bodies 
is so wide that it is often difficult to stick the label to one set of citizen’s groups in 
contradiction to another.588 
Although this definition is widely used, it is very broad and lacks specificity. 
Most Sri Lankan authors include community-based organisations (CBOs) like 
neighbourhood associations, pensioner’s clubs or temple development societies in 
their definitions of NGOs, but this definition makes no reference to the 
international dimension of many of the larger, more influential NGOs.589 Perera 
suggests that the definition does not pay enough attention to the different roles 
NGOs play, the differences in their emergence and historical evolution and the 
differences in organisation and funding.590 NGOs are not village level voluntary 
organisations in the sense of people in Sri Lanka, but are organisations set up by 
specific individuals from the local area or by individuals from outside with access 
to local contacts.591 Wickramasinghe notes three characteristics of the NGO sector 
in Sri Lanka: 1) an international NGO sector serving the humanitarian needs of 
the country stemming from the ethnic conflict; 2) a few large and well distributed 
national NGOs involved in poverty alleviation projects in conjunction with the 
state or complementary to the state; and 3) a myriad of small NGOs sometimes 
called CBOs involved in rural development.592 
The Voluntary Social Service Organisations (Registration and Supervision) Act, 
No. 31 of 1980 is the main act which refers to organisational forms similar to 
NGOs but it does not specifically mention the term ‘NGO’. According to the act, 
‘voluntary social service organisation’ means any organisation formed by a group 
of persons on a voluntary basis and (a) is of a non-governmental nature; (b) is 
dependent on public contributions, charities, grants payable by the government or 
588 Uyangoda, J. (1995) ‘NGOs, Hate Politics and Questions of Democracy’, Pravada, Vol. 4, No. 
5 & 6 (December/January) Social Scientists’ Association, Colombo, p. 6. 
589 See Perera, S. (1998) ‘Non Government Organizations in Sri Lanka: The Dynamics, the Impact, 
the Rhetoric and the Politics’, http://sasankaperera.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/NGOs-
1998.pdf, accessed 15-06-2012) and Kloos, P. (1999) The Sri Lankan Government and the NGO’s: 
An Ambivalent Relationship, Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam. 
590 Perera, S., (1998), p. 1. 
591 Ibid., p. 2. 
592 Wickramasinghe, N. (2001) Civil Society in Sri Lanka: New Circles of Power, Sage 
Publications, New Delhi p. 76. 
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donations local or foreign, in carrying out its functions; (c) has as its main 
objectives, the provision of such relief and services as are necessary for the 
mentally retarded or physically disabled, the poor, the sick, orphans and the 
destitute, and the provision of relief to the needy in times of disaster.593 Fernando 
notes that NGOs cannot be addressed as a homogenous category due to the vast 
diversity of different historical specificities in which these organisations emerged 
and the different ideological perspectives held by the organisations.594 Therefore, 
Fernando suggests using a country-specific definition to denote different 
conceptual and operational meanings in terms of one country to another. 595 
Accordingly, the meaning of the term NGOs by different writers can vary 
according to the context of a study. 
In sum, there is no widely accepted definition for NGOs in Sri Lanka. But there is 
ready agreement about the main elements of what constitutes an NGO. The 
different and overlapping definitions on NGOs indicate that there is a need to use 
the term NGO purposively and flexibly to match the Sri Lankan context and 
within the parameters of the particular study objectives concerning NGO-related 
research. 
6.3. Growth of NGOs in Sri Lanka 
NGOs are identifiable in Sri Lanka during the pre-colonial and colonial eras. A 
significant growth in such organisational forms is seen in the post-independence 
period. This section underlines the growth of the various organisational forms and 
investigates the reasons for their growth. 
6.3.1. Growth of NGOs: pre-colonial times to present times 
The emergence of NGOs can be identified in Sri Lanka manifested by the 
informal groups functioning as Wev Sabhas (irrigation councils) which 
maintained and managed small scale water reservoirs for agricultural needs.596 
The British colonial period marked the clear emergence of the organisational 
forms of NGOs as they are known today. For example, the Christian missionary 
593 Voluntary Social Service Organizations (Registration and Supervision) Act, No. 31 of 1980, p. 
63. 
594 Fernando, U. (2003) ‘The Landscape of NGOs in Sri Lanka: Issues and Challenges’, p. 3 
(http://www2.fmg.uva.nl/agids/publications/2003/fernando_ls.html, accessed 15-06-2012). 
595 Ibid. 
596 Ibid., p. 4. 
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work in education, health and social welfare, and the establishment of the Young 
Men’s Christian Association (YMCA), the Young Women’s Christian 
Association (YWCA) and the Salvation Army’s presence in Sri Lanka were 
significant597 not for profit organisations. 
In the late 19th century, local Buddhists, Hindus and Muslims began to imitate the 
organisational structures of the Christian missionaries with religious and social 
service agendas being established.598 Despite their strong religious identity, the 
common feature of these organisations was social service and welfare activities,599 
although the designation NGO was not used.600 These social service provisions 
and welfare activities continued to develop into the post-independence period. 
Up until 1970, there was a slow but steady increase in the number of NGOs.601 
The reason for the sudden increase in the number of NGOs from 1971 onwards 
was in response to the internal conflicts and insurrections which occurred at that 
time. In 1971 the JVP insurgency led to a new awareness about problematic socio-
economic issues, and in the absence of an adequate government policy, private 
persons took various initiatives to improve situations conceived as highly 
problematic.602 
According to Fernando, prior to 1977 there was no trend towards the formation of 
new, or expansion of, the existing NGOs. 603   It was the newly elected UNP 
government’s emphasis on an open economic policy, after 1977, which led to a 
reduction of certain welfare policies and this trend opened spaces for NGOs to 
enter where and when the government withdrew.604 This argument is supported by 
Wickramasinghe who maintains that, after 1977, industrial growth based on 
foreign investment was encouraged, and a necessary concomitant to such an 
export-led strategy was the WB and IMF’s ‘structural adjustment policies’, which 
597 Ibid. 
598 For example, according to Kumari Jayawardena, among the early NGOs was the Buddhist 
Theosophical Society which pioneered the movement for Buddhist education. This Society 
received contributions from Europe, the USA and Australia and one of Colonel Olcott’s important 
missions was fund-raising abroad for local Buddhist causes (Jayawardena, K. (1995) ‘The NGO 
Bogey’, Pravada, Vol. 4, No. 5 & 6 (December/January) Social Scientists’ Association, Colombo, 
p. 10). 
599 Fernando, (2003), p. 4. 
600 Kloos, (1999), p. 12. 
601 Ibid., p. 13. 
602 Ibid. 
603 Fernando, (2003), p. 5. 
604 Kloos, (1999), pp. 13-14. 
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demanded shifting public resources away from social welfare into investment.605 
Perera adds that since 1977 attempts were made to dismantle many components of 
the post-colonial welfare society which in financial terms were becoming 
unaffordable. This meant that certain kinds of activities such as small scale 
development initiatives, informal educational activities, and the distribution of 
food rations were no longer the prerogative of the state.606 NGO development in 
Sri Lanka might, therefore, be described as an appendage to market-oriented 
growth.607 
The National Secretariat for Non-Governmental Organisations (the NGO 
Secretariat), discussed later in this chapter, refers to the growth of NGOs in Sri 
Lanka as follows: 
With the liberalisation of the economy in the late-1970s and the consequent 
relaxation of foreign exchange regulations, trade and travel restrictions, there 
arose a phenomenal increase in the number of foreign NGOs. With the increased 
flow of foreign assistance and the expansion of community and rural development, 
a further proliferation of NGOs was observed in the country. Since NGOs were 
expected to play a complementary role to that of the government, and its selfless 
nature, the presence and operation of NGOs was welcomed by the government.608 
Many of the NGOs in Sri Lanka were interested in the issues of development 
located within the spheres in which the state played a less dynamic role or had 
completely vacated.609 Wickramasinghe notes that over 65 per cent of these were 
established after 1977,610 and Perera adds that this trend gathered momentum in 
the 1980s. During the 1970s and 1980s, therefore, there was a quantitative 
expansion of NGOs set up by Sri Lankan citizens with or without the aid of 
international or foreign agencies. 611  There was also growth in the range of 
activities they performed.612  
This can be seen in the wider focus of NGOs in the 1980s, where they expanded 
their concerns from development-oriented activities to a rights-oriented sphere. 
The prolonged war and the second JVP insurrection resulted in numerous human 
rights violations, and many NGOs were involved in activities associated with the 
605 Wickramasinghe, (2001), pp. 39-40. 
606 Perera, S. (1998), p. 7. 
607 Wickramasinghe, (2001), p. 108. 
608 ‘The Growth of NGOs’ (n.d.) http://www.ngosecretariat.gov.lk, accessed 24-11-2011. 
609 Perera, S. (1998), p. 8. 
610 Wickramasinghe, (2001), p. 78. 
611 Perera, S. (1998), p. 3. 
612 Ibid. 
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protection of human rights and the support of war-affected people through relief 
and rehabilitation work. 613  Uyangoda claims that in the 1980s and 1990s, a 
number of other NGOs actively campaigned for peace and the democratic rights 
of the Tamil people.614 These were multi-ethnic advocacy and activist groups, 
who were bound by a shared commitment to a vision of progress for Sri Lanka, 
conceived on the basis of liberal and humanitarian concepts of ethnic harmony, 
justice, and equality.615 
In the 1990s increasing pressure came on NGOs through their donors demanding 
more attention be given to the effectiveness and efficiency of the aid. The heavy 
dependence of NGOs on foreign donor funds was a contributing factor in this. 
Many NGOs were unable to adapt to these new pressures due to a lack of capacity 
in terms of their institutional capability, human resources and organisational 
planning ability. As a result new NGOs emerged in the 1990s, along with 
individual consultants and consultancy firms, to assist in building this type of 
capacity.616 
After the tsunami disaster in December 2004, many NGOs and private individuals 
descended on Sri Lanka with budgets of various dimensions and involving 
projects of varying time frames.617 This involvement can be highlighted as an 
important point of NGO growth in Sri Lanka. Although there was already 
considerable NGO involvement, it was in the post-tsunami period that these rose 
rapidly. There are, however, no reliable, systematically recorded data about the 
exact number of NGOs in Sri Lanka at this time. Brochard reports that, the exact 
numbers of NGOs are actually difficult to obtain as these change from week to 
week. It is estimated that over 2,000 NGOs of various sizes have come to Sri 
Lanka since the tsunami. However, at April 2005 the newly created Centre for 
613 Fernando, (2003), p. 5. 
614 Movement for Inter-Racial Justice and Equality (MIRJE), Movement for the Defence of 
Democratic Rights (MDDR), Information Monitor on Human Rights (INFORM), Women for 
Peace, Dharmavedi Institute for Communication and Peace, National Christian Council, Citizens’ 
Committee for National Harmony, and Sarvodaya are some of the leading NGOs active in the 
peace and democracy front (Uyangoda, (1995), p. 7). 
615 Ibid. 
616 Fernando, (2003), p. 21. 
617 Brochard, P. (2005) ‘New Regulations and Procedures Affecting the NGOs in Sri Lanka’, 
CIDA Programme Support Unit, p. 1. 
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Non-Governmental Sector (CNGS) (discussed later in this chapter) only records 
the presence of 103 organisations.618 
Without a systematic and unambiguous registration system,619 it has been difficult 
to determine the exact number of NGOs in Sri Lanka.620 The best the available 
literature has been able to offer is estimates of the number of NGOs from a variety 
of sources (see Table 6.1). 
Table 6.1: Estimated number of NGOs in Sri Lanka 
Year Source Estimated number of NGOs 
1991 The directory of foreign 
development agencies in Sri 
Lanka published by IRED 
(Innovations et Reseaux pour le 
Development)621 
293 local NGOs 
50 foreign NGOs  
1993 The NGO Commission report622 25,000-30,000 grassroots 
organisations623 
3,000 NGOs624 
1997 USAID 50,000 NGOs and CBOs625  
1997 ADB 25,000 NGOs and CBOs626 
1997 Stirrat and Henkel627 20,000 local NGOs and 
grassroots organisations 
1999 Kloos628 20,000-30,000 NGOs 
2001 Wickramasinghe629 4,000 NGOs 
2007 Walton630 10,000-12,000 local NGOs at 
the district and divisional 
levels 
618 Ibid. 
619 Fernando, (2003), p. 5. 
620 Wickramasinghe, (2001), pp. 82-83. 
621 Cited in Fernando, (2003), p. 5. 
622 Discussed later in this chapter. 
623 Cited in Wickramasinghe, (2001), pp. 82-83.  
624 Cited in ‘ICJ on the NGO Commission’ (1992) Pravada, Vol. 1, No. 2 (January) Social 
Scientists’ Association, Colombo, p. 15. 
625 Cited in Wickramasinghe, (2001), pp. 82-83. 
626 Cited in Fernando, (2003), p. 5. 
627 Stirrat, R.L. and Henkel, H. (1997) ‘The Development Gift: The Problem of Reciprocity in the 
NGO World’, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 554 
(November) The Role of NGOs: Charity and Empowerment, p. 67 
(http://www.jstor.org/stable/1049567, accessed 12-03-2013). 
628 Kloos, (1999), p. 15. 
629 Wickramasinghe, (2001), pp. 82-83. 
630 Walton, O. (2008) ‘Conflict, Peacebuilding and NGO Legitimacy: National NGOs in Sri 
Lanka’, Conflict, Security & Development, Vol. 8, No. 1, p. 163 
(http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14678800801977146, accessed 27-05-2011). 
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2007 NGO Secretariat631 1,073 registered NGOs632 
2012 NGO Secretariat633 1,398 registered local and 
foreign NGOs634 
 
The figures in Table 6.1 show a broad range of assessments in the number of 
NGOs. These figures, especially the larger ones, include organisations ranging 
from village level CBOs to national level NGOs. There is no viable source from 
which to obtain a reliable idea about the number of NGOs, and the figures 
available in the form of estimates do not provide details of the diversity of these 
organisations.635 
It is clear that the same uncertainty governs estimates of NGO funding. For 
Wickramasinghe, the donor funding channelled to local NGOs has increased if 
one were to judge it by the expansion of the number of organisations that call 
themselves NGOs. But the uncertainty about the exact number of NGOs makes it 
difficult to ascertain the volume of funds they now handle.636 Wickramasinghe 
adds that in Sri Lanka, specific factors such as the war must be added as the 
expansion was driven partly by increased international NGO aid during the 
political crisis that began in the late 1970s with the emergence of a violent 
secessionist movement in the north and east of the island.637 Much of the influx of 
foreign relief funds after the 1983 Sinhala-Tamil ethnic riots was handled by 
NGOs.638 In 1993, the NGO Commission report acknowledged that 22 per cent of 
the total foreign aid received by Sri Lanka was channelled through NGOs.639 
Walton claims that the amount of funding allocated to the NGO sector in Sri 
Lanka grew rapidly following the signing of the ceasefire agreement between the 
Sri Lankan government and the LTTE in 2002, and in the aftermath of the 
631 Cited in Walton, (2008), p. 163. 
632 This figure only includes international NGOs, Sri Lankan NGOs receiving foreign funds, 
and/or Sri Lankan NGOs working in more than one administrative district. 
633 ‘Directory of Registered NGO’s Sri Lanka’ (2012) http://www.ngosecretariat.gov.lk, accessed 
18-03-2013. 
634 According to the data recorded by the NGO Secretariat, out of 1,398 NGOs registered at the 
end of year 2012, 357 were foreign-funded NGOs (ibid.). But this data does not show the origins 
of the NGOs or the detailed sources of their funding. 
635 Fernando, (2003), p. 5. 
636 Wickramasinghe, (2001), pp. 82-83. 
637 Ibid., p. 75. 
638 Orjuela, C. (2005) ‘Dilemmas of Civil Society Aid: Donors, NGOs and the Quest for Peace in 
Sri Lanka’, Peace and Democracy in South Asia, Vol. 1, No. 1 (January) p. 5. 
639 Wickramasinghe, (2001), p. 75. 
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tsunami.640 The total aid channelled through NGOs in 2005 was around US$400 
million.641 
In sum, while there is evidence of growth in the number of NGOs in Sri Lanka, 
there is a lack of specific detail about the nature, quality and impact of that growth. 
Nonetheless this data is sufficient to draw a conclusion that NGOs and their 
activities have a significant place in Sri Lanka, and that their growth has coincided 
with changes to the politico-economic situation. Similarly, political changes have 
had a positive as well as negative influence on NGOs, their growth and activity in 
Sri Lanka, as discussed below. 
6.4. Relations between the Sri Lankan government and NGOs 
The relationship between the Sri Lankan government and NGOs has taken a 
variety of forms over time going through stages of relative indifference up until 
the 1970s, ambivalence in the 1980s, and open confrontation in the early 1990s.642 
The role of NGOs in Sri Lanka has to be understood in the context of a 
transformed political outlook on the part of governments and a change in attitude 
to developmental activities.643 
6.4.1. Different government policies on NGOs 
The earliest recognition of an NGO taking a social role is seen in the Children and 
Young Persons’ Ordinance of 1939 and in the Orphanages Ordinance of 1941, 
which empowered government agencies to obtain services for the rehabilitation of 
young offenders. 644After 1948 the UNP government continued the plantation-
based economy and the open policy on foreign investments.645 In 1950 Sri Lanka 
obtained membership of the IMF and the WB. At that time, the government also 
reduced its social welfare commitments and this led to a change of government in 
1956.646 After 1956 the government promoted Sinhala nationalism and this had a 
profound influence on development policies, foreign policy and on the flow of 
640 Walton, (2008), p. 139. 
641 Ibid., p. 163. 
642 Wickramasinghe, (2001), p. 84. 
643 Perera, S. (1998), p. 4. 
644 Wickramasinghe, (2001), p. 99. 
645 Fernando, (2003), p. 10. 
646 Ibid. 
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foreign aid.647 Furthermore, this period marked the establishment of diplomatic, 
trade and other relations with the Eastern European countries led by Soviet Union 
and China. During this period, therefore, the links with the IMF, WB, USA and 
the Western European countries became weaker.648 
In the 1960s, government recognition of an NGO role came in the ‘freedom from 
hunger campaign’ under the auspices of the FAO.649 At this time, NGOs also 
worked with the state on the promotion of minor irrigation schemes and as 
collaborators with government in development projects.650 In 1965, there was a 
change of government with the UNP again coming into power. During this period 
the Paris Aid Group651 was established with Western donors, together with the 
IMF and WB, extending their assistance to Sri Lanka. The developmental trend 
was reversed in 1970 when the SLFP-led coalition government came into 
power.652 Although the Paris Aid Group continued to function, the aid flow from 
the Western countries declined under the strict socialist economic policies 
followed by the government.653 
The open economic policy of the new UNP government included efforts to attract 
foreign capital. An example is the Greater Colombo Economic Commission – 
now called as the Board of Investment (BoI) – which was established to attract 
foreign investments by providing legal and infrastructure facilities to such 
investors.654 The state policy on welfare was changed and it began to reduce its 
role in providing welfare services such as health, education, subsidised food and 
transportation. In this context, the government allowed foreign NGOs and donors 
to work in Sri Lanka. As a result, there was a proliferation of both foreign and 
local NGOs. The initiatives of these NGOs received significant support from the 
international community. As was done with the foreign investors, the government 
created an environment which was conducive to international NGOs and donors 
functioning in Sri Lanka.655 The trend continued in the 1980s as an increased 
amount of government spending was allocated to defence expenses leaving the 
647 Ibid. 
648 Ibid. 
649 Wickramasinghe, (2001), p. 99. 
650 Fernando, (2003), p. 14. 
651 The forum of donor countries supporting Sri Lanka under the auspices of the WB. 
652 Fernando, (2003), p. 11. 
653 Ibid. 
654 Ibid. 
655 Ibid. 
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state more dependent on international NGO and foreign donor funding for welfare 
and development work.656 
In the 1980s the Gramodaya Mandalas provided for the participation of NGOs in 
local level planning and implementation. NGOs collaborated, with more or less 
success, in government projects such as the Gam Udawa (village re-awakening), 
integral rural development programme and the Mahaweli 657  development 
project. 658 The growing importance of NGOs is evident in the way the UNP 
manifesto in 1988 specifically recognised their role. It was the first time in Sri 
Lanka that a political party made an official stand on NGOs.659 In 1988-1989, the 
UNP’s electoral victory was achieved partly by incorporating an electoral 
commitment to an extensive ‘safety net’ programme660 in the form of a large 
income transfer scheme for the declared purpose of ‘poverty alleviation’.661 This 
programme was introduced as the Janasaviya, and sponsored by the WB.662 In 
May 1991, the Janasaviya trust fund (JTF) 663  was set up to implement the 
programmes of savings and credit, and nutrition, among CBOs.664 NGOs were 
involved as intermediaries in implementing Janasaviya sub-projects.665 A large 
amount of funding began to be channelled to NGOs and a number of NGOs were 
formed exclusively to implement the JTF-funded projects. As partner 
organisations of the JTF, NGOs received assistance for institutional development 
which included funding for infrastructure, office equipment and vehicles. This 
was recognised as one of the major collaborative relationships between the 
656 Ibid., pp. 11-12. 
657 Mahaweli is the longest river in Sri Lanka. Mahaweli development project aimed to generate 
electricity and to develop agriculture in the dry zones in Sri Lanka. 
658 Cited in Wickramasinghe, (2001), p. 99. 
659 Fernando, (2003), p. 24. 
660 Safety nets deserve a place in development policy in all countries. They mitigate extreme 
poverty through the re-distribution of resources; they help households invest in their future and 
manage risks; and they help governments make sound policy decisions in macro-economic, trade, 
labour, and many other sectors (Grosh, M.; Ninno, C.; Tesliuc, E. and Ouerghi, A. (2008) For 
Protection and Promotion: The Design and Implementation of Effective Safety Nets, The World 
Bank, Washington, p. 11). 
661 Wickramasinghe, (2001), p. 101. 
662 The WB is the most articulate and influential promoter of partnership in development. More 
than any other development agency, the WB has selected, adapted, and adopted the NGO 
participation agenda insofar as it strengthens and promotes local involvement in project 
management (ibid., p. 92). 
663 The JTF was jointly funded by the government and bilateral or multilateral donors (ibid., p. 
101). The strategy of the JTF was to work in partnership with NGOs that functioned both at the 
national and village levels in order to mobilise the CBOs (Fernando, (2003), p. 14). 
664 Ibid. 
665 Wickramasinghe, (2001), p. 101. 
147 
 
                                                 
government and NGOs.666 It reflected an acknowledgement by the Sri Lankan 
government of a need for NGO support in the implementation of the project.  
In 1994, the SLFP-led PA coalition came into power marking another phase of 
government-NGO relations. In the 1994 Parliamentary election, the NGOs and PA 
government shared common ground on the need to solve the ethnic conflict 
through a negotiated political settlement. 667  NGOs became involved in 
implementing programmes towards a non-military solution for the ethnic conflict 
to restore peace.668 However, this collaboration between the PA government and 
NGOs was not evident in other government programmes, with Fernando claiming 
that the government began to narrow the scope of NGOs.669  For example, in the 
Samurdhi programme, the successor to the Janasaviya, the government did not 
obtain the support of NGOs.670 This trend continued when the PA government 
failed in its peace negotiations with the LTTE. The decision of the PA 
government to go back to a military strategy further undermined collaboration 
between the government and NGOs. Fernando notes that human rights-based 
NGOs began to revert to the watch-dog role they had played in the 1988-1993 era 
as many incidents of human rights violations began to be reported, especially in 
war-affected areas.671 Election malpractices, violence and misuse of power by the 
government were also reported during the Wayamba (north western) provincial 
council election in 1999. NGOs played an active role in monitoring the election 
process and openly confronted the government’s action. 672  In this period, 
therefore, the government began to come under heavy criticism by NGOs. 
In response to these criticisms, the government attempted to pressurise agencies 
such as USAID and the Asia Foundation not to support those NGOs involved in 
election monitoring, by interpreting that such support was a contravention of the 
666 Fernando, (2003), p. 14. 
667 Ibid., p. 15. 
668 Especially the NGOs collaborated with two initiatives of the PA government. The first was the 
Sudu Nelum Viyaparaya (the white lotus movement), which raised the public awareness of the 
ethnic conflict and advocated a non-military political solution. The second was the National 
Integration and Planning Unit (NIPU) formed under the Ministry of Constitutional Affairs and 
Ethnic Integration with the assistance of the Norwegian government. In both these initiatives, 
many NGOs took an active part in collaborating with the government (ibid.). 
669 Ibid. 
670 The strategy of Samurdhi was to recruit about 3,000 unemployed educated youth as village 
level coordinators (Niyamakas) and to establish a powerful network of CBOs. 
671 Fernando, (2003), p. 15. 
672 Ibid. 
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memoranda of understanding they had signed with the government. 673  NGO 
liaison units in many ministries were disabled under the PA government 
indicating that the state had moved away from formally acknowledging a special 
role for NGOs in the development of the country.674 Government withdrew from 
its association with not only rights-oriented NGOs, but also with development-
oriented NGOs. 
In December 2001, the UNP-led UNF coalition came into power and introduced 
new economic reforms and development programmes with the fullest support of 
the organisations like the WB, IMF and ADB.675 The election manifesto of the 
UNF had a separate section on its stand and policy on NGOs.676 Fernando reports 
that the secretary of the Ministry of Finance and Planning and the Treasury, while 
addressing a meeting of a group of NGO representatives, invited the NGOs to take 
an active part in the UNF government’s 100 days accelerated development 
programme. Some NGOs saw this as an opportunity to forge a more positive 
working relationship with the government and perform their role without being 
harassed by the government.677 
After the ceasefire of 2002, NGOs became involved in a range of peace building 
projects, which included promoting development in conflict-affected areas in an 
effort to establish a ‘peace dividend’, building relationships at a community level, 
and attempting to foster popular support for the peace process (particularly in the 
south). According to Walton, donor commitment to these programmes, and hence 
their support for NGOs, was heavily dependent on the state’s commitment to the 
peace process. As a result, NGO activities and objectives became increasingly 
aligned with the political project driven by the UNF government and its 
international backers.678 
However, in 2004 the UNF government collapsed and the UPFA, an alliance of 
the SLFP and the Sinhala nationalist JVP, came into power. Later this alliance 
received the support of the JHU, another Sinhala nationalist political party but this 
collaboration again weakened government-NGO relations. As has been said, 
673 Ibid. 
674 Wickramasinghe, (2001), pp. 99-100. 
675 Fernando, (2003), p. 23. 
676 The manifesto claimed that the UNF recognised the NGOs and CBOs as important partners of 
the development process, and as leading actors in socio-economic transformation. 
677 Fernando, (2003), p. 24. 
678 Walton, (2008), p. 141. 
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political responses to NGOs in Sri Lanka during this period were heavily 
influenced by the tsunami of December 2004. According to Walton, the 
unprecedented international response to the tsunami produced an unruly funding 
environment, which resulted in numerous examples of malpractice. 679  This 
response not only transformed the NGO sector in Sri Lanka by making it richer, it 
also boosted the public consciousness of NGOs. Walton further notes that this 
international response in turn, increased the potential advantages open to political 
actors who criticised NGOs as a means of articulating their own political visions 
which, for nationalist groups, usually meant highlighting the corrupting influence 
of Western culture or political interference. As a result, well-established 
nationalist discourses about the harmful impact of NGOs on Sri Lankan life 
gained greater relevance and public perceptions of NGOs were damaged.680 But 
the base of these criticisms can be identified as the government’s attempt to 
compete with the NGO sector. For Walton, the tsunami also rapidly elevated the 
NGO sector from an insignificant concern for government, to one which was 
suddenly receiving and distributing foreign resources and social welfare on a scale 
comparable to that of the state. Furthermore, for Walton, the tsunami response 
exposed failures in government decision making and operational weakness in the 
aftermath of the tsunami, providing further incentives for the government to attack 
NGOs. 681  Government criticism of NGOs, in this context, can be seen as an 
attempt to hide its own weaknesses. 
The election of a new President in November 2005 began a period of growing 
hostility towards NGOs in Sri Lanka. This prompted a sudden widening of the 
ideological gap between the government and the majority of donors and NGOs 
working on peace building whose ideas had fitted closely with the previous UNF 
679 Ibid., p. 142. Tsunami funds scandal popularly known as the Helping Hambantota case is the 
most prominent among frauds of tsunami funds by government. Sri Lanka’s Prime Minister at that 
time, Mahinda Rajapaksa was siphoning off tsunami funds into a private account maintained in his 
father’s name. However this case was dismissed by the Supreme Court due to political influences 
made by government and the personal connections which the Chief Justice had with Mahinda 
Rajapaksa (‘Helping Hambantota Investigation’ (n.d.) 
http://www.lankastandard.com/vault/helping-hambantota-investigation/, accessed 31-07-2013). 
Moreover, nearly half a billion US dollars in tsunami aid for Sri Lanka is unaccounted for and over 
US$600 million has been spent on projects unrelated to the disaster (‘Sri Lanka’s Tsunami Aid: 
Over $1 Billion Missing or Misappropriated’ (2009) 
http://srilankastateterrorism.blogspot.com/2009/12/sri-lankas-tsunami-aid-over-1-billion.html, 
accessed 26-05-2012). 
680 Walton, (2008), p. 142. 
681 Ibid. 
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government’s version of liberal peace building. This shift was accelerated by the 
government’s reliance on two Sinhalese nationalist parties, the JVP and the JHU, 
as partners in the ruling UPFA coalition. Their new prominence allowed them 
much greater space to promote their views through the mainstream state media, 
and to encourage government measures to restrict the work of NGOs. Walton 
further adds that the backlash against NGOs was also closely linked to the slide 
back to full-scale military confrontation, which began in 2006. The government’s 
increasingly militarist approach reduced the space for the critical voices that had 
grown in confidence during the ceasefire period. By putting the country on a war 
footing, the government was also able to tighten its grip over the media and use it 
to attack human rights and peace advocates, who were increasingly seen as a 
threat to the state’s military objectives,682 and indicated a return to past beliefs 
about NGOs. Since 2004, the UPFA government has remained in power and 
NGOs have faced continued limitations in terms of their operational capacities. 
6.4.1.1. The NGO Commission 
In March 1990 a high powered committee was appointed by the then Executive, 
President R. Premadasa, to investigate allegations that foreign funds were flowing 
into both international and local NGOs without the knowledge or concurrence of 
the government.683 This was called ‘the Presidential Commission of Inquiry in 
Respect of Non-governmental Organisations Functioning in Sri Lanka’, better 
known as ‘the NGO Commission’. There were three broad reasons for the inquiry 
which were made public in the gazette notification setting up the commission: 1) 
the number of (3,000) NGOs function in Sri Lanka; 2) concern that there was no 
framework for monitoring the activities and funding of these NGOs; and 3) 
concern that some of the funds received from foreign sources, as well as those 
generated locally, were being misappropriated and/or used for activities 
prejudicial to national security, public order and/or economic interests and, in 
addition, for activities detrimental to the maintenance of ethnic, religious and 
cultural harmony among the people of Sri Lanka.684 
682 Ibid. 
683 Wickramasinghe, (2001), p. 84. 
684 ‘ICJ on the NGO Commission’ (1992), p. 15. 
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The commission began work in the first week of January 1991 and continued until 
December 1993. The general public were invited to make complaints or 
representations either publicly or anonymously and behind closed doors.685  The 
commission also surveyed a number of NGOs (the exact number is unknown)686 
asking for details of all staff, use of funds, assets, and even the bank account 
details of spouses, children of senior staff and the board of directors.687 From the 
NGOs who answered the questionnaire, it was revealed that a number of them 
were asked for very detailed information in a number of subsequent 
questionnaires.688  Public hearings were held into allegations against three NGOs: 
1) World Vision, an American NGO; 2) the Eye Donation Society; 689 and 3) 
Sarvodaya, a large and well-known Sri Lankan NGO, with a presence in hundreds 
of villages and receiving significant amounts of international funding.690 In these 
open session hearings, the general public came forward on their own initiative or 
were called by the commission.691  Investigations and interrogations were also 
conducted by the police unit attached to the commission.692 These events of the 
commission received significant media coverage and created much unrest among 
the NGO community.693 
An independent report published in November 1991 by the International 
Commission of Jurists (ICJ) following their visit to Sri Lanka,694 concluded that 
whereas the intentions and the activities of the NGO Commission as such might 
be defended as ‘reasonable’, what was being done in its name was not acceptable. 
685 Brabant, K. (1995) ‘NGO Legislation: The Sri Lanka Case’, RPN, No. 19 (May) Refugee 
Studies Programme, Oxford, UK, p. 12. 
686 ‘NGO Commission and Emergency Regulations’ (1993) Pravada, Vol. 2, No. 10 
(November/December) Social Scientists’ Association, Colombo, p. 5. 
687 Brabant, (1995), p. 12. 
688 ‘NGO Commission and Emergency Regulations’ (1993), p. 5. 
689 Sri Lanka Eye Donation Society is an NGO involved in donating human eyes and tissues for 
transplantation.  It serves patients in need both in Sri Lanka and around the world. The society is a 
non-profit organisation and provides the organs free of charge, except for a small fee on 
processing and delivery. 
690 ‘NGO Commission and Emergency Regulations’ (1993), p. 6. 
691 Brabant, (1995), p. 12. 
692 ‘ICJ on the NGO Commission’ (1992), p. 15. 
693 Brabant, (1995), p. 12. 
694 The Geneva-based ICJ commissioned Dr Stephen Neff to visit Sri Lanka to study the mandate 
and operation of the NGO Commission. The ICJ submitted their draft report to the government in 
July 1991 and asked for an opportunity for an ICJ delegation to discuss its findings with the 
government and with the members of the NGO Commission. This request was denied, and the ICJ 
was informed by the permanent representative of Sri Lanka to the UN in Geneva that any 
comment or critique on the operations of the commission “would be a violation of the principle of 
non-interference in matters that are deemed to be sub-judice” (‘ICJ on the NGO Commission’, 
(1992), p. 14). 
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Brabant wrote that the ICJ considered that the government had used the NGO 
Commission to foster a negative, discrediting and intimidating climate around 
NGOs. The effect was that NGOs felt that their rights to freedom of association 
and privacy were under threat. 695 The ICJ report recognised the government’s 
desire to seek information on NGOs as a prelude to establishing a regulatory 
framework. It also did not doubt the integrity and impartiality of the members of 
the NGO Commission, chaired by a former judge of the Supreme Court.696 But 
the report suggested that the commission should not lead to the harassment of 
NGOs.697 The ICJ report stated that it should not be used to justify a control 
system that would be so heavy-handed as to dissuade persons from joining or 
contributing funds to NGOs.698  
The NGO Commission handed in its report to the President on 11th December 
1993.699 But the report has not been published and has not been released as public 
information.700 An unofficial summary of the findings reveals that the commission 
found the NGO sector seemingly ‘chaotic, anarchic and in disarray’. The report 
also criticised the undemocratic structure of some NGOs, their large overheads 
and especially their actions in promoting ‘unlawful religious conversions’. To the 
degree that they sought to ameliorate the causes of poverty through advocacy and 
influence policy with foreign funding, criticism was levelled that they represented 
‘an alien hand’ which was directly or indirectly trying to exercise power in Sri 
695 Brabant, (1995), p. 12. 
696 Ibid. 
697 The ICJ report suggested that the commission must be genuinely, and not merely nominally, a 
vehicle for finding facts that would be relevant to the regulation of NGOs. It should not be used as 
a device for intimidating NGOs. The report further suggested that if the commission functions in 
such a way as to lead to harassment of NGOs, then the commission’s manner of operation should 
be changed. The ICJ report suggested that evidence should be obtained from the public in writing 
rather than taken orally, to remove restrictions on press reporting of the commission’s hearings, 
and police investigations to be undertaken only under the most careful supervision of the 
commission itself, rather than of the commission’s staff. Furthermore the report suggested that 
police investigations in the commission’s name be stopped and that the police unit attached to the 
commission be disbanded because there was unacceptably great scope for police harassment of 
NGOs under the general auspices of the commission (‘ICJ on the NGO Commission’ (1992), p. 
16). 
698 Ibid., p. 17. 
699 ‘NGO Commission and Emergency Regulations’ (1993), p. 6. 
700 Although the report of the NGO Commission has not been released or published some authors 
have referred to an unofficially released version on the NGO Commission report. See Kloos, 
(1999), and Wickramasinghe, (2001). Some authors mention that they have to go on certain brief 
government statements and extracts in the newspapers of some sections of the NGO Commission 
report (‘NGO Commission and Emergency Regulations’ (1993), p. 7). This researcher was not 
able to find the NGO Commission report. But an official from the Sri Lanka National Archives 
mentioned that there is a copy of the released report, but as it is a closed and restricted archive, it 
cannot be released for reference for any reason. 
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Lankan society. The report regretted that the NGO community had been 
uncooperative and seemingly hostile to the deliberations of the commission. It 
rejected the possibility of excessive legislation but acknowledged the state’s right 
to supervise the proper use of funds.701 The report revealed that NGO officers 
enjoyed extraordinarily high salaries and fringe benefits. It also revealed that there 
was misappropriation and other practices by NGOs, and that the NGOs were 
spending an unusually high proportion of funds for administrative purposes.702 
The report stated that NGOs would not only have to comply with the national 
laws but also not undertake activities that might upset the balance between 
communities and religions, or to interfere in political matters.703 
According to government statements, the report recommended compulsory 
registration for foreign and local NGOs receiving foreign funding, as well as 
CBOs directly sponsored or directed by a registered NGO. The report further 
recommended monitoring of foreign funding. Therefore the NGOs would be 
required to disclose very detailed and comprehensive information about the use of 
foreign funds. 704  The commission report further recommended a new post 
consisting of a commissioner with its own secretariat, and an NGO coordinating 
mechanism.705 This would require the creation of a central office, support staff, 
and two advisory committees706 to support the commissioner. It proposed that a 
few members from the NGO sector would sit on the committees, but that all 
would be appointed by the President. The NGO commissioner’s office was to be 
the focal point for all national and international NGOs and would be authorised to 
make preliminary inquiries into matters of alleged misconduct or 
misappropriation, but would then refer the case to the proper authorities if 
warranted.707 The report recommended the establishment of an NGO fund made 
up of percentage allocations of government grants and foreign aid grants. The 
stated purpose of the fund would be to help prevent ‘uneven and skewed 
development within the country’ and disproportionate funding going to ‘selected 
701 Brabant, (1995), p. 13. 
702 Fernando, (2003), p. 13. 
703 Brabant, (1995), pp. 13-14. 
704 Ibid., p. 13. 
705 Ibid. 
706 One on ‘administrative matters’ and one on ‘state-NGO relations’. 
707 Brabant, (1995), p. 13. 
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groups’.708 These recommendations reflect an attempt by government to create a 
mechanism to control NGOs and their funds according to government’s 
preferences. 
Several criticisms emerged during and after the NGO Commission. Kloos noted 
that even though the report referred to various allegations, at the end only one 
particular NGO, Sarvodaya, was singled out for further investigation. According 
to Kloos, this is probably related to President Premadasa’s suspicion that 
Sarvodaya leader A.T. Ariyaratne might become a rival for the presidency.709 This 
case is complicated. Sarvodaya is a giant among local NGOs and its leader is 
particularly influential among the rural poor. Premadasa was engaged in island-
wide welfare programmes such as Janasaviya and Gam Udawa. Kloos further 
adds that Premadasa may have seen in Ariyaratne a potential rival when thinking 
about the future Presidential elections which were scheduled for 1994.710 
However Premadasa’s assassination in May 1993 is probably the reason that the 
report of the NGO Commission was shelved before it reached the Parliament.711 
This episode has become infamous as an attempt by the government to control 
NGOs.712 
6.4.1.2. Critiques and counter criticisms 
There were subsequent challenges to the presence and activities of NGOs. In mid-
November 1995, the official meetings of the Sri Lankan NGO Forum713 were 
disturbed by rioters. Kloos notes that in the same month, November, the Sri 
708 Ibid., p. 14. 
709 Kloos, (1999), p. 32. 
710 Ibid., p. 29. 
711 Ibid., p. 32. 
712 Fernando, (2003), p. 12. 
713 The establishment of an NGO Forum in 1993 followed the created of the European NGO 
Forum on Sri Lanka in 1990. The Forum was established in response to the crisis that had begun in 
1987, after the arrival in Sri Lanka of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF). The Forum was 
seeking attention from the international community for the increasing violation of human rights in 
Sri Lanka. A shifting number of European NGOs participated in the Forum. Providing information 
on Sri Lanka was one goal, exerting pressure on the combatants in Sri Lanka another. The 
meetings of the Sri Lankan Forum would be chaired by the chairman of the European Forum and 
the chairman of the Sri Lankan Forum. Sri Lankans decided in 1994 to form a ‘counter Forum’ 
and therefore four types of NGOs would participate: those in the fields of human rights, relief and 
rehabilitation, economic development, and peace (Kloos, (1999), pp. 33-35). The topics to be 
discussed were economic development, human rights and NGO partnership in addition to the more 
sensitive topics of peace and humanitarian assistance (Perera, J. (1995) ‘Today the NGOs; 
Tomorrow…’, Pravada, Vol. 4, No. 4 (November/December) Social Scientists’ Association, 
Colombo, p. 31). 
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Lankan army launched operation Riviresa, which was meant to wrench Jaffna 
from the LTTE. Some Sinhala from nationalist groups and a number of their 
newspapers created the impression that the forum meeting was held in order to 
stop the military campaign arguing that foreign-based and Sri Lanka-based NGOs 
supported the LTTE.714 He further added that although there was no evidence to 
justify this suspicion against NGOs, the government was also not free from the 
same suspicion.715 Perera critiques that: “It is quite absurd to believe that at a 
large meeting of around 80 NGOs, almost all of them local, that anything ‘anti-Sri 
Lanka’ could ever have been decided upon.”716 
The campaign of hostility was of course not directed at all NGOs. Its primary 
targets were those NGOs that had intervened in national policy debates, lobbied 
and agitated for national policy reforms and worked in a manner that had called 
for mobilisation of the people on specific issues. Democratic reforms, human 
rights, peace, free and fair elections, and media freedom were major themes in the 
advocacy and interventionist campaigns of these NGOs.717 The attacks by Sinhala 
nationalist groups on NGOs as foreign agents who supported the LTTE were 
countered by Uyangoda who argued that: 
Actually, this ‘foreign agent’ argument is linked to an ideology of xenophobia, 
propagated by a section of Sri Lankans who, despite their own connections with 
foreign organisations, business enterprises and individuals, appear to believe that 
‘foreign links’ endanger national security.718 
It is significant that foreign funding of NGO peace work had come under harsh 
criticism in Sri Lanka. According to Orjuela, the most vociferous opposition to 
NGOs and peace processes came from Sinhala nationalist groups. 719 
Wickramasinghe adds that militant Sinhala groups vilified ‘foreign-funded NGOs’ 
as responsible for undermining the morale of the troops and pursuing ‘selfish aims’ 
instead of thinking of the good of the nation.720 Critiques of relief organisations 
failed to make distinctions between local NGOs which received foreign funds and 
others.721 Uyangoda connected his argument with the government and said that 
714 Kloos, (1999), p. 35. 
715 Ibid., p. 36. 
716 Perera, (1995), p. 31. 
717 Uyangoda, (1995), p. 6. 
718 Ibid. 
719 Orjuela, (2005), p. 7. 
720 Wickramasinghe, (2001), pp. 40-41. 
721 Ibid., p. 152. 
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what was extremely interesting in Sri Lanka was that the state had only 
occasionally come out against the human rights-based NGOs on the argument that 
they endangered national security.722 Furthermore, Uyangoda added that if one 
really wanted to demonise, terrorise and silence one’s enemy, the easiest 
argument was to suggest collusion with the LTTE. By using this argument, many 
NGOs have been demonised in Sri Lanka.723 
Reasons for the emergence of arguments suggesting NGO collusion with the 
LTTE include the fact that some NGOs had funded the LTTE and, in the north, 
there had been pro-LTTE NGOs. Humanitarian NGOs who had worked in the 
conflict areas were branded as pro-LTTE because they had worked among 
civilians in LTTE-controlled areas. For example, international humanitarian 
NGOs such as the ICRC and the UNHCR were there because in situations of 
armed conflicts, direct parties to the conflict are not always capable of looking 
after, and providing for, the civilian population, affected by the conflict itself.724 
Uyangoda adds that these critics know that no international humanitarian NGO 
has worked in Sri Lanka’s north without being invited by the government and 
asked by the government to carry out specific activities.725 
Many authors have repeatedly pointed out the baselessness of the government’s 
criticisms of NGOs. According to Wickramasinghe, what some critics have failed 
to understand is that it is possible to pressure a legitimate state which has signed 
binding treaties and conventions relating to humanitarian law but exerting similar 
pressure on rebel groups is hardly feasible.726 Brabant states that NGOs clearly 
provided assistance to local government departments in the LTTE-controlled 
north, notably through purchasing and transporting essential supplies for them. 
NGOs provided assistance to displaced and resettled groups of people that led 
observers to wonder whether they were filling a gap or substituting for 
government.727 
Prior to the end of the war, the links between the LTTE and NGOs were of 
concern to some commentators. Only a handful of international NGOs were 
722 Uyangoda, (1995), pp. 7-8. 
723 Ibid., p. 8. 
724 Ibid. 
725 Ibid. 
726 Wickramasinghe, (2001), p. 152. 
727 Brabant, (1995), p. 14. 
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working in the LTTE-controlled north where there was no legal recourse or 
protection outside of LTTE structures. A few of these NGOs were directly 
operational while others funded a variety of small local NGOs. It was felt that the 
LTTE preferred to keep the international presence to the absolute minimum and 
that international agencies should fund and develop the capacity of local NGOs. 
The latter, however, have had little potential to negotiate LTTE directives.728 This 
argument rejects the Sinhala nationalist suspicion that the NGOs have been in 
collusion with the LTTE. 
Notably, most of the criticisms against NGOs have been connected to the 
sovereignty of the state and to colonialism. Jayawardena has countered this, 
asserting that situations of war tend to make people emotional and fearful. They 
also provide an occasion for nationalists and others to get up against ‘foreign 
conspiracies’ and local ‘treason’.729 She further adds that: 
Why is it possible 50 years after colonial rule to raise cries of foreign money, 
alien ideology and a western way of life especially at a time when all 
governments try to attract foreign money, and when the people have modernised 
their dress and life styles? The reason is that it is the cheapest trick in the book to 
invoke ‘imperialism’ about which people have strong feelings and to abuse one’s 
opponents as agents or running dogs of imperialism. In most parts of South Asia, 
this pretext is still used to stifle criticism. Human rights which are universal, 
become ‘Western’ (one of the most ludicrous of all excuses); comment by human 
rights groups in Sri Lanka become treacherous action (by those who work for 
‘dollars’) and comment by foreign human rights groups become ‘interference’ in 
the internal affairs of the country.730 
Uyangoda adds that: “It is sheer nonsense to suggest that these NGOs have been 
challenging the sovereignty of the Sri Lankan state and acting as new colonial 
masters.” 731  These debates are typical of the PA era of government rule and 
government relations with NGOs since 1994. But, as mentioned above, the later 
UPFA government together with the support of Sinhala nationalist political parties 
and groups have continued to make such criticisms against NGOs. 
728 Ibid., p. 15. 
729 Jayawardena, (1995), p. 10. 
730 Ibid., p. 11. 
731 Uyangoda, (1995), p. 8. 
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6.4.1.3. Legal procedures 
The lack of a uniform registration mechanism has been a major reason for 
confusion and ambiguity in defining NGOs. There are different forms of NGO 
registration in Sri Lanka. Under the Voluntary Social Service Organisations 
(Registration and Supervision) Act, No. 31 of 1980, better known as the VSSO 
Act, 732 registration is mandatory for NGOs that obtain contributions from the 
public and government sources.733 Under the Companies Act, No. 17 of 1982, the 
companies formed to promote commerce, arts, science, religion, charity, sports or 
any other useful object, who intend to apply its profits, if any, or other income in 
promoting its objects, and agree to prohibit the payment of any dividend to its 
members, can be registered. NGOs can register under this act as ‘guaranteed 
limited companies’. 734  NGOs may also register in a variety of other ways. 
Through the Societies Ordinance of 1891 and Trust Ordinance of 1917, NGOs can 
register as unincorporated associations, while the foreign NGOs usually enter into 
a memorandum of understanding with an appropriate government ministry.735 
In May 1993, after President Premadasa’s assassination, President D.B. Wijetunga 
acted on the NGO Commission’s recommendations, promulgating an emergency 
regulation entitled ‘the Monitoring of Receipts and Disbursements of Non-
governmental Organisations Regulation No. 1.’ 736  This was made through an 
extraordinary gazette under emergency regulations.737 Several criticisms emerged 
regarding the emergency regulation. Critics pointed out that there was no reason 
for the use of emergency regulations to register and monitor the workings of 
732 The VSSO Act sought to introduce a system of registration of NGOs with the government; to 
provide for their inspection and supervision; to facilitate the coordination of the activities of such 
organisations; to give governmental recognition to such organisations which are properly 
constituted; to enforce the accountability of such organisations in respect of financial and policy 
management under the existing rules of such organisations, to the members of such organisations, 
the general public and the government; to prevent malpractices by persons purporting to be such 
organisations; to regularise the constitution of voluntary social service groups which have been 
legally recognised; and for matters connected therewith or incidental (Act, No. 31 of 1980). 
733 Ibid. 
734 Companies Act, No. 17 of 1982. 
735 Brabant, (1995), p. 14. 
736 Under this regulation, the organisations that are dependent upon the public or government 
grants-in-aid for funds and that are engaged in social welfare, development, empowerment, 
research, and environmental protection activities were defined as NGOs. Cooperative societies and 
NGOs with annual budgets less than Rs.50,000 were excluded. The regulation required an NGO to 
register with the director of social services and submit detailed information regarding receipts and 
disbursements. Heavy penalties for non-compliance were built into the regulation 
(Wickramasinghe, (2001), pp. 84-85). 
737 Fernando, (2003), p. 13. 
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NGOs. Furthermore, commentators stated that if during its three years of 
operation the NGO Commission had found at least some of the suspicions on 
NGOs well founded, this fact would have been mentioned in the commission 
report and that it would have figured as a reason for urgency. Therefore the 
commentators justifiably assume that the commission had found no material base 
for such suspicions.738 The NGO sector also noted that there was no discernible 
urgency or threat to the public security 739  that warranted the enactment of 
legislation under emergency regulations.740 However this regulation lapsed741 in 
1994 after the PA government came into power. Wickramasinghe notes that 
NGOs complied with such regulation until the government allowed it to lapse the 
following year. She further adds that the general analysis of the NGO 
Commission episode has been a condemnation of the state’s use of emergency 
measures to unleash its resources against institutions of civil society.742 
However in 1995, the PA government attempted to control NGOs through 
introducing an amendment to the VSSO Act. Although this amendment bill was 
presented to the Parliament, it was not taken for approval by the Parliament due to 
lobbying of the NGOs and the Parliamentary opposition.743 But on the 27th March 
1998, when the main opposition party, the UNP boycotted the Parliament, the 
government tactically passed this bill. 744  This Voluntary Social Service 
Organisations (Registration and Supervision) (Amendment) Act, No. 8 of 1998 
gives power to the minister of social services to control NGOs.745 The VSSO act 
together with the amendment remains is the latest Sri Lankan act applicable to 
NGOs. Some authors interpret these attempts of the government as a negative 
response towards NGOs. For Kloos, the rush to pass such an amendment signified 
738 ‘NGO Commission and Emergency Regulations’ (1993), p. 7. 
739 Regulations can be issued under the Public Security Ordinance only where there is a need for 
regulations to meet threats to public security and public order, to quell any mutiny or commotion 
or to ensure the maintenance of services essential to public life (Ibid.). 
740 Brabant, (1995), p. 14.  
741 Fernando, (2003), p. 13. 
742 Wickramasinghe, (2001), pp. 84-85. 
743 Fernando, (2003), p. 13. 
744 Ibid. 
745 For example, this amendment act states that: If there is evidence to support any allegation of 
fraud or misappropriation made against a voluntary organisation, and the minister is satisfied that 
the fraud or misappropriation is of such nature as would affect the financial management of the 
organisation and that public interest will suffer if such organisation is continued to be carried on 
by its existing executive committee, the minister shall, by order published in the gazette, appoint 
an interim board of management for the purpose of administering the affairs of such voluntary 
organisation (Voluntary Social Service Organizations (Registration and Supervision) (Amendment) 
Act, No. 8 of 1998). 
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the anger of the government towards human rights NGOs.746 Kloos is critical of 
the government for betraying its wish for monitoring rather than understanding. 
Control of the NGO world would imply control of civil society.747 
Additional legal procedures regarding NGOs have been introduced. In April 1999, 
a presidential circular was issued to all government ministries, district secretariats, 
and departments calling all NGOs to be re-registered under the NGO Secretariat. 
All international and national level foreign-funded voluntary service organisations 
were required to declare their sources of funding, annual expenditure, and annual 
budgets. Clearance from Ministries of Defence, Foreign Affairs, Plan 
Implementation, and the relevant line ministry was made a pre-requisite for re-
registration. The exceptions for re-registration under the NGO Secretariat are 
those organisations whose activities are conducted in one district and at divisional 
levels. Those organisations are required to re-register under the district secretary 
and the divisional secretary, respectively. However, if these organisations receive 
funds from foreign sources, they have to register under the NGO Secretariat.748 
Although the NGO Secretariat was formed in 1996, it was not active till 1999. 
Following the presidential circular, the NGO Secretariat became re-activated 
because the circular very clearly made re-registration compulsory.749 
As mentioned earlier, large amounts of foreign funds flowed to Sri Lanka 
following the tsunami and the government introduced new regulations and 
procedures for international NGOs. Since the tsunami the NGO registration 
procedures have changed. According to Brochard, the introduction of new 
regulations and procedures has added a new layer to the relationship between the 
government and NGOs.750 A new institutional mechanism established under the 
External Resources Department (ERD) of the Ministry of Finance and Planning 
became the Centre for Non-Governmental Sector (CNGS).  Prior to the tsunami 
all international NGOs were registered with the NGO Secretariat of the Ministry 
of Social Services. But when the CNGS was established, pre-tsunami international 
NGOs were also requested to provide information on their activities to the CNGS 
746 Kloos, (1999), p. 33. 
747 Ibid., p. 39. 
748 Fernando, (2003), pp. 13-14. 
749 Ibid., pp. 14. 
750 Brochard, (2005), p. 1. 
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as well. 751 The new registrations had to be initially recommended by the line 
ministry and approved by the Ministry of Social Services. Following this, 
applications needed to be forwarded to the CNGS of the ERD who then forward 
them to the Immigration Department after obtaining clearance from the Ministries 
of Defence, Finance, and Foreign Affairs. This process made registrations very 
slow, and as Brochard claims, discouraged the international NGOs.752 He further 
adds that the procedure and the duration varied from agency to agency. For 
example, with regard to the Caritas agencies, 753 the initial approval has to be 
given by the Ministry of Christian Affairs.754 
The 2005 budget proposed to tax six per cent of all funds granted by both local 
and international NGOs at the rate of 30 per cent.755 While the taxation applied to 
international NGOs as well those involved in relief work had an opportunity to 
apply for exemption. But Brochard notes that, it was not clear how the exemptions 
were to be granted and also it was unclear if this would apply to tsunami related 
relief work. Moreover, ‘humanitarian’ had not been defined in this regard. This 
added yet another registration which created further delays.756 
The NGOs receiving tsunami related funds were asked to channel those funds 
through a special bank account titled ‘post-tsunami inward remittances account’. 
Brochard says that it was reported that remittances received by NGOs far 
exceeded funds received by the government of Sri Lanka for tsunami related 
initiatives. 757  He further adds that the government of Sri Lanka was not 
encouraging expatriates to take up positions in Sri Lanka with NGOs.758 Agencies 
751 Ibid., p. 2. 
752 Ibid. 
753 Caritas is a confederation of 164 Roman Catholic relief, development and social service 
organisations operating in over 200 countries and territories worldwide. Their mission is to work 
to build a better world, especially for the poor and oppressed. 
754 Brochard, (2005), p. 2. 
755 In the 2005 budget speech, the minister stated that: There are many NGOs carrying out 
activities which are not monitored adequately. It is necessary to adopt a proper system of 
monitoring of such organisations particularly in areas of activities carried out and funds utilised by 
them. Those institutions are now required to register with the registrar of companies and open tax 
files. I propose to impose a presumptive tax at the rate of 30 per cent by taking six per cent of the 
funds received as income of the institution, other than the institutions carrying out activities solely 
related to rehabilitation work of work of north and east and any other activities which are approved 
by the minister on humanitarian grounds (Budget Speech – 2005). 
756 Brochard, (2005), p. 3. 
757 Ibid., p. 4. 
758 It was pointed out that foreign recruits ideally should have qualifications and experience that 
were not available locally. Foreign accountants were particularly discouraged with the arguments 
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were being encouraged to employ Sri Lankans wherever possible. 759  These 
conditions prompted a re-evaluation of the state’s institutional and legal 
relationship with NGOs. 
In January 2006, a Parliamentary select committee into the activities and impact 
of NGOs was launched with a ‘special focus’ on post-tsunami developments. Its 
terms of reference clearly reflected concerns linked to the ethnic conflict, 
including the allegations that some NGOs were engaged in activities that were 
‘inimical to the sovereignty and integrity of Sri Lanka’, ‘detrimental to the 
national and social wellbeing of the country’ and adversely affected ‘national 
security’. 760 According to Walton, therefore, NGO legitimacy in Sri Lanka is 
reliant on a number of factors specific to the Sri Lankan context such as a highly 
centralised political system, a lack of legal protection for NGOs, and a sense that 
NGOs were elitist and threatened the aims of a nationalist political agenda.761 
Perera notes that, the legal procedures have not been to evaluate the utility of 
NGO activities and projects but monitor them, which can leave them subject to 
control through state intervention.762 Such legal procedures reflect government 
aims to suppress and control NGOs rather than obtaining their support in various 
sectors such as human rights protection and development. 
6.4.1.4. The NGO Secretariat 
As noted earlier, in 1995 amendments were proposed to the VSSO Act which 
provided for the establishment of an NGO advisory council and appointment of 
interim boards of management to administer the affairs of NGOs,763 reflecting the 
recommendations of the NGO Commission. Although a secretariat for NGOs was 
established in 1996 in the Ministry of Health, Highways and Social Services, the 
VSSO Amendment Act was passed in 1998. However this act has not been 
adequately implemented and the registration of such organisations had not been 
that: 1) there is a pool of local professionals; and 2) accountants must be familiar with local 
accounting practices. 
759 Brochard, (2005), p. 5. 
760 Walton, (2008), p. 143. 
761 Ibid. 
762 Perera, (1998), p. 9. 
763 ‘Measures to Introduce a System of Registration’ (n.d.) http://www.ngosecretariat.gov.lk, 
accessed 24-11-2011. 
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strictly followed764 leading to a presidential circular which was issued in April 
1999 to make the NGO registration compulsory.765 
The official web site of the NGO Secretariat mentions that their mission is to 
mobilise the resources and to coordinate the activities of NGOs within the 
national policy framework and to have NGOs contributing as partners in the 
process of development of the country. The goals of the NGO Secretariat are to 
ensure the registration of all NGOs which function in Sri Lanka, and to assess if 
they are functioning within the frame of government policies.766 The official web 
site mentions several objectives of the NGO Secretariat.767 However, the entire 
mission, goals and the objectives of the NGO Secretariat stresses its strong 
affiliation with central government policy. 
Among the various activities of the NGO Secretariat,768 the registration of NGOs 
is prominent. There are different levels of NGO registration. All foreign NGOs, 
local NGOs receiving foreign funds, and the local NGOs which conduct their 
activities in more than one administrative district are required to register with the 
NGO Secretariat. The NGOs which conduct activities within the boundaries of 
only one administrative district should register in the appropriate district 
764 For example, in 1997 the Ministry of Social Services collected lists of NGOs from variety of 
sources such as ministries, provincial councils, divisional offices, government agencies and human 
rights commission. At the end of 1997 a four-page form was sent to all known NGOs. Many filled-
in-forms have meanwhile been returned, but nothing has been done with the data due to lack of 
staff and computer facilities. The ministry could do not much more than store the forms in one of 
its two rooms (Kloos, (1999), p. 15). 
765 ‘Measures to Introduce a System of Registration’ (n.d.). 
766 ‘Mission and Goal’ (n.d.) http://www.ngosecretariat.gov.lk, accessed 24-11-2011. 
767 The objectives of the NGO Secretariat are: to make a conducive environment for national and 
international communities to contribute in the relief and development activities; to make 
coordination among NGOs, government institutions and people who need services of the NGOs; to 
make NGOs projects compatible with the legal framework of the country; and to ensure the NGOs 
act within the national policy framework of the country (‘Objectives’ (n.d.) 
http://www.ngosecretariat.gov.lk, accessed 24-11-2011). 
768 The activities of the NGO Secretariat are: registering NGOs; facilitating services to NGOs; 
signing memoranda of understanding with NGOs; monitoring NGO activities and providing 
information about the coordination between government institutions, NGOs and needy people; 
taking legal action against misconduct and misbehaviour of NGOs; establishing district 
coordinating committees chaired by the district secretaries, and activating them to monitor the 
activities of the NGOs at the district level; collecting information about various phases of projects 
implement by NGOs at the divisional level; obtaining NGO participation to implement the projects 
proposed by the divisional secretariats; and conducting comprehensive surveys to manage a data 
base to commence strict monitoring at the district level. The supportive activities of the NGO 
Secretariat include: printing the NGO and CBO directory and the NGO project directory; 
conducting capacity building programmes to improve skills of NGO Secretariat officials and of 
NGO staffs; conducting site visits to observe NGO activities; facilitating foreign NGO officials to 
obtain visa, to open bank accounts and to sign memoranda of understanding with the ministries; 
and providing advisory services to NGOs to overcome the difficulties they encounter (‘Activities’ 
(n.d.) http://www.ngosecretariat.gov.lk, accessed 24-11-2011). 
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secretariat. The NGOs which conduct activities within the boundaries of only one 
divisional secretariat area need to register in the appropriate divisional secretariat. 
These complexities reflect that there is still no single institution to register all 
NGOs in Sri Lanka. 
The NGOs need to qualify to be registered. These organisations are not for profit; 
shall not share the profit or surplus earned through fundraising activities among its 
members; shall not be self-serving in aims and related values; and shall be within 
the legal framework and social values of the country.769 Prior to registration, these 
organisations should apply for the recommendation of the ERD 770  through a 
separate form obtained from the NGO Secretariat. Some of these requirements are 
vague and complex, with regulations designed to discourage the NGOs. If a high 
official sees an NGO as a threat to the existing government’s power, there are 
many ways to supress or restrict NGOs in the country by labelling them as 
imperial agents. There are controversies over interpreting such vague terms as 
‘social values of the country’. These loopholes make a path for the misuse of laws 
and to direct the aims of NGO Secretariat towards fulfilment of political needs.  
According to a special gazette notice issued by the President on 30th April 2010, 
the NGO Secretariat presently functions under the purview of the Ministry of 
Defence. And while the aims of establishing the NGO Secretariat may be clear 
and reasonable, the problem is the control the Defence Ministry has over it. 
Because the war ended in 2009, the government cannot put forward arguments of 
national security anymore. In the post-war period, numerous human rights 
violations occurred in Sri Lanka. The government’s poor response to these issues 
was manifest with the government fearing NGOs might spread news of these 
violent incidents to the outside world. Thus, the government might be trying to 
suppress the NGOs by controlling them under the purview of the Defence 
Ministry. According to critics, NGOs are required to submit financial statements, 
audited reports and work plans on a regular basis to the NGO Secretariat. 
Oversight of a clearly civilian function by the Ministry of Defence is deeply 
repressive and highly political. This is apparent in the restrictions that have been 
769 Ibid. 
770 The ERD approval is needed only if the objectives of an NGO contain the provision that their 
relief services are for the mentally retarded or physically disabled, the poor, the sick, the orphans 
and destitute, and contains the provision that the relief services aim the needy in times of disasters. 
These NGOs also needed to get the positive recommendations from the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and the Ministry of Defence to be qualified to be registered in the NGO Secretariat (ibid.). 
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placed on organisations limiting work to specific activities and subject areas.771 
The monitoring of such organisations mainly working to address human rights 
and humanitarian concerns, especially in the north and the east, creates an 
environment of self-censorship and curtails meaningful intervention.772 
It is important here to note the role of the President who, at the time of writing, is 
the Minister of Defence, with the defence secretary being one of his brothers. The 
control of the NGO Secretariat under the purview of the Defence Ministry 
indicates attempts by the President to centralise the authoritative power within his 
family and control NGO funds and work plans according to his self-interested 
priorities. This raises the spectre of nepotism within the ruling government. 
This researcher found that the actual mechanism of the NGO Secretariat is 
different to the statements listed on their web site. Although the NGO Secretariat 
gives contact details including postal and e-mail addresses and phone numbers, 
several attempts to make contact by those means was unsuccessful. No replies 
were received. Finally the phone was answered and an official told this researcher 
to come over to the office if information was needed. 
Entering the office was a long process because of the rules and regulations of the 
Defence Ministry, with details required of personal details such as name, address, 
and the reason for coming.  After a security check the security office provided a 
visitor’s tag which gave permission to enter the relevant office. This researcher 
had to wait for more than two hours in the NGO Secretariat to obtain the 
requested data, which turned out not to be relevant. 
This researcher observed the inefficiency of the officials and the overarching 
hierarchical power structure between higher and lower officials. The office 
environment was not client-friendly, and the officers were discouraging to those 
people who came to register NGOs. There were clear inconsistencies between the 
771 For example, after the war the Sri Lankan military forces denied all access to the IDP camps by 
NGOs. This was later relaxed after pressure was exerted by the international community. Many 
local and international NGOs now work in the camps but they continue to report problems with 
access. However, human rights groups and others who wish to provide advice to the IDPs are still 
denied access (see ‘Sri Lanka: Unlock the Camps in Sri Lanka: Safety and Dignity for the 
Displaced Now’ (2009) Amnesty International, 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ASA37/016/2009/en/5de112c8-c8d4-4c31-8144-
2a69aa9fff58/asa370162009en.html, accessed 02-10-2013). 
772 ‘Situation in North-Eastern Sri Lanka: A Series of Serious Concerns’, a document tabled in 
Parliament on 21st October 2011 by M.A. Sumanthiran, MP (TNA), www.dbsjeyaraj.com, 
accessed 23-11-2011. 
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activities followed in the office and the mission, goals and objectives mentioned 
in their web site. If foreign NGO officials are discouraged and ill-treated by the 
NGO Secretariat officials then this may result in them backing away from their 
operational objectives. 
6.4.1.5. Significant views 
The writings on government-NGO relations suggest that the government readily 
perceives at least some NGOs as a threat and that it seeks to control and curb their 
activities.773 Kloos’ critique of the government position maintains that: 1) because 
NGOs are not effectively controlled there is a chance that financial resources are 
wasted or misappropriated; 2) when applying for resources abroad, NGOs may be 
tempted to present a picture of reality in Sri Lanka worse than it actually is, 
thereby tarnishing the image of the country; 3) support for an NGO might amount 
to support for an insurgent revolutionary or secessionist movement; 4) resources, 
foreign resources in particular, may be used to gain political influence in the 
national arena, thus undermining the sovereignty of the state, or for private gain; 
and 5) foreign resources, while officially used for socio-economic purposes, may 
have undesirable cultural consequences. 774  Kloos claims this last criticism is 
voiced by some Sinhala nationalist groups and occasionally used by some of the 
Buddhist monks against Christian charity NGOs. The reason for this critique is 
that these NGOs are suspected of conversion activities in the wake of helping the 
poor.775 For Kloos there is a tension between the government and human rights 
NGOs, but hardly between the government and development-oriented NGOs.776 
Kloos further adds that although there definitely is a relationship of mutual 
suspicion, actual conflicts are rare indeed.777 Wickramasinghe also notes that open 
conflicts rarely arise between the state and NGOs involved in rural and technical 
development but do occur between the state and human rights NGOs who purport 
to act as watch-dogs of state excesses.778 For example, the NGO Commission 
773 Kloos, (1999), p. 36. 
774 Ibid., p. 26. 
775 Ibid., p. 30. 
776 Ibid., p. 37. 
777 Ibid. 
778 Wickramasinghe, (2001), p. 98. 
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report states that, human rights issues should not be used as political issues for 
confrontation with the government but as pure human rights issues.779 
Through these writings it is clear that there is ambivalence and suspicion of Sri 
Lankan governments regarding their position vis-à-vis NGOs. Kloos brings three 
things to the discussion on the relationship between the government and NGOs in 
Sri Lanka: 1) the quantitative importance of NGOs in terms of the number of 
people working in this sector and concerns about the amount of money spent by 
NGOs; 2) the bewildering variety of activities carried out under the banner of 
NGOs; and 3) the fact that absolutely nobody has a full grasp of the extent of the 
phenomenon. 780  Therefore despite an explicit willingness on both sides to 
cooperate, collaboration between NGOs and government is limited. According to 
Wickramasinghe, for the state quite clearly the partnership with NGOs does not 
grow naturally out of its development vision. It is more a means to achieving 
certain political objectives.781  
The challenge for the Sri Lankan government is to combine economic growth and 
employment creation with a reduction in government spending.782 For Brabant, 
this is only possible if the private sector and the non-governmental sector expand 
and take over the roles and responsibilities previously exercised by government. 
He questions whether a government can opt to attract foreign investment and 
increase deregulation in the private sector, while simultaneously increasing its 
regulation over the civil society sector and controlling that sector’s access to 
foreign funds.783 This indicates the ambiguous policies of government over NGOs. 
According to some of the respondents attached to NGOs, it is evident that 
government-NGO rivalry continues to exist. Nonetheless, the respondents pointed 
out their willingness to work with the government and stressed that their aim was 
not to challenge the government. One stated: 
Although people expect many things from our NGOs, we are not going to play the 
role of central government. We cannot violate the government’s rules and 
regulations. We carry a facilitating role and we want to introduce our working 
models to both government and private sector policy makers. However, we are 
not representing the government. When we try to obtain support from the 
779 Cited in Wickramasinghe, (2001), p. 99. 
780 Kloos, (1999), p. 37. 
781 Wickramasinghe, (2001), p. 101. 
782 Brabant, (1995), p. 15. 
783 Ibid. 
168 
 
                                                 
government, sometimes we face problems due to inefficiencies and their inability 
to handle them. The government should motivate or promote the NGOs without 
putting them all into the same category. The government can select NGOs by 
using interviews or other methods. We always try to obey government regulations 
and try to provide an efficient service to the people within the legal limitations. 
We want to show good results from our projects and to change the mentality of 
the government about NGOs. (Respondent: Mr Sisira Wijesundara, Team Leader, 
CARE International – Hambantota Office.) 
This indicates that the NGOs expected the government’s support in their work 
while affirming their willingness to collaborate with the government. Another 
respondent noted: 
We obtain the support of central and also the provincial governments. Actually 
we need the support of the central and provincial governments. It is not good to 
go beyond government rules and regulations because then there is a risk of 
wasting all the money and efforts of our NGOs. However, most of the foreign 
funds come to the central government. The NGOs get smaller amounts of foreign 
funds compared to the government. But nobody questions the funding which the 
central government receives. (Respondent: Ms Nauli Wimalarathna, Consultant, 
Transparency International-Sri Lanka.) 
The common criticism which emerges from the government side about the foreign 
funds is again highlighted here. However, the respondents’ views also indicate 
that if there are no such government barriers, NGOs have capacities to be 
involved in more development activities. 
We have no direct access to local government bodies. We have to sign 
memoranda of understanding with the relevant central government ministry to 
start a programme. The ministry does not allow NGOs to work according to their 
desires. Therefore the capabilities of the NGOs to be involved in local 
government work have been limited. Although USAID has a good capacity to 
work more, it has been limited due to the strict rules of the central government. 
Also the aid does not reach the most needed people. All processes have been 
politicised. (Respondent: Mr Abul Kalam, Programme Manager, Supporting 
Regional Governance Programme (SuRG) of USAID.) 
Through these observations and statements it is clear that the relationship between 
the Sri Lankan government and NGOs has not evolved smoothly. Careful scrutiny 
into such criticisms and the different reactions of certain governments on NGOs, 
give rise to several arguments. First, the government-NGO relations have slowly 
changed and are still changing according to different government policies, and 
therefore, it is clear that within the state boundaries of Sri Lanka, the government 
can and will control the activities of NGOs according to its political objectives. 
Second, the government’s attempts to control NGOs indicate that the government 
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identifies NGOs as significant and influential. Third, during the moments when 
the government and NGOs collaborated in the matters of human rights and 
development, it is evident that the results achieved were positive. 
6.5. Summary 
Overall, in Sri Lanka there is no widely accepted definition for the term NGO. 
Although there is evidence of the organisational forms like NGOs since pre-
colonial times, due to the ambiguities of definitions and legal procedures, there is 
no clear data about the growth of NGOs in Sri Lanka. The relations between 
government and NGOs have taken a variety of forms according to the policies and 
aspirations of different governments and rulers, political parties and leaders, and 
incidents occurring in the country. The governments which obtained the support 
of Sinhala nationalist political parties and groups tried to label NGOs as imperial 
agents. This criticism has been counter critiqued by many authors as a trick of 
governments to avoid NGOs becoming involved in human rights protection, a 
sector which is intentionally ignored by many governments. This reveals the 
government’s fear of receiving international pressure on human rights protection 
when the NGOs act as watch-dogs to protect human rights. Compared with rights-
oriented NGOs, development-oriented NGOs have not faced much pressure.  
The following chapters examine the current gaps of Sri Lankan government 
structure especially in terms of local government, and seek ways in which NGOs 
can involve and contribute to local government and development in Sri Lanka 
despite the limitations imposed on NGOs by central government. 
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Chapter 7 
Local development, people’s participation and local politics 
7.1. Introduction 
Development is an elusive and ambiguous concept reflected by different meanings 
according to the context in which it is used.784 The Sri Lankan literature points to 
development is a multidimensional process involving major changes in the social 
structures, popular culture and national political institutions combined with an 
acceleration of economic growth, the reduction of inequality and the eradication 
of poverty. 785  Development, thus covers a broad range of positive changes 
however, the ways in which different parties define development varies. For 
example, when central government promotes large scale development at one end 
of the spectrum, some local governments prefer to promote small scale 
development at the other end. Between these two variants, a range different 
interpretations for development is evident. As outlined in chapter 2, the main 
interest of this research centres on local development which is locally-led and 
community-oriented and where the development of human resources over 
physical infrastructure is stressed.786 
This research proceeds on the assumption that local development is a 
responsibility of local government since that is where local needs must be met. 
The Pradeshiya Sabhas Act No. 15 of 1987 establishes the significance of 
people’s participation in local development activities. According to the Act, 
Pradeshiya Sabhas (PSs) were established to provide greater opportunities for the 
people to participate effectively in the decision making processes relating to 
administrative and development activities at a local level.787 
784 Kularatne, W.G. (n.d.) ‘Community Development in Sri Lanka’, Sri Lankan Journal of 
Librarianship and Information Management, Vol. 2, No. 1, p. 2 
(http://www.cmb.ac.lk/academic/institutes/nilis/reports/kularatne.pdf, accessed 17-12-2013). 
785 Amarathunge, S.P.P.; Rathnayake, R.M.A.K.; Fernando, P.J.S.; Bandara, Y.M.H.P.M. and 
Gunasekara, W.G.V. (n.d.) ‘Conflict of Development, Culture Ahead of Definition: Field Study in 
Mahaweli System “C” in Sri Lanka’, http://journals.sjp.ac.lk/index.php/icbm/article/view/704, 
accessed 10-12-2013. 
786 Kleymeyer, C.D. (ed) (1994) Cultural Expression and Grassroots Development: Cases from 
Latin America and the Caribbean, Lynne Rienner Publishers, London, pp. 4-6. 
787 Pradeshiya Sabhas Act No. 15 of 1987, p. 1. 
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The way in which local government views development varies according to the 
situation within particular areas coupled with political considerations. The 
availability of natural resources, and the demographic and geographical 
backgrounds also vary from area to area. Further, the political and administrative 
influences of central and provincial governments regarding local development, 
and the ways in which the NGOs and the individuals involved in local 
development activities cooperate also differ from area to area. To address the 
issues of local development and people’s participation, it is important to 
understand the situation within the areas, and examine the ways in which local 
government representatives define development and people’s participation. In turn, 
how local government is affected by national and provincial politics is critical. 
This chapter outlines the different perspectives on local development, people’s 
participation and local politics from the research that was carried out in the 12 
selected local government bodies, as outlined in chapter 3. This chapter draws on 
the views of 20 respondents788 and on publically available information on the 
views of local government representatives. 
Issues are addressed that emerge from the literature reviewed in chapter 2 aimed 
at encouraging people’s participation in the local policy processes and local 
development. The chapter identifies gaps in development and people’s 
participation at the local government level in Sri Lanka and looks towards 
possibilities to fulfil this neglect. 
7.2. Features of the selected local government bodies 
As mentioned in chapter 3, this research was carried out in the southern and 
eastern provinces of Sri Lanka. Within these two provinces 12 local government 
bodies were selected covering three districts of each province and three levels of 
local government, as shown in Table 7.1. This section outlines the features of each 
local government body. 
788 Of the 20, 18 are local government representatives. Also included are one provincial council 
representative and one community-based organisation (CBO) representative. Of the 18 local 
government representatives, 11 are from the southern province and seven from the eastern 
province. Six are municipal council (MC) representatives, five are UC representatives and seven 
are PS representatives. 
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7.2.1. Local government bodies: significance and specialities 
Table 7.1: Details of the selected local government bodies 
 Local 
government 
body 
Province District Area 
(square 
kilometres) 
Number 
of GN 
divisions 
Number 
of wards 
Population Number of 
council 
members 
1 Galle MC Southern Galle 16.5 43 15 90,934 19 
2 Matara MC Southern Matara 12.8 41 15 74,771 15 
3 Batticaloa MC Eastern Batticaloa 76 48 19 89,758 19 
4 Kalmunai MC Eastern Ampara 23 74 28 104,546 19 
5 Weligama UC Southern Matara 6.65 13 10 25,967 10 
6 Hambantota 
UC 
Southern Hambantota 10.1 2 7 11,802 9 
7 Trincomalee 
UC 
Eastern Trincomalee 7.5 19 12 102,857 12 
8 Kattankudy 
UC 
Eastern Batticaloa 6.5 18 12 53,153 9 
9 Baddegama 
PS 
Southern Galle 112.8 70 3 80,586 17 
10 Suriyawewa 
PS 
Southern Hambantota 167.7 21 5 48,500 5 
11 Kinniya PS Eastern Trincomalee 137.5 14 9 33,945 7 
12 Lahugala PS Eastern Ampara 618 13 12 10,272 11 
GN – Grama Niladhari; MC – Municipal Council; UC – Urban Council; PS – Pradeshiya Sabha 
Source: Budget reports (2011) of the 12 local government bodies 
 
There were only two MCs in each province in 2011 at the time of the field 
research. Therefore, there was no choice other than selecting the Galle and Matara 
MCs in the southern province, and the Batticaloa and Kalmunai MCs in the 
eastern province. These MC areas were affected by the tsunami in 2004, and were 
the major bodies in receipt of aid and support from NGOs. In addition, Batticaloa 
and Kalmunai are post-war areas and have also received the aid and support of 
foreign-funded post-war rehabilitation programmes. 
The UCs selected from the southern province were Weligama and Hambantota, 
both of which received significant aid and support from NGOs in developing local 
policies and also in developing the UC area following the damage from the 
tsunami. The eastern province is ethnically diverse with Tamil the majority ethnic 
group in Trincomalee UC area, while in the Kattankudy UC area a Muslim 
majority is prominent. 
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The selected PSs from the southern province are Baddegama and Suriyawewa. 
These two PS areas have been the site of the large scale construction projects, 
such as the southern expressway (Galle-Colombo highway) which goes along 
Baddegama, and also Suriyawewa which is being renovated to facilitate the newly 
built international cricket stadium. These projects have had a major effect on the 
lives of people in these areas. Kinniya and Lahugala PS areas from the eastern 
province were also affected by the tsunami disaster and by the war. Kinniya is a 
Muslim area while Lahugala is a Sinhala area. The post-war reconstruction 
projects have had a significant influence on the lives of the people in these areas 
as well, as will be discussed below. 
Table 7.1 indicates the main demographic and geographical differences of the 
local government bodies. Comparing the MC and UC areas, it is clear that the PS 
areas are larger than the others. The land area and population together decide the 
number of local government representatives to be elected for each area and while 
the high populations have been mostly centred in the MC and UC areas, there are 
a number of PS areas with significantly higher populations as well (for example 
Baddegama PS), while some UC areas have significantly smaller populations (for 
example the Hambantota UC). These differences occur due to geographical 
location and the available facilities of each area. The numbers of Grama 
Niladhari (GN) divisions and wards789 indicate the inconsistency of Sri Lankan 
administrative and political divisions (see Table 7.1), but the information 
indicated in the Table 7.1 identifies several differences in each area. 
Table 7.2: Special features of the selected local government bodies 
 Local government body Area specialities Vision Mission 
1 Galle MC Capital of the southern 
province, multi-cultural; 
Sinhala majority and a 
significant Muslim 
population, Galle 
harbour, ancient Dutch 
fort, tsunami-affected 
city. 
To build a 
respectable city by 
supplying high 
quality utility 
services to the 
people who pay 
taxes to the MC.  
To improve all facilities through 
developing human, material and 
monetary resources efficiently 
and effectively to provide public 
health and utility services to 
facilitate locals and foreigners 
who live in the city and visit the 
city. 
2 Matara MC Multi-cultural; Sinhala 
majority and a 
significant Muslim 
population, ancient 
Dutch fort, tsunami-
affected city. 
To build a 
commercial city to 
improve the 
development of the 
citizens in the MC 
area.  
To use the entire human and 
material resources in a 
sustainable way and to get the 
people’s participation in the 
development process of the city 
and to provide welfare and 
utility services to the people who 
live in the city and visit the city. 
789 Grama Niladhari (GN) division is the lowest level administrative division and the ward is the 
lowest level political division in Sri Lanka. 
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3 Batticaloa MC Tamil majority, a 
significant Burgher and 
Muslim population and 
a small Sinhala 
population, huge lagoon 
area, ancient Dutch fort, 
tsunami-affected and 
war-affected city. 
To build a 
beautiful, tidy, 
complete and 
modern city 
ensuring fraternity 
and safety.  
To create good governance for 
the prosperity of the people with 
participatory development 
projects and healthy 
environment. 
4 Kalmunai MC Muslim majority, the 
second largest 
population is Tamil, a 
few Sinhala people, the 
most populated area in 
the Ampara district, 
indicates high density of 
population, tsunami-
affected and war-
affected city. 
To build up 
Kalmunai 
municipality as the 
best MC in Sri 
Lanka through 
implementing 
sustainable 
development 
activities. 
To achieve excellence in 
providing citizen-centred 
services to the public/customers 
by optimising the use of 
available resources through a 
competent, motivated and 
dedicated team. 
5 Weligama UC Multi-cultural; Sinhala 
majority and a 
significant Muslim 
population, fishing 
harbour, tsunami-
affected area. 
To build a tourist 
city based on the 
beautiful beach.  
To contribute to social and 
national development through 
improving public utility services 
using material and human 
resources of the UC area, and to 
provide a better life for the 
people in the area. 
6 Hambantota UC Multi-cultural; Sinhala 
majority and a 
significant Muslim 
population, area belongs 
to the dry zone, salt-
mixed soil, salterns, 
many historical places, 
tsunami-affected area, 
large scale construction 
projects are significant. 
To build a beautiful 
tourist city towards 
a prosperous 
country.  
To build an equal society 
through people’s participation 
and to provide a good service to 
the people by improving health, 
welfare, utility services and 
roads. 
7 Trincomalee UC Multi-cultural; Tamil 
majority and significant 
Sinhala and Muslim 
populations, 
Trincomalee bay, one of 
the best natural 
harbours in the world, 
ancient Dutch fort and 
many historical places, 
tsunami-affected and 
war-affected area. 
To build a tourist 
city in 2014 with 
all relevant 
infrastructure 
facilities. 
To build Trincomalee as a 
beautiful tourist city through the 
improvement of road 
development, drinking water 
supply, waste management, 
infrastructure facilities, and 
people’s unity. 
8 Kattankudy UC Highest population 
density area in Sri 
Lanka, a Muslim area, 
lagoon area, tsunami-
affected and war-
affected area. 
To establish good 
infrastructure and 
to keep the city 
green and clean.  
To achieve the following goals: 
environmental sanitation of the 
town; enhanced opportunities for 
better livelihood; supply of clean 
water; develop infrastructure; 
peace and harmony; gender 
equality; discipline and order of 
the society; build-up an efficient 
administration; implement 
schemes to increase the revenue 
of the council; flood control; 
coastal conservation; increase 
leisure and recreation facilities; 
and promote Islamic culture in 
the area. 
9 Baddegama PS Sinhala majority and a 
significant Tamil 
population who work in 
plantation estates, many 
village areas, paddy 
fields and plantation 
estates especially tea 
and rubber plantations, 
one entrance of the 
southern expressway 
has been situated in the 
To be the excellent 
PS in Sri Lanka. 
To improve the facilities of the 
people to obtain an independent 
life style and to live in respect 
and dignity. 
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area. 
10 Suriyawewa PS Prominent Sinhala 
majority, agricultural 
area, many lakes and 
streams, hot springs, 
international cricket 
stadium. 
To build the area 
through courage.  
To develop the area and to 
improve the citizens’ life 
according to an appropriate plan 
by supplying administrative, 
health, physical, utility and 
welfare services through using 
the human, material and 
financial resources of the PS. 
11 Kinniya PS Prominent Muslim 
majority, lagoon area, 
tsunami-affected and 
war-affected area. 
To make Kinniya a 
beautiful place 
through developing 
all sectors.  
To undertake sectoral 
development and to enhance 
people’s participation. 
12 Lahugala PS Prominent Sinhala 
majority and fewer 
Tamil people, people’s 
names indicate a 
mixture of Sinhala and 
Tamil, a well-known 
national park and an 
elephant sanctuary, 
Ampara-Pottuvil road 
along Lahugala 
connects Arugam bay, a 
well-known beach, 
many village areas and 
grain-cultivated lands, 
war-affected area. 
To build a self-
sufficient and eco-
friendly area 
through preserving 
ancient heritage 
and obeying the 
social, cultural and 
religious values, to 
attract local and 
foreign tourists. 
To develop the area to achieve a 
good economic level through 
improving infrastructure, 
reconstructing reservoirs, 
providing equal facilities to all 
ethnic, religious, cultural groups 
and to tourists visit the area to 
see the ancient places and 
sanctuaries. 
Source: Budget reports (2011) of the 12 local government bodies 
 
Table 7.2 more closely scrutinises a wide variety of area specialities of the 
selected local government bodies, and suggests that not only the areas but also the 
potential for development varies in each local government body. The vision and 
mission statements of each local government body are the main criteria in 
understanding the potential for development. The most important and available 
detailed documents on each local government body are their annual budget reports. 
When considering the three districts of the southern province, Galle is the 
provincial capital, and the Galle MC area is prominent due to the Galle harbour, 
the ancient Dutch fort and the scenic beauty of the beach. The Galle MC area is 
multi-cultural with a Sinhala majority and a significant Muslim population. The 
vision and the mission of the Galle MC indicate the aspiration for city 
development. The Matara MC area has similar characteristics to those of the Galle 
MC area, with its beautiful beach and a Dutch fort, and many other ancient places. 
The area is also multi-cultural with a Sinhala majority and a significant Muslim 
population. For the Matara MC the major vision and mission relates to increased 
development for the people. Obtaining people’s participation in developing the 
MC area is a significant policy feature. 
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In the southern province, the Weligama UC is special for several reasons one 
being that the whole UC building was washed away by the tsunami and replaced 
with a building in a different location after donor aid flowed into the area. The 
area is multi-cultural with a Sinhala majority and a significant Muslim population. 
The fishing harbour and beautiful beach are prominent scenic attractions with the 
vision of the UC being to improve tourism in the area highlighting the aim to 
contribute to national development. It is also the vision of the Hambantota UC to 
promote tourism in the area. The mission highlights the idea of building an equal 
society based on the importance of people’s participation following the tsunami 
which brought vital aid to this area. The population of the area consists of a 
Sinhala majority and a significant Muslim population. Owing to the dry weather 
conditions and the less populated flat areas, salterns have been situated in the area. 
Through the salterns people have started small industries such as packing iodised 
salt for local markets. Because of the salt-mixed soil there is no major cultivation 
in the area with fishing being the main source of income for the people in the UC 
area. 
Regarding the southern province, the vision and the mission of the Baddegama PS 
do not present their views of development or put forward any special 
characteristic about their potential, yet there are many socio-economic issues to be 
addressed. There is a Sinhala majority and a significant Tamil population in the 
area working in the tea and rubber plantation estates. Agriculture, especially 
paddy cultivation, is prominent in the area. Similarly, the vision and the mission 
of the Suriyawewa PS, does not have any special view about development or 
people’s participation. Although Suriyawewa is in the dry zone, it is an 
agricultural area with some water reservoirs to supply water for agricultural needs 
with hot springs providing a tourist attraction. These area specialities have not 
been addressed in proposals for local development as yet. 
The eastern provincial council and most of the local government bodies in the 
eastern province failed to function for many years due to the war. After 
government military forces secured the areas, fresh elections were held in the 
eastern province in 2008 to elect representatives for the provincial council and for 
the local government bodies. 
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In the eastern province, the Batticaloa MC area consists of a Tamil majority and a 
significant Burgher and Muslim population. There is a small Sinhala population as 
well. The huge lagoon area and scenic beauty of the city is built into the vision of 
the Batticaloa MC to create a beautiful city which is safe and united. The mission 
of the MC highlights good governance procedures and participatory development. 
The Kalmunai MC area is the most populated area in the Ampara district. The 
majority of the area is Muslim and there are a large number of Tamils and fewer 
Sinhalese. The vision of the MC notes implementing sustainable development, 
with the mission suggesting using available resources to provide services to the 
public. 
In the eastern province, Trincomalee, the capital of the eastern province, consists 
of a Tamil majority and significant Sinhala and Muslim populations. The natural 
harbour, the ancient Dutch fort, and the scenic beauty of the beach have increased 
the importance of the area. Therefore both the vision and mission of the 
Trincomalee UC aims to build an infrastructure to promote it as a tourist city.  
Kattankudy UC area has the highest population density in Sri Lanka with no land 
space available for agriculture or any expansion. The Muslim population is 
dominant in this area. The vision and the mission of the Kattankudy UC directly 
addresses the needs of the people living in the area. 
In the eastern province, the Kinniya PS area is almost totally Muslim-populated. It 
is the biggest PS area in Trincomalee district. The scenic beauty of the area is 
prominent because of the lagoon areas and the beach. The vision and the mission 
of the PS is to develop all sectors but it does not mention what they are. The 
mission also suggests enhancing people’s participation. The Lahugala PS area 
consists of a large land area with a national park and well-known elephant 
sanctuary. The Sinhala majority is prominent and there are also some Tamils. The 
Ampara-Pottuvil road was reconstructed after the war and this road along 
Lahugala connects Arugam Bay, a well-known beach. Therefore the tourist 
attraction of the area is high. The vision and the mission of the Lahugala PS aim 
to protect the environment and to develop tourism. 
Although the visions and missions of each local government body cover a wide 
range of subjects, a common feature of these statements is development of the city 
or area through improving the public services and facilities provided by each local 
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government body. Other than the promotion of tourism in some areas, there is no 
evidence in these statements of specific plans to address particular area needs such 
as ethno-cultural diversities, agricultural needs or small scale industries. Some of 
the statements refer to obtaining people’s participation in development. For the 
purpose of this thesis it is necessary to investigate whether the vision and mission 
statements of the local government bodies are merely rhetorical or real. An 
important part of this research is to address the local development and the 
people’s participation in the selected areas. 
7.3. Local development, people’s participation and local politics: an overview 
The aim of this section is threefold. First, it provides a detailed overview of the 
perspectives of local government representatives on local development, and 
discusses the contradictions and problems attached to development with regard to 
the southern and eastern provinces. The discussion proceeds to consider the views 
of people’s participation in local governing processes. Finally, this section focuses 
on the political influences of the central and provincial governments on local 
government, and on the ways such influences affect local development and 
people’s participation in the selected areas. 
7.3.1. Local development: different perspectives 
An underlying assumption of this research is that local government is best placed 
to address the demographic and geographical specialities of local areas when 
promoting local development. However, local government representatives have 
different perspectives on local development. This section examines the various 
perspectives with the goal of obtaining insights into development issues in the 
southern and eastern provinces. 
7.3.1.1. Southern province 
In a number of local government areas in this province, central government-led 
large scale construction projects are the drivers of development. An example of 
this is the Hambantota UC which has seen large-scale infrastructural development 
in the form of the construction of a new harbour and an international conference 
centre. According to the chairman of the Hambantota UC, these initiatives are 
expected to lead to rapid development in the city. Already, he suggests, the 
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improving infrastructure and facilities in the area, such as roads, markets and 
libraries, have made a major contribution to the city’s development.790  
Other local government areas, such as the Galle MC, have looked upon the new 
infrastructure as a source of direct income. New construction and reconstruction 
work791 was highlighted as the pathway to development by the mayor when he 
commented: 
The Galle MC area is going through rapid development processes to reduce 
expenses and gain income. Through these plans we now have additional earnings 
and we can use them to improve utility services further. (Respondent: Mr Methsiri 
De Silva, Mayor (UPFA), Galle Municipal Council.) 
Improving the income of the council through renting buildings and providing 
public utility services is important. 792  A similar view was expressed by the 
chairman of the Weligama UC who, in his 2011 budget message noted 
development achievements over the last five years, with a new town hall and 
facilities, a supermarket, other markets and shops, and a beach park. There had 
also been reconstruction work including a playground, street lights and many 
roads.793 He also commented specifically on the economic potential for income 
generation through rental properties and the supply of utility services to the people. 
Noteworthy is that centrally-led initiatives tend to ignore local knowledge which 
can lead to poorly planned projects that waste scarce resources and result in few 
local benefits.794 Two examples of government wasting funds and resources on 
large scale construction projects include the harbour project and the building of a 
new airport in Hambantota. Hambantota is situated in the dry zone where rainfall 
occurs for one month each year, leaving the area with serious water shortage 
problems. The population in the area is low compared with the other two districts 
in the province (see Table 7.1) and most of the people are poor. The harbour 
project was planned with a view to develop Hambantota as the country’s future 
capital.795 Although there was no demand from the people in the area, or even the 
790 Budget Report – Hambantota Urban Council (2011) p. 1. 
791 These include construction projects such as the new Galle central bus stand, a fish market, other 
buildings, and the reconstruction of roads, the erection of street lights and many other utilities. 
792 Budget Report – Galle Municipal Council (2011) pp. 1-6. 
793 Budget Report – Weligama Urban Council (2011) pp. i-vii. 
794 ‘Tsunami Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Programme’ (n.d.) http://www.acdi-
cida.gc.ca/acdi-cida/ACDI-CIDA.nsf/eng/NAT-215111822-M5J, accessed 21-06-2013. 
795 Cassim, N. (2013) ‘Future of Hambantota as a Hub: Progress so far and Unfolding New 
Opportunities’, http://www.ft.lk/2013/09/13/future-of-hambantota-as-a-hub-progress-so-far-and-
unfolding-new-opportunities/, accessed 27-11-2013. 
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wider country, the present Executive President of Sri Lanka is from Hambantota, 
and he is widely understood to be behind the decision to construct the new 
harbour. 796  The harbour is being built, but some have argued that the Galle 
harbour would have been better if it had been renovated, or that the well-known 
Trincomalee natural harbour would meet the needs of the country. Instead the 
government has spent, and continues to spend, millions of dollars building 
Hambantota harbour. 797  The plan is flawed given the existence of significant 
bedrock deposits which prevent ships reaching the harbour.798 Similar criticisms 
have been levelled at the project to build a new international airport in Mattala, 
Hambantota. The site for the airport is in a reserved forest area.799 An article in a 
leading national newspaper, commenting on this development, stated: 
Putting an airport right near a dedicated wildlife sanctuary and distant from large 
human populations is not the greatest idea. It will, guaranteed, disrupt the wildlife, 
and if the area does become a hub, that will disrupt and uproot them more. This 
might be necessary if there were no alternatives, but there are alternatives. Air 
traffic to Jaffna would be a guaranteed earner and many other regions 
(Anuradhapura, Matara) are projected to grow into major cities soon.800 
The Suriyawewa PS in the Hambantota district has also had a large scale project 
involving the building of an international cricket stadium, but it has been built a 
long distance from the developed areas where there is a population of supporters.  
The majority of the poor in the Hambantota district do not have a culture of 
watching cricket matches and in fact struggle to afford day to day meals. Again, 
these examples are evidence of a poorly designed development strategy that has 
not been informed by local knowledge or the needs of the people. 
Much of the centrally-led infrastructure development is oriented towards 
investment in the tourism sector and the promotion of sports events facilities. 
Central government has stated that it is attempting to promote tourism in Sri 
796 ‘Why Hambantota?’ (2011) http://www.thesundayleader.lk/2011/09/04/why-hambantota/, 
accessed 13-05-2013. 
797 Ibid. 
798 In building the harbour the Colombo-Kataragama road was submerged to accommodate the 
new entrance channel. A new road, 21kms longer than the old road, was built with four lanes 
through a reserved forest. The forest lands near to the new road have been sold to various 
companies to build hotels, conference halls, office buildings and many other constructions. 
799 The wild life has been disturbed from this construction and the airport does not have the 
environmental approval yet (‘Bird Attack on Sri Lankan Flight to Mattala’ (2013) 
http://srilankaoneislandtwonations.tumblr.com/post/45608637295/bird-attack-on-srilankan-flight-
to-mattala, accessed 17-05-2013). 
800 ‘Why Hambantota?’ (2011). 
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Lanka by improving infrastructure,801 expanding the capacity of the hotel sector, 
refurbishing existing facilities and building new hotels. Existing coastal tourist 
resorts as well as new resorts are being positioned for high spending tourists. For 
this purpose, investments by internationally reputed hotel companies have 
increased.802 The President, who also holds the post of Minister of Finance, is 
playing a key role in driving these initiatives, reflecting the central government’s 
view that large scale tourism represents the ideal pathway to development. 
Clearly, a mismatch exists between large scale construction projects being 
pursued by the central government and the smaller scale tourism industry 
practices of local government bodies. The Hambantota UC has interpreted tourism 
needs differently requiring not large scale industry but small scale, local projects. 
An official document of the UC captures this: 
Tourism has helped to improve the people’s lives in the UC area. Local and 
foreign tourists pass the Hambantota UC area when they travel along the 
Colombo-Kataragama road to visit the reserved forests and sanctuaries, and the 
religious and historical places. People sell food items to these tourists and earn 
money. Some people have small huts to sell these things to the tourists.803 
According to local respondents, the rapid development of infrastructure in 
Hambantota with the use of foreign-funded large scale construction projects has 
not benefitted these local tourist operators. For example, the people in the area 
have remained poor and are no longer able to sell small things such as sweets, 
casual food, king coconuts and fried fish along the road. Huts have become 
prohibited near the main road with the poor losing income as well as forest areas 
to feed their cows, and no land for cultivation. This researcher observed that a 
number of schools in Suriyawewa PS area have very poor facilities and do not 
have water and electricity. The conditions of the interior roads are very poor, but 
the main road which has been constructed to reach the international cricket 
stadium has four lanes. The chairman of the Suriyawewa PS pointed out the needs 
of the area as follows: 
In the area there are many problems related to lands, water, electricity, roads, and 
the selling of the agricultural harvests. Although it is not easy to solve these 
problems, the PS needs to address and find solutions for these problems. For a 
long time, people in the area have suffered from these problems. We need to 
801 Budget Speech – 2013, pp. 14-15. 
802 Ibid., pp. 36-38. 
803 Hambantota Urban Council Area Details – 2008-2009, p. 4. 
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make a plan to solve these problems using the resources in the area. (Respondent: 
Mr Nandasiri Ranathunga, Chairman (UPFA), Suriyawewa Pradeshiya Sabha.) 
In sum, it is clear that the government’s large scale construction projects in 
promoting tourism and a sports economy are not addressing the needs of the 
poorer communities.  
The southern expressway from Galle to Colombo804 is another large scale project 
which has affected local people adversely. Although the highway entrance roads 
have been built along the villages, including the Baddegama PS area, the interior 
roads of the area are in poor condition and have not been repaired or maintained. 
The area has not been developed to accommodate the needs of locals and the 
people in the area do not get any advantage from the highway project. A 
representative of the Baddegama PS noted the current situation and the actual 
needs of the area. 
No development is seen in the area. The Baddegama PS area remains in the same 
undeveloped position. There are many children without parents in the area. They 
need support for their education. They also need support to fulfil their other 
personal and social needs. The disabled people in the area need help as well. As a 
local government we have to look after these people. (Respondent: Mr Manjula 
Liyanage, Representative (UNP), Baddegama Pradeshiya Sabha.) 
As well as noting the lack of development, this statement also indicates that there 
are local government representatives who aspire to play a greater role in meeting 
the needs of their specific communities. However, local government has been 
unable to influence these projects not as a result of a lack of interest in being 
involved in the development of such plans but because there are questions about 
whether local government bodies have the capacity to address the issues.  
7.3.1.2. Eastern province 
Central government-led large scale construction projects promoting tourism is 
also characteristic of the development focus in much of the eastern province. The 
representatives of the Batticaloa MC were largely supportive of the large scale 
construction projects that have been undertaken in the area since the war. 
According to the deputy mayor of the Batticaloa MC, the area has gained from 
these initiatives.805 The mayor referred to large scale construction projects in her 
804 The government has plans to extend it from Galle to Matara, and from Colombo to the 
Katunayake airport. 
805 Respondent: Mr George Pillai, Deputy Mayor (UPFA), Batticaloa Municipal Council. 
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message that accompanied the MC budget report of 2011, in which she thanked 
the provincial chief minister and the Economic Development Minister for 
developmental support. 806  The Batticaloa municipal commissioner commented 
that these were already generating revenue for the council: 
New avenues of increasing the revenue of the council by lease and rent of shops 
and tourism development, without burdening the tax payers with increased taxes, 
are opened with the beautification of the beach, and construction of the new bus 
stand and business complex. We must strive to get the maximum revenue out of 
these new assets to increase the service provided by us to the tax payers.807 
Large scale construction projects are therefore seen as positive initiatives and 
comments by members of the Trincomalee UC indicate that they were hopeful 
such projects would be conducted in their area. The chairman of the Trincomalee 
UC stated: 
I believe in major development. I accept the central government’s large scale 
construction projects. The defence secretary’s 808  authoritarian approach to 
development work is good and it should be extended to Trincomalee as well. 
Otherwise it is difficult to satisfy all as people reject things without thinking about 
the benefits. (Respondent: Mr K. Selvarajah, Chairman (TNA), Trincomalee 
Urban Council.) 
While there is advocacy, statements from other representatives of the Trincomalee 
UC indicate strong support for including local people in decisions about 
development projects in the area.809 
The chairman of the Kinniya PS has a goal of responding quite specifically to the 
particular social needs in his area, which are greatest in education and 
employment. 
There are many youngsters in the PS area that have passed the G.C.E. advanced 
level examination. If we can provide opportunities to them, these youngsters can 
be used as the future base of local development. At present most of them are 
jobless. We as a PS want to help them develop their future as well as to develop 
the area. We are searching for investors who can start industries in this area. I 
expect that through investments like this, these youngsters will be able to get jobs 
and then the area and the people will be developed. (Respondent: Mr S.L.M. 
Jawadullah, Chairman (UPFA), Kinniya Pradeshiya Sabha.) 
806 Budget Report – Batticaloa Municipal Council (2011) p. vi. 
807 Ibid., p. viii. 
808 This refers to defence secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa. 
809 Respondent: Mr N. Noormohamad, Representative (UPFA), Trincomalee Urban Council and 
Respondent: Mr S. Sanoon, Representative (UNP), Trincomalee Urban Council. 
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Although the expectation of the Kinniya PS chairman is to avoid unemployment, 
a document tabled in Parliament by MP M.A. Sumanthiran810 reveals that much of 
the government and donor focus on infrastructure projects does nothing to assist 
local communities. With soaring levels of unemployment, issues of hunger and 
malnutrition have become a serious concern. 811  This reveals that the local 
communities in the area do not get job opportunities or benefits from large scale 
construction projects.  
A feature of central government involvement in post-war development in the 
eastern province is the large role played by the armed forces. Related to this is the 
question of land redistribution, and this has become a major problem, with the 
traditional agricultural lands of the people having been confiscated by central 
government and handed over to military personnel for major projects. According 
to MP Sumanthiran, large sections of eastern province beach front land have been 
parcelled out to companies which are headed by military officers and, 
interestingly, the military has established a string of restaurants. 812  The local 
people are therefore very much at risk of losing their livelihoods due to the loss of 
their lands and lagoon areas where they cultivate and fish.813 The chairman of the 
Lahugala PS commented on this as follows: 
The Lahugala area is special due to its tourist attractiveness.814 But this area is 
war-affected and still under the influences of government military forces which 
are in the area. The lands used by villagers in Panama for their agricultural 
cultivations were forcefully taken by the military and now it is prohibited to enter 
these lands because of army fences and boards declaring ‘No Entry’. Other than 
this, the fishermen also face problems when they fish in their usual fishing areas. 
The navy gun boats anchored near the shore and the traditional fishermen were 
not allowed to fish in those areas. (Respondent: Mr Rassaiya Chandrasena, 
Chairman (UNP), Lahugala Pradeshiya Sabha.) 
810 MP M.A. Sumanthiran represents TNA. 
811 ‘Situation in North-Eastern Sri Lanka: A Series of Serious Concerns’, a document tabled in 
Parliament on 21st October 2011 by M.A. Sumanthiran, MP (TNA), www.dbsjeyaraj.com, 
accessed 23-11-2011. 
812 An entire military tourism industry catering to southern visitors is run by the military 
establishment. The navy uses state resources to run ferry services for the southern tourist industry. 
Military personnel also run various quasi-commercial enterprises such as shops and salons that are 
highly irregular and impact negatively on the local economies. Furthermore with the access and 
advertising support of corporate entities in the south and the unfair benefits of highly subsidised 
cost structure through the use of state infrastructure the military is distorting and suppressing any 
attempt at economic recovery in the north and east (ibid.). 
813 Ibid. 
814 See Table 7.2. 
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These reflections raise questions about the central government’s large scale 
projects and the taking of land. Many signs declaring “ENTRANCE 
PROHIBITED – This land is a property of the Ministry of Defence” have 
appeared in the province. Locals now cannot enter their historically owned lands 
as commented on by MP Sumanthiran: 
People in Panama allege that officials from the Ampara divisional secretariat have 
forcibly taken over 850 acres of land belonging to the Panama villagers. The 
inhabitants of this village comprise both Sinhala and Tamil communities and their 
main source of income is derived through farming and fishing.815 
A CBO leader who has fought to protect the agricultural lands of the people said: 
During the war, the military forced people off their cultivated lands. People 
obeyed these rules because of the war. But the situation has worsened since the 
war. The people did not get permission to return to their lands which they had 
previously cultivated. The villagers started a movement to protect Panama. I 
showed leadership and people protested against the arbitrary involvement of the 
central government who robbed the villagers of their cultivated lands. 
(Respondent: Rev. Panama Chandarathana Thero, the Chief Priest of Panama 
Buddhist temple, the Principal of the Panama school, and the Leader of the 
movement to protect Panampaththuwa.) 
The document tabled in Parliament by MP Sumanthiran refers to this issue and 
says that, villagers in Panama were prevented from resettling after the war by the 
Sri Lanka navy.816 Some of the lands have been used for large military camps for 
the army, navy and the air force. These new military camps have been called 
deployment camps and the locals suspect the government plans to build hotels on 
them. The following statement indicates this and the need to give greater 
consideration to people’s needs in local development. 
We found that the government had given 5,000 acres of lands to a Korean 
company. We don’t know the exact aim of the government, but know they wanted 
to improve tourism and these lands might be used to build hotels and to entertain 
tourists. The roads have been reconstructed to fulfil this aim and we can see that 
things are going in the wrong direction. It is not a matter of improving tourism, 
but the government must listen to the ideas of the people. This development 
process is unsustainable. The villagers cannot bear this kind of development. 
Panama is a traditional village with many rituals. If tourism and huge construction 
projects come directly to the villages, the lives of the people may be badly 
affected. Development should advance through the people according to the 
people’s needs. Otherwise there is no meaning from these huge construction 
815 ‘Situation in North-Eastern Sri Lanka: A Series of Serious Concerns’ (2011). 
816 ‘Issues and Problems Facing People of the Northern and Eastern Provinces’, a document tabled 
in Parliament on 7th July 2011 by M.A. Sumanthiran, MP (TNA), www.dbsjeyaraj.com, accessed 
28-11-2011. 
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projects. (Respondent: Rev. Panama Chandarathana Thero, the Chief Priest of 
Panama Buddhist temple, the Principal of the Panama school, and the Leader of 
the movement to protect Panampaththuwa.) 
By appropriating the limited economic opportunities that might otherwise be used 
by local residents to bring income and revenue to the fragile local communities, 
the military is maintaining and reinforcing the cycle of poverty.817 Local people 
have been continuously losing their sources of income generation. According to 
MP Sumanthiran, severe restrictions are placed on members of fishing 
communities by resulting in a drastic change to their means of livelihood. These 
communities are unable to pursue their traditional livelihood.818 A CBO leader 
stated that the locals have to get permission from the military personnel to fish in 
the lagoons and the sea. 
The traditional fishermen have lost their rights to fish in the Panama coastal area. 
They now have to get permission from the navy to fish. The navy issues a special 
identity card for them. People everywhere are arbitrarily ruled by the military. 
(Respondent: Rev. Panama Chandarathana Thero, the Chief Priest of Panama 
Buddhist temple, the Principal of the Panama school, and the Leader of the 
movement to protect Panampaththuwa.) 
Land use issues have important dimensions. The reserved forest areas in the 
eastern province have been cleared and huge projects started. For example, 11,600 
acres of the Somawathiya national sanctuary have been given to the Dole 
company to cultivate bananas,819 with the military being involved in preparing the 
land for banana cultivation.820 In addition, the military has taken several thousand 
acres for cultivation without due process. 
The resettlement process since war continues in the northern and the eastern 
provinces however the armed forces are forcibly, and often without any 
explanation, taking over public or private property and land, in areas where people 
were returning to after being displaced because of war.821 Many of the internally-
817 ‘Situation in North-Eastern Sri Lanka: A Series of Serious Concerns’ (2011) op.cit. 
818 Ibid. 
819 ‘Dole Admits Growing Bananas in Somawathiya Area’ (2011) 
http://www.lankatruth.com/english/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=207:dole-
admits-growing-bananas-in-somawathiya-area&catid=42:smartphones&Itemid=74, accessed 10-
05-2013. 
820 This project was later stopped by the Dole company in response to the protests of international 
environmental organisations against building new plantations in a tropical forest area and elephant 
habitats in Sri Lanka (‘Partial Success in Sri Lanka: Dole Withdraws from National Park’ (2011) 
http://www.rainforest-rescue.org/achievements/3890/partial-success-in-sri-lanka-dole-withdraws-
from-national-park, accessed 10-05-2013). 
821 ‘Situation in North-Eastern Sri Lanka: A Series of Serious Concerns’ (2011). 
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displaced persons (IDPs) have been relocated to remote areas in the interior where 
there are no facilities such as health, sanitation, education and transport. The 
military is also taking part in all activities at the community level including 
meetings to discuss local issues.822 
Clearly, local communities have been neglected and their voices compromised by 
government-sponsored military involvement and large scale construction projects. 
These projects have failed the needs of the local communities including farmers 
and fishermen with the poor helpless in the face of large scale construction 
projects. According to MP Sumanthiran, reports indicate that the heavy military 
control and presence in these areas has resulted in psychological stress on local 
communities.823 
It is evident that the people working against the arbitrary involvement of the 
central government and military forces have been threatened. According to 
Panama Chandarathana Thero, his own life is in danger because he gives 
leadership assistance to the movement to protect Panampaththuwa.824 This priest 
lives in the Panama Buddhist temple where it was observed that the main gate of 
the temple was locked. As it was abnormal to see a temple gate locked, this 
researcher asked the priest about this.  He said he had been getting many 
anonymous threatening phone calls, including death warnings because he works 
to protect people’s agricultural lands against the government and military forces. 
While donor agencies have supplied funds to reconstruct the areas which were 
heavily damaged in the war the main goal of these projects has been to develop 
infrastructure facilities in the eastern province, with most of them being handled 
by the Ministry of Economic Development. Significant amounts of foreign funds 
have been redirected to this ministry which has retained control of them. The 
chairman of the Lahugala PS reported that this has also led to the misuse of funds. 
The main roads were reconstructed by the central government but the quality of 
them is not satisfactory. There is huge corruption. Only 45 per cent of the funds 
were used for road development and the other 55 per cent disappeared through 
central governmental authorities especially the Minister of Economic 
Development. 825 These roads will be destroyed soon due to their bad quality. 
822 Ibid. 
823 Ibid. 
824 Respondent: Rev. Panama Chandarathana Thero, the Chief Priest of Panama Buddhist temple, 
the Principal of the Panama school, and the Leader of the movement to protect Panampaththuwa. 
825 Basil Rajapaksa holds the post of Minister of Economic Development. 
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(Respondent: Mr Rassaiya Chandrasena, Chairman (UNP), Lahugala Pradeshiya 
Sabha.) 
In terms of both the southern and eastern provinces, it is significant that there are 
variations in the views of local government representatives’ understanding of 
local development. Addressing local development through dimensions such as 
environmental protection, education for children, employment for youth, welfare 
for the needy, the needs of fishermen, cultivators and small scale employees, and 
sustainable usage of resources is important and are key issues which have 
emerged among respondents. Comparing the southern and eastern provinces, 
several differences are apparent. The local communities in the eastern province 
have been greatly affected by the large scale construction projects and by the 
heavy military involvement. Local government bodies have become powerless 
through central government decision making. Some of the CBOs such as the 
movement to protect Panampaththuwa argued against the arbitrary attempts of the 
government to grab people’s agricultural lands with threats made on the life of the 
leader of this movement. Thus, there is a need for significantly more powerful 
CBOs in these areas. In southern and eastern provinces there are many 
unaddressed issues relating to people’s needs in different areas. There are two 
dimensions to the problem: first, large scale construction projects of central 
government never addresses the needs of local communities; and second, despite 
their powerlessness to control the projects which impinge on the local 
communities, some local government representatives continue to believe that local 
development can be achieved through these large scale construction projects. 
7.3.2. Encouraging people’s participation 
As Sisk notes, there is a new appreciation that local government is much more 
than administrative bodies that collect taxes and deliver essential services such as 
education, clean water, sewers, transportation, or housing. 826  To Sisk, local 
government is the level of democracy at which the citizen has the most effective 
opportunity to participate actively and directly in decisions made for all of 
society.827 Although some of the local government vision and mission statements 
highlight the importance of people’s participation in local policy processes and 
826 Sisk, T.D. (ed) (2001) Democracy at the Local Level: The International IDEA Handbook on 
Participation, Representation, Conflict Management, and Governance, Stockholm, Sweden, p. 1. 
827 Ibid. 
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local development, it can be seen that securing people’s participation is not easy. 
The following section examines the views of local government representatives on 
people’s participation, and explores some of the attempts made to obtain people’s 
participation in local policy processes and local development. 
7.3.2.1. Southern province 
Most local government bodies do not have effective links with the people in such 
areas. When considering most of the local government bodies in the southern 
province, there is little evidence of people’s participation in local policy processes 
towards local development. Although the mission of the Hambantota UC 
mentions people’s participation (see Table 7.2), according to one respondent the 
practical situation is very different. 
People’s participation is very low in the UC area. The people do not participate in 
the UC work. There is no proper relationship between the CBOs and the UC. Also, 
no proper mechanisms to obtain people’s participation exist. (Respondent: Mr 
D.A. Gamini, Opposition Leader (UNP), Hambantota Urban Council.) 
In other local government areas, there have been attempts to obtain people’s 
participation. The chairman of the Suriyawewa PS stated: 
We expect to build a four-year plan after obtaining ideas from the people. To 
obtain people’s ideas and to meet their needs we are conducting group meetings 
in the villages. However the PS does not have a direct relationship with the CBOs 
and also we are not maintaining a data base on CBOs in the area. (Respondent: 
Mr Nandasiri Ranathunga, Chairman (UPFA), Suriyawewa Pradeshiya Sabha.) 
The chairman of the Baddegama PS, while referring to the construction and 
reconstruction work in the area, talked of the importance of people’s participation 
in local development and ways they encouraged people’s participation. 
Aside from many barriers we have established CBOs in every GN division in the 
area to obtain people’s participation in identifying development needs. Through 
this process we try to obtain people’s proposals on area development and to 
supply the people’s needs. (Respondent: Mr Anura Amarasiri Narangoda, 
Chairman (UPFA), Baddegama Pradeshiya Sabha.) 
Reference to the CBOs in these three statements reflect the link between people 
and local government bodies. 
Some local government representatives noted the difficulties of achieving 
people’s participation in local development. In the Weligama UC, the situation of 
the area and the people’s attitudes changed after the tsunami and this has become 
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a specific problem to be addressed by the UC. A representative of the Weligama 
UC stated: 
After the tsunami it took a long time for reconstruction to obtain and to re-settle 
the people. After the tsunami, people received support from the government and 
especially from non-governmental donors. Because of this people still have a 
dependency mentality and are not interested in becoming involved in 
development work. There is a need to change the attitudes of the people. 
(Respondent: Ms K.H. Thakshila Damayanthi, Representative (UPFA), Weligama 
Urban Council.) 
Development initiatives are of little benefit if they do not connect with the 
people.828 The following statement of the former mayor of the Matara MC, Upul 
Nishantha, gives prominence to the relationship which the MC had built with the 
people in the area. 
Development should lie with the people. For example, when people who have 
lived in individual houses receive flats, they should know the different living 
conditions applied to flats. When they get flats without the knowledge of these 
spaces problems occur. Huge development projects are not well matched to a 
country like Sri Lanka. The main key to sustainable development of a country is 
local government. (Respondent: Mr Upul Nishantha, former Mayor, 829 Matara 
Municipal Council.) 
To obtain the people’s participation in city development, Matara MC created 15 
Purawesi Sabhas (citizen committees)830 in the 15 wards of the MC area. This has 
built a path to solve problems between the MC area and the people. The former 
mayor of the Matara MC said they had established citizen committees to 
encourage people’s participation. He added: “This was very effective and people 
have adopted the idea that they should work for the success of their city.”831 
The establishment of citizen committees832 gave the community power to make 
decisions for their ward in development activities, service needs, wider 
828 ‘Tsunami Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Programme’ (n.d.). 
829 He represented the UPFA during his period as the mayor, but later joined UNP. He contested 
the 2011 local government election and was elected as a representative of the Matara municipal 
council representing the UNP. 
830 Literal meaning is citizens’ councils. But the documents refer to Purawesi Sabhas as citizen 
committees. 
831 Respondent: Mr Upul Nishantha, former Mayor, Matara Municipal Council. 
832 Each citizen committee contained an elected member of the municipal council as the political 
representative, and each committee elected 16 members as an executive committee, eight of them 
nominated by the community and eight by the municipal council. This decision was made to 
ensure inclusion of minorities, and the exclusion of groups such as business community, 
professionals and religious leaders (‘CIVICUS Complete Report’ (n.d.) http://www.fslga.org/by-
laws/civicus-complete-report/index.html, accessed 05-05-2011). Ward coordinators were 
appointed to each citizen committee and designated as community service facilitators. These ward 
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community needs, and welfare. A constitution clearly defines the roles and 
responsibilities of the citizen committees.833 In the beginning some people were 
sceptical about the process of the citizen committees but over time, people have 
become engaged and have appointed community leaders to each committee. 
According to the former mayor of the Matara MC, Upul Nishantha, “it is very 
difficult to change the traditional attitudes of the people. There is a huge need for 
a change in attitude.” 
The special feature of the citizen committees was that there were no political party 
divisions in this process. All representatives of the MC equally supported and 
contributed to this process. The former mayor stated that, “if the political 
representatives work hard, it is easy to get the people’s support.” An opposition 
party representative of the Matara MC stated: 
The former mayor created citizen committees to fulfil a need for CBOs. This was 
a great idea. These committees are also continuing the work which some of the 
NGOs started. When there is a local development project in the area, these 
committees supply labour and food as well. So when this supply combines with 
the MC’s labour, the strength and the results achieved can be doubled. 
(Respondent: Mr Mohammad Nabavi, Opposition Leader (UNP), Matara 
Municipal Council.) 
The comments reflect the supportive views of opposition party representatives in 
the MC regarding citizen committees. 
Through citizen committees, people pledged their support for the MC in collection 
of garbage, and maintaining a clean environment.  These committees are also 
vigilant about the construction of unauthorised structures and other obstacles to 
good health and sanitation. They organised Shramadana834 once a month to clean 
the MC area, creating a good social network among neighbours. The citizen 
committees held regular meetings with the MC officials, mayor and elected 
members to update the outcomes of the committee meetings, and developed their 
own mechanisms to raise funds to develop the city.835 These committees became 
participants in the participatory planning and budgeting process implemented by 
coordinators were all females attached to the municipal council who were working as officers in 
charge of the community service centres of the municipal council. 
833 Under the constitution a citizen committee can summon any municipal council official, 
provincial and central government officers, in seeking to resolve issues related to their wards 
(ibid.). 
834 The literal meaning of the word Shramadana is sharing of one’s time, thought and energy for 
the welfare of all. In short, Shramadana means a gift of labour. 
835 ‘CIVICUS Complete Report’ (n.d.). 
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the Matara MC from 2010 onwards. Citizen committees are a good example of 
how people’s active participation in local policy processes can promote locally-
led development. 
The successful implementation of citizen committees shows that people do 
participate in local government activities if given due space and recognition. 
Furthermore, citizen committees show that people need autonomy in the decision 
making process, without the occurrence of political interference. The success 
story of citizen committees indicates that local government can attract resources 
from various institutions, voluntary organisations, expert groups, and volunteers 
by establishing participatory, accountable and transparent governing systems.836 
However, behind the success story of citizen committees is a need for strong 
leadership (this is discussed below) and the assistance of government and non-
government organisations.837 
7.3.2.2. Eastern province 
As discussed earlier, following the war, and in the post-war environment a large 
and on-going level of military involvement is present in people’s lives with 
people’s participation in local policy processes becoming a distant memory. It is 
also evident that large scale construction projects being undertaken by the central 
government ignored needs at the local level. Nonetheless, messages from the 
chairman and the secretary of the Kattankudy UC in the UC’s 2011 budget report 
provide evidence of people’s participation in UC’s annual budget preparation. 
According to the chairman: 
Discussions were held with the people in every GN division as a prelude to the 
preparation of this budget. These estimates will be a guide for us to ensure 
continuity of the activities of the previous years, and to embark on new activities 
in the future.838 
And according to the secretary: 
People of Kattankudy can now identify and prioritise their needs. They can obtain 
the financial resources and prepare budgets. This practice provides an opportunity 
for voters themselves to participate in local development. This is a special feature 
of exercising people’s rights and is a significant democratic advance. It is our 
836 Ibid. 
837 The Federation of Sri Lankan Local Government Authorities (FSLGA), the World Alliance for 
Citizen Participation (CIVICUS) and the Asia Foundation provided support in this. 
838 Budget Report – Kattankudy Urban Council (2011) p. 2. 
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fervent hope and desire that we can progress towards development and good 
governance with the support and participation of people as well as with the 
dedicated service of our staff.839 
These statements reflect the formation of a people-centred view of local 
development. Furthermore, the budget report provides a detailed list of project 
activities planned by the UC together with the people to implement them in 2011. 
This list includes major 14 sections840 and several sub sections providing a good 
example of local government’s attempt to identify the actual needs of the people 
and to address local development through people’s participation. 
In his message to the council’s 2011 budget report, the former chairman of the 
Kinniya PS gave a different view on people’s participation which is as follows: 
Let me first thank you the voters of this PS area for electing me as the first 
chairman of this council by casting your valuable votes with the expectation that 
this council would fulfil your needs by providing extended services under my 
chairmanship. Having this in mind we embarked on the task of preparing a budget 
after identifying your needs and problems. We present this budget as a 
development-oriented one prepared by the representatives chosen by you.841 
This statement reflects that as local government representatives have been elected 
by the people, they should represent the people’s needs in the council, and this 
signifies that there is no need to obtain people’s direct participation in local policy 
processes. However, there is no guarantee that local government representatives 
will represent the actual needs of the people at all. The above examples of the 
Kattankudy UC and the Kinniya PS reflect two different views of democracy: first, 
the participatory democracy which strives to create opportunities for people to 
make contributions to decision making; and second, representative democracy 
where people vote for representatives who then decide policy initiatives.842 
In summary, the local government representatives identify CBOs as appropriate 
links to use in obtaining people’s participation. A dependency mentality and the 
traditional attitudes of the people work as barriers, limiting participation and 
839 Ibid., p. 1. 
840 The major 14 sections are: 1) preservation of the urban environment; 2) livelihood 
improvement; 3) purified drinking water supply; 4) local government infrastructure development; 
5) activities towards promotion of peaceful co-existence; 6) gender equality; 7) inculcate a sense 
of discipline in the community; 8) initiate projects to earn permanent income for the council; 9) 
build Kattankudy as an efficient urban council; 10) control the occurrence of annual floods; 11) 
coastal community protection; 12) better sports and recreation facilities; 13) promote culture and 
arts; and 14) promotional activities for development of school education (ibid., pp. 13-15). 
841 Budget Report – Kinniya Pradeshiya Sabha (2011) p. 1. 
842 See Beetham, D. and Boyle, K. (1996) Democracy: 80 Questions and Answers, National Book 
Trust, India. 
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suggesting there should be a mechanism to drive people towards participation in 
local policy processes. Area-specific and people-centred development through 
obtaining people’s participation is a significant issue in local government bodies 
such as the Matara MC and the Kattankudy UC. If local government bodies can 
provide opportunities, people are actively willing to participate in local policy 
processes. 
7.3.3. Local politics 
The politicisation of the local government system in Sri Lanka has been a 
common feature, according to Bigdon and Hettige, who state that when one party 
proposes a project, the opposition blocks it, or the divisional secretariat will not 
allow it, since it is from the opposition and the divisional secretariat which 
represents the government. This political behaviour by local government leaders 
undermines the effectiveness of the local government system.843 As established 
earlier, the prominent issue in local politics is the influence of central and 
provincial governments. These influences undermine and limit the powers of local 
government. The following section outlines attempts by central and provincial 
governments to control local government and emerging local leadership. This 
section also focuses on some of the contradictions between governing political 
parties and opposition political parties at the national, provincial and local levels 
of government. 
7.3.3.1. Southern province 
Effective local government leadership can be identified as an important factor in 
local development. The example of citizen committees indicates that the Matara 
MC has had a positive view of people-centred development, although these 
development attempts have changed since the resignation of the mayor. In this 
MC, the loss of a mayor committed to an inclusive approach to local decision 
making has resulted in a decline in the level of local participation in planning and 
a recentralisation of power. A representative of the Matara MC stated: 
Citizen committees are still continuing but are not as effective as before because 
we lost the leadership of the former mayor. The former mayor spent his whole 
843 Bigdon, C. and Hettige, S.T. (2003) ‘Key Issues of Good Local Governance’, Local 
Governance and Conflict Management in Sri Lanka-Final Report, Sri Lanka Institute of Local 
Governance and Berghof Foundation for Conflict Studies, p. 95. 
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time developing the MC area. (Respondent: Mr Mohammad Nabavi, Opposition 
Leader (UNP), Matara Municipal Council.) 
There is no doubt that the former mayor of the Matara MC worked to develop the 
MC area in a democratically inclusive way. He decentralised his power base and 
worked hard to overcome the challenges in the Matara MC area in a way that 
involved including the local population in decision processes. In the 2010 
Presidential election he gave his support to General Sarath Fonseka against the 
present President Mahinda Rajapaksa. As a result of this support, in March 2010 
he received a charge sheet from the southern provincial chief minister Shan 
Wijelal De Silva844 alleging that he had committed several transgressions contrary 
to the Municipal Councils Ordinance.845 However by filing a writ application846 in 
the southern provincial high court of Galle, mayor Upul Nishantha sought an 
order of a stay in relation to the inquiry against him and the decision to suspend 
his duties as mayor.847 Although mayor Upul Nishantha won the case he resigned 
from his post in December 2010 until the investigation regarding him was 
complete.848 This incident suggests that when the local leaders work hard and 
receive popularity, central and provincial government politicians see it as a 
challenge to their image, popularity and future in politics. 
844 Several attempts by this researcher to interview the southern provincial chief minister were 
unsuccessful. His personal secretary recommended this researcher interview the chief minister’s 
legal advisor because the chief minister is always busy with many programmes and therefore had 
no time to meet researchers. 
845 ‘CA Refuses Order against Matara Mayor’ (2010) http://www.lankika.com/?p=7569, accessed 
14-12-2011. 
846 In his application the mayor informed the court that he was appointed to the post at the 2006 
local government election and he had been politically victimised as he had supported the 
opposition candidate, General Sarath Fonseka, at the last Presidential election. He stated his strong 
support for the former cabinet minister, Mangala Samaraweera (Mangala Samaraweera is a former 
minister in both Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga’s and Mahinda Rajapaksa’s UPFA 
cabinets. In 2010 he joined UNP criticising the Rajapaksa government), and he openly supported 
General Sarath Fonseka at the election rallies. From that time he was subjected to various 
harassments (ibid.). 
847 Subsequent to this writ application, on 6th May 2010, the respondent chief minister made an 
order suspending him from functioning in the office of mayor with immediate effect, and directed 
deputy mayor Deegoda Gamage Yasaratne to replace him. But on 19th May 2010 the Galle high 
court judge issued an interim order staying the operation of chief minister’s decision to suspend 
mayor Upul Nishantha and appointing anyone else to the said post. Challenging this order, the 
chief minister filed an appeal and stated that the mayor of the Matara municipal council had 
obtained the said order by suppressing and misrepresenting the material facts and stated that the 
provincial high court judge erred when she made the said order. When the case was supported 
before the appeal court, the court directed the petitioner chief minister to withdraw it (ibid.). The 
order was delivered hours after deputy mayor Yasaratne took oaths as the new mayor of Matara 
(‘Court Issues Order Suspending Matara Mayor’s Removal’ (2010) 
http://www.colombopage.com/archive_10A/May20_1274333715JV.php, accessed 14-12-2011). 
848 ‘Matara Mayor Resigns’ (2010) http://www.adaderana.lk/news.php?nid=11203, accessed 08-
05-2013. 
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Soon after the resignation of mayor Upul Nishantha, the deputy mayor was 
appointed as the new mayor but the control of the MC had been taken over by the 
Urban Development Authority (UDA) under the direction of the Ministry of 
Defence. Following this, there has been an increase in the level of involvement of 
military forces in the Matara MC. It has been observed that the military forces had 
started collecting garbage and carried out most of the construction work in the 
area, such as preparing land for new buildings and parks using the heavy vehicles 
from the war. This military influence was not acceptable to the staff of the MC or 
the people in the area. These actions point to the ways central and provincial 
government has become more involved in controlling local government bodies. 
The following respondent emphasised this situation. 
The local government bodies do not have a wide range of powers because of the 
provincial councils. Also the UDA has been involved in many of the MC projects 
recently. The system does not run smoothly because of these influences. At 
present the UDA works under the Ministry of Defence with army personnel 
becoming directly involved in the matters of the MC. The elected council 
members have no power to operate. We feel that we do not have the power to 
make decisions and work for the people in our own area. (Respondent: Mr 
Jayantha Pathirana, Representative (JVP) Matara Municipal Council.) 
Central and provincial governments are seen by some as taking the view that local 
leadership should be aligned with the major political agendas of those in power 
without reference to the specific local needs of areas. A representative of the 
Matara MC highlighted this as follows: 
The elected members of the MC are the most suitable people to make decisions 
and to plan projects for the area because they know what the needs of the people 
in the area are. There are other authorities who do not care for our ideas and they 
work according to their desires without listening to our ideas. We also can’t sit in 
on their decision panels. This means that decisions are arbitrary. We are the 
people who are accountable for the matters of the MC area. Moreover we cannot 
be accountable if we do not know about the decisions which the higher authorities 
make. We have been put into a uncompromising position. (Respondent: Mr 
Jayantha Pathirana, Representative (JVP) Matara Municipal Council.) 
Central and provincial governments’ influence on local government worsens 
when the local governing party is different from the central and provincial 
governing parties. The following two statements by the opposition party 
representatives of the Galle and Matara MCs reflect this. 
There is politicisation everywhere. When the provincial government and the local 
government are run by different political parties, the problems become worse. 
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Local government does not get sufficient funds and the opportunities to appoint 
local government staff become limited because of political reasons. The reason 
being is that local government staff appointments need the recommendation of the 
provincial council. (Respondent: Mr Nimalchandra Ranasinghe, Representative 
(UNP), Galle Municipal Council.) 
When the local government is headed by a different political party other than the 
central or provincial governing party, council does not get funds either from the 
central or provincial governments. There are many examples of provincial 
councils’ political influences. For example, the Tissamaharama PS849 failed to get 
funds from the provincial council because the JVP governed the PS at that time. 
(Respondent: Mr Jayantha Pathirana, Representative (JVP) Matara Municipal 
Council.) 
Even if the local governing party is the same as the central and provincial 
governing parties, the opposition party representatives of the local government 
face ill-treatment most of the time. The opposition party representatives of the 
Galle and Matara MCs mentioned that there are no opportunities for them to be 
involved in the major development projects like Maga Neguma, 850  Jathika 
Saviya, 851  Gama Neguma 852  and Divi Neguma. 853  The following statements 
provide evidence for this. 
The council members of the other political parties do not get the opportunity to be 
involved in major development projects like Maga Neguma, and Jathika Saviya. 
The local government legal procedures do not treat each political party 
representative differently although it is the council members of the governing 
party who get central government funds. The other council members remain 
powerless and do not have funds to serve the people. (Respondent: Mr 
Nimalchandra Ranasinghe, Representative (UNP), Galle Municipal Council.) 
The other political party representatives do not get a chance to work on the central 
government projects at the local level. For example, the central government 
programmes such as Maga Neguma, Jathika Saviya, Gama Neguma and Divi 
849 Tissamaharama Pradeshiya Sabha is in the Hambantota district, southern province. It was the 
only Pradeshiya Sabha won by the JVP in the 2006 local government elections. But in 2010, the 
chairman of the Pradeshiya Sabha was allegedly removed from his office by the southern 
provincial chief minister following recommendations of an appointed commission of inquiry 
against the chairman. This commission was appointed by the chief minister. 
850 Rural road development programme conducting by the central government Ministry of Ports 
and Highways. 
851 A central government programme envisioned to develop infrastructure in the villages, 
especially the war-affected villages. It is aimed to give roads, water, electricity, education, 
transport and housing to such villages through this programme. This is conducted by the 
President’s office. 
852 A programme conducted by the Ministry of Economic Development aiming to uplift the life of 
every single family in villages. The ministry says that the Gama Neguma has a participatory 
approach and people of the village are involved in developing their own village (‘Gama Neguma’ 
(n.d.) http://med.gov.lk/english/?page_id=1263, accessed 09-05-2013). 
853 A programme initiated by the Ministry of Economic Development to establish one million 
domestic economic units. 
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Neguma do not seek the involvement of politicians from other political parties. 
(Respondent: Mr Jayantha Pathirana, Representative (JVP) Matara Municipal 
Council.) 
These statements reveal how some local government representatives of non-
governing political parties face ill-treatment. It is evident that all the opportunities 
and benefits, such as handling the contracts of construction projects, remain with 
the council members representing the central and provincial governing party. 
These party affiliations create divisions between the local representatives and this 
affects the unity of local government. This problem can be further illustrated 
through examining the committee system in the local government bodies. 
As identified by the 1999 Commission of Inquiry, the committee system operating 
in local government bodies is a very important element of management. 854 
Although the law provides for the appointment of various committees to assist the 
administration of local government bodies, in every local government area there 
are implementation problems arising from the existing law. Since political input 
has been uppermost in the minds of the politicians in power, adequate 
representation has not been the case in committees, even though the opposition 
groups or representatives have deserved representation.855 An opposition party 
representative of the Matara MC stated: 
There are legal procedures to work through in the committees without political 
bias and we have been appointed to follow them. But the ideas of the governing 
party get prominence. There is a need for more legal procedures to make these 
committees stronger. (Respondent: Mr Jayantha Pathirana, Representative (JVP) 
Matara Municipal Council.) 
854 The committees are called standing committees in municipal councils whilst in urban councils 
and Pradeshiya Sabhas they are called committees. The Municipal Councils Ordinance stipulates 
that a standing committee on finance and not less than two standing committees should be 
appointed. The Urban Councils Ordinance does not specify the number of committees to be 
appointed nor does it make it compulsory to appoint committees. The Pradeshiya Sabhas Act too 
does not make the appointment of committees compulsory, but it states that in the appointment of 
committees, four committees should be appointed for the following subjects: 1) finance and policy 
planning; 2) housing and community development; 3) technical services; and 4) environment and 
amenities. Except for the standing committees operating in the municipal councils, committees in 
the urban councils and Pradeshiya Sabhas function as advisory committees. While outsiders 
cannot be appointed to standing committees in municipal councils, the committees in urban 
councils and Pradeshiya Sabhas may consist of residents. Under the law, the chairmen of 
Gramodaya Mandalas in the area can also be appointed to committees of Pradeshiya Sabhas 
(Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Local Government Reforms 1999 (Sessional Paper No. I 
– 1999) pp. 63-64). 
855 ‘Country Paper: Sri Lanka’ (n.d.) 
http://www.unescap.org/huset/lgstudy/country/srilanka/srilanka.html#top, accessed 29-12-2011. 
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This observation supports the assertion that the committee system in local 
government bodies is failing, because of the impact of strong party affiliations. 
Even in cases where members of these committees were appointed, the ideas of 
the political opponents and the disadvantaged groups were by-passed.856 
The problems get worse when the local leadership is affiliated with the political 
interests of the central and provincial governments. According to the comments of 
respondents, most of the time the political connections between local government 
heads and political leaders in higher branches of government are aimed at 
securing profitable contracts and candidacy to contest future provincial councils 
or parliamentary elections. An opposition party representative of the Baddegama 
PS stated: 
Most of the council members work for their own self-interested success not for 
the people. A lot of corruption and misuse of resources is happening. Always the 
success or the destruction of the PS remains in the hands of central and provincial 
governments and on their decisions. (Respondent: Mr Manjula Liyanage, 
Representative (UNP), Baddegama Pradeshiya Sabha.) 
A member of the southern provincial council added:  
As with national politicians, most of the local politicians are also corrupt. They 
only think about profits. If we read their leaflets distributed and posters pasted 
during local government elections we can see how corrupt they are. For example, 
when building concrete roads, they give the contracts to their henchmen and get a 
big share for themselves. (Respondent: Rev. Baddegama Samitha Thero, 
Representative (UPFA), Southern Provincial Council.) 
These statements indicate the ways in which local government representatives can 
follow central and provincial government agendas for their personal gain. 
National political parties have long been influencing local government by making 
national political issues the mainstay when canvassing votes around local 
government elections. The local issues such as water and electricity supply, 
education, unemployment, health and sanitation, transport, livelihood and 
agriculture have been for too long been neglected and the local communities 
remain voiceless. In such circumstances, they have no way of expressing needs. 
Instead, national politics emerge at the local government level as major issues. For 
example, in the 2011 local government election campaign, the UPFA continually 
856 Ibid. 
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raised the war victory and paid little attention to local issues. The UPFA won the 
election by a large majority.857 
7.3.3.2. Eastern province 
The eastern provincial council is newer than the southern provincial council, but 
the responses of the local government representatives are almost similar in both 
provinces regarding provincial councils. The local government representatives in 
the eastern province, who were interviewed in this research, did not have positive 
feedback regarding provincial politics. The following statements demonstrate this 
point. 
I am not participating in the provincial council meetings. These meetings are 
useless. They force us to do the work according to their criteria. But their criteria 
are not matched to the area. They are not concerned our ideas. We are the ones 
who know the area and people well. They have to ask us. But the system goes the 
other way around. It is good to be in my office and serve people rather than 
listening the useless talks by provincial ministers. (Respondent: Mr K. Selvarajah, 
Chairman (TNA), Trincomalee Urban Council.) 
The provincial council is useless and also it is an extra barrier. We have enough 
power to work but the provincial council does not allow us to work on our own. 
They receive all the staff and luxury facilities. But they do not do anything. They 
don’t want to work. During their time in office they only try to earn as much as 
they can. That’s all they do. As local government representatives we get very few 
facilities but we want to work for the area and the people. (Respondent: Mr S. 
Sanoon, Representative (UNP), Trincomalee Urban Council.) 
In fact, some local government representatives saw the provincial council as a 
barrier to their work. 
We have enough power but we cannot work because of the other institutions 
especially the provincial council. It is always a barrier to our work. They do not 
allow us to work independently. We have to work according to their criteria and 
we do not have a say. There is no need for provincial councils. It is easier to deal 
with the central government directly as before. We hope we can get more aid and 
facilities without disturbances from another useless institution. (Respondent: Mr 
N. Noormohamad, Representative (UPFA), Trincomalee Urban Council.) 
This view confirms that some local government representatives still have hopes 
for central government. But the problem here is that the central government 
controls the provincial councils and tries to fulfil its aims through provincial 
councils. The political aims of central government become easier when the 
857 See ‘Local Authorities Elections’ (2011) 
http://www.slelections.gov.lk/local_authorities2011/province.html, accessed 08-07-2013. 
201 
 
                                                 
provincial councils are also governed by the same central governing political 
party. For example, MP Sumanthiran reports that the eastern provincial council 
provided assistance to the central government-sponsored land confiscation 
attempts handled by the military.858 
In the 2012 eastern provincial council election no party obtained an overall 
majority. Out of 37 seats in the provincial council, the numbers of seats obtained 
by the political parties were: UPFA – 14; TNA – 11; SLMC – 7; UNP – 4; and 
NFF – 1.859 The TNA invited SLMC to join them to obtain a majority and the 
UNP declared their willingness to join. But the central government forced the 
SLMC provincial council members to join the UPFA instead.860 In this way, the 
opportunity to form a coalition of the minority parties to govern the province was 
lost. As a consequence the position of central government was strengthened while 
the opportunity to build a minority party coalition provincial government was 
disabled. 
The involvement of central and provincial governments in local issues resulted in 
local politics changing. As mentioned earlier, land confiscation issues have been 
directly connected with local politics in the Lahugala PS area. The chairman of 
the Lahugala PS explained how this was happened. 
These incidents increased people’s anger toward the UPFA. In the recent local 
government election, 861  the UNP won and obtained seven seats. The UPFA 
obtained only four seats in the PS. Five UNP council members were elected 
representing the Panama area.862 The UPFA has only one member representing 
Panama. (Respondent: Mr Rassaiya Chandrasena, Chairman (UNP), Lahugala 
Pradeshiya Sabha.) 
This statement reflects how people responded to land confiscation in Panama at 
the local government election process. Tensions were clearly evident between the 
governing and opposition parties on these issues. The following statement of the 
opposition party leader of the Lahugala PS reflects this. 
The Buddhist priest in the Panama temple is motivating people to protest against 
the government. There is a movement to protect Panama. Most of the CBOs work 
858 ‘Issues and Problems Facing People of the Northern and Eastern Provinces’ (2011). 
859 ‘Provincial Council Elections’ (2012) http://www.slelections.gov.lk/2012PPC/eppc.htm, 
accessed 14-05-2013. 
860 Sampanthan, R. (2012) ‘ITAK Strongly Condemns SLMC for Betraying and Undermining the 
Democratic Verdict of Eastern Voters’, http://dbsjeyaraj.com/dbsj/archives/11052, accessed 20-
11-2013. 
861 This election was held in October 2011. 
862 The Lahugala Pradeshiya Sabha chairman, Rassaiya Chandrasena also represents Panama area. 
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with the priest and also the UNP won the Lahugala PS in the local government 
election this time due to these influences. The priest is an agent of the 
Sirikotha. 863  (Respondent: Mr J.S.D.M. Ravin Niroshan Kumara, Opposition 
Leader and former Chairman (UPFA), Lahugala Pradeshiya Sabha.) 
This response by the former chairman of the Lahugala PS clearly reflects anger 
against the CBO movements in the area that worked to protect the lands. His 
major criticism is directed at the role of the priest in the Panama temple. This 
response also indicates the unconditional support by the former chairman towards 
the central government’s decisions, and less concern for the people’s problems at 
the local level. However, the priest rejected this criticism. 
I don’t have any connection with political parties. In this era, every force against 
the central government receives a bad name, blame and ill-treatment. Even the 
lives of the people who work against the central government’s injustice are in 
danger. (Respondent: Rev. Panama Chandarathana Thero, the Chief Priest of 
Panama Buddhist temple, the Principal of the Panama school, and the Leader of 
the movement to protect Panampaththuwa.) 
The responses of the representatives of the Lahugala PS provide more evidence 
about the different treatment of central and provincial governments toward local 
government when the local governing party is different from the central and 
provincial governing parties. The following statement of the former chairman of 
the Lahugala PS confirms this. 
The PS cannot work alone without the help of the central government. In my 
period in office, the central government gave huge support to Lahugala PS 
because we represented the same central governing party (UPFA). The President 
Mahinda Rajapaksa and the Minister Basil Rajapaksa personally looked after this 
area and supported the people. Now the local governing party has changed. The 
UNP chairman does not receive any support from the central government. 
Therefore the development in the area has been stopped for now. I hope the 
people understand this. (Respondent: Mr J.S.D.M. Ravin Niroshan Kumara, 
Opposition Leader and former Chairman (UPFA), Lahugala Pradeshiya Sabha.) 
The new chairman of the Lahugala PS reported that the central government and 
the provincial council were not giving any support to the PS. This reflects the 
partial reactions of the central and provincial governments regarding local 
government bodies under different political parties. 
When considering the southern and eastern provinces, there is little difference in 
the experience of local body politics. Political party affiliations clearly interrupt 
local government and people’s participation in local development. In summary, 
863 The UNP headquarters situated in Colombo. 
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central government has taken control of provincial governments, with these then 
following the central government’s agenda.864 When the local governing party is 
different from the central and provincial governing party, local government bodies 
do not receive support either from the central or provincial governments. Also, the 
representatives elected to local government bodies from political parties other 
than the central, provincial or local governing parties do not receive funds, and 
opportunities to address their projects or the needs of local communities. Even if 
the local leadership has been elected from the same central and provincial 
governing party, when such leadership does not conform to the agendas of central 
and provincial governments, or if they become popular, national and provincial 
politicians act against these local leaders. 
The above sections on local development, people’s participation and local politics, 
reflect the central and provincial government influences on local government in 
the southern and eastern provinces of Sri Lanka. These influences are seen in 
various ways. The central government-sponsored large scale construction projects 
directly affect local communities, especially their traditional income sources. 
Such projects have not provided any benefit for local government or local 
communities. It is evident that there are possible ways for local government to 
obtain people’s participation in local development. But some of these attempts by 
local leaders have been interrupted and disabled by higher-level politicians who 
find local leaders’ agendas oppose central and provincial government agendas. 
The nature of local politics discussed above reveals that the central government 
acts as an ultimate controller of the local government mechanism. 
7.4. Summary 
Overall, this chapter argues that central government has largely neglected local 
government and the needs of local communities. While it is clear that most of the 
local government representatives have positive expectations about the large scale 
construction projects conducted by the central government, some local 
government representatives claim that local development can only be achieved 
through the large scale construction projects favoured by central government. This 
situation creates a major gap in addressing the needs at the local level by local 
864 At present, eight of the nine provincial councils are governed by the UPFA. The northern 
provincial council is governed by the TNA. 
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government bodies and acts against addressing needs by compromising people’s 
participation. In both the southern and eastern provinces, local government 
representatives have aspirations to promote local development through 
educational achievement, increasing employment opportunities, sustainable use of 
lands and resources and environmental protection. These views build a positive 
trend towards finding solutions to address local needs through local government 
initiatives. Citizen committees in Matara MC provide an example of successful 
participation by people in local development. Although there are several views on 
local development and people’s participation, there has been no proper assessment 
of, or agreed way, to address or implement area-specific and people-centred local 
government policies towards fulfilling needs. 
A significant feature outlined in this chapter has been that most local government 
representatives elected have represented the central and provincial governing 
party, the UPFA, on development without considering the actual local situations. 
Local politics have been highly affected by central and provincial government 
power and influence and by the political party affiliations of local politicians. 
Where local leadership has worked to achieve local development and people’s 
participation, it has been rejected by central or provincial government. With such 
reactions to the creative and independent local leaders, most local government 
bodies have come to accept the central government’s development plans. These 
findings indicate that the reasons for the contradictions and complications 
regarding local development and people’s participation are mostly related to local 
politics rather than to the systems structural issues around local government which 
are discussed in chapter 5. This suggests that structural issues are not the sole 
reason for the limitations local government face in Sri Lanka. 
The next chapter explores the reasons for the varied and complex views associated 
with the implementation problems of local government policies concerning local 
development and people’s participation. From this analysis, new ways to address 
the needs of local communities can be developed. 
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Chapter 8 
Problems in local government and possible solutions: NGOs as a 
support of local government 
8.1. Introduction 
As discussed in chapters 4 and 5, there are a number of repercussions associated 
with local government development and decentralisation in Sri Lanka. The 
constitution’s 13th amendment to decentralise power to provincial councils has not 
yet been fully implemented and, instead, there has been a recentralisation of 
power in some instances making those provincial councils dependants of central 
government. Under the 13th amendment, local government is subject to provincial 
councils, and the provincial chief minister has official powers to hold the 
provincial ministership of local government. As outlined in chapter 7, this 
situation has resulted in conflict between local government and provincial 
councils when provincial councils have attempted to interfere in local government 
matters, and to control local leadership. There are close connections between 
provincial councils and central government, especially when members of the same 
political party head both central and provincial governments. In such situations, 
provincial councils are seen as acting mostly as central government’s agents 
rather than as separate provincial governing bodies, which has implications for the 
powers of local government. 
Several local government representatives interviewed identified provincial 
councils as barriers to development and people’s participation at the local level. A 
major complaint of local government representatives concerns their inability to 
work for the area due to a lack of power, funding and resources. Furthermore, as 
mentioned in chapters 4 and 5, some of the legal procedures and established 
administrative bodies, such as divisional secretariats, have at times taken over the 
powers and functions of local government resulting in local government facing 
political limitations, conflicts of interest and an overlap in responsibilities. 
This chapter examines these issues and extends the discussion developed in 
chapter 7 on the possibilities to fulfil the existing gaps within local government 
that affect development and people’s participation at the local level. It draws 
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specifically on the comments of 28 key respondents in central, provincial and 
local government. Of the 28, 19 were political representatives865 and nine were 
administrative officials.866 
The aim of this chapter is twofold. Firstly, to examine the perspectives of 
respondents by focusing on the problems identified in local government in Sri 
Lanka. Secondly, this chapter examines the reasons for such problems, and the 
proposals to solve them. The proposal to obtain NGO support to solve problems in 
local government is a major consideration in this chapter. The chapter, therefore, 
addresses the issues that emerged from the literature reviewed in chapter 2 
regarding the possibilities and opportunities for NGOs to be involved in and 
support local government in Sri Lanka. 
8.2. Problems in local government: perspectives 
This section outlines the different perspectives of national, provincial and local 
political representatives and administrative officials, and scholars in terms of 
problems in local government under three main areas: 1) powers and functions; 2) 
funding and staffing; and 3) politico-administrative relations. 
8.2.1. Powers and functions 
As outlined in chapter 5, the powers and functions of local government are limited 
in Sri Lanka for several reasons. First, laws governing local government specify 
and delimit its functions meaning local government bodies can only perform those 
functions specified in law. 867  Local government does not have autonomous 
powers and is not sovereign in its sphere of activities.868 
Second, the functions allocated to local government are limited and focused on 
environmental management and social services. Roads, sanitation, health, water 
865 Of the 19 political representatives, 17 were local government representatives, one was a 
provincial council representative and one was a member of parliament.  Of the 17 local 
government representatives, there are six municipal council representatives, four urban council 
representatives and seven Pradeshiya Sabha representatives. They represent a number of political 
parties such as UNP, UPFA, JVP and TNA. Of the 17 local government representatives, 10 were 
from the southern province, and seven from the eastern province. 
866 Of the nine administrative officials, three were from local government, four were from district 
and divisional secretariats, and two were from the Ministry of Local Government and Provincial 
Councils. 
867 Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Local Government Reforms 1999 (Sessional Paper No. 
I – 1999) p. 29. 
868 Ibid., p. 30. 
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supply and solid waste management have been the primary responsibilities of 
local government bodies since their inception. Other activities such as education, 
agriculture, employment generation and poverty alleviation are not provided for 
under these laws.869 
Third, other government authorities such as government-owned boards, 
corporations or statutory bodies, and, in the post-war period, the military have 
taken over many of the powers and functions allocated to local government, 
leaving local government increasingly dependent on those authorities to meet the 
needs of their electorates. Local government policies, operational systems and 
management in this context are more likely to be influenced by central 
government interests,870 constraining local government further and reinforcing its 
relatively weak functional position. 
Fourth, many of the powers that, under the 13th amendment, were to be 
decentralised have not been transferred to the relevant bodies at provincial and 
local levels. As discussed in chapter 4, the TNA’s recent demand for the full 
implementation of land and police powers to the control of provincial councils has 
not resulted in central government relinquishing these powers. In what follows, 
the respondents reveal the various dimensions of these limitations and the political 
implications arising from this failure to transfer power. 
The mission of the southern provincial council’s department of local 
government871 is charged with ensuring a robust local government system in the 
province, and achieving this through providing guidance, advice and assistance to 
local government bodies to work efficiently and economically, and in compliance 
with national policies for the well-being of the public in the area.872 This close 
connection with central government has resulted in provincial councils tending to 
neglect local government. The mission of the local government department in the 
eastern provincial council centres on guiding, facilitating and supporting local 
government in policy formulation, and institutional and programme development 
to deliver quality services in a responsible, accountable and participatory 
869 ‘Country Paper: Sri Lanka’ (n.d.) 
http://www.unescap.org/huset/lgstudy/country/srilanka/srilanka.html#top, accessed 29-12-2011. 
870 Ibid. 
871 The ministries of provincial councils are known as departments. 
872 ‘Southern Provincial Council – Department of Local Government’ (n.d.) 
http://www.spc.gov.lk/urban.php, accessed 28-11-2011. 
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manner.873 As with the southern province no direct connection with the central 
government is made in the mission statement. 
Although the mission of the southern and eastern provincial councils 
acknowledges assisting local government, a major complaint of respondent local 
government representatives centred on the way provincial councils had become 
barriers to effective local government and community development. Some 
depicted the provincial councils as white elephants,874 and referred to the system 
of provincial councils as a big burden. 875 Comments from a number of local 
government representatives in the southern province capture these views. One 
said: “Provincial councils are not supportive of local governance. They put up 
barriers to local government. These institutions are extra burdens on the 
country.” 876  Another said: “Provincial councils consume a lot of funds and 
resources but nothing useful is happening. They are big barriers between the 
central government and local government bodies.”877 
The respondents from the eastern province voiced a widely held view: 
The provincial council is useless. It does not concern itself with the needs of local 
government or people. The provincial council does not care about our ideas. They 
never ask us or listen to us when doing things. The provincial council wastes 
people’s money. (Respondent: Mr K. Selvarajah, Chairman (TNA), Trincomalee 
Urban Council.) 
We do not get help from the provincial council to develop the area or to help the 
people. The provincial councils are useless. When we try to go through the 
procedures to get approval from the provincial council, huge delays occur. 
(Respondent: Mr S.L.M. Jawadullah, Chairman (UPFA), Kinniya Pradeshiya 
Sabha.) 
When provincial councils were established, the previous direct relationship 
between central government and local government ended and provincial councils 
were to become intermediary bodies. A number of respondents, however, stated 
that this had not occurred as intended. Placing local government under provincial 
councils had not improved local government. 
873 ‘Eastern Provincial Council – Department of Local Government’ (n.d.) 
http://www.ep.gov.lk/CLGindex.asp, accessed 27-05-2013. 
874 Respondent: Mr Nimalchandra Ranasinghe, Representative (UNP), Galle Municipal Council. 
875 Respondent: Mr Anura Amarasiri Narangoda, Chairman (UPFA), Baddegama Pradeshiya 
Sabha. 
876 Respondent: Mr Mohammad Nabavi, Opposition Leader (UNP), Matara Municipal Council. 
877 Respondent: Mr Jayantha Pathirana, Representative (JVP), Matara Municipal Council. 
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Provincial councils put up big barriers to the progress of local government bodies. 
When the provincial councils were established, the direct relationship between the 
central government and local government changed. (Respondent: Mr 
Nimalchandra Ranasinghe, Representative (UNP), Galle Municipal Council.) 
Decentralised power is very limited and there are no sufficient resources to work 
independently from government. Constant influences are coming from central 
government and from the provincial council. Provincial councils always disturb 
our work without helping us. There is no need for provincial councils in Sri Lanka. 
(Respondent: Mr Manjula Liyanage, Representative (UNP), Baddegama 
Pradeshiya Sabha.) 
Each of the local government representatives, from all political parties, agreed that 
provincial councils had not acted as intermediaries but had become barriers to 
effective communication between central government and local government. As 
discussed in chapters 4, 5 and 7, central government today controls provincial 
councils driving them to carry out self-interested political agendas. In practice, 
central government has not decentralised power to the provincial councils. 
Alternatively the views of the eastern province local government representatives 
have revealed a willingness to connect with central government. In this area, most 
local government representatives did not have a sense that the provincial councils 
were powerless because central government had kept provincial councils under 
direct control. The reference to provincial councils as ‘useless’ bodies can be 
understood in the sense that they tend, merely, to follow central government 
policy, without reference to specific provincial needs.  
These arguments lend weight to central government attempts to reduce the role of, 
or even abolish, provincial councils. In fact, local government criticism of 
provincial councils was described by a member of the southern provincial council 
as an excuse for central government to abolish provincial councils. He commented: 
Most of the local politicians talk is against provincial councils. This is a trick by 
central government to clear a path to abolish provincial councils. I call this trick a 
coup. The central government does not like to decentralise power. (Respondent: 
Rev. Baddegama Samitha Thero, Representative (UPFA), Southern Provincial 
Council.) 
This statement suggests that central government can refer to the dissatisfaction of 
local government representatives with provincial councils as supporting its 
decision to abolish provincial councils. 
Although powers have been granted to provincial councils through the 
constitution, the non-transference of those powers in a practical sense is identified 
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as a major problem in the literature on local government in Sri Lanka and also by 
the respondents. A member of parliament highlighted this issue, as follows. 
The problem is that, when the power has been decentralised through the 13th 
amendment, some of the decentralised powers have not been transferred to the 
provincial councils by central government. (Respondent: Mr Joseph Michael 
Perera, MP (UNP), Gampaha District.) 
As discussed earlier, provincial councils were proposed as a solution to the ethnic 
conflict in the northern and eastern provinces, but they have not proved to be a 
solution and are now seen as problematic. The respondent MP further added: 
Provincial councils were established to solve the ethnic problem and not to 
decentralise power to all provinces. But provincial councils were established in all 
provinces. Therefore much has been spent to maintain provincial councils. Most 
of the provincial councils work to fulfil their political desires, and not to develop 
the area. Therefore most of the people reject provincial councils. They see 
provincial councils as forcefully established bodies without caring for the exact 
needs. (Respondent: Mr Joseph Michael Perera, MP (UNP), Gampaha District.) 
In sum, the attempt to come up with a solution to the ethnic conflict through 
decentralising power to the northern and eastern provinces has not been a success.  
An important reason for this failure has been a lack of clarity in the existing legal 
powers and procedures set down for provincial councils. There are separate acts 
governing provincial councils and local government bodies. According to the 
constitution, no government, at any level, can exceed its power. Clause 4.3 in the 
9th schedule of the 13th amendment indicates limits: “It will be open to a 
provincial council to confer additional powers on local authorities but not to take 
away their powers.”878 It was expected that provinces would prepare and pass 
statutes to transfer legally the official activities of local government bodies. 
Despite the law, local government has become a dependent of both central and 
provincial government. The respondent MP gave examples on this. 
If a local government needs land for local development purposes, they cannot 
obtain it directly. The local government has to borrow it from the central 
government or from the provincial council. The powers of local government are 
limited. The dissolving powers of local government have been vested in 
provincial councils. Therefore local government are suppressed dependants. Local 
government is afraid to act against the central government and provincial councils 
for this reason. (Respondent: Mr Joseph Michael Perera, MP (UNP), Gampaha 
District.) 
878 13th Amendment to the Constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka-1978, 
14th November 1987, p. 19. 
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According to the law, provincial councils are not designed as a control of local 
government instead, local government bodies, are independent with separate laws. 
Some respondents expressed the view that provincial council powers were 
designed for administrative supervision only. 
Provincial councils have power only for administrative supervision which means 
provincial public service. Local government bodies are independent bodies 
because they have separate laws to continue their mechanisms. But the provincial 
councils identify local government bodies as their local agents. This is the 
problem. The political influences and challenges always come through the 
provincial councils. Most of the local government representatives do not like 
having to face these challenges. They have a fear of charge sheets. The only one 
who faced these challenges successfully has been Mr Upul Nishantha, a former 
mayor of the Matara MC. (Respondent: Mr Gamini Gunasekara, Commissioner, 
Kaduwela Municipal Council.) 
As discussed in chapter 7, a former mayor of the Matara MC faced a number of 
problems under the provincial chief minister. The Matara MC example reveals 
there are ways to contest the political influence of provincial councils, however 
most local government representatives do not challenge the central and provincial 
governments claims against decentralising power which, in law, is allocated to 
local government. 
Despite the imposed limitations of decentralisation, some local government 
representatives in the southern province saw opportunities to work within the 
existing power structures. But they also pointed out that even though they had 
input, there were other problems which undermined local government 
effectiveness. 
MCs have powers and this power is more than enough to work. But the central 
governing political party corrupts the local government bodies. Nobody talks 
against this even when they see the failures. Therefore success has been hard to 
achieve. (Respondent: Mr Nimalchandra Ranasinghe, Representative (UNP), 
Galle Municipal Council.) 
As discussed in chapter 7, this comes through political party affiliations. The 
important point in the above statement confirms that the powers of local 
government are set in law. A representative of the Hambantota UC noted: “We 
have enough power but we do not have sufficient resources.” 879  Another 
respondent noted: “Local government bodies can do many things within their 
879 Respondent: Mr D.A. Gamini, Opposition Leader (UNP), Hambantota Urban Council. 
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power structures. But there is no unity among the political representatives.”880 
Although this indicates problems such as insufficient resources and disunity 
among political representatives, these views show that in some instances there 
remain opportunities for local government to work. 
In this context, it is important to examine the reasons behind complaints about a 
lack of power. One major reason is the lack of knowledge local government 
representatives have about legal procedure and power, as one respondent noted: 
“Most of the political representatives do not have a proper knowledge base about 
acts, statutes and the other legal procedures related to local government.” 881 
Another respondent said: 
The major problem in the Sri Lankan decentralisation policy is that most of the 
political representatives do not have a proper and clear knowledge about legal 
procedures. They do not know their legal powers and their range of powers. There 
is a need to give practical knowledge to them about the existing laws and 
regulations. (Respondent: Mr Upul Nishantha, former Mayor, Matara Municipal 
Council.) 
On this account, although there are pre-existing powers, local government 
representatives lack the knowledge to exercise them effectively. This view is 
shared by other respondents, including the following. 
Most political representatives have no knowledge of local government legal 
procedures. They have been elected by the people due to their popularity. People 
are not concerned about the political or legal knowledge of these political 
representatives at all. (Respondent: Mr Mohammad Nabavi, Opposition Leader 
(UNP), Matara Municipal Council.) 
Further, most local government representatives lack the capability to write 
development proposals, as the following respondent stated. 
There are many valuable ideas but there are no exact plans towards 
implementation. The local leaders should come forward and make plans. But most 
of them do not have a proper working knowledge of writing proposals and 
obtaining funds and technology. (Respondent: Mr H.G.K. Jagath Kumara, PHI 
Officer, Matara Municipal Council.) 
This lack of policy knowledge is not only a problem for local government 
representatives but extends to the provincial level as well. One respondent noted 
the consequences of this deficiency. 
880 Respondent: Mr Anura Amarasiri Narangoda, Chairman (UPFA), Baddegama Pradeshiya 
Sabha. 
881 Respondent: Mr Manjula Liyanage, Representative (UNP), Baddegama Pradeshiya Sabha. 
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Most provincial and local political representatives do not know about local 
government mechanisms. For example, health and education are two major 
subjects of the provincial councils. But the provincial ministers do not have 
proper knowledge about these subjects. Therefore the central government uses 
this as an excuse to get involved in these matters. (Respondent: Mr Joseph 
Michael Perera, MP (UNP), Gampaha District.) 
The poor knowledge among provincial and local government representatives in 
terms of their powers and functions creates an opportunity for central government 
to become involved in provincial and local government matters. It also means that 
upper level politicians can block the opportunities of lower level politicians to 
gain knowledge. One respondent highlighted reasons for this. 
Some higher level politicians do not like it when the lower level politicians and 
officials receive knowledge of their powers. This is because when these lower 
level politicians obtain a good knowledge about their powers and responsibilities, 
the higher level politicians do not get a chance to fool them and to force them to 
work according to their criteria. (Respondent: Mr Gamini Gunasekara, 
Commissioner, Kaduwela Municipal Council.) 
The lack of knowledge results in the failure to interpret laws effectively, and leads 
to an unwillingness by local government heads to decentralise power within local 
government. Some respondents highlighted the need to re-interpret the existing 
laws and activities of local government and to widen their capacities.882 Another 
respondent noted: “Power should be decentralised in a positive way. The 
appropriate lower level officials should receive instruction to make decisions and 
to act independently.”883 
The 40th and 188th articles of the Municipal Councils Ordinance 884  suggest 
decentralising power to lower levels. But most local government heads resist 
decentralisation, as the following respondent stated. 
Local government heads try to keep all their powers and to work individually. 
This is very unfair. Only two local government bodies in Sri Lanka practically 
implemented decentralisation of power. They are Matara and Pathadumbara.885 
When the power has been decentralised, it is evident that the political 
representatives and administrative officials were fearful of these powers. This is 
the way that the system has been structured. (Respondent: Mr Gamini Gunasekara, 
Commissioner, Kaduwela Municipal Council.) 
882 Respondent: Mr Gamini Gunasekara, Commissioner, Kaduwela Municipal Council. 
883 Respondent: Mr H.G.K. Jagath Kumara, PHI Officer, Matara Municipal Council. 
884 Article 40 is on the general powers of a municipal council and article 188 is on the application 
of municipal fund. 
885 A Pradeshiya Sabha in Kandy district, central province, Sri Lanka. 
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In some areas local government has achieved positive results by exercising the 
powers they have. A former mayor of the Matara MC practically implemented the 
decentralisation of power within the council. He said: 
Today’s situation is that the leaders are centralising even the simple ground level 
powers also. I tried to do my best to change this centralisation. Although it is not 
easy, I tried to change the whole physical structure of the MC and also the 
attitudes of my staff members. I achieved good results through this. There are 
many local government laws which most people do not know. I have 
decentralised powers to the other political representatives and administrative 
officials of the MC. I believe that people who are unable to take a risk or a 
challenge cannot make any changes. (Respondent: Mr Upul Nishantha, former 
Mayor, Matara Municipal Council.) 
There was no response from the eastern province interviewees about exercising 
existing local government initiatives without considering the powerful influence 
of central and provincial governments. Although there are detractors of provincial 
councils, in the main, local government representatives and the people still pin 
their hopes on the provincial and local levels of government because, compared to 
other provinces, the eastern provincial council and the local government bodies 
are more recent with some respondents pointing out the war is the reason for this. 
The northern and eastern provinces did not have active political bodies for a long 
time due to the war. The people did not have access even to central government. 
Therefore, when new provincial council and local government bodies were 
established there, people and also the politicians felt that the new political bodies 
were good and helpful. Also through these bodies, they received a link to central 
government. (Respondent: Mr Gamini Gunasekara, Commissioner, Kaduwela 
Municipal Council.) 
According to some respondents, the situation is different in the south. People in 
the south have access to all levels of government and did not have any special 
need for provincial councils. 886 This statement again reveals the inappropriate 
application of provincial councils across the entire country. 
In summary, most local government representatives still believe that if they have a 
direct relationship with central government, without provincial councils as 
intermediaries, they will receive more benefits. In addition, the impotency of the 
provincial councils is a result of the non-transference of decentralised power to 
the provincial councils by central government. There are few differences between 
the responses of local government representatives in the southern and eastern 
886 Respondent: Mr Gamini Gunasekara, Commissioner, Kaduwela Municipal Council. 
216 
 
                                                 
provinces regarding provincial councils. Although there are certain working 
limitations to local government law, local government does have some autonomy 
to work on its own. But the most significant problem stems from local 
government representatives lacking the knowledge about the procedures and 
processes of legal jurisdictions. 
8.2.2. Funding and staffing 
Local government becomes dependent when it lacks the funds, resources and staff 
to implement policy. This dependency on provincial councils for financial support 
and guidance fails when provincial council support is not forthcoming. According 
to the ADB, local government in Sri Lanka has been largely dependent on grants 
received from provincial councils to meet their recurrent expenses, with the 
balance coming from their own revenue. 887 Most local government bodies are 
unable to meet operational and maintenance costs of existing assets as a large 
portion of their funds are allocated to pay for salaries and administration.888 
The limitation of revenue earnings by local government is a significant issue. As 
mentioned in chapter 5, there is a variety of funding sources available for local 
government. But there is a lack of taxation revenue, especially for the PSs, with 
local government not owning enough properties and is thus not able to provide 
many services. Additionally, when local government services such as water and 
electricity supplies are taken over by other agencies, this leaves local government 
with very limited opportunity for earning financial income. 
As well as depending on funds from the centre, local government also depends on 
the administrative bodies through which government funds are channelled. 
Funding, such as that made through the decentralised budget, 889  is often 
channelled through district and divisional secretariats which disempowers local 
government of certain disbursements. Although members of parliament are keen 
on the construction of new facilities such as markets, playgrounds, and roads, 
another problem emerges when the decentralised budget does not provide funds 
887 Few MCs and UCs are able to generate 70 per cent of their own revenue and they rely for the 
remaining 30 per cent on support from central and provincial governments (‘Country Paper: Sri 
Lanka’ (n.d.)). 
888 Technical Assistance Report (2005) Asian Development Bank, http://www.adb.org, accessed 
02-01-2011. 
889 A fund allocated to parliament members as well as to provincial council members to carry on 
area development. This fund is allocated through the annual budget. 
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for the maintenance of such facilities. Local government is thus saddled with 
maintenance of facilities they did not ask for and for which they are not funded.890 
It has also been pointed out that the district and divisional secretaries, who are 
supposed to be neutral civil servants, often succumb to the demands of members 
of parliament and, in many cases, have built facilities knowing that local 
government did not have adequate capacity to maintain these.891 According to 
Bigdon and Hettige, not only the members of parliament, but also the international 
donor organisations cooperate more often with the divisional secretariats than 
with local government, which contributes to a further strengthening of the 
divisional secretariat while at the same time pushing the elected local bodies to an 
even more marginalised position.892 
Local government dependency impacts on staffing and related matters. As 
outlined in chapter 5, after the implementation of the 13th amendment, the 
administrative officials of local government bodies were absorbed into the 
provincial public service, where they were subjected to the procedures of the 
provincial public service commission and therefore transferable between local 
government bodies. 893  As all recurrent establishment costs are borne from 
allocations made by the finance commission894 under block grants,895 provincial 
councils, and through them local government, are required by the central 
government to decide on cadres, job descriptions and recruitment procedures 
which is a time consuming process. 896  This situation has resulted in local 
government facing a shortage of suitable experienced administrative officials. The 
report of the 1999 Commission of Inquiry forewarned that a competent work force 
is a must for a systemic and efficient supply of services, and that the non-
890 ‘Country Paper: Sri Lanka’ (n.d.). 
891 Ibid. 
892 Bigdon, C. and Hettige, S.T. (2003) ‘Key Issues of Good Local Governance’, Local 
Governance and Conflict Management in Sri Lanka – Final Report, Sri Lanka Institute of Local 
Governance and Berghof Foundation for Conflict Studies, p. 94. 
893 ‘Country Paper: Sri Lanka’ (n.d.). 
894 The finance commission is the mechanism through which the financial allocations are made to 
the provincial councils in Sri Lanka. 
895 A grant from a central government that a local government can allocate to a range of services. 
896 First, the needs are studied and proposals are submitted to the Ministry of Local Government 
which then submits the proposal for staff revision to the cabinet. The normal procedure is to direct 
the salaries and cadre committees of the central government to study the proposal and submit the 
proposal back to the cabinet with a recommendation. Upon approval by the cabinet, recruitment 
procedures are applied. Generally, administrative officials for all-island services are recruited by 
the central government, whereas the provincial public service commission takes responsibility in 
recruiting civil servants for other services (‘Country Paper: Sri Lanka’ (n.d.)). 
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availability of approved cadres and lack of knowledge on the part of the available 
staff affected the quality of local government services.897 Although there is a huge 
demand for trained officials, the government does not have sufficient training 
programmes or the technical capacity to train new officials. 
The important point made by respondents was that without sufficient funding, 
local government is unable to plan for local development. If local government 
cannot afford the costs of maintenance and salaries it is unable to respond to 
people’s needs at the local level. Most southern province respondents highlighted 
the problem regarding the lack of funding. As one said, “there are many needs but 
no funds to fulfil them.”898 Another made the same comment: “There are not 
many funds for the PS.”899 Another pointed out: “We don’t have sufficient funds 
and staff to fulfil the needs of the PS area.”900 
Problems of staffing at the local government level are linked directly to the lack of 
funding allocated to local government. The statements of some respondents reveal 
this. 
The central government pays salaries for the permanent staff of local government. 
Therefore the central government does not allow appointing more staff for local 
government. So local government appoints temporary staff members and the 
salaries have to be paid using local government income. For these reasons, local 
government does not have extra money to spend on local development projects. 
(Respondent: Mr Jayantha Pathirana, Representative (JVP), Matara Municipal 
Council.) 
As mentioned earlier, local government can generate revenue and obtain funds in 
many ways, but respondents pointed out that local government revenue sources 
and funds had been taken over by the provincial councils. 
The provincial councils are parasites that squeeze all nutrition from local 
government. Earlier local government collected taxes and also received court 
charges. But now the taxes and court charges are collected by the provincial 
councils. We have requested these funds several times but the provincial council 
does not release these to us on time. Even if we obtain them, we do not receive 
the full amount of money which belongs to local government.901 The provincial 
council invests that money according to their preferences. These investments 
897 Sessional Paper No. I – 1999, p. 73. 
898 Respondent: Mr Manjula Liyanage, Representative (UNP), Baddegama Pradeshiya Sabha. 
899 Respondent: Mr M.D. Indika Thushara, Opposition Leader (JVP), Suriyawewa Pradeshiya 
Sabha. 
900 Respondent: Mr Nandasiri Ranathunga, Chairman (UPFA), Suriyawewa Pradeshiya Sabha. 
901 Local government sends an agent to the court to represent and to find out the amounts of the 
court charges which belong to local government. So they find that the provincial council does not 
release these funds to local government. 
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hardly help local government. Now local government only receives the PHI 
charges and the trade license charges. (Respondent: Mr Nimalchandra Ranasinghe, 
Representative (UNP), Galle Municipal Council.) 
The provincial councils have taken control of funds which previously belonged to 
local government and therefore local government always has to beg for funds 
from the provincial council. Also the court fines are not received as full amounts. 
Therefore it is difficult to plan development projects. These funds belong to us 
and we need them for our work. (Respondent: Mr Anura Amarasiri Narangoda, 
Chairman (UPFA), Baddegama Pradeshiya Sabha.) 
In the final analysis, both provincial and local government depends on central 
government. By taking revenue and funds belonging to local government, the 
provincial councils have compromised local government’s capacity to be involved 
in local development. Criticism by senior administrative officials and national 
politicians confirm this conclusion. Many believe the provincial council take-over 
of local government revenue streams and funding is a breach of the constitution 
because according to clause 4.3 of the 9th schedule of the 13th amendment, the 
provincial councils do not have the power to appropriate local government 
resources. Senior administrative officials confirmed this anomaly in their 
responses. 
Local revenue, such as court charges and stamp duties, has been transferred to the 
provincial councils using two statutes. Although this action was in breach of the 
constitution, nobody came forward to fight against that. The provincial councils 
are supposed to pay that money to local government quarterly. But this never 
happens. They use these funds according to their interests and neglect the local 
needs. (Respondent: Mr Gamini Gunasekara, Commissioner, Kaduwela 
Municipal Council.) 
National politicians were also aware of the take-over of local government revenue 
sources and funds by provincial councils.902 A further reason for this take-over by 
provincial councils relates to provincial taxes in the provincial fund 903  which 
central government has taken over. One respondent said: “Recently the laws have 
been changed. Now the central government takes over the provincial taxes as 
well.”904 In turn, the provincial councils seek funds from local government to fill 
the gap left by losing provincial taxes. 
902 Respondent: Mr Joseph Michael Perera, MP (UNP), Gampaha District. 
903 The provincial fund consists of: a) all taxes imposed by the provincial council; b) all grants 
made to such provincial council in respect of the province by the government of Sri Lanka; c) all 
loans advanced to the provincial council from the consolidated fund of Sri Lanka; and d) all other 
receipts of the provincial council (Provincial Councils Act, No. 42 of 1987, p. 6). 
904 Respondent: Mr L.H.A.C. Kumara, Assistant Director-Planning, Weligama Divisional 
Secretariat. 
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The local government representatives of the eastern province also highlighted 
local government’s lack of funds. 
We are the authoritative institutions to collect taxes. But the amount of taxes is 
not enough to conduct proper development. We need funds. We have many plans 
to develop the area. As we all work as a group, we provide Rs.7 lakhs to each 
representative annually without considering their political party affiliations. This 
amount comes through the UC’s annual income. But this is not enough to fulfil 
the many needs in the area. (Respondent: Mr K. Selvarajah, Chairman (TNA), 
Trincomalee Urban Council.) 
Again this indicates a lack of local government income and the difficulties in 
generating funds and conducting development programmes without the necessary 
resources. Respondents agreed that the amount of funds received by local 
government was insufficient for development. 
We are not able to serve people because we do not have funds. For example, we 
only receive Rs.7 lakhs annually from the UC. To build a road length of 2kms we 
have to spend Rs.2 lakhs. This example shows our poor working capacity. All this 
happens because of a lack of funds. (Respondent: Mr S. Sanoon, Representative 
(UNP), Trincomalee Urban Council.) 
Kinniya is the biggest PS area in the Trincomalee district. But we don’t have 
sufficient income to develop the area. The PSs especially receive fewer funds than 
MCs and UCs. There are many needs and new ideas to develop the area. But we 
don’t have funds. Also we don’t have many resources to collect taxes. The people 
in the area are poor. (Respondent: Mr S.L.M. Jawadullah, Chairman (UPFA), 
Kinniya Pradeshiya Sabha.) 
While the Trincomalee UC provides at least Rs.7 lakhs to its representatives 
annually the PS funding situation is worse. The Kinniya PS chairman’s response 
reveals that the PSs have more funding problems than the MCs and UCs because 
the PS areas do not collect enough tax revenue and do not have the infrastructure 
to earn a sufficient income. This point is further elaborated by the chairman of the 
Lahugala PS. 
We have several plans to develop our area and to solve people’s problems. The 
main problem is the limited amounts of funds we receive. The people are poor. 
There are a few shops with very poor facilities. These people cannot pay taxes to 
the PS and therefore the income level of the PS is very low. (Respondent: Mr 
Rassaiya Chandrasena, Chairman (UNP), Lahugala Pradeshiya Sabha.) 
The problem of funding stems from the lack of coordination among the national, 
provincial and local level development plans, as the chairman of the Trincomalee 
UC confirmed. 
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We request funds from members of parliament and also from the provincial 
council. But they are not providing funds to the UC. They do their own work 
independently in the area without connecting with the UC. Anyway, there is no 
problem if they work positively for the area. But only a few members of 
parliament work for the area. (Respondent: Mr K. Selvarajah, Chairman (TNA), 
Trincomalee Urban Council.) 
National and provincial politicians neglect local needs when administering funds 
for development projects. The chairman of the Kinniya PS supplied evidence for 
this. 
We do not get funds from the provincial council or from central government at all. 
In recent floods many people in the area were severely affected. But we did not 
receive any money to help people recover. We had to manage our limited funds to 
help people. (Respondent: Mr S.L.M. Jawadullah, Chairman (UPFA), Kinniya 
Pradeshiya Sabha.) 
Often funds fail to reach local government directly because of significant 
problems such as delays or reduced funds passing through several institutions, as 
the following respondent noted. 
For example, think of a big piece of ice. When it passes through many hands it 
melts and becomes very small. That is what happens to funds as well. When funds 
pass through several institutions, local government receives very little. We cannot 
work with such small amounts of funds. (Respondent: Mr N. Noormohamad, 
Representative (UPFA), Trincomalee Urban Council.) 
Also, proposals prepared by local government have to pass through complex 
processes and be approved by higher level institutions. There are constant delays 
and most of the time approval never comes, as the following respondent stated. 
We do not have direct access to the investors. We can write proposals and get the 
support of all the political representatives of the PS, but we are not sure about the 
result because these proposals pass through several authorities and they might or 
might not be approved. If approved we may have to wait for a long time to obtain 
the funds. There are barriers everywhere. All the systems are not friendly to the 
lower levels of government. (Respondent: Mr S.L.M. Jawadullah, Chairman 
(UPFA), Kinniya Pradeshiya Sabha.) 
According to the chairman of the Lahugala PS, political affiliations are connected 
to the distribution of local government funding. He claimed that, “we receive 
some funds from the province specific development grant.  But the amount of this 
fund depends on provincial council’s political affiliations with the local 
government.”905 As noted in chapter 7, the Lahugala PS’s governing party is the 
UNP, and it differs from the central and provincial governing party, the UPFA. 
905 Respondent: Mr Rassaiya Chandrasena, Chairman (UNP), Lahugala Pradeshiya Sabha. 
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Clearly, this relationship matters when obtaining province specific development 
grants.  
Frequently, local government is unable to make use of the funds allocated to it 
because of the negligence and failures of provincial councils. One senior 
administrative official stated: 
There is a grant called a ‘criteria-based grant’906 that provides Rs.1.5 million to 
each local government. This comes to local government through the provincial 
councils. This grant does not reach local government on time. Because of political 
influences, provincial councils do not release this grant on time. When the grant 
has been released at the end of the year, there is no time to start and complete 
development or construction projects. Therefore there is a need to make use of 
this grant without returning it and without doing any work. (Respondent: Mr 
Gamini Gunasekara, Commissioner, Kaduwela Municipal Council.) 
As mentioned earlier, the lack of funding also affects the salaries and allowances 
of local government representatives and staff. The MC representatives receive a 
very small allowance of Rs.7,500 and the mayor receives only Rs.12,000. 
Compared to the salaries of the provincial council members, these amounts are 
very small.907 Given this lack of funds, local government staff become frustrated 
and discouraged, the result being that many lack motivation. The following 
respondent provided examples for this. 
There are very good workers but they do not have a proper training, guidance, 
facilities or encouragement. They work with very few resources. For example, we 
use broken vehicles to collect garbage. The labourers do not have boots and 
gloves. But they work hard to keep the city clean. As PHI officers attached to the 
MC, we can do a lot of things if we get a small push. We don’t have facilities and 
funds. (Respondent: Mr H.G.K. Jagath Kumara, PHI Officer, Matara Municipal 
Council.) 
Further, the limitations on taxes and fines set out in earlier acts and statutes do not 
match the current economic situation. The need to increase tax revenue and fine 
rates has been pointed out by some local government representatives as 
economically important. 
Most of the acts are out of date. Especially the mentioned amounts of the taxes 
and fines are small. For example, the bicycle tax is still Rs.5. Compared with 
today’s economic changes, this amount is very small. There is a need to amend 
906 This is allocated on the basis of population, per capita income or poverty levels, unemployment, 
health and nutrition, education, level of economic development, and inadequacy of current 
development activities in a local government area. 
907 Respondent: Mr Nimalchandra Ranasinghe, Representative (UNP), Galle Municipal Council. 
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these expired acts. (Respondent: Mr Mohammad Nabavi, Opposition Leader 
(UNP), Matara Municipal Council.) 
These failures and delays affect the whole system of local government income 
generation. The responses of the eastern province’s local government 
representatives are similar to those from the southern province. From all these 
responses it is clear that the central and provincial governments have neglected 
local government. 
One respondent advised that foreign grants should go to the lower levels of 
government through the External Resources Department (ERD). 908  The ERD 
works to obtain foreign aid to fill the gaps in the annual budget by going to the 
foreign countries and requesting foreign aid through proposals.909 The aid flow is 
shown in Figure 8.1 and indicates the complexity of the processes whereby 
foreign aid gets to local government. 
Figure 8.1: Aid flow 
 
Source: The information provided by respondent: Mr L.H.A.C. Kumara, Assistant Director-
Planning, Weligama Divisional Secretariat. 
There are some exceptions regarding this funding process. A former mayor of the 
Matara MC, Upul Nishantha, noted that the mayor has powers to obtain direct 
support from external organisations such as NGOs.910 Another respondent agreed 
on this point. 
908 Respondent: Mr D.P. Hettiarachchi, Retired Additional Secretary, Ministry of Local 
Government and Provincial Councils; and Consultant, EML Consultants. 
909 Respondent: Mr L.H.A.C. Kumara, Assistant Director-Planning, Weligama Divisional 
Secretariat. 
910 Respondent: Mr Upul Nishantha, former Mayor, Matara Municipal Council. 
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The MCs especially have direct access to foreign aid. Also local government can 
access NGOs directly. But many local government representatives lack 
knowledge of local government powers. NGOs however, are always interested in 
helping local government. (Respondent: Mr Gamini Gunasekara, Commissioner, 
Kaduwela Municipal Council.) 
This again highlights the lack of knowledge local government representatives 
have about their legal powers.  
Another way local government can obtain direct foreign aid is through ‘sister city’ 
programmes, as noted by one respondent. 
There is a system which is called ‘sister cities’. Here a local government builds 
connections with a local government in a foreign country to obtain aid. Also local 
government can go through this process via an NGO. (Respondent: Mr Joseph 
Michael Perera, MP (UNP), Gampaha District.) 
This system is a mutual relationship built between local government and a foreign 
counterpart. For example, the Galle MC has a long term relationship with the 
Velsen municipality in the Netherlands. Through this relationship, the Galle MC 
has received significant aid and facilities from the Velsen municipality911 (see 
chapter 9). 
In summary, the lack of funding is a major problem for local government. The 
staffing problems also exacerbate the funding problem as local government is 
unable to afford the staff it needs. Local government, especially the PSs, do not 
have sufficient resources to generate income. Local government dependency on 
central and provincial governments for funding and staff recruitment is 
highlighted as a major problem. The take-over of revenue sources belonging to 
local government by the provincial councils is another problem with funds and aid 
for local government often delayed and reduced as they pass through central and 
provincial government hands. Sometimes resources never reach local government 
coffers because the central and provincial governments use these funds and aid 
according to their political agendas. Local government development proposals 
also get delayed and neglected when they go through central and provincial 
government authorities. Local government representatives report that most of their 
proposals never receive approval. Sometimes these delays are connected to the 
political affiliations which central and provincial governments have with certain 
local government bodies. Construction projects under the direction of other 
911 Respondent: Mr Methsiri De Silva, Mayor (UPFA), Galle Municipal Council. 
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authorities in the local government areas are an extra burden in terms of 
maintenance for local government when the facilities were never sought in the 
first place. Although local government still has powers and ways to obtain direct 
foreign aid, many local government representatives are not aware of how to access 
procedural powers. 
8.2.3. Local level politico-administrative relations 
As discussed above and in chapter 5, there are a number of overlaps and 
contradictions between political and administrative bodies at the local level in the 
exercise of their powers. First, the relationship between local government and 
administrative bodies such as district and divisional secretariats is very weak. 
Second, there are poor relationships between local government and central 
government authorities who are involved in local development. Examples include 
the Urban Development Authority (UDA), the Ceylon Electricity Board (CEB), 
and other institutions mentioned in chapter 5. According to Hettige, in rural areas 
local government bodies have been marginalised in the development process due 
to the increasing significance of other political and administrative actors 
associated with national politics and the wider processes of development.912 
As outlined in chapter 7, large scale construction projects conducted by central 
government in local government areas have neglected the voices of local 
government bodies related to the actual needs of the people. For Hettige, the area 
of authority of the divisional secretariat often overlaps with that of the PS. The 
expected outcome of the establishment of divisional secretariats was to facilitate 
the integration of the local administration with the elected local body so that local 
level development and other activities could be better coordinated. In reality, the 
PSs and the divisional secretariats have functioned largely independently of each 
other. 913  According to Fernando, the situation changed drastically after the 
introduction of provincial councils as divisional secretariats continued to function 
as the arm of central government without much concern for the provincial 
912 Hettige, S. (2008) ‘Local Democracy: The Sri Lankan Experience’, in D.N. Gellner and K. 
Hachhethu (eds) Local Democracy in South Asia: Microprocesses of Democratisation in Nepal 
and its Neighbours: Governance, Conflict and Civic Action, Vol. 1, Sage Publications, India, p. 
435. 
913 Ibid., p. 429. 
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councils or the PSs. The public servants at the divisional secretariats, who are 
central government employees, do not feel obliged to work for the PSs.914 
In addition, the overlapping issues of the existing laws, especially in the 
development sector, make for on-going problems, given the lack of clear 
responsibilities for each institution. This makes the coordination between 
authorities more difficult. Dasanayake notes that there is no uniformity in the way 
devolved subject matters have been defined in the legislative documents, giving 
rise to definitive problems when exercising the legislative power.915 The lack of 
uniform laws governing local authorities has made legal procedures complicated 
and unclear. There has been no demand to create a uniform law, and the law-
makers are silent on the complexities and overlaps within the existing local 
government laws. 
In the view of the Baddegama PS chairman there is minimal support from central 
and provincial level administrative officials for local government work. 
There are many area officers, technical officers who are attached to central 
government and provincial councils. They do not work properly but are obtaining 
big salaries. If there is a possibility for local government to use them, it is good. 
But this has not happened yet. (Respondent: Mr Anura Amarasiri Narangoda, 
Chairman (UPFA), Baddegama Pradeshiya Sabha.) 
Given this view, the Baddegama PS chairman hopes to get the support of central 
and provincial level administrative officials for local government work. To 
examine the distinctions within the political and administrative bodies in the same 
area, it is necessary to explore the views of the administrative officials attached to 
the Baddegama divisional secretariat. The following statement indicates 
contrasting viewpoints. 
There is a good relationship between the divisional secretariat and the PS. The 
technical officers in both institutions work together on projects. When 
constructing roads which belong to the PS, we get their permission, and after 
construction we hand the property back to them. We do not have conflict with 
them. (Respondent: Mrs H.I.G. Shirani Pushpakumari, Assistant Director-
Planning, Baddegama Divisional Secretariat.) 
914 Fernando, L. (2003) ‘Local Governance in the Uva Province: Monaragala Pradeshiya Sabha’, 
Local Governance and Conflict Management in Sri Lanka – Final Report, Sri Lanka Institute of 
Local Governance and Berghof Foundation for Conflict Studies, p. 54. 
915 Dasanayake, S.M. (2001) ‘Provincial Councils System: Some Operational Constraints’, 
Governance, No. 1, Vol. 1, Sri Lanka Institute of Local Governance, Colombo-07, pp. 34-36. 
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This respondent indicates a good working relationship between the divisional 
secretariat and the PS officials. Obtaining permission from the PS before starting 
any construction work in the PS area is an important step to productive work 
relations between the two institutions. However, local government respondents 
have a different view about the limitations of the politico-administrative 
relationships, as the following respondent stated. 
The relationship between the divisional secretariat and the PS is understandable. 
But as these two institutions are working independently, we do not have close 
relations. (Respondent: Mr Nandasiri Ranathunga, Chairman (UPFA), 
Suriyawewa Pradeshiya Sabha.) 
A respondent attached to the Suriyawewa divisional secretariat noted: “The 
relationship between the PS and the divisional secretariat is good. But there is 
conflict between the political representatives and administrative officials.” 916 
These views reveal the contradictions between local political and administrative 
bodies. The response of the Suriyawewa divisional secretariat official signifies 
that the institutional relations are functional, but that the personal relations 
between political representatives and administrative officials are not as good. As 
they work according to central government agendas, divisional secretariats are 
less inclined to give attention to local government preferences. Local government 
representatives, therefore, do not get the support they expect from local 
administrative bodies. 
The politico-administrative relations in the eastern province are different from 
those found in the southern province. In the eastern province higher administrative 
officials, such as district secretaries, were former high ranking Sinhala military 
personnel, whereas the majority of the population was Tamil and Muslim.917 The 
military influence has been observed in the Trincomalee given that large amounts 
of foreign aid are granted primarily to Sinhala villages. This leaves the Tamil and 
Muslim majority within the area dissatisfied. The chairman of the Kinniya PS 
expressed his dissatisfaction about this situation: “The main administrative 
916 Respondent: Mr M.K. Pradeep Kumara, Assistant Director-Planning, Suriyawewa Divisional 
Secretariat. 
917 Formerly, administrative officials had to successfully complete the Sri Lanka administrative 
service (SLAS) examination to become an administrative official. Currently the executive 
President has taken the power of appointing administrative officials through the 18th amendment to 
the constitution and he has appointed former high ranking Sinhala military personnel as higher 
administrative officials especially in the post-war areas. These retired military officials would try 
to implement their strict military rule in the administrative sector, which was not practical. They 
kept army soldiers as their body guards and used army vehicles. 
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authority, the Trincomalee district secretariat does not provide aid to Kinniya 
because Kinniya is a Muslim area.”918 One administrative official attached to the 
Trincomalee district secretariat viewed it differently, saying: “Some NGOs are 
partial. Sometimes they make favourable grants to specific ethnic groups. But the 
district secretary tries to send aid to the Sinhala areas as well.”919 It is evident that 
there is some truth in the complaints against the Trincomalee district secretary 
regarding the ethnic biases in aid distribution in the area. 
Another respondent from Trincomalee noted: “The district secretariat works as a 
separate unit. We don’t have problems or special friendships with them. The 
relationship is neutral.” 920  The problems are not necessarily about personal 
relations, but about the structure of institutions and procedures which create 
contradictions and overlaps. One administrative official said: 
The systems in this country are very complicated. There are so many institutions 
and they do not have exact work practices. Some work overlaps. There is no need 
for elected political representatives. As administrative officials we can handle 
most of the work. We follow exact procedures. We do not have provincial barriers. 
We receive power directly from the central government. (Respondent: Mr Subash 
Ponnamperuma, NGO Coordinating Officer, Trincomalee District Secretariat.) 
This reveals the negative relationship existing between the political and 
administrative bodies. As discussed earlier, an example of problems arising from 
overlapping power is seen in the local administrative bodies such as district and 
divisional secretariats which receive direct instruction from central government, 
while the local government recruits staff from the provincial public service. As 
the above respondent noted, local administrative officials who have been 
appointed by central government see themselves as more powerful than the 
provincial and local government representatives and the administrative officials 
attached to provincial and local government. This situation creates a lot of 
divisions and negates any positive impact on tackling the issues. 
At every level of administrative division it is evident that central government has 
its agents: at the provincial level the provincial governor; at the district level the 
district secretary; at the divisional level the divisional secretary. This means that 
both the provincial councils and local government bodies are marginalised and 
918 Respondent: Mr S.L.M. Jawadullah, Chairman (UPFA), Kinniya Pradeshiya Sabha. 
919 Respondent: Mr Subash Ponnamperuma, NGO Coordinating Officer, Trincomalee District 
Secretariat. 
920 Respondent: Mr K Selvarajah, Chairman (TNA), Trincomalee Urban Council. 
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forced to carry out the wishes of central government. Furthermore, it is evident 
that the control of district and divisional secretariats by central government has 
created major divisions between the local political and administrative bodies, as 
the following respondent noted. 
The central government is using district and divisional secretariats to control local 
government, especially to control any local government which does not care for 
central government agendas. As local administrative bodies, the district and 
divisional secretariats should work together with local government. Otherwise 
many difficulties occur. There are overlaps in decisions and development work 
when there is no proper coordination between political and administrative bodies. 
(Respondent: Mr Gamini Gunasekara, Commissioner, Kaduwela Municipal 
Council.) 
Despite this, local government has the legal power to control administrative 
influences when they affect local governance. One respondent noted that, some 
local government bodies have prepared procedures to control administrative 
influences by passing regulations, including making it compulsory to obtain 
permission from the relevant local government before becoming involved in an 
area project. For example, Dehiwala-Mount Lavinia MC 921  implemented 
procedures with successful results. 922  This example suggests that control is 
possible if the local government knows and exercises its powers of governance 
well. 
In summary, the responses of local government representatives and local 
administrative officials regarding their politico-administrative relations are 
inconsistent. Evidence of good mutual relationships or understandings between 
political and administrative bodies is lacking. The paucity of clear legal provisions 
on the scope and powers of local political and administrative bodies is identified 
as a major gap. Moreover, it is evident that as a result of a lack of political will on 
behalf of central government to decentralise power to the lower levels of 
government, the central government-controlled local administrative bodies have 
been significantly strengthened. Although local government has the power to 
enact procedures to control administrative influences as shown by examples, 
exercising such power is not common. 
921 A municipal council in Colombo district, western province, Sri Lanka. 
922 Respondent: Mr Gamini Gunasekara, Commissioner, Kaduwela Municipal Council. 
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8.3. Possible solutions: NGOs as a support of local government 
The previous section revealed a number of problems associated with local 
government and decentralisation in Sri Lanka. This section analyses the proposals 
made by respondents to solve problems, focusing on the recommendations aimed 
at developing more robust local government in Sri Lanka. 
8.3.1. Proposals: local level 
Most local government representative respondents in the southern province 
proposed obtaining foreign funds to develop the area and to fulfil the people’s 
needs via NGOs. The following respondents outlined what type of foreign support 
they needed. 
We need more foreign funds and the support of the NGOs to reconstruct the 
streams and drainage systems in the city. It is good if we can participate in foreign 
conferences on local government. Then we can obtain experience, training and 
also benefits. (Respondent: Mr Methsiri De Silva, Mayor (UPFA), Galle 
Municipal Council.) 
If we receive foreign funds there are heaps of things to do. We have a compost 
plant but we do not have a plastic recycling unit. We never get technological 
support for these things. The foreign funds and the foreign technological support 
can help a lot. (Respondent: Mr Manjula Liyanage, Representative (UNP), 
Baddegama Pradeshiya Sabha.) 
Obtaining foreign funds and technological support for local government work is 
important to respondents. As discussed earlier, local government in Sri Lanka has 
few funds for local development, but if foreign funds and support are obtained 
then local government can develop the area without depending on central and 
provincial government. One respondent was clear: “It is difficult to do all the 
work of a local government without foreign funds. Therefore we absolutely need 
foreign funds and support.”923 
Respondents in the eastern province were also clear about the importance of 
obtaining foreign funds. One respondent asserted: “We need foreign funds and 
support to develop the area.”924 Not only local government representatives, but 
also local government administrative officials hope to obtain foreign funds and 
support for local development. One observed: 
923 Respondent: Mr Anura Amarasiri Narangoda, Chairman (UPFA), Baddegama Pradeshiya 
Sabha. 
924 Respondent: Mr Rassaiya Chandrasena, Chairman (UNP), Lahugala Pradeshiya Sabha. 
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Our area is very crowded and there is no space to do agriculture or anything 
which needs much space. To fulfil the people’s need we need foreign funds and 
support. (Respondent: Mr Rahuman, Revenue Supervisor, Kattankudy Urban 
Council.) 
Without space for agriculture and other activities local government cannot attract 
the revenue needed, so they need external funds. Another respondent noted that 
they do not have many facilities to serve people. He stated: “If foreign funding 
agencies can support us, we will be able to provide a better service to the people 
in the area.”925 
Foreign sources can provide important knowledge and technological skills. One 
respondent noted: “We need more training programmes and workshops which are 
conducted by the foreign-funded agencies. These can provide knowledge for us on 
local governing procedures.”926 The following respondent gave more prominence 
to the need for training and technological skills rather than funds. 
Sri Lankan local government bodies do not need huge amounts of foreign funds 
but they always need new knowledge-based training and technological skills from 
foreign countries to overcome the existing challenges. When the donor agencies 
feel confident about the local government development plans, they trust the local 
government and donate aid. The strong support of foreign donor agencies is a 
great gift for the local government. (Respondent: Mr Upul Nishantha, former 
Mayor, Matara Municipal Council.) 
This signifies that even if there are sufficient funds, to achieve success local 
government needs to understand the proper methods of service provision for 
development. For this, it needs knowledge-based training and technological skills. 
Respondents pointed to their need for aid-related management systems to guide 
and implement training methods and programmes which the NGOs had started but 
needed to continue. They also highlighted the need for better methods of fund 
dispersion and a continuous monitoring system to avoid misuse of foreign 
funds.927 
Local government representatives take the view that with proper guidance and a 
monitoring system, local benefits will be achieved. Administrative officials have 
the same view. 
925 Respondent: Mr H.G.K. Jagath Kumara, PHI Officer, Matara Municipal Council. 
926 Respondent: Mr D.A. Gamini, Opposition Leader (UNP), Hambantota Urban Council. 
927 Respondent: Mr Nimalchandra Ranasinghe, Representative (UNP), Galle Municipal Council, 
Respondent: Mr D.A. Gamini, Opposition Leader (UNP), Hambantota Urban Council and 
Respondent: Mr Padmasiri Ediriweera, Opposition Leader (UNP), Weligama Urban Council. 
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Work done by the NGOs is good and helpful. But there is a need to continue their 
work. After the NGO left, there was nobody to continue the guidance they had 
provided. As the people in the rural areas do not work without any guidance, the 
programmes and projects which the NGOs started are not continuing. There is no 
way to maintain or to repair the NGO-funded constructions. (Respondent: Mr 
M.K. Pradeep Kumara, Assistant Director-Planning, Suriyawewa Divisional 
Secretariat.) 
This respondent proposed the appointment of someone to maintain NGO-funded 
construction and to oversee on-going projects. In his view, if the NGOs deposited 
funds into a bank account for future use, then the repairs and maintenance of 
construction would yield results.928 
Eastern province respondents were cognisant of the need for mechanisms to 
handle funds carefully to avoid misuse. A local government representative said: 
“We need foreign funds and also a mechanism to handle them properly. When a 
number of institutions are involved in handling funds, misuse happens.” 929 
Another respondent said: “We need foreign aid. We are at a big disadvantage if 
we refuse NGOs. What we need is good mechanisms to deal with the NGOs.”930 
These respondents emphasised the importance of having the resources to ensure 
the projects and programmes developed with the assistance of NGOs could 
continue. Although most respondents proposed continuous guidance, management 
systems, and robust mechanisms to handle foreign aid in dealing with NGOs, few 
mentioned how this could become a reality. 
Some respondents proposed that local government was the most suitable for 
handling the supervision of foreign aid, projects and programmes. One local 
government representative said: “Foreign aid is always helpful to the PS. But the 
aid needs to be maintained by the PS by directing them to the most critical areas 
and needy people.” 931  Another local government representative spoke of 
supervision. 
We need foreign funds and NGO support because local government is not self-
sufficient enough to conduct development projects in the area. But there is a need 
to supervise the NGO work by the MC. Foreign aid needs to be used carefully to 
928 Respondent: Mr M.K. Pradeep Kumara, Assistant Director-Planning, Suriyawewa Divisional 
Secretariat. 
929 Respondent: Mr N. Noormohamad, Representative (UPFA), Trincomalee Urban Council. 
930 Respondent: Mr Subash Ponnamperuma, NGO Coordinating Officer, Trincomalee District 
Secretariat. 
931 Respondent: Mr M.D. Indika Thushara, Opposition Leader (JVP), Suriyawewa Pradeshiya 
Sabha. 
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fulfil the most important needs. (Respondent: Mr Jayantha Pathirana, 
Representative (JVP), Matara Municipal Council.) 
NGOs are recognised as having an important role to fulfil together with local 
government in identifying ways to approach local needs. One respondent 
mentioned: 
If the MC can obtain foreign aid directly and if the NGOs can reach through the 
MC, good results can be obtained. Now there is a long procedure to obtain foreign 
aid. Therefore the aid does not reach the most needed and also it is not prioritised 
according to needs. (Respondent: Mr Nimalchandra Ranasinghe, Representative 
(UNP), Galle Municipal Council.) 
As with southern province respondents, eastern province respondents proposed 
that foreign funds should reach local government directly. One issue raised was 
how to avoid the current long process of obtaining foreign funds. 
We like to have foreign funds. We need more foreign funds to serve the people in 
the area. Also we know that there is a long process to receive them. (Respondent: 
Mr S. Sanoon, Representative (UNP), Trincomalee Urban Council.) 
The chairmen of the Trincomalee UC and the Kinniya PS expressed similar views, 
as follows. 
The foreign funds should come directly to the UC. Then we can use them 
according to our plans. Otherwise when the funds pass through institutions, we 
receive less amounts which is not sufficient to develop the area. (Respondent: Mr 
K. Selvarajah, Chairman (TNA), Trincomalee Urban Council.) 
We need foreign funds. But when the foreign funds pass through various levels of 
government and several institutions, the PS receives a very small amount of funds. 
It is good if the NGOs can access the PS directly. (Respondent: Mr S.L.M. 
Jawadullah, Chairman (UPFA), Kinniya Pradeshiya Sabha.) 
Overall, the proposals of southern and eastern provinces’ local government 
representatives and local administrative officials are strongly in agreement that 
foreign funds are necessary to develop the area and to provide services to the 
people. Other than funds, the respondents highlighted the importance of expert 
knowledge, technology and training from the NGOs. Also they believed that there 
should be proper plans to use the foreign funds carefully. To continue the projects 
and programmes started by NGOs, and to maintain the work, local government 
representatives and local administrative officials looked to the continuous 
guidance and management of NGOs. Some local government respondents 
proposed the supervision and maintenance of funds by local government. They 
also proposed that funds should reach local government directly. The issues for 
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both southern and eastern provinces were very similar, with the same proposals on 
funding issues emerging from representatives of different political parties. 
However, the proposals of the southern province were more informed and detailed 
than those of the eastern province. Eastern province local government 
representatives were newly elected and during their short period in office they had 
not had received much experience in their current positions. 
8.3.2. Proposals: national level 
Some of the proposals emerging from both southern and eastern provinces were 
questioned by this researcher in discussion with senior administrative officials and 
national politicians. These respondents identified the lack of capacity at the local 
government level as a barrier to their effective liaison with NGOs. Even though 
local government has direct access to foreign funds, barrier limits were set on the 
funds received. A senior administrative official stated that, without reliable data 
bases, local government faces difficulties in obtaining foreign funds and support 
for projects. He further added: 
Normally the NGOs require a systematic data base to provide aid. There are data 
bases for the national bodies, but at the local level we can’t find information to 
provide information when NGOs request it. For example, the Road Development 
Authority (RDA) has a detailed data base about the roads under their control 
which is updated. But the roads in local government areas are always changing. 
New roads are emerging regularly in these areas. Therefore it is difficult to 
maintain a data base. But local government should try and prepare data bases. If 
they have a proper data base, in place local government can obtain direct support 
from the NGOs. (Respondent: Mr Gamini Gunasekara, Commissioner, Kaduwela 
Municipal Council.) 
It is assumed that local government lacks reliable data bases because they do not 
have the knowledge or expertise to prepare them or the relevant proposals to 
obtain funds. Knowledge and guidance is required and NGOs can play a role in 
providing this. 
As with local government representatives, some national politicians believe that 
there is a need to monitor and guide the work of NGOs and these should be 
friendly to local government and to NGOs. A member of parliament stated: 
Foreign aid and NGOs can provide a positive and satisfactory service for the 
villages. For example, in the past when we were school boys, the problem of 
malnutrition was identified. At that time foreign organisations came to the 
villages and donated milk and food. They did this by building links with 
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voluntary organisations. This programme was satisfactory. But problem is that 
when these organisations get involved in local projects, how their work should be 
monitored and guided. There should be a system established to do this. 
(Respondent: Mr Joseph Michael Perera, MP (UNP), Gampaha District.) 
Not only local government representatives, but also national politicians believe 
that NGOs can provide advantages for the local level collaboration. However, the 
above respondent offered no suggestions about how to implement or evaluate a 
system to monitor and guide NGOs. 
According to some respondents, power should be balanced to avoid overlaps and 
conflict between local political and administrative bodies. 
There is a need to balance the power of all authorities. The imbalance of power 
creates all the problems. District and divisional coordinating committees932 also 
play a significant role in balancing power. Here they can discuss their work and 
make decisions to avoid overlaps and clashes. (Respondent: Mr Gamini 
Gunasekara, Commissioner, Kaduwela Municipal Council.) 
Despite the presence of district and divisional coordinating committees, the 
responses of the political representatives and administrative officials at the local 
level, as mentioned earlier, reflect arguments that politico-administrative relations 
are not being carried out successfully. 
As discussed in chapter 5, the recommendations of several commissions and 
committees on restructuring the local government system in Sri Lanka have not 
implemented. Respondent senior administrative officials mentioned that even the 
recently drafted proposals cannot be implemented owing to the political 
influences and unwillingness of central government. For example, the draft 
national policy to improve the situation of local government has faced a number 
of difficulties and challenges. The cabinet did not pass the original policy 
document and recommended amending some parts of it. 933  The proposal for 
metropolitan and ward committees was rejected by central government which 
wanted to add Jana Sabhas. Metropolitan committees were aimed at making all 
932 District and divisional coordinating committee meetings take place once a month. The district 
coordinating committees head by a parliament member representing such district. District 
secretary and many other administrative officials, police officers in charge, heads of the local 
government bodies, representatives of the community-based organisations (CBOs) and also the 
NGO officials participate in these committees.  In the divisional coordinating committees, the PS 
chairman and the divisional secretary are the co-chairmen. Other local government representatives, 
divisional level administrative officials, police officer in charge, CBO representatives and NGO 
officials participate in these committees. 
933 Respondent: Mr M.L. Sunil Fernando, Advisor, Policy Division, Ministry of Local Government 
and Provincial Councils. 
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MCs and UCs in a city work together by discussing plans and problems. 
Furthermore, these committees aimed to reduce overlaps, as the following 
respondent stated. 
A large city cannot be developed without a metropolitan plan. To establish a 
metropolitan committee, as the first step we planned to connect 11 local 
government bodies (MCs and UCs) together in the Colombo district. Here we 
wanted to consider the Kelani river as the base. In a city, a river can do a lot of 
things. It beautifies the city and fulfils a lot of people’s needs. (Respondent: Mr 
M.L. Sunil Fernando, Advisor, Policy Division, Ministry of Local Government 
and Provincial Councils.) 
In its rejection central government proposed reducing the number of MCs and 
UCs in the metropolitan committee with only five local government bodies being 
added to the metropolitan committee. The proposed ward committees to the PS 
level required PSs to work together under a joint plan. But this proposal was 
rejected by central government. A senior administrative official noted: 
Finally we had to remove the proposed metropolitan committees and ward 
committees from the national policy because the central government wanted to 
replace such committees by adding Jana Sabhas. However there are no proper 
criteria to implement Jana Sabhas. These Jana Sabhas seem problematic because 
these institutions do not have a base or a plan. (Respondent: Mr M.L. Sunil 
Fernando, Advisor, Policy Division, Ministry of Local Government and 
Provincial Councils.) 
Government’s documents reveal that Jana Sabhas are part of the Gama Neguma 
programme mentioned in chapter 7. Jana Sabhas have been named as the 
principal organisations responsible for the implementation of Gama Neguma 
conducted by the Ministry of Economic Development through the district and 
divisional secretariats. 934  According to government, one Jana Sabha will be 
established in each PS area.935 
934 ‘Prosperous Village Programme: Jathika Saviya and Gama Neguma Programme’ (n.d.) 
http://203.94.76.60/AHF/presentation/3Jathikasaviya-Gamaneguma.ppt, accessed 04-07-2013. 
935 There will be an executive committee, the directing body of Jana Sabhas. Secretaries would be 
appointed to Jana Sabhas presumably by government. All government departments, NGOs and 
CBOs would be represented in Jana Sabhas. The members would not be elected; they would be 
ex-officio. All government employees at village level would be ex-officio members. The chairman 
of Jana Sabha would be the chairman of Pradeshiya Sabha. Moreover, Jana Sabha would prepare 
a budget for its area with people’s participation. It would approve all new projects within the area 
of Jana Sabha. Even NGO projects would have to be approved by the Jana Sabha and included in 
the budget (Senanayake, R. M. B. (2011) ‘Jana Sabhas’, 
http://www.island.lk/index.php?page_cat=article-details&page=article-details&code_title=27233, 
accessed 02-07-2013). 
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If the Jana Sabhas are not to replace PSs and divisional secretariats, then the 
establishment of another institutional mechanism under the name of Jana Sabhas 
will be an extra burden on the country. Commentators question: 
How will the Jana Sabhas get funds? They depend only on grants from the 
central government? Whoever pays the piper calls the tune. Will they be 
politicised units? How will the secretaries be appointed – on merit on political 
affiliation? How would the people come in? Will the Jana Sabha be an executive 
and supervisory body or only a planning and budgeting body? Despite the 
amendment (13th amendment to the constitution), however, the government 
structure remains centralised; almost all provincial activities are tightly controlled 
from the centre and the local authorities have limited fiscal and administrative 
authority. What will be the role of the Jana Sabhas within this context?936 
These critiques show the difficulties of establishing the proposed Jana Sabhas. 
Although the PS chairman is supposed to be the chairman of Jana Sabha, it can be 
identified that the proposed Jana Sabha is mostly connected with central 
government-led administrative bodies rather than with provincial councils or local 
government bodies. Critics point out that, “the new Jana Sabha system of 
government looks set to gut the powers of local level state structures in Sri Lanka, 
strengthening the hands of the Colombo regime.” 937  For Gunasekara, the 
government’s attempt to introduce a local level Jana Sabha system is connected 
with the government’s recentralisation efforts. This system will take over many of 
the responsibilities of local government. In addition: 
As currently discussed, Sri Lanka’s Jana Sabhas will be appointed (by whom is 
not yet known), not elected institutions, and they will be given most of the powers 
currently enjoyed by provincial councils and local government authorities.938 
One respondent noted: “The idea of Jana Sabhas is new, but entirely political and 
opportunistic. The only aim of these institutions is to give appointments to 
unemployed graduates.” 939 Gunasekara also critiques the government’s plan to 
provide jobs for graduates through implementing Jana Sabhas which was one of 
the SLFP-led UPFA’s election promises. The proposal to enrol 5,000 graduates at 
village level purely on the recommendation of the SLFP electoral organisers 
without conducting interviews940 reveals that the Jana Sabha system is a political 
936 Ibid. 
937 Gunasekara, T. (2011) ‘Rajapakse Devolution’, 
http://himalmag.com/component/content/article/4548-rajapakse-devolution.html, accessed 02-07-
2013. 
938 Ibid. 
939 Respondent: Mr Joseph Michael Perera, MP (UNP), Gampaha District. 
940 Gunasekara, (2011). 
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project. It would extend the centralisation of authoritative power, and disempower 
provincial and local levels of government. 
Re-activating Gramodaya Mandalas is a popular proposal for some writers. As 
mentioned in chapter 5, Gramodaya Mandalas were not abolished but 
automatically de-activated through changes in local government law. Leitan 
proposes re-activating Gramodaya Mandalas in terms of as ‘bridging institutions’. 
Because Gramodaya Mandalas had constitutional recognition under the 13th 
amendment they would be suitable for connecting village level groups to the 
Pradeshiya Sabhas.941 A member of parliament noted: 
The government has totally neglected the Gramodaya Mandalas. Gramodaya 
Mandalas have not been demolished. But these institutions were de-activated by 
the government. If the government is willing, these institutions can be re-activated. 
(Respondent: Mr Joseph Michael Perera, MP (UNP), Gampaha District.) 
It was 2005 that the Ministry of Provincial Councils and Local Government942 
took steps to re-launch Gramodaya Mandalas, confirmed in a performance report 
about their revitalisation.943 A national newspaper reported that the Ministry of 
Provincial Councils and Local Government re-launched Gramodaya Mandalas on 
17th June 2005.944 Pilot programmes commenced in 11 districts to facilitate the 
activities of Gramodaya Mandalas, and a unit was established under the ministry. 
The objective of Gramodaya Mandala revitalisation programme was to ensure the 
availability of active community organisation at the village level, which would be 
useful for rural development. These organisations were expected to work closely 
with local government bodies in developing their areas. The ministry expected 
that this initiative would also create a forum for all community organisations to 
meet and participate in the development process.945 
However, after 2007 the Gramodaya Mandala re-launch took a different direction 
led by a funding proposal called Jana Diriya.946 The ministry decided to establish 
941 Leitan, G.R.T. (2004) ‘The Role of Local Government in Citizen Participation’, Governance, 
No. 4, Vol. 4, Sri Lanka Institute of Local Governance, Colombo-07, pp. 54-55. 
942 Prior to 2006, the Ministry of Local Government and Provincial Councils was called as the 
Ministry of Provincial Councils and Local Government. The Minister of Provincial Councils and 
Local Government at that time was Janaka Bandara Tennakoon. He was in the ministership from 
2004 to 2010. 
943 Perfomance-2005 & Future Plans-2006, Ministry of Provincial Councils and Local 
Government, Colombo-02, p. 10. 
944 Kumarasinghe, U. (n.d.) ‘Gramodaya Mandalas Re-launched’, 
http://www.dailynews.lk/2005/06/18/pol18.htm, accessed 02-07-2013. 
945 Perfomance-2005 & Future Plans-2006, p. 10. 
946 Literal meaning is people’s courage. 
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this fund to provide investment support from local government bodies to CBOs 
working at the local level.947 In establishing the Jana Diriya fund, government 
amended the Gramodaya Mandala Fund Act, 948  renaming the Gramodaya 
Mandala fund the Jana Diriya fund. 949  In 2009 a Jana Diriya division was 
established in the Ministry of Local Government and Provincial Councils. 950 
However, expectations about the viability of the Jana Diriya fund were not 
realised and it collapsed, as the following respondent noted: 
Gramodaya Mandalas still have the constitutional recognition but nobody wants 
to activate these institutions again. There was a large amount of money in the 
Gramodaya Mandala fund, and we prepared procedures to transfer this fund to 
start a new programme called Jana Diriya. This aimed to help PS areas. But the 
Jana Diriya has been taken over by the Ministry of Economic Development and 
the President. So the expected results have not been achieved. (Respondent: Mr 
M.L. Sunil Fernando, Advisor, Policy Division, Ministry of Local Government 
and Provincial Councils.) 
This points to another recentralising attempt by the central government, and as 
such attempts by the Ministry of Local Government and Provincial Councils to re-
launch Gramodaya Mandalas have discontinued. Even with renaming the fund, 
the expected aims of Jana Diriya have not been fulfilled. From 2009 there is no 
evidence of Gramodaya Mandala or Jana Diriya implementation processes 
occurring. This reveals that government favours extending its centralisation 
agenda. In 2010 the Minister of Local Government and Provincial Councils 
changed. Although reform processes have not been successful because of 
government disagreements and influence, it is evident that during the period of 
former minister Janaka Bandara Tennakoon, certain attempts were made to 
restructure local government aimed at strengthening decentralisation. Instead the 
government has discontinued these attempts by replacing the Minister of Local 
Government and Provincial Councils. One respondent highlighted defects in 
policy implementation, as follows. 
We have drafted new local government policy. But still we are not able to 
implement it. Central government always tries to take over the decentralised 
947 Performance-2007 & Future Plans-2008, p. 18 and Performance-2008 & Future Plans-2009, 
Ministry of Local Government and Provincial Councils, Colombo-02, p. 36. 
948 The Gramodaya Mandala fund was established in 1982 to grant financial and other assistance 
to Gramodaya Mandalas at that time to carry out their work (Gramodaya Mandala Fund Act, No. 
28 of 1982). 
949 Gramodaya Mandala Fund (Amendment) Act, No. 68 of 2009. 
950 Progress Report 2009, Future Plans 2010, Ministry of Local Government and Provincial 
Councils, Colombo-02, p. 4. 
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powers and has become involved in many projects which belong to local 
government. The Defence Ministry has become involved in local government 
matters too. For example, they work arbitrarily and forcefully in the Colombo MC 
area. They do favours without informing the Colombo MC. This is a bad trend. In 
every way local government is losing its power and becoming helpless and 
useless. With these actions, the most badly affected are the people. (Respondent: 
Mr D.P. Hettiarachchi, Retired Additional Secretary, Ministry of Local 
Government and Provincial Councils; and Consultant, EML Consultants.) 
This response further shows the political influences of central government in 
failing to implement proposals to restructure local government systems and, 
instead, points to the take-over of the powers at local government level. Another 
respondent added to this point: 
It is very difficult to work under political influences. We have good plans but 
there are no opportunities to implement them. Everywhere there are restrictions. 
We want to serve the people by developing policies and implementing them 
correctly. We are trying to work tactfully with the central government to achieve 
positive results. (Respondent: Mr M.L. Sunil Fernando, Advisor, Policy Division, 
Ministry of Local Government and Provincial Councils.) 
This indicates that there is still hope for improvements in local government in Sri 
Lanka. Clearly local government representatives and local administrative officials 
are focused on obtaining foreign funding, knowledge, technology and guidance. 
This would then give them sufficient funds to develop key areas and to provide 
for people’s needs. But there are major discrepancies between proposals at the 
national level and those at the local level. When national level officials complain 
about the non-implementation of proposals and about the centralisation of power, 
the local level shows little concern about their lack of power. In turn, respondents 
at the national level were not concerned about foreign funding and its dispersal at 
the local level. Despite this the interest at the local level to obtain foreign funds, 
knowledge, technology and guidance using their remaining legal power is a 
positive trend. 
8.4. Summary 
In examining the perspectives of the respondents, this chapter identified three 
main problem areas pertaining to the Sri Lankan local government. It has not 
always been the lack of legal power, but rather the lack of knowledge of local 
government representatives in terms of their power which is the major problem. It 
is also evident that local government representatives have the potential to obtain 
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knowledge about legal procedures. Although they complain about the provincial 
councils, local government representatives realise that they have sufficient power 
to work if they have the support of funds. Local government representatives were 
not proposing to amend local government policies but were proposing to abolish 
provincial councils because the provincial councils had barred local government 
from obtaining central government funds and had also taken over local 
government funding sources. Due to the lack of funding, local government 
representatives and local administrative officials propose obtaining funds from 
foreign sources and also knowledge, technology and guidance from NGOs to 
develop the areas and secure people’s needs. This is clearly different from the 
proposals of national level administrative officials and some authors who argue 
amendments to Sri Lankan local government policies will suffice. Additionally, 
connecting local political and administrative bodies, implementing a metropolitan 
plan, re-activating Gramodaya Mandalas, and launching the Jana Diriya 
programme found prominence among national policy makers. Within these local-
national contrasts, it is evident that there are opportunities in Sri Lankan local 
government for NGOs to be involved providing support in developing solutions to 
problems. The next chapter focuses on the ways in which this involvement can 
materialise and assesses the most suitable direction for NGOs to support local 
initiatives.  
242 
 
Chapter 9 
NGO involvement in local government and local development in 
Sri Lanka 
9.1. Introduction 
As outlined in chapter 6, NGO involvement in welfare, development, human 
rights, relief and rehabilitation in Sri Lanka has developed into a significant issue. 
The Sri Lankan government has, over time, had both collaborative and 
antagonistic relations with NGOs. Apart from a small number of municipal 
councils (MCs) with long-term connections to foreign municipalities, Sri Lankan 
local government organisation has not had links with NGOs until the disastrous 
tsunami in December 2004. Prior to the tsunami, obtaining foreign support was an 
unfamiliar concept for local government bodies in Sri Lanka. When large amounts 
of foreign funds and resources flowed into Sri Lanka in the post-tsunami period, 
there were no proper mechanisms at local, provincial, or central government level 
to manage the aid in an effective way. Additional foreign aid flowed into Sri 
Lanka in the post-war period from May 2009 and was managed centrally with 
limitations placed on the role NGOs could play in how it was used. Although 
NGOs have been required to ensure their work supports the central government 
agendas some have continued to be involved in local development through 
various projects and programmes.  
Chapter 7 argued that centrally-led foreign-funded large scale construction 
projects have not effectively addressed local needs. As reported in chapter 8, 
respondents highlighted the lack of funds, resources, knowledge, technology and 
guidance available to local government in Sri Lanka. Obtaining support from 
NGOs to carry on locally-led development and to fulfil people’s needs at the local 
level was the main proposal put forward by respondents. The purpose of this 
chapter is to outline the key features of the involvement of NGOs in local 
development and analyse the results. This chapter, therefore, addresses the 
questions raised in chapter 2 about whether the involvement of NGOs leads to 
improved forms of local governance and local development, and investigates how 
NGOs might work more effectively with vulnerable sections of Sri Lankan 
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society. It explores whether foreign aid can be delivered in a way that does not 
reinforce dependence or hinders development. 
The chapter examines the views of 32 respondents. Of the 32, 14 were local 
government representatives, 951  11 provincial, district and local administrative 
officials, 952 and seven were officials attached to NGOs. There are three main 
sections in this chapter. The first section examines the issues and problems related 
to foreign aid and NGO involvement at the local level through the perspectives of 
local government representatives and local level administrative officials. The 
second section examines a number of foreign-funded projects which were 
conducted at the local level characterised by adherence to central government 
agendas. The third section examines a number of foreign-funded and recently 
completed projects implemented at the local government level in the southern and 
eastern provinces. 
9.2. Foreign aid, NGO involvement and local government: issues and 
problems 
The tsunami led to major damage in 70 of 311 local government areas in seven 
MC areas, 14 UC areas and 49 PS areas in Sri Lanka.  Damage was estimated at 
Rs.2833 million, which is approximately US$30 million. 953  It led to the 
destruction of many local government buildings and paralysed local government 
service deliveries. Roads and bridges were destroyed, public markets and 
shopping complexes were ruined and there was a loss of income from taxes and 
rates which left local government bodies in a most difficult fiscal situation.  
Irreparable damage was done to many local government records.954 
The affected areas received large amounts of foreign aid and a remarkable level of 
NGO support following the tsunami and, later, the war. Given this situation, there 
were problems with the effective management and utilisation of aid. These 
included political interference in the planning, implementation and allocation of 
951 Of the 14 local government representatives, five represent MCs, five represent urban councils 
(UCs) and four represent Pradeshiya Sabhas (PSs). Of these 14, 10 were from the southern 
province and four from the eastern province. 
952 Of the 11 administrative officials, seven were from the southern province and four from the 
eastern province. 
953 Performance-2005 & Future Plans-2006, Ministry of Provincial Councils and Local 
Government, Colombo-02, p. 12. 
954 Ibid. 
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funds; staffing and related problems in project management; excessive conditions 
imposed by donors; and complex government procedures imposed on NGOs.955 
The destruction of infrastructure, the disappearance of public records, and the 
sheer number of donors and programmes created a complex web of aid 
transactions that were difficult for both donors and recipients to manage.956 The 
risk of poor coordination between many government bodies and NGOs resulted in 
the reduction and effectiveness of foreign assistance. The reluctance by certain 
NGOs to engage with government administrative structures was part of this 
problem.957 
The problems associated with the government distribution of aid, described above, 
led to NGOs often being seen as a more efficient means of aid delivery. 958 
However, in the process NGOs were unable to fully bypass government. Some 
NGO-related literature suggests there should be a collaborative approach 
involving effective coordination between NGOs, central, local government and 
community groups. 959  This literature recognises that, despite their real and 
perceived inadequacies, local government bodies in Sri Lanka can, and should, 
play a positive role in such coordination.960 
The involvement of NGOs in local government and local development is rarely 
touched on by Sri Lankan scholars. Some authors such as Fernando and 
Thangarajah have highlighted the importance of NGOs at the local level, and 
Leitan has proposed building a coordinating mechanism to link NGOs and the 
other local level organisations with local government bodies towards an effective 
performance of local government, 961 but these have not been taken further by 
researchers. This thesis seeks to address that gap. 
955 Jayasuriya, S.; Steele, P.; Weerakoon, D.; Knight-John, M. and Arunatilake, N. (2005) Post-
Tsunami Recovery: Issues and Challenges in Sri Lanka, The Institute of Policy Studies (IPS) of Sri 
Lanka and the Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI), Tokyo, Japan in collaboration with The 
Asian Economics Centre, University of Melbourne, Australia, p. 33. 
956 Ibid., p. 34. 
957 Ibid., p. 45. 
958 Ibid., p. 46. 
959 Ibid., pp. 3, 46. 
960 Ibid., p. 46. 
961 See Fernando, L. (2003) ‘Local Governance in the Uva Province: Monaragala Pradeshiya 
Sabha’ and Thangarajah, Y. (2003) ‘Local Governance in the Eastern Province: Kaluvanchikudy 
Pradeshiya Sabha & Kattankudy Urban Council’, Local Governance and Conflict Management in 
Sri Lanka-Final Report, Sri Lanka Institute of Local Governance and Berghof Foundation for 
Conflict Studies and Leitan, G.R.T. (2001) ‘Sri Lanka’s Institutions of Local Governance: Their 
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The involvement of external organisations in local development in Sri Lanka is 
highlighted in some writing, 962  but these only provide descriptions of the 
completed and on-going local development projects of some of the leading donor 
agencies such as the Asia Foundation, ADB, WB, UNDP, AusAID and USAID. 
The ‘national policy declaration for local government’ which was followed by the 
‘national policy on local government’ (Gazette No. 1632/26), mentions one of its 
aims to obtain the support of international agencies, as follows: 
The contribution and support of the national and international resource agencies 
will be provided, for the purpose of building capacity development and providing 
necessary computer hardware in line with the applications of new technology.963 
There is no expectation in this statement of international resource agencies other 
than technological equipment and support. The annual performance reports 
published by the Ministry of Local Government and Provincial Councils contain 
long lists of foreign-funded projects, which highlight the ministry’s cooperation 
and partnership with foreign agencies such as the WB, ADB, JICA, UNDP, 
USAID, EU, FCM and Asia Foundation. 964  These reports provide brief 
descriptions of the foreign-funded projects at the local government level but offer 
no wide analysis. The documents published by certain NGOs on their projects at 
the local government level provide more detailed information compared to 
government documents. 
Against this background of aid distribution problems and limited literature on 
NGO involvement at the local government level, this section addresses the 
perspectives of the southern and eastern province local government 
representatives and the local administrative officials regarding the ways in which 
they dealt with foreign aid and NGOs, and the problems which occurred in this 
process. 
Present Status and Possibilities for the Future’, Governance, No. 1, Vol. 1, Sri Lanka Institute of 
Local Governance, Colombo-07. 
962 See Overview of the Local Government System: Towards Participatory Democracy in Sri 
Lankan Society (2011) Marga Institute, Ethul Kotte, Colombo, p. 32. 
963 National Policy on Local Government (Gazette No. 1632/26) 18th December 2009, p. 10. 
964 Performance-2010 & Future Plans-2011, Ministry of Local Government and Provincial 
Councils, Colombo-02, p. 9. 
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9.2.1. Southern province 
Only a very few of the local government areas in the southern province received 
foreign funds and resources prior to the tsunami. One exception, as mentioned in 
chapter 8, is the Galle MC which operated a sister-city relationship with the city 
of Velsen which led to the flow of funds and support from the Netherlands. The 
sister-city links commemorate the Dutch-related background of Galle, 965  the 
ancient Dutch fort and other historical sites which help cement the connection. 
Some organisations, such as the NAAL, and the ‘Velsen helps Galle’ Foundation, 
helped in creating connections between the city of Galle and the city of Velsen.966 
While Galle MC received support from the Dutch government, and after the 
tsunami, the government of Netherlands extended support to some other Sri 
Lankan local government areas as well. 
Prior to the tsunami, and apart from the sister-city arrangements in Galle, there 
was no history of foreign funds, resources or development guidance being 
provided in this area.967 Most of the foreign aid that subsequently arrived was 
aimed at helping those affected by the tsunami and with reconstruction 
initiatives.968 Local government bodies in the province received large amounts of 
foreign aid following the tsunami, but there were many problems in managing that 
aid. Working with NGOs and handling large amounts of foreign aid was new to 
local government bodies, and local government representatives and staff lacked 
relevant knowledge and management experience, as noted by one respondent.  
“We were unable to manage the tsunami funds. If the MC had managed these 
funds properly at that time, we might have achieved more advantages.”969 
Another noted: 
965 Respondent: Mr Methsiri De Silva, Mayor (UPFA), Galle Municipal Council and Respondent: 
Mr Nimalchandra Ranasinghe, Representative (UNP), Galle Municipal Council. 
966 LOGO South Country Programme for Sri Lanka/Solid Waste Management of Local 
Government Bodies in Sri Lanka (2006) VNG International, The Hague, p. 5 (http://www.cities-
localgovernments.org/committees/cib/Upload/compendium/EN_38_LOGO_South_Country_Progr
amme_Sri_Lanka.pdf, accessed 21-06-2013). 
967 Respondent: Mr Mohammad Nabavi, Opposition Leader (UNP), Matara Municipal Council, 
Respondent: Mr Padmasiri Ediriweera, Opposition Leader (UNP), Weligama Urban Council and 
Respondent: Mr D.A. Gamini, Opposition Leader (UNP), Hambantota Urban Council. 
968 Respondent: Mr Nimalchandra Ranasinghe, Representative (UNP), Galle Municipal Council, 
Respondent: Mr Mohammad Nabavi, Opposition Leader (UNP), Matara Municipal Council, 
Respondent: Mr Padmasiri Ediriweera, Opposition Leader (UNP), Weligama Urban Council and 
Respondent: Mr D.A. Gamini, Opposition Leader (UNP), Hambantota Urban Council. 
969 Respondent: Mr Nimalchandra Ranasinghe, Representative (UNP), Galle Municipal Council. 
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In the post-tsunami period we were not able to control or organise the aid. At that 
time we spent more time re-settling the tsunami-affected people. Our offices were 
washed away and there were no proper plans to obtain aid according to the 
procedures. (Respondent: Mr D.A. Gamini, Opposition Leader (UNP), 
Hambantota Urban Council.) 
Other respondents added that there was a lack of capacity and opportunity to 
prepare the proposals and plans needed to obtain additional aid. One respondent 
noted: 
There were no proper development plans for the PS. Many donor agencies came 
to Suriyawewa and also were willing to provide aid. But the problem was that the 
PS did not have project plans to show them and therefore the PS missed many 
opportunities. (Respondent: Mr M.D. Indika Thushara, Opposition Leader (JVP), 
Suriyawewa Pradeshiya Sabha.) 
In these situations, a large amount of aid was returned.970 Disagreements between 
the NGOs and government authorities also resulted in the return of aid. 
Representatives of the Hambantota UC highlighted this issue. According to the 
deputy chairman of the UC, “the politicians of the area did not agree with the 
foreign agendas and therefore a lot of aid was returned.”971 These views were 
reinforced by the opposition leader of the UC who stated: 
Many donor agencies came with their own agendas. Sometimes the political and 
administrative authorities did not allow them to work totally according to their 
own agendas. Therefore there were conflicts between the donors and the 
authorities. (Respondent: Mr D.A. Gamini, Opposition Leader (UNP), 
Hambantota Urban Council.) 
These statements signify that in many instances there was a lack of a shared 
understanding between the NGOs and government authorities at the local level 
about the exact needs of the areas and where aid should be directed. 
Local government representatives expressed dissatisfaction with and suspicion 
towards NGOs. One respondent said: “After the tsunami, many NGOs came and 
were involved in the reconstruction work. But we were not satisfied with the 
quality of their work at all.”972  Another respondent noted: 
Before accepting them, we needed to select the good and bad NGOs. This is a 
challenge. Some NGOs had bad objectives. For example, we received an offer of 
a huge amount of funds from Netherlands. They wanted to establish a kind of 
farm called ‘Rob’s Garden’. But finally we found that the main aim of this project 
970 Respondent: Mr S. Mubarak Maulana, Deputy Chairman (UPFA), Hambantota Urban Council 
and Respondent: Mr Nimalchandra Ranasinghe, Representative (UNP), Galle Municipal Council. 
971 Respondent: Mr S. Mubarak Maulana, Deputy Chairman (UPFA), Hambantota Urban Council. 
972 Respondent: Mr Jayantha Pathirana, Representative (JVP) Matara Municipal Council. 
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was to convert people to Christianity. Therefore we rejected it. (Respondent: Mr 
Anura Amarasiri Narangoda, Chairman (UPFA), Baddegama Pradeshiya Sabha.) 
Suspicions continued regarding NGOs, particularly the connection between some 
of the NGOs and religious groups, as indicated in the statement above. 
The fact that the foreign aid which arrived in the wake of the tsunami went 
through dual institutional lines – political and administrative bodies – contributed 
to complications. As the district secretariats and divisional secretariats are under 
the direct control of the central government, most of the tsunami aid came through 
these administrative bodies. As a result, local government was not able to obtain 
such funds for its own development purposes. A representative of the Galle MC 
stated the problems they had with the Galle district secretary in the aftermath of 
the tsunami. 
In the post-tsunami period, the district secretary did not support obtaining aid. 
Most of the aid came through the district secretariat. But most of the time the 
district secretary neglected and postponed facilitating NGOs. There were many 
disadvantages due to the failures of such authorities. The aid did not reach the 
most needy people. (Respondent: Mr Nimalchandra Ranasinghe, Representative 
(UNP), Galle Municipal Council.) 
In contrast with this perspective from an elected representative, administrative 
officials stated that they believed they were the most appropriate authorities to 
handle foreign aid and NGOs. 
There are many NGOs which conduct projects in the area. Their funds go through 
the district secretariat. These funds are different from the funds which reach the 
MC. We coordinate and manage the funds always. We give guidance and support 
to the NGOs. It is a part of our job. (Respondent: Ms Rupika Rajakaruna, NGO 
Coordinating Officer, Galle District Secretariat.) 
The divisional secretariat has a better relationship with the NGOs than the PS. 
There are separate meetings for the NGOs that are involved in major projects in 
the area. Again there is a monthly committee meeting to discuss the progress of 
all the projects in the whole district.973 (Respondent: Mr M.K. Pradeep Kumara, 
Assistant Director-Planning, Suriyawewa Divisional Secretariat.) 
These respondents believe local government was marginalised in aid distribution, 
with the role of administrative officials to the fore rather than local political 
representatives. 
973 This refers to district coordinating committees mentioned in chapter 8. 
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9.2.2. Eastern province 
The eastern province, in contrast with the southern province, attracted much 
foreign aid in the aftermath of the war. The tsunami struck while the war in the 
north and east was still underway, and as a consequence many local government 
bodies were not activated, leading to a greater role by central government-
controlled administrative authorities in the control of aid management process.974 
Following both events, according to eastern province respondents, many NGOs 
offered support to the eastern province people in order to rebuild the area.975 In 
this province, local administrative bodies received funds to address the needs of 
specific ethnic groups, given the more multicultural character of the area. For 
example, the Kalmunai divisional secretariat received funds from local and 
foreign Muslim associations and from Arab agencies because it is an area with a 
Muslim majority.976 
As with the southern province, aid management of the eastern province was also 
characterised by problems, resulting in what was described as the misuse of funds 
and resources. A representative of the Trincomalee UC stated: 
The UC received foreign funds after the tsunami. But the criteria for obtaining 
and using them were problematic. Not only the UC but also many government 
authorities mishandled the responsibility of aid management. Therefore there was 
misuse of aid. (Respondent: Mr N. Noormohamad, Representative (UPFA), 
Trincomalee Urban Council.) 
However, according to a number of eastern province respondents, NGOs were 
also partly responsible for the failures in the process of aid distribution and usage. 
One respondent said: “The NGOs try to work according to their agendas without 
listening to the government. We cannot trust their work at all.”977 Another added 
that, “some NGOs work well. But most of them use funds for their own benefit 
and contribute small funds to the needy. Therefore we cannot trust all of them.”978 
These statements do not reject all NGOs and their work. There were NGOs which 
worked effectively at the local level as discussed below. Some of the failures of 
974 Respondent: Mr Mohamad Mussil, Assistant Director-Planning, Kinniya Divisional Secretariat. 
975 Respondent: Mr Subash Ponnamperuma, NGO Coordinating Officer, Trincomalee District 
Secretariat and Respondent: Mr George Pillai, Deputy Mayor (UPFA), Batticaloa Municipal 
Council. 
976 Respondent: Mr Abul Hassan, Administrative Officer, Kalmunai Divisional Secretariat. 
977 Respondent: Mr Subash Ponnamperuma, NGO Coordinating Officer, Trincomalee District 
Secretariat. 
978 Respondent: Mr K. Selvarajah, Chairman (TNA), Trincomalee Urban Council. 
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NGOs, therefore, did not stop local political representatives and administrative 
officials from expecting support from the NGOs.979  
Overall, local government in the southern and eastern provinces received large 
amounts of foreign aid, but the failures of local government and other government 
authorities to manage the aid, the lack of knowledge in handling the aid and in 
working with the NGOs, the institutional complexities, and the disagreements and 
suspicion towards some of the NGOs made for a complicated and difficult 
situation. Despite disagreements, dissatisfactions, suspicions and limitations, 
several NGOs have worked well in local communities. 
9.3. Central government and NGO projects 
Central government involvement in the provincial and local level 
construction/reconstruction work has been a prominent feature in the post-tsunami 
and post-war situations in Sri Lanka. For example, central government established 
a Task Force to Rebuild the Nation (TAFREN) which is the single coordinating 
agency to manage tsunami aid and to organise reconstruction. However, there 
have been problems with its overall effectiveness which some have attributed to 
political interference. These include the influences of central government 
ministries on TAFREN’s staff appointments and decisions.980 
The Ministry of Provincial Councils and Local Government noted that the 
mandate and the mission of the ministry made the reconstruction and 
rehabilitation of the provincial and local government assets destroyed by the 
tsunami, a direct responsibility of the ministry and not the provincial or local 
government.981  
As the parental organisation of the decentralised agencies, i.e. provincial councils 
and municipal councils, urban councils and Pradeshiya Sabhas, this ministry is 
expected to deliver the wide variety of services related to the rehabilitation and 
reconstruction of those agencies.982 
The same report goes on to note: “Within the parameters of the strategic 
framework of the national implementation plan for rebuilding the tsunami-
979 Respondent: Mr K. Selvarajah, Chairman (TNA), Trincomalee Urban Council and Respondent: 
Mr Subash Ponnamperuma, NGO Coordinating Officer, Trincomalee District Secretariat. 
980 Jayasuriya; Steele; Weerakoon; Knight-John and Arunatilake, (2005), p. 45. 
981 Performance-2005 & Future Plans-2006, p. 12. 
982 Ibid. 
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affected area, the priorities have been decided.” 983  In the ministry’s annual 
performance reports, reference is made to a number of foreign-funded projects 
which have been implemented by the ministry with or without the cooperation of 
the other government bodies.984 More than 30 projects can be identified which are 
totally or partly related to the local level in the southern and eastern provinces.985 
This section describes a number of foreign-funded projects implemented at the 
local level following central government agendas, and analyses their significance. 
This section investigates whether working according to central government 
agendas undermines NGOs in addressing local needs, and the extent to which 
central government involvement in foreign aid distribution at the local level 
reinforces dependence and hinders development. 
9.3.1. Local Government Infrastructure Improvement Project (LGIIP) 
The first foreign-funded project was the LGIIP, a semi-government project 
conducted through the Ministry of Local Government and Provincial Councils, 
which covered the whole country, except the Colombo district, for the period 
2006-2011. The ADB provided US$50 million to implement this project 
comprising 75 per cent of the total project expenditure. The central government 
contributed 18 per cent with seven per cent from local government.986 As part of 
its assistance to the local loans and development fund (LL&DF)987 needed for 
implementing the planned LGIIP, the ADB supplied technical assistance to 
strengthen local government infrastructure financing in Sri Lanka. 988  LGIIP 
targeted the building of provincial council and local government capacities to 
983 Ibid., pp. 12-13. 
984 The annual performance reports from 2005 to 2010 were available at the ministry at the time of 
the field research. 
985 A number of the foreign-funded project descriptions are included in the Appendix VI. 
986 Respondent: Mr Lal Induruwage, Project Director, LGIIP, ADB-Sri Lanka. 
987 LL&DF is a statutory body incorporated by the Ordinance No. 22 of 1916. This institute is one 
of the oldest financial institutions in Sri Lanka and provides loans at concessionary rates for local 
infrastructure and revenue generating projects. The fund operates on an annual financial provision 
allocated through the annual budget estimates of the Ministry of Local Government and Provincial 
Councils repayable in 25 years at an interest rate of six per cent per annum. By the year 2010, 
LL&DF has become the foremost financial agency for the improvement of local government 
infrastructure (Performance-2010 & Future Plans-2011, pp. 19-21). To obtain grants and loans 
from LL&DF, local government has to meet certain criteria, including the capacities for existing 
revenue generation, performance of existing loan repayment, and the ability to contribute a 
minimum seven per cent of the project cost (‘Projects with the Assistance of the Asian 
Development Bank’ (n.d.) op.cit.). 
988 Technical Assistance Report (2005) Asian Development Bank, http://www.adb.org, accessed 
02-01-2011. 
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strengthen the LL&DF. 989 Under LGIIP, several components were eligible for 
financing.990 Table 9.1 sets out the ways in which the grants and loans have been 
distributed to local government bodies. 
Table 9.1: Terms of financial assistance to local government bodies 
 Grants (%) Loans 
(%) 
Local government 
contribution (%) 
Pradeshiya Sabha 60 33 7 
Urban Council 50 43 7 
Municipal Council 40 53 7 
Source: ‘Projects with the Assistance of the Asian Development Bank’ (n.d.) 
http://www.pclg.gov.lk/en/sub_pgs/projects_1_4.html, accessed 14-06-2013. 
 
Figure 9.1 shows the LL&DF flow and LGIIP implementation. Analysis of the 
implementation of LGIIP shows that the donor agency’s role was limited, and 
there was no direct communication between local government and the agency. All 
project proposals, funding and repayments went through provincial level to the 
national level ministry. The ministry planned the LGIIP and handled the LL&DF 
where a project was in line with the central government’s development 
priorities,991 especially where the pursuit of economic growth through investment 
in large scale infrastructure was apparent.992 
At the provincial level, the CLG had the responsibility of controlling and directing 
LL&DF (see Figure 9.1). The CLG maintains a data base of local government in 
the province, including the current needs of local government.  
Knowing the needs and also the defects of local government in the area is very 
important. Also it needed to know the successes and losses of each local 
government. Various projects related to local government are handled through the 
CLG’s office. For example, the ADB-funded LGIIP reached the appropriate local 
government bodies through the CLG’s office. (Respondent: Mr Saman 
Pandikorala, Provincial Local Government Commissioner, Provincial Local 
Government Commission, Southern Province.) 
The ministry claims that under LGIIP, there was potential for local government to 
plan for the improvement of its basic infrastructure and living conditions, and that 
this project was designed to be decentralised, providing local government with the 
decision making role to identify, decide and apply for sub-project finance from 
989 ‘Projects with the Assistance of the Asian Development Bank’ (n.d.). 
990 These include community water supply, roads, drainage and communal sewerage, solid waste 
management, and basic health clinics, public libraries, and recreational parks (Technical 
Assistance Report (2005)). 
991 Respondent: Mr Lal Induruwage, Project Director, LGIIP, ADB-Sri Lanka. 
992 ‘LGIIP’ (n.d.) http://www.adb.org, accessed 02-01-2011. 
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the LL&DF.993 As discussed in chapter 8, most local government representatives 
and staff said they did not have the knowledge and skills to write proposals to 
obtain funds, leading to situations where the resources local government received 
from LGIIP were less than expected. It is not evident that local government made 
creative decisions to the LL&DF for funding. 
Figure 9.1: LGIIP implementation 
Source: Information provided by respondent: Mr Lal Induruwage, Project Director, LGIIP, ADB-
Sri Lanka. 
9.3.2. North East Local Services Improvement Project (NELSIP) 
The WB-funded NELSIP has been conducted by two ministries: the Ministry of 
Economic Development; and the Ministry of Local Government and Provincial 
Councils. The project is scheduled to be implemented between May 2010 to 
993 ‘Projects with the Assistance of the Asian Development Bank’ (n.d.). 
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December 2015,994 at a total cost of US$86 million, with US$50 million from a 
WB loan, US$34 million from the Sri Lankan government and US$2 million from 
community contributions.995 NELSIP is designed “to improve the delivery of local 
infrastructure services by local authorities in the northern and eastern provinces of 
Sri Lanka in an accountable and responsive manner.”996 The five components of 
the NELSIP are: 1) infrastructure service delivery; 2) institutionalising 
accountabilities; 3) building capacities; 4) assessments and evaluation; and 5) 
project management. 997  The greatest provision has been allocated to the first 
component, infrastructure service delivery.  
Figure 9.2 indicates the large distance between project planning and 
implementation. NELSIP has been planned at the national level, and there are 
certain levels of the project which reach the divisional level. When it reaches local 
government, questions about whether such a project addresses the actual needs of 
a local government area and whether local government can implement such a 
project emerge. Figure 9.2, drawn by the Ministry of Economic Development, 
does not indicate the donor, the WB. 
994 ‘North East Local Services Improvement Project’ (n.d.) 
http://www.worldbank.org/projects/P113036/north-east-local-services-improvement-project-
nelsip?lang=en, accessed 14-06-2013. 
995 Draft Project Implementation Plan, North East Local Services Improvement Project (NELSIP) 
(2011) Ministry of Economic Development, Sri Lanka, p. 16. 
996 ‘North East Local Services Improvement Project’ (n.d.) op.cit. 
997 The cost of infrastructure service delivery was given as US$76 million. This is to improve the 
quantity and quality of public goods delivered and maintained by the local government bodies. The 
cost of the institutionalising accountabilities was less at US$2 million. This is to ensure that the 
local government bodies undertake public expenditures and deliver local services in a transparent 
and accountable manner. The cost of building capacities was US$4 million. This is to strengthen 
the service delivery systems and capacities of the local government bodies to deliver their 
mandated services as well as to strengthen the monitoring capacities of the provincial and national 
level institutions. The cost of assessment and evaluation was US$1 million. This is to finance 
monitoring, assessments and evaluation. The cost of project management was given as US$3 
million. This is to support the key agencies at the central, provincial and local levels that are 
involved in the day to day management of the project (‘North East Local Services Improvement 
Project’ (n.d.)). 
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Figure 9.2: Institutional arrangements for NELSIP implementation 
 
Source: Draft Project Implementation Plan, North East Local Services Improvement Project 
(NELSIP) (2011) op.cit., p. 27. 
 
However, according to its aims, NELSIP is to improve the quality of governance 
processes, not to build infrastructure, nonetheless, the chairman of the Lahugala 
PS stated: 
NELSIP provides funds for road construction. But their criteria are so 
complicated because there are many rules and regulations to fulfil before 
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releasing funds. Our PS applied for a fund from NELSIP but is not sure about 
obtaining it. (Respondent: Mr Rassaiya Chandrasena, Chairman (UNP), Lahugala 
Pradeshiya Sabha.) 
This statement indicates that NELSIP is not supposed to follow local government 
agendas. Even the WB finds gaps in NELSIP implementation. For example, a WB 
report on NELSIP notes that the progress reports indicated set-backs in the 
approval and commencement of sub-projects for 2012 in some local government 
areas. The WB has to discuss the matter with the Ministry of Economic 
Development and with the provincial councils998 because it does not have direct 
relations with the local government bodies where the projects have been carried 
on. 
9.3.3. Local Governance Project (LoGoPro) 
LoGoPro, funded by the UNDP, was implemented through the Ministry of Public 
Administration and Home Affairs, and the Ministry of Local Government and 
Provincial Councils. The four-year project (2009-2012) was to expand the 
capacities of provincial and local government for peace-building, strengthening 
social cohesion and managing the equitable delivery of public services.999 In the 
post-war period in Sri Lanka, local government in the eastern province was in the 
process of being re-established, and with newly elected representatives, there was 
an urgent need to ensure the core functioning of these newly reinstated 
institutions.1000 
Although LoGoPro’s aims were connected specifically with local governance, 
Figure 9.3 indicates the project board does not have any direct link with local 
government bodies. The project board consists of a number of administrative 
officials but there are no political representatives. The UNDP’s view is that the 
ministry can guide LoGoPro to help local government, as the project advisor of 
the LoGoPro stated: 
998 ‘Implementation Status & Results: Sri Lanka – North East Local Services Improvement Project 
(NELSIP)’ (2012) http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/SAR/2012/12/16/090224b081811
555/1_0/Rendered/PDF/Sri0Lanka000No0Report000Sequence005.pdf, accessed 14-06-2013. 
999 LoGoPro Sri Lanka: Project Document (2009) UNDP, p. 1 
(http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/documents/projects/LKA/00050761/LoGoPro_11_05_09.
pdf, accessed 17-06-2013). 
1000 UNDP-Local Governance Project (2009) http://www.undp.lk, accessed 02-01-2011. 
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LoGoPro is to promote local government. I believe that reaching local 
government through the ministries is fine. Such ministries can guide NGOs to 
help local government bodies that need aid. (Respondent: Mr Rajendrakumar 
Ganesarajah, Local Governance Advisor, Local Governance Project, UNDP-Sri 
Lanka.) 
This research notes that through LoGoPro, two local government bodies have 
received infrastructure facilities such as a community meeting hall 1001  and a 
market. 1002  These are infrastructure although the purpose of LoGoPro is to 
enhance governance. This reveals a mismatch between governance aims and 
project implementation at the local level. 
Figure 9.3: LoGoPro organisation structure 
Source: LoGoPro Sri Lanka: Project Document (2009) op.cit., p. 34. 
1001 Respondent: Mr Rassaiya Chandrasena, Chairman (UNP), Lahugala Pradeshiya Sabha. 
1002 Respondent: Mr A.R. Subair, Secretary, Kinniya Pradeshiya Sabha. 
258 
 
                                                 
9.3.4. ART GOLD1003 Sri Lanka (AGSL) 
This programme promotes area-based development through mobilising 
international resources, and through channelling specialised technical resources 
by activating thematic networks of cooperation for human development and 
universities associated with the programme. 1004  This programme was 
implemented by UNDP with the cooperation of the Ministry of Local Government 
and Provincial Councils. This was financed for five years (2006-2011) mainly by 
the Spanish Agency for International Cooperation.1005 
Central government plays the lead role in coordinating the programme through its 
membership in the project board and as a beneficiary and chair of the national 
coordinating committee1006 (see Figure 9.4). The southern province has been the 
main partner in this programme. 1007  Local working groups were established, 
guided and supervised by the southern province working group and the national 
coordinating committee with the support of the AGSL project team.1008 Although 
the AGSL project is on governance and local development, this structure means 
that the AGSL mostly connects with the central government-controlled 
administrative bodies rather than with the local government bodies. 
A major concern of the AGSL has been to develop infrastructure in the local 
government areas such as market places, pre-schools and government offices.1009 
For example, a pre-school has been established in the Suriyawewa PS area 
through the UNDP’s ART GOLD programme.1010 But, as mentioned in chapter 7, 
the Suriyawewa PS area lacks key facilities such as water, electricity and proper 
interior roads. Had there been good coordination among local working groups and 
the provincial and national level bodies involved in AGSL, then establishing a 
1003 In this programme, ART stands for support to territorial and thematic networks of cooperation 
for human development, and GOLD stands for governance and local development. 
1004 ART GOLD Sri Lanka Programme (2008) Ministry of Local Government and Provincial 
Councils, p. 2 
(http://web.undp.org/geneva/ART/resources/Brochure%20ART%20Sri%20Lanka.pdf, accessed 
31-03-2013). 
1005 Performance-2008 & Future Plans-2009, Ministry of Local Government and Provincial 
Councils, Colombo-02, p. 25. 
1006 The national coordinating committee is responsible for policy decisions, supporting the 
provincial and local working groups, promoting the project activities at national level and the 
outreach to international partners (ART GOLD Sri Lanka: Project Document (n.d.) UNDP, p. 27). 
1007 Performance-2008 & Future Plans-2009, p. 25. 
1008 ART GOLD Sri Lanka: Project Document (n.d.), pp. 26, 29. 
1009 Performance-2008 & Future Plans-2009, p. 25. 
1010 Respondent: Mr Nandasiri Ranathunga, Chairman (UPFA), Suriyawewa Pradeshiya Sabha. 
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pre-school would not have been the main priority in the Suriyawewa PS area for 
the AGSL. Instead, the basic lack of infrastructure services would have been 
addressed. 
Figure 9.4: AGSL implementation structure 
Source: ‘UNDP ART GOLD Sri Lanka: A Territorial Approach to Development and Partnership’ 
(n.d.) 
http://www.crpm.org/pub/agenda/626_atelier_8_samarasinghe_amarasiri_pnud_sri_lanka.pdf, 
accessed 17-06-2013. 
9.3.5. Discussion 
Overall, the foreign-funded projects as outlined in this section were aimed at 
enhancing local governance and local development. A number of problems can be 
highlighted when assessing these projects in terms of the ways in which the NGOs 
are involved at local government level and in analysing whether their project aims 
match with local needs, or indeed, how far the aims have been successfully 
achieved in terms of the extent to which they address the local development needs. 
The neglect of NGO project aims at the implementation stage by central 
government ministries was a common problem. Critically, when projects were 
planned by central government ministries, and implementation strategies put in 
place either through central government-controlled administrative bodies or 
provincial councils, local government or local communities cannot be involved in 
such projects. Therefore the needs of communities at the local level were often not 
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identified. The distance between the project planning and implementation stages 
resulted in a lack of coordination between the local needs and the project 
outcomes. While some local government areas needed aspects of infrastructure, 
the projects were not prioritised in order to meet needs. 
The responses of local government representatives revealed their lack of 
knowledge of the objectives of the major foreign-funded projects. This type of aid 
delivery reinforces the dependence of local government on central government 
and serves to undermine NGO efforts to address local needs and, therefore hinders 
local development. Such an approach to local government leads to a strengthening 
and centralisation of authoritative power.  
As discussed in chapter 8, central government’s argument is that there is no 
capacity at local government level to deal with foreign aid and NGOs. Further, 
local government representatives reported that they lacked experience on foreign 
aid management and did not have the knowledge and capacity to prepare 
development proposals and plans to obtain aid. While they expected to obtain 
such experience and knowledge this was not available. Clearly, lack of capability 
at the local government level should not be an excuse for the central government 
to control foreign aid and NGO projects according to its political agendas. Central 
government needs to equip local government officials to deal with foreign aid and 
NGO projects in terms of locally-led and community-oriented development. As 
evidenced in the above discussed projects, when there is no direct relationship 
between NGOs and local government, NGOs have to follow central government 
preferences without considering local needs. If NGOs can connect directly with 
local government bodies, these NGOs will be able to develop local government 
competency in preparing development proposals and plans, identifying the actual 
needs at the local level, and managing aid. A real change must be instituted 
around capacity development aimed at enhancing local government and local 
development. 
9.4. Local government and NGO projects 
In interviews with local government representatives there were reports of effective 
support coming from NGOs, which had successfully provided infrastructure 
facilities and material aid. This support is summarised in Table 9.2. 
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Table 9.2: Involvement of NGOs in local government: A summary 
 Local 
government 
Poverty 
reduction / 
livelihood 
support 
Disaster 
management 
Waste 
management / 
environmental 
protection 
Infrastructure 
development / 
material aid  
Policy 
planning / 
management 
training 
1 Galle MC WACAP 
conference on 
poverty 
reduction – 
Netherlands, 
Practical 
Action 
Conference on 
disaster 
management – 
New Delhi, 
India,  
Plan to control 
floods – Asian 
city 
development 
education 
institution, 
Philippines 
CIFAL low 
carbon city 
training in Jeju 
island, South 
Korea,  
Caritas SED 
Galle, 
FCM/MCP, 
VNG, German 
aid, EU, HELP-
O, Practical 
Action 
NAAL, 
UNICEF, 
FCM/MCP, 
USAID, HELP-
O, Practical 
Action, German 
and Italian aid, 
UN-HABITAT, 
Melbourne city 
council-
Australia  
Asia 
Foundation, 
UN-
HABITAT  
2 Matara MC WACAP 
conference on 
poverty 
reduction – 
Netherlands,  
Save the 
Children 
ADPC EU, JICA, 
ADG, VNG 
NAAL, USAID, 
UNDP, 
FCM/MCP 
FCM/MCP 
3 Batticaloa MC   UNDP, UN-
HABITAT, 
NECCDEP 
NELSIP, UN-
HABITAT, 
PTCRRMP, 
WASSER, WB, 
ADB 
GIZ, PIDT, 
Asia 
Foundation 
4 Kalmunai MC  WASSER EU WASSER, EU, 
UNOPS 
Asia 
Foundation, 
FCM/MCP, 
WASSER 
5 Weligama UC   WB, Red Cross 
Society, IUCN 
ADB, 
FCM/MCP, 
Caritas SED 
Galle, IFAD, 
SPREAP 
USAID, Asia 
Foundation, 
ICMA, EML 
consultants 
6 Hambantota UC   Energy Forum-
Netherlands, 
VNG, 
CORDAID 
VNG, 
Melbourne city 
council-
Australia, 
USAID, CCF, 
TAARP, 
SPREAP 
Asia 
Foundation 
7 Trincomalee UC    NELSIP, 
FCM/MCP, 
NECORD, 
USAID, Dutch 
aid 
AusAID, Asia 
Foundation 
8 Kattankudy UC    UNICEF, 
WASH, UNDP, 
USAID, PMGG 
Asia 
Foundation 
9 Baddegama PS    FCM/MCP, 
ADB 
Asia 
Foundation 
10 Suriyawewa PS CARE   CARE, UNDP-
ART GOLD, 
JICA South 
CAP, Asia 
Foundation 
CARE, Asia 
Foundation  
11 Kinniya PS   JICA  GTZ-PIP, PIN, 
FCM/MCP, 
UNDP-
LoGoPro, 
ADB/JFPR, 
NELSIP, CBG 
PIN, USAID-
SuRG, Asia 
Foundation 
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12 Lahugala PS   Asia 
Foundation 
Asia 
Foundation, 
UNDP-
LoGoPro, GTZ, 
NECORD, 
CADREP 
Asia 
Foundation 
Source: The information provided by the 12 local government bodies. 
 
The data presented in Table 9.2 indicates that issues such as poverty reduction, 
livelihood support, and disaster management are not seen as responsibilities for 
local government. As noted in chapter 7, most of these local government areas 
were affected by the tsunami, but there is little evidence that foreign-funded 
disaster management support was delivered to local areas through local 
government bodies. Instead, most NGO projects, and the funds for them went to 
the central government-controlled administrative bodies. The long lists of NGOs 
provided by the district secretariats1011 show evidence of this, for example, Table 
9.2 indicates that NGO support for poverty reduction, livelihood support and 
disaster management was not distributed in the Hambantota UC. The Hambantota 
district secretariat is identified as overseeing the distribution of NGO foreign aid 
such as BRAC-Sri Lanka and OXFAM-Australia for livelihood support, FORUT 
for poverty reduction, and Practical Action for disaster management. 1012 
Furthermore, as shown in Table 9.2, Trincomalee UC and Batticaloa MC did not 
oversee NGO funds or receive support for poverty reduction, livelihood support 
and disaster management. Instead, the Trincomalee district secretariat oversaw the 
distribution of foreign aid for livelihood support from many NGOs, including 
Save the Children, Caritas-EHED, UMCOR, ZOA Refugee Care-Netherlands, 
World Concern and IOM.1013 The Batticaloa district secretariat also oversaw the 
distribution of foreign support from NGOs for livelihood support and disaster 
management: ACTED, ZOA Refugee Care-Netherlands, BRAC-Sri Lanka, 
OXFAM-Australia, OXFAM GB and IOM for livelihood support, and World 
Vision for disaster management.1014 
As discussed above, NGOs are required to follow directives from central 
government and go through its administrative bodies rather than through local 
government. According to Thangarajah, in most cases, NGOs are explicitly 
1011 Some of these lists have been included in the Appendix VII. 
1012 Details provided by the NGO coordinating office, Hambantota district secretariat. 
1013 Respondent: Mr Subash Ponnamperuma, NGO Coordinating Officer, Trincomalee District 
Secretariat. 
1014 Details provided by the NGO coordinating office, Batticaloa district secretariat. 
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instructed by the central government to work through the administrative system 
beginning with the district secretary and divisional secretary. This means that 
NGOs have been reluctant to be involved with entities such as the PSs.1015 The 
problem here is that the central government-controlled administrative bodies give 
prominence to the agendas of central government rather than local government. 
Because central government political agendas predominate there is less likelihood 
of creative decisions on aid distribution. For example, through directing NGOs to 
provide infrastructure, central government has been able to capture aid and use it 
to fulfil its aims in particular areas, such as developing large scale tourism 
industries rather than the development of local communities. A further problem is 
that in general the bureaucratic officials in such administrative bodies are not from 
the same area and lack knowledge about local needs in the areas in which they 
work. 
Some NGOs are aware of defects in centrally-led development and have found 
ways to connect directly with local government to carry-out their projects. For 
example, CIDA acknowledged that international partners faced circumstances 
over which they had little control when dealing with a highly centralised approach 
and sought to overcome the disjunction between lower levels of government and 
community organisations.1016 This resulted in CIDA working directly with local 
government. What follows is an outline of a number of recently completed and 
on-going projects which directly connected local government levels. 
9.4.1. Federation of Canadian Municipalities – Canada/Sri Lanka Municipal 
Cooperation Programme (FCM/MCP) 
Under this programme the FCM provides assistance to local government, 
especially to rehabilitate the service delivery systems of tsunami-affected local 
government bodies in the southern and eastern provinces.1017 The involvement of 
the FCM began with the signing of a memorandum of understanding with the 
Ministry of Local Government and Provincial Councils.1018 This was part of the 
tsunami reconstruction and rehabilitation programme of CIDA, with many sectors 
1015 Thangarajah, (2003), p. 90. 
1016 ‘Tsunami Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Programme’ (n.d.). 
1017 Performance-2007 & Future Plans-2008, Ministry of Local Government and Provincial 
Councils, Colombo-02, p. 18. 
1018 Ibid. 
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cooperating including employment, economic well-being and micro-finance, 
governance, housing, and the environment.1019 
FCM was one of the few organisations that worked with local political 
representatives.1020 FCM’s participatory mechanisms like the community support 
fund (CSF), 1021  association building, and mid-term planning systems and 
procedures1022 have had significantly positive results in local government areas. In 
this way communities are able to influence the order of priorities for rural 
infrastructure by submitting proposals and contributing 50 per cent of the project 
costs in the form of labour. Evidence for the success of FCM/MCP was found in 
the Matara MC. A respondent stated: 
FCM/MCP worked with the people and therefore they received full support of the 
people. Most funds were saved due to the people’s labour. For example, when we 
received funds from FCM/MCP to construct 75km rural roads, we could complete 
an additional 25km as well because we could save money by using people’s 
labour. (Respondent: Mr Mohammad Nabavi, Opposition Leader (UNP), Matara 
Municipal Council.) 
Moreover, FCM/MCP provided good guidance to local development work in the 
Matara MC area. They provided opportunities to the Matara MC staff to go on 
foreign work tours to Canada for training programmes. As a consequence, the 
staff gained knowledge of working in local government and received useful 
advice on processes and procedures from the Canadian experiences.1023 
9.4.2. City of Munich, Germany – WASSER1024 Project 
Under this partnership between a Sri Lankan local government and the city of 
Munich, Germany, assistance was offered to the tsunami-affected cities of 
Batticaloa and Kalmunai.1025 At the request of the special commissioner of the 
Kalmunai MC, and with the facilitation of the national technical advisor of UN-
1019 ‘Tsunami Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Programme’ (n.d.). 
1020 Ibid. 
1021 The CSF has been used mostly for road construction. Without contractors, road building 
became cheaper, local ownership and maintenance better, real estate values improved and, with it, 
an improved tax base for local government. The CSF model provoked a re-consideration of 
policies with respect to the size of road eligible for municipal attention (see ibid.). 
1022 Ibid. 
1023 Respondent: Mr Mohammad Nabavi, Opposition Leader (UNP), Matara Municipal Council. 
1024 The term WASSER means water in German. 
1025 Kalmunai experienced the highest death toll and property damage in Sri Lanka (‘Completed 
Projects: Kalmunai Municipal Council’ (n.d.) 
http://www.kalmunaimc.org/ProjectsCompleted.html, accessed 10-11-2011). 
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HABITAT, the mayor of Munich agreed to assist the Kalmunai MC. 1026 The 
combination of foreign and Sri Lankan local government officials in policy 
planning leads to successful development plans. 1027  The city of Munich also 
prepared a proposal for the EU to implement the WASSER project acting as the 
overall project coordinator and serving as a direct link to the EU. The Batticaloa 
and Kalmunai MCs integrated the participatory planning approaches for strategy 
development and forged ahead with implementation of the project.1028 
The objectives of the WASSER project include planning and setting-up of 
sewerage systems in tsunami-affected areas and the provision of drinking water 
supplies for the poor and tsunami-affected people. 1029  As a result the MCs’ 
capabilities was enhanced in the field of environmental planning, and 
environmental management of information systems, setting-up of a cadastre for 
utility planning, and adopting information for risk assessment and disaster 
mitigation purposes.1030 Moreover, because this project established a relationship 
between a well-developed city and a city in a developing country, the Kalmunai 
MC believed this would open new doors for its needs and concerns to be voiced 
the outer world.1031 
The WASSER project has been a remarkable success in educating the local 
community about conserving water, and assisting poor families in meeting their 
drinking water problems, and for highlighting the services rendered by the 
municipal administration. Through the WASSER project, improved community 
participation has been achieved. 1032  Another important achievement was the 
establishment of networks and linkages with local communities. WASSER 
created the opportunity for local government representatives, staff and community 
volunteers to meet together and discuss the needs and problems of the area. 
1026 Ibid. 
1027 Ibid. 
1028 ‘The Project Partners of the WASSER Project’ (n.d.) http://www.wasser-
muenchen.de/cms/index.php?id=36, accessed 27-06-2013. 
1029 In the Kalmunai municipality more than 50 per cent of the people use shallow wells to drink 
water which is polluted by the open dumping by the cess pits. Therefore WASSER brought timely 
assistance to Kalmunai at the critical point of water pollution. Another project funded by the EU, 
the Environmental Remediation Programme (ERP), supported WASSER. Under the ERP the 
garbage-dumped open water bodies are cleaned (‘Completed Projects: Kalmunai Municipal 
Council’ (n.d.)). 
1030 Ibid. 
1031 Ibid. 
1032 Ibid. 
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Furthermore, after the tsunami, the capability of the municipal technical staff was 
poor and WASSER has helped to build competence.1033 
9.4.3. Asia Foundation – Local Economic Governance (LEG) Project and 
Transparent Accountable Local Governance (TALG) Programme 
The Asia Foundation works with the private sector and local government bodies 
to improve local service delivery, administration and accountability, and 
facilitates private-public dialogues that provide a forum for local government and 
business leaders to discuss the impediments to economic growth in their localities 
and provinces.1034 The Asia Foundation’s LEG project is designed to improve the 
overall business environment and to promote local economic development in Sri 
Lanka. In 2007 the Asia Foundation constructed an economic governance 
index 1035  for local government which has helped to identify and facilitate 
understanding of government-influenced constraints to economic growth and to 
indicate the influence of economic governance on business behaviour.1036 
Under the LEG project, and with the collaboration of AusAID, the Asia 
Foundation has established a mobile service assessment on tax collection in the 
Trincomalee UC area. Designed to start a conversation between the UC and the 
tax payers, it aimed at increasing transparency and people’s participation in UC 
matters. A booklet on the 2011 budget summary was printed and distributed to tax 
1033 The technical capacity of the staff involved in the WASSER project and staff training has 
increased. Top management have received exposure to international standards in report 
preparation, communication using IT and presentation skills (ibid.). 
1034 Policy Advocacy Handbook (2008) Asia Foundation, http://www.localgovernance.lk, accessed 
02-01-2011. 
1035 The Asia Foundation’s local economic governance indexes analyses local business 
environments, measures the quality of local economic governance, assesses progress through a set 
of quantitative and qualitative indicators, and supports policy reforms. Local economic governance 
indexes list indicators against which municipalities, districts, or provinces can be measured and 
ranked, and highlight local variations in the business environment. These indexes demonstrate that 
in regions, provinces, or municipalities, governance improvements can have a large impact on 
business expansion and employment. This index shows that even though structural conditions such 
as the quality of infrastructure in a locality tend to dominate the business environment, 
improvement in economic governance can substantially alter the business environment. It was 
expected that the improvement in certain areas of economic governance, such as reduction of 
informal charges, transparency, and participation can have an important impact on the overall 
business climate in the country (‘Measuring Economic Governance at the Local Level: The 
Experience of the Asia Foundation in Indonesia, Vietnam, Cambodia, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh’ 
(2009) Asia Foundation, http://asiafoundation.org/publications/pdf/41, accessed 24-11-2011). 
1036 Ibid. 
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payers in the area with important information about tax obligations and permit 
procedures.1037  
The USAID-funded TALG programme sought to help local government bodies 
make key political institutions more responsive to citizen input, improve service 
delivery, provide post-tsunami emergency recovery assistance, and increase the 
rule of law to protect and empower vulnerable groups. 1038  Through this 
programme (March 2005 – September 2007), the Asia Foundation1039 provided 
technical assistance and training to local government in 35 areas affected by the 
tsunami and/or by the war within the country. 
The TALG programme developed a number of training modules and guide books 
as part of its institutional strengthening programme for local government in Sri 
Lanka1040 to cater for the demand within local government and mobilise funds 
from external sources for priority social, environmental, economic and 
infrastructure projects. 1041  In the post-tsunami rehabilitation process funding 
agencies were eager to fund local reconstruction and rehabilitation work, however 
few appropriate funding proposals came forward from local government 
bodies.1042 Consequently, it became evident that for fundraising to be effective, 
there was a need to increase the knowledge around project proposal writing.  
The successful implementation of the TALG programme has enabled mid-term 
and short-term planning to be incorporated in local government management 
processes.1043 Among the local government bodies in this research, Weligama UC 
1037 Budget Summary-2011: Trincomalee Urban Council, prepared by the Trincomalee Urban 
Council with the technical and financial support of the Local Economic Governance (LEG) 
Programme, implemented by Asia Foundation and funded by AusAID in association with the 
Department of Local Government of Eastern Province. 
1038 ‘Country Overview: Sri Lanka’ (n.d.) http://asiafoundation.org/country/overview/sri-lanka, 
accessed 25-05-2011. 
1039 In the TALG programme, the Asia Foundation’s main counterparts were the Ministry of Local 
Government and Provincial Councils, and the SLILG. The ICMA and EML provided additional 
technical assistance and support. 
1040 Guide to Proposal Writing for Local Authorities (2008) Asia Foundation, Ministry of Local 
Government and Provincial Councils and SLILG, Sri Lanka, p. 1. 
1041 The Asia Foundation expects that such training modules and guide books can be used to 
improve the ability of local government to write successful proposals and to acquire the funds 
needed to implement their medium-term development plans and other priority projects to improve 
the delivery of services to citizens and promote development in their communities. For example, 
the manual for writing a funding proposal is designed to empower persons to be successful in 
obtaining funding grants. The manual focuses on the relationships with funding agencies, 
organisations and persons in a collaborative and participatory approach at all levels of government. 
This manual assists in the preparation of strong and fundable proposals (ibid., pp. 5, 7). 
1042 Ibid., p. 5. 
1043 Performance-2007 & Future Plans-2008, p. 17. 
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experienced successful results from the TALG programme, as the following 
respondent noted.  
The Asia Foundation gave very good guidance about developing project 
proposals. After developing project proposals, it was very easy to obtain foreign 
funds because then the UC already had a proposal to show the donors. However it 
was a difficult task to collect people’s ideas. They only explain their ideas. They 
do not even write their ideas down. Therefore during the TALG programme we 
were very busy collecting ideas. It was a new experience. We collected people’s 
ideas and wrote all of them up then edited and organised those ideas in a way in 
which they could be implemented. (Respondent: Mrs Nirosha Kumari Herath, 
Community Development Officer, Weligama Urban Council.)  
The participatory planning process helped local government identify the high 
priority needs of its citizens with TALG effectively encouraging local government 
staff and others to become involved in making project proposals. The Asia 
Foundation helped in preparing a four-year plan for the Weligama UC. Under the 
four-year plan, 16 proposals were written for 16 projects, 1044  with the UC 
implementing all of them.1045 
Suriyawewa PS also provides evidence for the success of the Asia Foundation’s 
guidance on policy planning and suggests that local government can achieve 
people’s participation without much difficulty. The chairman of the Suriyawewa 
PS noted: 
The Asia Foundation’s involvement in policy planning was remarkable. They 
have given guidance for policies according to rural people’s needs. They have 
organised people to participate in policy planning by raising people’s needs and 
related issues. We have received a good working knowledge about policy 
planning through this. (Respondent: Mr Nandasiri Ranathunga, Chairman (UPFA), 
Suriyawewa Pradeshiya Sabha.) 
According to the Asia Foundation, the planning and managerial capabilities of 
local government improved giving them a stronger role in socio-economic 
development and in planning for their areas by strengthening coordination 
between local and central government officials at the community level.1046 The 
Asia Foundation supported the Ministry of Local Government and Provincial 
Councils in developing a national policy on local government with the expectation 
1044 Some of the projects are: construction of two public fairs, an urban council building, meeting 
halls for fishermen, a library, children’s parks, parking place for three wheelers, solid waste 
management, a compost yard development and the purchase of tractors. 
1045 Respondent: Mrs Nirosha Kumari Herath, Community Development Officer, Weligama Urban 
Council. 
1046 ‘Local Governance Programmes’ (2010) Asia Foundation, www.asiafoundation.org, accessed 
06-20-2011. 
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that this would broaden the scope of local government and endow it with 
additional functions, powers, and resources. The Asia Foundation works with the 
ministry to prepare an action plan to implement such national policy.1047 
9.4.4. USAID – Democracy and Governance Programme: Supporting 
Regional Governance (SuRG) 
USAID’s Democracy and Governance Programme started in 2007 to support 
provincial and local government in particular areas aimed at strengthening their 
capacity in planning, budgeting and in ensuring transparent and participatory 
planning processes. SuRG (2008-2011) is one of many democracy and 
governance programmes to facilitate post-war transformation in the eastern 
province. Beginning in 2007 it centred on increasing citizen engagement in 
provincial and local government, strengthening inter-community reconciliation 
procedures and promoting social equity. USAID was awarded a contract to ARD 
for implementation of its SuRG in March 2008.1048 
SuRG has identified a range of training needs for local government, including 
participatory planning, governance, proposal development, project management, 
office management, accounting, finance, leadership and legislature progrmmes. 
SuRG aims to improve the knowledge and skills of elected representatives and 
staff to fulfil their core functions, increase public participation in decision making, 
increase transparency and accountability of local government functions, and 
enhance the public sector environment. 1049  SuRG has provided technical 
assistance to all selected local government bodies in the eastern province through 
workshop level training. Capacity building within selected local government 
bodies is provided through workshops, mentoring, technical assistance and 
training. The programme manager of the SuRG noted: “Under this programme we 
have already trained hundreds of officials and councillors within selected local 
government bodies, including the CLGs and ACLGs.”1050 
SuRG has a language training programme which targets the local government 
sector. Under this, 40 language teachers from 38 local government areas have 
1047 Respondent: Mr Jayantha Wickramanayake, Senior Technical Advisor – Local Government 
Policy Planning, Asia Foundation, Sri Lanka. 
1048 Respondent: Mr Abul Kalam, Programme Manager, SuRG of USAID. 
1049 Ibid. 
1050 Ibid. 
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been trained. Local government officials learn Tamil or Sinhala through this 
programme.1051 
SuRG assists local government to build participatory governance forums and 
works to engage directly with the local level by encouraging citizens to participate 
in local government policy processes. Figure 9.5 shows the composition of these 
forums.  
Figure 9.5: Citizen engagement mechanisms of SuRG: An informal structure 
Source: Details provided by respondent: Mr Abul Kalam, Programme Manager, SuRG of USAID. 
 
As discussed in chapter 7, Kattankudy UC, one of the local government bodies for 
SuRG, has developed a wide range of plans to implement in 2011 with the 
assistance of SuRG. 
9.4.5. CARE International – livelihood support projects 
CARE International operates small scale projects in villages which provide 
support for people’s lives by developing socio-economic programmes to improve 
conditions in the rural communities. The duration of this project is five years with 
its direct involvement in the project implementation lasting two years. The project 
includes 110 villages in three divisions in Hambantota district: Suriyawewa, 
Hambantota and Tissamaharama. From its area office in the Hambantota district, 
CARE addresses rural development through a community participatory approach 
1051 Ibid. 
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using the theory and practices of community governance.1052 The team leader of 
the project stated: 
We see that it is not enough to focus on only one sector. For example, if 
livelihood development is the major component, we also have to improve 
people’s social and economic development as well. Therefore the support we 
provide differs such as improving the income level or developing the 
infrastructure. (Respondent: Mr Sisira Wijesundara, Team Leader, CARE 
International – Hambantota Office.) 
This project aims to improve peoples’ social status by focusing on women, youth, 
and POP (poorest of the poor – the lowest economic level of the society). The 
POP have no opportunities to enter development processes, earn small wages on a 
daily basis, and cannot participate in meetings. They are vulnerable and 
marginalised.1053 The team leader of the project further noted: 
We cannot make development plans to improve POP’s conditions by sitting in the 
offices. We need to reach them and to obtain their participation. Also we need to 
develop a system to obtain their participation. We call it an enabling environment. 
The meaning of this is to build a proper environment around these people. 
(Respondent: Mr Sisira Wijesundara, Team Leader, CARE International – 
Hambantota Office.) 
CARE promotes community participatory development based in the villages 
where the issues are livelihood development, environmental management, social 
resources, and infrastructure development.1054 CARE establishes village operating 
units (VOUs) and selects officials to represent the villagers. As a result CARE 
reaches the community-based organisations (CBOs) in the villages. CARE further 
encourages and builds CBOs in the villages and supports women and youth 
participation.1055 
CARE reaches villages through the Grama Niladhari (GN) because it simplifies 
the identification of village leadership. CARE prepares an activity plan for each 
village known as the village development plan (VDP) which is constantly updated 
and implemented through a VOU. Participatory rural appraisal (PRA) has been 
used to make VDPs accountable. Through this, CARE touches the lowest level 
group which lie below the GN level.  
1052 Respondent: Mr Sisira Wijesundara, Team Leader, CARE International – Hambantota Office. 
1053 Ibid. 
1054 Ibid. 
1055 Ibid. 
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According to CARE, poor people may have skills but they can lack the relevant 
equipment to work effectively so CARE provides direct grants and training to 
these people, as the same respondent highlighted.  
The villagers do not have opportunities to obtain funds. They do not have access 
to the banks and the other financial agencies at all. The banks may have high 
interest rates and they often need documents; there may be no buses to go to town. 
Therefore people’s accessibility to the banks is hard. We thought of creating seed 
capital in the villages. Here we ask people to state their priority issues and we 
give money to them through our project. But they can’t get these funds without a 
plan or a proposal. So we tell them to make a design plan or a proposal. We 
deposit money in VOUs or CBOs. People have to repay this money to the VOU 
or to the CBO. Through this method, people can use this money again and again. 
(Respondent: Mr Sisira Wijesundara, Team Leader, CARE International – 
Hambantota Office.) 
The importance of this project is that it ensures closer scrutiny of the poor local 
communities in the villages. CARE works with the central government-controlled 
administrative authorities especially with divisional secretariats when 
implementing VDPs and not with local government, but it works according to its 
own priorities and not according to central government agendas. Central 
government does not pay much attention to control NGOs directly connected with 
the local level and small scale projects which handle less funds compared with the 
larger funds of major NGOs. 
CARE only selects two proposals at once when providing assistance, and expects 
that through their projects, the people will learn how to prepare proposals and 
plans which go to other institutions (government or the private sector) to obtain 
funds. CARE does a facilitating role and in this way it addresses core issues. 
When the villagers are able to administer alone the project is transferred to the 
next village. 
9.4.6. Transparency International – projects to support local government 
Transparency International has three working areas: 1) national and local 
government; 2) private and civil society; and 3) citizenry. It prepared a three-year 
strategic plan (July 2011-2013) to improve people’s participation in local 
government and to improve the services of local government to the people. These 
projects have been implemented in five districts in Sri Lanka and funded by EU 
273 
 
and US-based PTF and NED.1056 Its first programme aimed to reduce corruption 
by teaching the people and local government officials about corruption, and how 
to work against its influences.1057 
Transparency International has built a direct relationship with local government to 
reach local levels. Its second programme in Ridimaliyadda PS1058 centres on good 
governance by guiding local government to provide efficient services to the public. 
Under this programme, a system called citizen report card (CRC) was developed 
as a kind of survey used to determine people’s responses to local government 
services.1059 Transparency International joined with the PSs in carrying out this 
survey. After obtaining people’s responses, Transparency International trained the 
elected representatives of the PSs on the ways of improving their services.1060 
In their programme, Transparency International found that the PS did not have 
strategic plans, especially a four-year plan or knowledge to make plans to obtain 
funds.1061 As discussed in chapters 7 and 8, this is a common situation in many 
local government bodies. A consultant of Transparency International stated: 
PSs can obtain funds from NGOs if they can make plans or proposals. We did a 
workshop to develop a four-year plan for Ridimaliyadda PS. We expect to help 
them until they are able to handle it alone. (Respondent: Ms Nauli Wimalarathna, 
Consultant, Transparency International-Sri Lanka.) 
Without guidance, encouragement or motivation, local government 
representatives and communities do not engage in policy development processes. 
Transparency International’s expectations to continue their assistance is proving 
effective. Transparency International has equally divided responsibilities among 
the 10 local government representatives in order to work within 42 GN divisions 
in the Ridimaliyadda PS area. 
At the time of this research, a third programme was scheduled to be conducted in 
the Galle district. In Galle district, Transparency International puts into practice 
people’s participation at local government level by selecting PSs which can 
maintain a standard budget. Three local government bodies from Galle district – 
1056 ‘Funds Received: 2014-2012’ (n.d.) http://www.tisrilanka.org/pub/funds/Funding2004-
2012.pdf, accessed 06-12-2013. 
1057 Respondent: Ms Nauli Wimalarathna, Consultant, Transparency International-Sri Lanka. 
1058 A Pradeshiya Sabha in Badulla district, Uva province. Uva province has three poorer PSs. 
Ridimaliyadda is the poorest. 
1059 Respondent: Ms Nauli Wimalarathna, Consultant, Transparency International-Sri Lanka. 
1060 Ibid. 
1061 Ibid. 
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Ambalangoda UC, Yakkalamulla PS and Baddegama PS were selected. 
Transparency International approaches local government bodies and builds 
connections with them with officials always involved in the programme to ensure 
its implementation.1062 
Transparency International does not provide funds or material aid to local 
government but provides guidance and builds connections between local 
government and people. The organisation does not act as a donor agency but 
provides knowledge to local government representatives about local government 
income sources. The respondent consultant further noted:  
When we tell them, they realise that they have certain ways to earn money. 
Through passing by-laws, local government can earn money using the resources 
in the local government area. We think that knowledge is needed and the most 
important thing for them. Provincial councils sometimes say that they have NGO 
funds to distribute to the local government bodies. But if local government does 
not have a proposal or a plan at the time, they cannot obtain these funds. For this 
reason, most of the time they miss out on chances of obtaining funds. We always 
work at giving knowledge to improve their ability to obtain funds. If local 
government has a plan, the funds will go through in the right direction and will 
reach the most needy. (Respondent: Ms Nauli Wimalarathna, Consultant, 
Transparency International-Sri Lanka.) 
Again this project is an example of NGO efforts to address the problems of local 
government funding as discussed in chapters 7 and 8. 
9.4.7. Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA) – programmes to support local 
government 
CPA works to build two way communications between people and local 
government so that representatives can get to know the people’s problems and 
needs 1063  following regional and world best practice solutions. CPA adopts 
examples from the Indian and Nepalese local government systems and looks at 
both advantages and disadvantages in these systems.1064 For its programmes CPA 
receives foreign funding mainly from ANSA1065 as well as IBP, Washington. 
CPA supports local government to obtain people’s participation in decision 
making, as the following respondent stated. 
1062 Ibid. 
1063 Respondent: Ms Sriyanie Wijesundara, Contact Person, Governance and Anti-Corruption 
Programme, CPA. 
1064 Ibid. 
1065 ANSA helps to improve local government budgeting in South Asian countries. 
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The public galleries1066 were closed in many PSs. These PSs had no idea about the 
importance of public galleries before. We have opened the public galleries in 
many PSs and now people are involved actively in local government matters. 
(Respondent: Ms Sriyanie Wijesundara, Contact Person, Governance and Anti-
Corruption Programme, CPA.) 
CPA guides local government bodies on effective methods of tax collection and 
provides knowledge to the people on taxes. Local government bodies depend on 
attracting 33 per cent for taxes which is insufficient with few people having any 
proper knowledge about taxation.1067 The same respondent further added: 
Local government representatives think that they are supposed to collect only the 
taxes mentioned in the revenue files. There are hidden taxes. There is a need to 
highlight these taxes and to give proper knowledge to the people about taxes. We 
believe that then the people will want to be actively involved in the tax payments. 
(Respondent: Ms Sriyanie Wijesundara, Contact Person, Governance and Anti-
Corruption Programme, CPA.) 
CPA’s Governance and Anti-Corruption Programme aims to reduce corruption in 
local government by acting as a facilitator with more than 75 area-specific local 
partners including local government and various civil society organisations (CSOs) 
all over the country. This programme focuses on governance issues with particular 
emphasis on local government and transparency and accountability within their 
budget processes. CPA pays attention to the attitudes and experiences of ordinary 
citizens as it pertains to corrupt practices when receiving goods or services from 
the public sector.1068 
9.4.8. Social Scientists’ Association (SSA) – networking at the local level 
The SSA works at sharing experiences in local governance between 
representatives and officials of PSs and CSOs in order to explore strategies for 
strengthening local democracy.1069 SSA’s programme on Local Governance and 
Local Democracy began with 75 participants from the rural areas, the majority of 
whom were elected representatives of PSs of Kurunegala, Monaragala and the 
Badulla districts. The programme brings together a range of people to share 
experiences in local governance in the periphery, and focuses on issues of 
1066 A public gallery is an area in a representative institution that is set aside for the public. 
1067 Respondent: Ms Sriyanie Wijesundara, Contact Person, Governance and Anti-Corruption 
Programme, CPA. 
1068 ‘On-going Projects and Programmes’ (n.d.) http://www.cpalanka.org/governance/, accessed 
29-06-2013. 
1069 ‘Recent Events’ (n.d.) http://www.ssalanka.org/index.htm#, accessed 03-09-2011. 
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development, people’s participation in governance, and strengthening the capacity 
of PSs in efficient governance. 1070 Through this programme, SSA expected to 
bring different communities at local levels together through forums for sharing 
and learning. SSA says that this forum enabled SSA to establish and strengthen 
direct links with practitioners at local levels.1071 
Another programme of SSA is Promoting Social Engagement through Buddhist 
Practices.1072 This programme is a part of the above discussed USAID’s SuRG 
programme and is designed to help ease tensions in the community, especially in 
Sri Lanka’s eastern province. This is funded by ARD-SuRG which reached out to 
a selected group of 75 Buddhist monks and 25 nuns who represented 
approximately 10 temples in each of the following districts: Monaragala, Ampara, 
Polonnaruwa.1073 They participated in capacity building, community engagement, 
language training, outreach and networking activities. The programme was 
focused on issues of reconciliation and governance issues including peace, 
democracy, conflict resolution, gender equality, diversity, human rights, and 
ethnic harmony within the framework of Buddhist teachings and practice.1074 The 
participating monks and nuns selected a curriculum topic in accordance with their 
abilities and interests to engage and raise awareness about reconciliation and 
governance with community members patronising their local temple to receive 
counsel. In each of these districts 30 lay people1075 who belong to 10 area temples 
have participated in this programme. They included youth groups connected to 
temples, and members of CSOs, local government bodies and local business 
establishments. Finally, this programme has laid the foundation for a network 
among Buddhist, Hindu, Christian and Islam clergy dedicated to inter-ethnic and 
religious reconciliation.1076 
1070 Ibid. 
1071 Ibid. 
1072 According to SSA, the religious leaders in Sri Lanka have long played an important role in 
national politics and social development. The role of Buddhist clergy in the political process and 
throughout the country’s long-lasting conflict has been both central and controversial. 
Conservatives in the Buddhist community are the most vocal politically but are by no means 
representatives of the community of Buddhist clergy as a whole, nor do they represent the views of 
the entire Sinhala Buddhist community (ibid.). 
1073 Ibid. 
1074 Ibid. 
1075 The SSA notes that as the temple in Sinhalese society is traditionally a centre for community 
activities, these lay people have provided a support base for the monks and nuns in the programme 
and have become change agents in the Dayaka Sabhas (patron societies) of the temples (ibid.). 
1076 Ibid. 
277 
 
                                                 
9.4.9. Waste management projects 
There has been remarkable support among several NGOs for waste management 
projects in many local government bodies (see Table 9.2). The tsunami severely 
damaged houses and belongings increasing the amount of solid waste which put 
pressure on the collection infrastructure, requiring NGOs to focus on solid waste 
management.1077 
The solid waste management project of the Matara MC is funded by the EU for 
the solid waste recycling plant. JICA provided the relevant technology and 
training. ADG was also involved and provided support for this project. Since the 
funding agencies left, the solid waste management project has been controlled by 
the Matara MC. This means all the profit goes to the MC.1078 
The Galle MC is another example of where various NGOs have become involved 
in different waste management projects. Caritas SED Galle constructed buildings 
and donated machinery to establish a compost plant which is now handled by the 
MC although project from time to time receives foreign funds for its maintenance 
from various sources such as FCM/MCP, VNG and Germany.1079 
In 2006 the EU was involved in a three-year waste management project called 
COWAM which aimed at building-waste management in Galle city. Through this 
project, waste is re-used to produce raw building materials, and deal with 
environmental pollution arising from building-waste which has subsequently been 
reduced. Staff members of the MC were trained in Germany and in 2009 total 
ownership of the project was handed over to the Galle MC. The MC now 
produces bricks and concrete chips which can be used for building and road 
construction.1080 The mayor of the Galle MC noted: 
The waste management project started with foreign guidance and support. 
Through recycling, we saved more money. Recycled concrete chips bring a good 
income to the MC and save a lot of funds. (Respondent: Mr Methsiri De Silva, 
Mayor (UPFA), Galle Municipal Council.) 
1077 LOGO South Country Programme for Sri Lanka/Solid Waste Management of Local 
Government Bodies in Sri Lanka (2006), p. 5. 
1078 Respondent: Mr H.G.K. Jagath Kumara, PHI Officer, Matara Municipal Council. 
1079 Respondent: Mr Dileepa De Silva, Technical Officer, Galle Municipal Council. 
1080 Information provided by the Galle municipal council. 
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Practical Action, also supported waste management in the Galle MC, introducing 
compost bins to the MC area, and sponsoring a paper, plastic and polythene 
recycling centre.1081 
Hambantota UC offers a different example of foreign-funded waste management. 
Prior to the tsunami disaster, garbage dumping was a major problem in the 
Hambantota UC area, until the UC started a solid waste management project. The 
project was stopped after the tsunami the Hambantota Nagara Pavithratha 
Sangamaya (association for Hambantota city cleaning), was established by a few 
young men who restarted the solid waste management project in 2007. They 
received funds, buildings and machinery from the Energy Forum-Netherlands and 
were supported by VNG and CORDAID.1082 The project is now run by the UC 
with workers receiving salaries from the UC. 
9.4.10. Discussion 
When analysing these projects using the same criteria used to assess central 
government-controlled NGO projects, many advantages can be identified. The 
special feature of these NGO projects is their direct connection to local 
communities. Through this these projects have been able to network local partners 
and people consistent with identifying, prioritising and addressing the needs of 
local communities. These project plans have been shown to fit with local needs. 
Throughout the duration of projects, NGO officials have been actively involved at 
all levels. By providing involvement and continuous guidance problems are 
reduced in project implementation. 
Supplying rural infrastructure, waste management, encouraging people’s 
participation in local government policy processes, educating local government 
representatives on their powers and income sources, training local government 
staff to improve their management skills, supporting the building of CBOs, 
addressing the needs of the POP, and strengthening inter-community relations 
have received critically important NGO contributions at the local level. These 
indicate the varied benefits and advantages of NGOs in the selected local 
government areas, and signify the importance and potential of NGOs who 
1081 Ibid. 
1082 Respondent: Mr H.A. Sisira Rohana, Project Manager, Solid Waste Management Project, 
Hambantota Urban Council. 
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contribute to development and address needs at the local level. The positive 
responses from respondent local government representatives and staff members in 
terms of successful achievement from these projects confirm this. For example, 
participatory budgeting promoted by the Asia Foundation and USAID has become 
popular among local government bodies in identifying the most appropriate needs 
in specific areas. The knowledge provided to local government representatives 
and staff on project proposal writing and income sources by NGOs, such as 
Transparency International, Asia Foundation and CPA, has built a path to achieve 
successful outcomes. 
The success of these projects highlights the way local government can establish an 
advantage if foreign assistance comes directly to local government sources. These 
NGO contributions match the proposals of local government representatives 
outlined in chapter 8. The importance of encouraging people’s participation in 
local government policy processes, the need of more knowledge and guidance on 
their powers and functions, and the need to obtain knowledge, guidance, funds, 
resources and technologies from NGOs to promote local governance and local 
development were some of these proposals. 
Some NGOs which directly connect with the local level through central 
government-controlled administrative bodies indicate a different reality of central 
government’s behaviour toward NGOs. Although some NGOs have signed 
memoranda of understanding with the central government ministries, central 
government does not try to control these NGOs. As noted above, central 
government does not have much concern about NGOs who handle small funds 
and implement small scale development projects at the local level. This behaviour 
by central government can be seen as an advantage to promote direct NGO 
involvement at the local level. Some NGOs realise that central government-
controlled projects have not responded appropriately to local needs, and should 
directly remedy this for better results. However, this does not mean that these 
NGOs have been excluded from the central government procedures of NGO 
registration and quarterly progress report provision. 
The projects outlined above indicate that there are possibilities to build 
collaboration among local government and NGOs in local level activities leading 
to improved forms of local governance and local development. The important 
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point here is that this can help local government bodies to overcome their 
dependency. An approach to local government which is dependent on central and 
provincial government can be changed by improving local government capacities 
through NGO involvement. This research, therefore, identifies the importance of 
substantive direct NGO involvement at the local level and stresses the need to 
shape future local government relationships away from the traditional approach 
toward cooperation. Through this process local government representatives and 
staff would connect with NGOs as collaborative partners focused on local 
development. The Asia Foundation’s work in capacity development, along with 
the central government’s Ministry of Local Government and Provincial Councils, 
and the SLILG (a government institution) has supported local government-NGO 
interactions and has resulted in collaboration in publishing guide books and 
related documents. This supportive role by central government needs to be 
improved to achieve more successful outcomes from direct NGO involvement. 
9.5. Summary 
As identified earlier, the extraordinary circumstances of the tsunami and the war 
provided room for NGOs to be involved in reconstruction, relief and rehabilitation 
work in Sri Lanka. Later this work was extended to other areas not directly 
affected by the tsunami or the war. This chapter analysed recently completed and 
on-going NGO projects which have taken place at the local level of the southern 
and eastern provinces. When considering all the projects discussed in this chapter, 
there are two major categories and several minor categories of NGO involvement 
at the local level. First the major NGOs such as WB and ADB work with the 
central government ministries and central government-controlled administrative 
bodies according to central government agendas and are mostly involved in large 
scale infrastructure development. These NGOs do not have direct links with the 
local level. This research reveals that these large scale construction projects were, 
in the views of respondents, unable to address the actual needs of local 
communities. Second there are many international NGOs directly involved in 
different projects at the local level. Some of them have country offices, and some 
of them have area offices located in local government areas to carry-on their 
projects at the local level. Some of them work together with local NGOs. While 
some of them are directly involved in project activities at the local level, others 
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provide aid and guidance to local NGOs. Many NGOs directly connect with 
central government-controlled administrative authorities such as district and 
divisional secretariats. Some NGOs directly connect with local government and 
assist local government representatives and staff through providing knowledge 
and encouraging people’s participation at the local level towards effective policy 
processes and local development. 
In this research, the NGO projects have been analysed according to how they 
participate in ways which address local needs, and in terms of the extent to which 
their project aims have been fulfilled. Compared with the larger foreign-funded 
projects of central government, the smaller projects conducted by various NGOs 
are more directly connected with local government and local communities and can 
be identified as more effective. When considering the proposals of the respondent 
local government representatives, such NGO projects match proposals and 
address the development needs at the local level. The active involvement of NGO 
officials at the local level with the appropriate local partners and people, correct 
identification and prioritisation of local needs, and less control by central 
government over NGO project agendas all points to some of the reasons for the 
success of these projects.   
Local government representatives know the local needs better than the central 
administrative officials who are not from the same area with the result that local 
government-NGO collaboration has been more effective than central government-
NGO relations in addressing the needs at local level. Local government-NGO 
relations, therefore, need to be encouraged and strengthened in local government 
capacity building. This will lead to changes away from the more traditional 
approach to local government which is highly dependent on central and provincial 
government, to local government which is shaped and better equipped towards 
addressing local needs. Local government representatives and staff can act as a 
supportive force for NGOs towards building networks with local communities. 
Central government does collaborate between local government and NGOs, 
playing a positive role in relations at the local level, although as examples have 
shown this rarely happens.  
This research has argued that NGOs have the capacity and potential to be 
involved in, and collaborate with, local government to improve local governance 
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and local development by working with vulnerable sections of the Sri Lankan 
society. Connecting communities with local policy processes through NGO 
contribution has helped to prioritise and address local needs correctly and 
effectively. The conclusion which emerges from this chapter, therefore, is that the 
requirements of the central government agenda often undermines the NGO role in 
addressing substantive needs at the local level which reinforces dependence and 
hinders development. However, the direct involvement of NGOs at the local level, 
especially in local government, can deliver foreign aid in a way that does not 
reinforce dependence or hinder development and this leads to improved forms of 
local governance and local development. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
283 
 
  
284 
 
Chapter 10 
Conclusion 
10.1. Introduction 
This study has focused on local development in Sri Lanka examining the role of 
local government in planning and promoting strategies within the context of 
longstanding neglect by central government. It explored how local communities in 
Sri Lanka have been over-looked in development initiatives, the reasons for this 
failure while analysing the positive role played by NGOs given this situation. 
Recognising the constraints imposed by central government on local government 
and on NGOs in Sri Lanka, the study examines the actual and potential 
contribution of NGOs to local government and local development in an effort to 
address the needs of local communities. 
Chapter 2 set out and analysed the literature related to this study, and developed a 
number of hypotheses derived from the literature.  A range of issues arise from 
the main focus of this study, including investigating the ways in which the local 
communities have been neglected in Sri Lankan development initiatives; 
identifying the roles of NGOs in local development; understanding the extent to 
which NGOs act as facilitators of local development; the extent to which NGOs 
strengthen the local policy processes by encouraging people’s participation; 
investigating the possibilities of collaboration between NGOs and local 
government in designing and implementing local policies and programmes; and 
checking whether NGOs can act as intermediaries in networking between national, 
provincial and local levels of government, and the people in the Sri Lankan 
context. 
As detailed in chapter 3, this research uses a mixed method approach relying 
heavily on qualitative data and on a single-case (embedded) design as its 
investigative approach. Limited use has been made of quantitative data although, 
where relevant, this method is adopted. Sri Lankan local government is the main 
unit of analysis with particular reference to the southern and eastern provincial 
councils as the sub-units of analysis. This research focused on 12 local 
government bodies selected from two provinces, and interviewed 47 respondents 
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including national, provincial and local political representatives, administrative 
officials, NGO officials, and CBO representatives on their views regarding local 
government, decentralisation, local development, people’s participation, and the 
role of NGOs at the local level. 
Chapter 4 analysed the history and political development of Sri Lanka and argued 
that constitutional evolution, political party development, the emergence of 
political leaders and decentralisation politics have reflected and revealed deep 
rooted ethnic divisions and conflicts in the country. As discussed in chapter 5, the 
recommendations of commissions and committees appointed by ruling 
governments over time to restructure local government have not been fully 
implemented. The establishment of district-based development councils and, later, 
provincial councils created a more centralised system, weakening local 
government and reinforcing its dependence on the centre. The continuation of 
colonial style central government-controlled administrative bodies together with 
local government bodies gave rise to complicated twin streams of administrative 
and political power which led to a strengthening and centralisation of authoritative 
power. 
Chapter 6 reviewed the history of NGO involvement in Sri Lanka. It began by 
identifying ambiguities in defining NGOs in the Sri Lankan context. These 
ambiguities, complex legal procedures and institutional mechanisms have led to a 
lack of clear data about NGO growth in Sri Lanka. Over time, government-NGO 
relations have taken a variety of forms. These have been shaped by the policies of 
ruling governments, political parties and leaders. They have also been shaped by 
the exploitation of specific historical events by political actors for political gain. 
An example of this has been the labelling of the NGOs which advocated for the 
protection of minority rights in the war-affected areas as imperial agents by 
Sinhala nationalist groups. 
Chapters 7, 8 and 9 presented the research findings. Chapter 7 outlined the 
complexities of local development, people’s participation and local politics by 
examining the views of respondents. The ways in which central government and 
local government define development was shown to differ. When central 
government promotes large scale development at one end of the spectrum, at the 
other end some local governments tended to identify small scale, local level 
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development as being more important and effective. From the local perspective, 
local development, which is locally-led and community-oriented, stresses the 
importance of human resources over physical infrastructure. To address the 
people’s needs, it is critical that local government obtain people’s participation in 
local policy processes, adequately control issues of local development and 
encourage people’s participation. 
Chapter 8 identified a range of problems in Sri Lankan local government, 
highlighted in the proposals of respondents seeking to solve issues. The lack of 
local government power, together with the lack of knowledge by local 
government representatives about how to use their power, presents a major 
problem. The main proposal for increasing local knowledge was to seek NGO 
support which would provide knowledge, technology, guidance, funds and 
resources to local government. In contrast, national level respondents proposed 
amendments, such as the integration of local government and central government-
controlled administrative bodies at the local level as a way of enhancing local 
development. Clearly, there were local-national discrepancies concerning 
proposed solutions for tackling local government problems and attaining solutions. 
Chapter 9 outlined the many foreign-funded NGO projects in Sri Lanka and 
investigated the features of NGO involvement at the local level. After the tsunami 
and the war, large amounts of foreign funds flowed into Sri Lanka together with 
many NGOs which aimed to provide support in disaster recovery. Aid 
management problems occurred at central, provincial and local government levels. 
Compared with the foreign-funded projects handled by central government, the 
NGOs, which directly connected with local government, were generally more 
successful and more focused on addressing local needs. 
10.2. Centralised power structures: the Sri Lankan context 
This study is situated in a political context where it has been argued the 
centralisation of power undermines local government. The latter is then unable to 
determine its own policy or to use its policy processes to bring about local 
development. The study focused on this context because centralisation has been a 
continuing and abiding feature in Sri Lanka. The attitudes, beliefs and sentiments 
of the Sri Lankan society have over many years seen the political system strongly 
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structured around centralisation, despite the many groups which have argued 
against centralisation. This political culture is a significant factor which needs to 
be highlighted in consideration of the recent trends and consequences of 
centralisation. 
Sri Lankan politics have been shaped and are still being shaped by the ambitions 
of certain governments, political parties, groups and leaders, who have relied on 
the highly centralised authoritative power structures in pursuing their political 
ambitions. A major consequence of this political sociology has been the neglect 
and undermining of provincial and local levels of government. As has been 
outlined above, Sri Lanka has had a long history of a strongly centralised and 
centralising government. It has built up a long political culture which is widely 
supported by a significant section of the population. It has not been part of Sri 
Lanka’s political culture to focus on the socio-economic needs of the many 
communities. It was expected that people would look after the social and 
economic welfare of their communities rather than looking to central government 
to provide a great deal.   
The long standing religious and ethnic structures reinforced the centralising 
political culture and the political elites, particularly those who were from the 
dominant groups, used the political culture to their advantage. The colonial 
experience did not challenge the dominant political culture, leaving governments 
and political leaders to maintain and reinforce the centralised authoritative power.  
The political elites have long been accustomed to this culture and have built on it 
over the centuries, so that with the on-going conflict and the recent tsunami the 
political leaders were able to draw on powerful and deep rooted cultural values to 
continue to assert their strongly centralising policies. The introduction of military 
personnel into positions of leadership reflects how far the centralisation of 
political authority has been widely accepted within the political culture. 
The issues of centralisation and its widespread acceptance show the mutual 
dependence of the political leadership and the public at large. Sri Lanka’s recent 
history shows how most uprisings by the people have been brutally supressed by 
government-sponsored military activities. People have significant social and 
economic needs which must be voiced, but they are afraid to express them in the 
current political context. This reluctance by people to express their views has 
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begun to be challenged following the recent tsunami and the conflict between 
Tamils and the government. 
The centralising tendencies strengthened by the tsunami of 2004 and the war have 
resulted in large amounts of foreign aid flowing into Sri Lanka and managed in a 
highly centralised way. While there have been questions about the lack of 
transparency with the administration of this aid, including questions about 
whether it has been directed towards the most needy, there have been no inquiries. 
The fact that there have been no demands or protests from within Sri Lankan 
society, especially from the local level, about these questions suggests a broad 
acceptance of centralising trends by the people, or an underlying fear of speaking 
out against the government. 
During the last few years of the war, prior to 2009, central government sustained 
public support for the war effort by promoting patriotism and war heroism among 
the Sinhala population. The popular media played a major role in this, with full 
sponsorship by the government. This has resulted in arousing the Sinhala 
majority’s patriotic and nationalist feelings against minority ethnic groups and has 
limited the potential for a balanced discussion between all ethnic groups about 
possible lasting solutions to the ethnic conflict. Against this background, the 
military has been highly favoured by the central government and granted the most 
important places in Sinhala society. By contrast, those who have acted against war 
policies and military actions have been identified by the government as traitors. In 
the aftermath of the war, central government has continued its promotion of the 
military in the name of ‘national security’ with a view towards containing a future 
‘enemy’ that might emerge from the Tamil minority. The media has played a role 
in these dynamics and continues to arouse the patriotic nationalist feelings of the 
Sinhala society. In this context, the government’s strategy can be seen as a means 
of remaining in power by using the threat of a future war as a means of sustaining 
popular support. The needs of local communities at the local level have been 
neglected within these politics. Importantly, military personnel have been 
appointed to higher level government administrative positions and have been 
encouraged to represent the central governing party, the UPFA, in elections. The 
military has therefore become a key tool for the promotion of central government 
agendas. Allocations in defence spending have increased every year following the 
war, diverting spending from important development initiatives. The extensive 
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use of the military by the government has created a large and controlling portion 
of government policy implementation. The result of this situation is military 
dominance over government and society which responds and reacts according to 
military experiences in addressing socio-economic issues. 
Simultaneously, the tsunami and conflict have introduced new factors to Sri 
Lanka’s experience and to the conduct of government as new actors effectively 
challenge the Sri Lankan government and its policies. Although government has 
aimed at retaining their electoral support, people have become intolerant of 
government policies and military involvement in their lives. For example, as 
discussed in chapter 7, when the military confiscated agricultural lands in the 
eastern province, people protested against the government and military. 
Government used the military to suppress protests, as is usual, and these 
government actions provided a clue to the Sinhala society that the military neither 
supports the majority nor the minorities, but it acts totally according to 
government orders. Sinhala society never expected the military would act against 
them after the war because they had supported the military during the war. 
However, the realisation within Sinhala society that the military was not on their 
side proved a disadvantage to government and future electoral success. For 
example, as discussed in chapter 7, due to land confiscation activities, and the 
suppression of protests against land confiscation, people in the Lahugala PS area 
voted against and defeated the central governing party in the recent local 
government elections. These issues draw a picture of the political sociology that is 
current in Sri Lankan society and of its vulnerable political culture. 
Since pre-colonial times Sri Lankan society has experienced a number of ethnic 
divisions and conflicts. As discussed in chapters 4 and 5, these divisions and 
conflicts have shaped, and are still shaping, constitutional developments, political 
party development, the emergence of political leaders, and especially the 
decentralisation process in Sri Lanka. After independence in 1948, several 
attempts were made by successive governments to decentralise power influenced 
by ethnic considerations aimed at ensuring one group’s advantage over the other. 
The anti-federalist reactions of some Sinhala nationalist political parties which 
have supported successive governments, together with some Buddhist priests, 
have contributed to the rejection of decentralisation proposals. These groups 
portray decentralisation as a threat to the unitary state structure and to state 
290 
 
sovereignty which, they argue, would divide the country. Much of the long-lasting 
ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka, which was evident in the war over demands for a 
separate Tamil state, does emerge from Sinhala nationalist parties and groups who 
are against decentralisation. A number of decentralisation proposals have 
therefore faded as successive governments, supported by these nationalist parties 
and groups, have exploited this issue in an effort to remain in power. The 
decentralisation process and local government reforms in Sri Lanka reflect the 
unwillingness, inability and negligence of ruling governments and leaders to 
decentralise power to local levels of government. In addition, the recent military-
led centralisation process of government depicts decentralisation and local 
government reforms as a distant reality. 
Attempts to reform local government have been connected with initiatives to 
decentralise government processes, but within the context of Sri Lankan politics, 
they have tended to end in failure.  As outlined in chapter 5, although there have 
been leaders who have proposed that local government should be more 
independent and powerful, these proposals have not been supported in the 
legislature. Most leaders, however, have supported the view that central 
government can govern effectively without institutions not under its direct control. 
For example, the development councils established in 1980 were a centralised 
approach to decentralisation and ended in failure. The provincial councils 
established later do have constitutionally recognised powers, but these have not 
actually been transferred by central government. 
Provincial councils were established as a part of the Indo-Lanka Peace Accord of 
1987 and therefore cannot be explained as a full attempt of Sri Lankan rulers to 
decentralise powers. They were developed as a solution to the ethnic conflict, but 
as mentioned earlier, there was no support for this initiative from the majority 
ethnic group, Sinhala. Sinhala nationalist elements have instead promoted the 
unitary state structure, and this has been met by the Tamil nationalist elements 
with demands for a separate Tamil state. The Sri Lankan government has been 
unable to provide a mediated solution which can satisfy the demands of these two 
positions. When Sinhala nationalist elements entered into coalition politics with 
the Sri Lankan political leadership, their ambition for a unitary state structure was 
promoted and the separatist Tamil nationalist elements were crushed through the 
war. The current Sri Lankan state structure is a reflection of the pro-unitary and 
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anti-federalist position. Under the auspices of war victory, the current Sri Lankan 
leadership has maintained its hold on power and has amended the constitution to 
remain in power for a longer period by removing the term limit for the President. 
The Executive President has thus been able to maintain control of Parliament and 
the Supreme Court by influencing MPs and the Chief Justice respectively, and 
rejecting decentralisation proposals by reference to nationalist arguments. 
Moreover, as discussed in chapter 6, these dynamics have resulted in the greater 
centralisation of power, with much of that now concentrated within one family. 
In this context of strong centralisation, groups which have supported 
decentralisation have been suppressed and silenced. As argued in chapter 7, 
central government maintains its position by using its power, funds and resources 
to fulfil its ambitions, without regard for the preferences and needs of the people. 
The large scale construction projects, land confiscation issues and military 
involvement in people’s lives in both southern and eastern provinces are examples 
of this highly centralised authoritative power. As argued above, reference to the 
war and the arousal of patriotic nationalist feelings among the majority Sinhala 
population contribute to the government’s ability to maintain power. 
This research has revealed that there are contradictions between what the central 
government interpret as development and what the local levels of government and 
the people expect. For example, the construction of a harbour, airport, 
international cricket stadium and an international conference centre in the 
Hambantota district of the southern province is not seen by locals as meeting the 
needs of the people in the area. Additionally, large scale tourism development in 
the eastern province has resulted in local people losing their agricultural lands and 
traditional fishing areas. People in these areas do not see themselves as receiving 
any benefit from such developments and many have lost their means to generate 
income. 
Central government has strongly influenced local politics by forcing provincial 
and local leaders to address central government agendas rather than fulfil local 
needs (see chapter 7). The major problem highlighted by local political 
representatives pertains to their lack of power and funding connected to the highly 
centralised power structures maintained by central government (see chapter 8). 
The central government-controlled administrative bodies also work as supportive 
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institutions in centralising attempts. Similarly, local government lacks the 
capacity to address development needs at the local level. Given this highly 
centralised power structure in Sri Lanka, this research has focused exploring ways 
in which local government can be empowered to address local community needs. 
10.3. Anti-colonial criticisms and NGOs 
As discussed in chapter 2, while providing a background to identify and explain 
the complexities of post-colonial societies, post-colonial criticisms draw a 
negative picture of Western influences on former colonies by interpreting the 
colonial past in former colonies as the reason for their present problems. In this 
context, foreign aid and the contribution of NGOs have been identified as 
perpetuating dependency on Western-based organisations. 
As detailed in chapters 4 and 5, Sri Lanka was under colonial rule for more than 
four centuries. More than six decades after decolonisation, debate about colonial 
influences still continues in the Sri Lankan political arena. Through the mixing of 
ethno-cultural diversities which evolved throughout history, the colonial 
influences structured many politico-economic and socio-cultural differences in Sri 
Lanka. Since decolonisation, Sri Lanka has been faced with its own problems 
such as internal conflict, poverty, election malpractices, violence, misuse of power 
by the government, corruption and nepotism. This gives rise to questions about 
the extent to which post-independence rulers have been responsible for such 
problems and whether the colonial past explains recent problems in Sri Lanka. As 
argued in chapter 2, post-colonial criticisms are unable to explain these new 
developments. Rather than the experience of colonialism, it has been the failures 
of post-independence rulers to address the various needs of the people which have 
been a barrier to development and a reason for many problems in Sri Lanka. But 
these failures have been interpreted by anti-colonial Sinhala nationalist political 
parties and groups as the result of colonialism. As discussed above, such rulers 
have shown a willingness to concentrate power in their hands rather than 
empowering other institutions at the local level which cannot be kept under their 
full control. Anti-colonial interpretations, the sensitivity of the Sri Lankan society 
towards nationalism, and the Sinhala majority’s willingness to protect the unitary 
state structure have all contributed to the centralisation of power. Recognising 
these issues adds to the above discussion on Sri Lankan political culture and helps 
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explain the people’s acceptance of central government rule, most of the time, 
without questioning, demanding or protesting. Acquiescence to central 
government and a lack of belief in the potential to challenge existing political 
power structures is a prominent feature of Sri Lankan political culture.  
In an environment where nationalist feelings have pitted one ethnic group against 
another, it is easier to introduce outside enemies naming them as supporters of 
each rival group. In Sri Lanka, NGOs have been named as imperial agents by the 
anti-colonial Sinhala nationalist parties and groups which have supported 
successive governments, and they have been portrayed as being supportive of the 
Tamil nationalist groups. This criticism has been used mostly by governments as a 
means of preventing rights-oriented NGOs which have engaged in protecting the 
interests of the people, especially those affected by the war (see chapter 6). This 
background opens a path to test the following hypothesis:  
• The involvement of NGOs in governance and development maintains the 
exploitative relations of colonialism. 
As discussed in chapter 6, in many situations, NGOs have been involved in 
protecting the rights of the people. In the 1980s the war and second JVP 
insurrection resulted in human rights violations, with many NGOs becoming 
actively involved in calls for the protection of human rights. They supported war-
affected people through relief and rehabilitation work and demanded inquiries to 
investigate the disappearance of people during hostilities and the insurrection. 
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s several NGOs campaigned for peace and for the 
democratic rights of the Tamils. Moreover, many NGOs worked against 
government-sponsored election violence, intimidation and malpractices, 
corruption and the misuse of power during from the late 1990s onwards. Similar 
NGO involvement was evident during the last years of the war. NGOs such as 
ICRC and UNHCR have worked to provide humanitarian aid to war-affected 
people faced with numerous restrictions, ill-treatment and harsh criticism by the 
government. NGO involvement has been met with a number of attempts by 
government to restrict and discourage their activities and tarnish their image 
among the people. This anti-NGO trend has been government-sponsored but 
publicised by Sinhala nationalist parties and groups. Despite this, NGOs continue 
to have government approval to continue with their work. The government’s 
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interest in receiving foreign aid means that although it promotes and supports 
nationalist groups in criticising rights-oriented NGOs, it does not reject the 
support of development-oriented NGOs (see chapter 6). Accordingly, the criticism 
of some anti-colonial Sinhala nationalist groups which depicts NGOs as imperial 
agents can be seen as opportunistic and far beyond the truth. 
NGO involvement that is oriented towards protecting people’s rights has the 
potential to influence governments in ways that are positive. In the context where 
people have not come forward on their own to advance and protect their 
democratic rights, such NGO involvement is beneficial for drawing attention to 
people’s needs and in improving democratic governance and development. Such 
NGO involvement, therefore, does not support the above hypothesis and instead 
confirms the following: 
• The involvement of NGOs leads to improved forms of governance and 
development.  
This NGO involvement suggests that post-colonial criticisms ignore the positive 
influence of foreign aid and NGOs in former colonies such as Sri Lanka. 
10.4. Formation of productive government-NGO relationships 
Chapter 2 identified two areas within the literature on government-NGO relations. 
The first is related to government attempts to control NGO activities within the 
state boundaries either by collaborating or clashing with them. The second refers 
to the capacities of NGOs to support local levels of government and the needs of 
local communities.  
As discussed in chapter 6, many and complex legal procedures and institutional 
mechanisms used by the Sri Lankan government to control NGOs have weakened 
government-NGO relations. In carrying out this research, it became clear that 
there are several important criteria and reporting requirements that must be met by 
NGOs if they are to be registered to work in Sri Lanka. Government has imposed 
strict conditions on NGOs working in post-war areas. Fulfilling these 
requirements does tend to discourage NGO activities and is not client-friendly. 
These government procedures open a way to test the following hypothesis derived 
from the literature: 
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• The need to maintain strong leadership leads to authoritative government 
responses and undermines the capacity to build collaborative relations 
with NGOs which enhance local government and local development. 
As mentioned earlier, Sri Lanka received large amounts of foreign aid and support 
from NGOs in the post-tsunami and post-war situations. These extraordinary 
circumstances were different from normal foreign aid flows and NGO support. As 
there were no aid management and distribution mechanisms at any level of 
government at that time, central government assumed control of the whole aid 
management and distribution process (see chapter 9). Many NGOs in Sri Lanka 
have had to work through central government ministries, the NGO Secretariat, 
district and divisional secretariats to support the local people. Much of the time, 
NGOs have to work according to the agendas of these institutions. NGOs which 
support central government agendas and political goals, such as the large scale 
construction projects, have been fully supported. As discussed in chapter 9, the 
WB, ADB and UNDP are directly connected with central government and work 
according to government agendas. Figures 9.1, 9.2 and 9.4 indicate the many 
stages of project planning and aid flow from national level to local levels which 
widen the distance between NGOs and local levels. When NGOs do not have 
direct access to the local level, they have to agree to central government control 
over their operations, finances and activities. As outlined in chapter 7, this 
undermines NGO capacity to address actual needs at the local level and confirms 
the above hypothesis. 
As set out in chapter 6, the relationship between the Sri Lankan government and 
NGOs has taken variety of forms. Among these, there were examples of 
collaborative relations. Three major examples were the Gramodaya Mandala 
system, the Janasaviya programme and the 2002 peace negotiations. In 1980s the 
Gramodaya Mandalas provided opportunities for NGOs to be involved in local 
level planning and implementation (see chapter 5). In the 1990s Janasaviya was 
set up as the government’s major poverty alleviation programme sponsored by the 
WB. Many NGOs were involved in implementing Janasaviya sub-projects at that 
time. During the 2002 peace negotiations, NGOs were involved in a number of 
peace building projects in the conflict-affected areas together with the government 
(see chapter 6). These collaborations were progressive and heavily dependent on 
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the pro-NGO policies of successive governments. These collaborative relations 
confirm the following hypothesis: 
• Central government can maintain strong leadership without undermining 
the development of collaborative relations with NGOs which enhance 
local government and local development.  
In the events mentioned above, the agreements with the NGOs permitted them to 
work without strict government controls. The Sri Lankan government provided its 
full support to promote the role of NGOs. This reveals that where government and 
NGOs collaborate, both parties can share responsibilities for addressing the needs 
of local communities without undermining one another. When compared to 
government-controlled NGO projects, such collaboration is identified as different 
and progressive. But this does not mean that there were no problems between the 
government and NGOs, during such events. In the Gramodaya Mandala system, 
some anti-government NGOs failed to participate in meetings and were not 
involved in planning and implementation. Although NGOs supported the 
Janasaviya programme, after the appointment of the NGO Commission in 1993 
by the President, many NGOs broke with the government. As mentioned in 
chapter 6, the NGO Commission was interpreted by commentators as an outcome 
of personal rivalry and competition between the President and a local NGO leader 
at that time. With changes of governments and leaders over time, therefore, 
government-NGO relations can also change. The positive support of NGOs in the 
2002 peace negotiations reversed when the war restarted.  In situations where the 
government does not recognise people’s democratic rights, and when NGOs work 
against such actions, there have been conflicts between government and NGOs, 
evident in the government imposed restrictions on rights-oriented NGOs (see 
chapter 6). 
As discussed in chapter 7, most local government representatives lacked a clear 
idea about local development and people’s participation in it. They tended to see 
central government-led large scale construction projects as local development. 
Also local government representatives’ lack of knowledge about their powers and 
functions was an obstacle to building productive relations with NGOs. Most local 
government representatives did not know that they had the power to obtain direct 
support from NGOs and they did not know how to apply for foreign funds, 
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resources and garner support from them. Despite their political party affiliations, 
local government representatives of both the southern and eastern provinces 
proposed that aid and support be sought from NGOs (see chapter 8). As 
mentioned above, most proposals by local government representatives and local 
administrative officials to get foreign funds needed the guidance of NGOs in 
management, technology and policy planning. 
NGOs such as Transparency International and CPA provided knowledge to local 
government representatives on local government legal powers and income sources. 
The Asia Foundation has been involved in promoting people’s participation in 
local government through participatory budgeting. The Weligama UC in the 
southern province received support from the Asia Foundation in preparing project 
proposals which helped it obtain aid from a number of foreign donors to develop 
the area. The Kattankudy UC in the eastern province also received guidance on 
participatory budgeting from USAID. CARE International has been involved in 
supporting the building of CBOs and addressing the needs of the poorest of the 
poor (see chapter 9). This NGO involvement at the local level illustrates two 
dimensions. First central government has not been involved in providing the 
support to encourage the development of local government capacities, and second 
the work which has been carried on by NGOs at the local level matches the 
proposals of local government representatives and local administrative officials.  
Some local government areas have sister-city relations with foreign counterparts 
that supply aid and guidance, such as the Galle MC with the city of Velsen, 
Netherlands, and the Kalmunai MC with the city of Munich, Germany and these 
are identified as having productive relations (see chapter 9). Because of these 
relations, local government was able to avoid the barriers put up by central and 
provincial government to control foreign aid and NGO support. Some NGOs 
working directly at the local level signed memoranda of understanding with the 
central government, and their activities at the local level have not been disturbed 
by the central government. It is evident that central government reacts differently 
to different NGOs, particularly NGOs directly connected to the local level which 
manage small funds. These NGOs have their own agendas and handle small 
projects according to needs at the local level. Central government does not find 
much advantage in taking over these NGOs because they cannot support central 
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government’s large scale project agendas. Also, these NGOs tend to be 
development-oriented and not rights-oriented. 
The central government behaviour towards NGOs can be explained by reference 
to the post-tsunami and the post-war environments. As mentioned earlier, in the 
post-tsunami and post-war environments, central government built mechanisms to 
keep the whole aid management process under its control. While central 
government was administering the major flows of foreign donor funds, a number 
of NGOs engaged directly with local government bodies to support their planning 
and local development programmes. These NGOs saw that working with central 
government agendas did not provide opportunities to address local needs. But this 
does not mean that these NGOs did not have to meet strict central government 
criteria. Nonetheless, they still had to follow central government agendas. In the 
post-tsunami and post-war context, central government paid little attention to the 
small funders and NGOs which engaged directly at the local level. Examining the 
post-tsunami and post-war environment, therefore, allows for insight into different 
forms of behaviour by central government towards various NGOs. 
This research has focused on two types of government-NGO relationship in Sri 
Lanka. The first is the central government-NGO relationship, and the second is 
the local government-NGO relationship. Two features are central in assessing the 
significance of NGOs: the extent to which NGOs identify and address the local 
needs through their projects and programmes, and in what ways they collaborate 
with local government and local communities. Among the two types of 
relationship, this research found that the most productive government-NGO 
relations are built at the local government level.  While the central government-
NGO relations focus on the importance of developing physical infrastructure, the 
significant work undertaken by NGOs through connecting with local government 
provides evidence of their support, for and encouragement of, developments 
beneficial to Sri Lanka by stressing the importance of human resources. These 
NGO relations support local government bodies in improving governance and in 
addressing the needs of local communities through providing knowledge to local 
government representatives and staff, and encouraging people’s participation to 
promote effective policy processes and local development (see chapter 9). This 
confirms the above hypothesis because there are possibilities for central 
government to accept NGOs which work at the local level, and there are 
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opportunities for local government to collaborate with NGOs towards enhancing 
local governance and local development. 
10.5. NGOs in policy processes and networking 
This research has revealed that specific local issues, such as ethnic divisions and 
decisions about the use of local natural resources, have not been addressed 
through local government policies (see Table 7.2). As discussed in chapter 7, the 
central government’s neglect of local government and local development is 
significant. Local government respondents indicated they had encountered 
discrimination from the national and provincial politicians who were aiming to 
use local political representatives as their agents to fulfil central and provincial 
government agendas. Most local government respondents saw provincial councils 
as barriers to local development. As noted in chapter 8, they responded negatively 
to provincial councils, not because they rejected decentralisation, but because the 
provincial councils lacked the powers and capacities to support local government.  
Provincial councils acted mostly as central government-controlled bodies rather 
than as separate political institutions because central government had not 
transferred the constitutionally allocated powers to provincial councils as 
mentioned above. As long as provincial councils acted in accordance with central 
government agendas, central government did not abolish these institutions. When 
there have been demands to transfer powers to provincial councils, central 
government has limited the role of provincial councils (see chapter 8). A main 
tactic employed by central government has been to set aside provincial councils as 
a part of any centralisation process. As discussed above, with central government-
centric policy processes, the government can neglect the issues it does not want to 
consider. For example, the problems faced by local communities due to a lack of 
essential facilities such as water, electricity and interior roads have not been 
addressed by central government’s large scale construction projects. Such projects 
are focused on tourism promotion which is a central government priority. The 
significant issue here is that local people’s views have not been considered in the 
policy process. 
In Sri Lanka there are limited means for organising and obtaining people’s 
participation in local policy planning and local development. This research has 
revealed that people’s participation in local policy processes was not encouraged 
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by local government bodies, nor were they required to consult locals (see chapter 
7). While many local government representatives saw the benefits of encouraging 
people’s participation in local policy processes and building CBOs for this 
purpose it rarely happened. In this context, this research identifies potential for 
external actors to promote a role for people in the policy process. It has shown 
that some NGOs have the potential to help build CBOs and guide local 
government representatives in ways of obtaining people’s participation in local 
policy processes (see chapter 9). Some local government bodies such as Matara 
MC have been successful in promoting people’s participation through establishing 
citizen committees at the ward level.  The major reason for the success of Matara 
MC was the creative and effective leadership of the mayor at that time. The NGO 
support in building citizen committees was an advantage. 
A number of respondents in this research proposed the need for improved 
mechanisms to engage with local communities and to bring all policy actors 
together in the policy planning process at the local level. There was, however, no 
mention of how to build such mechanisms (see chapter 8). It can be assumed that 
such respondents place their hopes in external actors helping them to build 
network mechanisms bringing all relevant parties together. The expectations of 
local government representatives and local administrative officials to obtain 
support from NGOs to organise and encourage people’s participation in policy 
planning and development programmes proved significant (see chapters 7 and 8). 
This research found that local government bodies, CBOs and local people did not 
come forward on their own to participate in the local policy process or to build 
networks. This is again a characteristic of the Sri Lankan political culture where 
people do not seek to project themselves forward to participate or object. 
Although some of the local government representatives stressed the importance of 
CBOs in obtaining ideas for local policy processes, many local government bodies 
lacked networked relationships with CBOs. Neither has information on CBOs 
been recorded by local government bodies. It is evident that NGOs such as CARE 
International helped to establish CBOs in certain local government areas. This 
research shows that key NGOs such as the Asia Foundation, Transparency 
International, SSA and CPA were involved in various ways in networking with 
local government, CBOs, people at the local level, intellectuals, professionals, the 
private sector and funding agencies aimed at organising local resources, solving 
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local development problems and overcoming difficulties in local government 
areas through making and implementing appropriate policies (see chapter 9). 
Furthermore, where people have been encouraged by NGOs to participate in the 
policy process in local government then better results have been obtained. For 
example, the Asia Foundation supported Weligama UC on participatory budgeting 
and through this guidance the UC was able to complete many foreign-funded 
projects which had been prioritised by the people. This research determined that 
NGOs have been involved in policy planning and in obtaining people’s 
participation in local governing and development (see chapter 9). 
These findings therefore do not support the following hypothesis: 
• NGOs do not encourage people’s participation in the local policy 
processes or promote local development. 
Instead, the findings of this research confirm the following hypothesis: 
• NGOs play a positive role in encouraging people’s participation in the 
local policy processes and local development. 
This research shows that despite the strong centralisation of authoritative power, 
NGOs can organise people’s participation in local policy processes towards local 
development through networking parties together (see chapter 9). 
10.6. Contribution 
The failure to investigate the reasons for the non-implementation of 
decentralisation and local government policy reforms is a major gap in the 
literature on Sri Lankan local government. Throughout the history of Sri Lankan 
local government, several policy reforms have been proposed and are still being 
proposed, but none have been fully implemented yet. This research identifies this 
major gap in the discussion of Sri Lankan local government and has investigated 
reasons for the non-implementation of such policy reforms. 
Furthermore there is very little research and literature on Sri Lankan local 
government and on NGOs in Sri Lanka, and there is no research which seeks to 
determine the contribution of NGOs in local government in Sri Lanka. This thesis 
opens up a new field related to Sri Lankan local government and NGOs, and 
contributes new dimensions to the study, knowledge and analysis of the Sri 
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Lankan policy debate. It encourages thinking about decentralisation and local 
government in Sri Lanka promoting effective NGO involvement at the local level. 
The long-term success of this promotion will challenge the highly centralised 
power structures in the future. If the political representatives and people at the 
local level can be empowered through knowledge on inclusive policy making as 
they seek to develop their local areas, they are likely to gain confidence in their 
ability to govern themselves and take control of their own development. The 
results of such a process are likely to help policy makers at the national level 
recognise that the issues are not really about a changed structure but about a much 
more effective structure as local people understand more about their own 
communities. This research contributes and promotes a bottom-up perspective of 
policy planning and implementation, with the support of NGOs who work at the 
local level, together with local government, towards local development. 
Without proposing any constitutional amendments or policy reforms related to 
decentralisation and local government, this research proposes a practical solution 
to empower local government in local development through better use of the 
powers, resources and abilities available at the local level. It challenges 
centralising power structures and argues for the empowering of local government 
and local communities. It argues that supporting local government as it pursues 
local development by providing sufficient knowledge, guidance, technologies, 
funds and resources to the local level, with the assistance of NGOs, is a way of 
achieving such empowerment.  
Despite the trends of centralisation and control of authoritative power, NGOs have 
been able to work effectively with local communities, to build CBOs, and network 
all parties together at the local level in local government policy processes and 
local development. This has come about in large measure because of the tsunami 
and conflict. The most important part of this local government-NGO interaction 
has been its ability to empower local communities towards voicing their needs in 
local policy processes. Once the habits of this cooperation are learned by the 
parties, this can transform not only Sri Lankan local government by developing 
the needed skills, competencies and understanding, and by providing funding, 
training and other resources, but also the understanding of central government 
about the considerable strengths at the local level to build the future for Sri Lanka. 
As the current government leaders understand this reality, they will come to 
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recognise that the new ideas are not threatening to their centralised power 
structures. Future political leaders will see the advantage of emerging changes for 
transforming the strong centralised power structures. As this happens NGOs, 
together with local government and local communities, can play a positive role in 
Sri Lanka towards this on-going transformation. 
The arguments are not about decentralisation or centralisation, which is shaped by 
the ethnic divisions in Sri Lanka, but about a system in which all people can 
participate fully and fairly without protecting already existing ethnic divisions. 
10.7. Limitations 
As this field has not been the focus of prior research, this study has sought to 
capture a ‘big picture’ analysis of NGO activities at the local level and identify the 
ways in which they can become more involved in policy making in local 
government and local development. Because of limited time, and due to the wide 
scope of NGO activities at the local level, this research was not able to investigate 
CBOs in-depth. This points to an area for future investigation. 
While it was possible to obtain the lists of CBOs and their contact details from 
district and divisional secretariats, it was found that most of these CBOs were not 
receiving foreign funds from NGOs. As this research is concerned only with 
foreign-funded NGOs that work at the local level, several other organisations 
were not being covered. Although neither remarkable nor prominent, these 
organisations work individually at the local level to fulfil some of the local 
community needs without foreign funding. Furthermore, this research covered 
only two of the nine provinces in Sri Lanka and six local government bodies from 
each province. A more extensive study was beyond the scope of this research. 
The limitations occurring through language is another issue. As this researcher 
does not speak or understand Tamil language, the support of translators was 
obtained when interviewing some of the local government representatives in the 
eastern province. The opportunity to talk with the general public in their familiar 
environments was limited. When using translators, there are doubts that the exact 
question, as intended by the researcher, has been conveyed to respondents. Also, 
the answers received may vary according to the translator’s interpretation. 
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Another limitation is the lack of participation by national and provincial 
politicians in this research. In particular, the national and provincial politicians 
representing the governing party, the UPFA, showed their dislike for face-to-face 
interviews. Their responses to this researcher’s requests for interviews were 
discouraging, with some not replying to letters, e-mails or even answering phone 
calls. 
In the course of this research, the methods of semi-structured and unstructured 
interviews resulted in some respondents talking on broad topics which were not 
relevant to the central research question, but which were related to Sri Lankan 
politics at the time. 
10.8. Future research 
Although there is only a limited literature on local government and NGOs in Sri 
Lanka, this research provides a base for future research in this field. As noted, a 
limitation of this research is the lack of attention given to CBOs. This research 
provides a base for future researchers to seek in-depth studies of CBOs and 
investigate ways to obtain support in building networks with local government 
bodies and assist NGOs towards promoting new aspects of local development. 
There is currently no agreed mechanism at the local level to obtain the support of 
NGOs, and policy makers and NGOs can use this research as a guideline to build 
an effective mechanism connecting all parties with local government, CBOs, 
people at the local level, intellectuals, professionals, private sector and NGOs can 
work together at the local level in developing and implementing policy on local 
development. 
Future researchers can expand and continue this research in other provinces and 
include other local government bodies as well to find out the possibilities of 
promoting NGO involvement at the local level. 
10.9. Final remarks 
The findings of this research reveal that throughout its history, local government 
reforms and decentralisation efforts have failed in Sri Lanka for many of the 
reasons outlined in this thesis. The influence of nationalist groups and the 
hesitations of post-independence rulers to decentralise power are some of the 
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major impediments to progress. There were no demands from the majority ethnic 
group for decentralisation and they have been accepting of the unitary state 
structure of the country for a long period of time. This is a prominent feature of 
Sri Lankan political culture. The demand for decentralisation has always arisen 
from ethnic minorities, especially from Tamils. Alongside this, local government 
reforms and decentralisation efforts have tended to come from the top rather than 
from a concern with the actual needs of those at the bottom. Central government 
has planned such reforms periodically, but when these reforms have shown the 
potential to empower people at the local level, the government has tended to 
withdraw its support. In this way, over decades central government has tended to 
use local government as a means to strengthen the centralised power structures. In 
this context, people have acquiesced to a highly centralised governing structure 
which has consistently neglected the local communities by concentrating power at 
the centre. People at the local level continue to be characterised by a lack of 
power, funds, resources and especially a lack of knowledge about how to advance 
their demands. 
Sri Lankan politics has been shaped by the post-tsunami and post-war situations 
where central government has dominated most of the reconstruction work, 
controlling aid and its management and distribution. National security and 
stability has been a significant political theme, especially after the war. The 
military has been promoted and given a high level of recognition within the 
administration. The present Sri Lankan political leadership’s attempt to remain in 
power through promoting the military and patriotic nationalism is significant. In 
this context, the government is less concerned with human rights and democratic 
governance. In turn, it has imposed restrictions on the work of rights-oriented 
NGOs. Yet at the same time, the government has welcomed development-oriented 
NGOs which do not raise the same concerns. 
This research began with the recognition of a clear need to empower the local 
level by connecting local government and local communities in order to overcome 
difficulties and to fulfil development needs. Central government has consistently 
withdrawn from initiatives to empower local government. Local government itself, 
and the people it represents, lacks the resources to advance local interests. NGOs 
do have potential in this regard. They have been identified here as having the 
capacity to empower local government in pursuit of local development through 
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encouraging people’s participation in local policy planning. Although NGOs have 
this potential, this research also reveals that there are challenges. Most of these 
challenges, again, are connected with central government control over foreign aid 
and NGOs. But such problems again can be resolved by empowering local 
government bodies to use their remaining functions and power to obtain NGO 
support directly. Despite their political party affiliations and provincial differences, 
the potential for many local government representatives to obtain NGO support 
and work for local communities is encouraging. After empowering local 
government and people in this way, it can be expected that reforms will emerge 
from the local level to address the actual needs of communities, which will 
challenge further the highly centralised power structures in Sri Lanka. 
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Appendix I 
Sri Lanka: location in world map 
Source: ‘Where is Sri Lanka Located on the World Map?’ (n.d.) 
http://www.freeworldmaps.net/asia/srilanka/location.html, accessed 23-12-2013. 
Source: ‘Indian Subcontinent’ (n.d.) 
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Appendix II 
Sri Lanka: provincial map 
Source: ‘Sri Lanka Map’ (n.d.) http://www.mapsofworld.com/sri-lanka/, accessed 23-12-2013. 
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Appendix III 
Sri Lanka: district map 
Source: ‘Maps’ (n.d.) http://www.jaffnahistory.com/Maps/North_West_Gallery.html, accessed 23-
12-2013. 
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Appendix IV 
Respondents 
Southern province 
Local government representatives: 
1. Mr Methsiri De Silva, Mayor (UPFA), Galle Municipal Council 
2. Mr Nimalchandra Ranasinghe, Representative (UNP), Galle Municipal 
Council 
3. Mr Upul Nishantha, former Mayor, Matara Municipal Council 
4. Mr Mohammad Nabavi, Opposition Leader (UNP), Matara Municipal 
Council 
5. Mr Jayantha Pathirana, Representative (JVP) Matara Municipal Council 
6. Ms K.H. Thakshila Damayanthi, Representative (UPFA), Weligama 
Urban Council 
7. Mr Padmasiri Ediriweera, Opposition Leader (UNP), Weligama Urban 
Council 
8. Mr D.A. Gamini, Opposition Leader (UNP), Hambantota Urban Council 
9. Mr S. Mubarak Maulana, Deputy Chairman (UPFA), Hambantota Urban 
Council 
10. Mr Anura Amarasiri Narangoda, Chairman (UPFA), Baddegama 
Pradeshiya Sabha 
11. Mr Manjula Liyanage, Representative (UNP), Baddegama Pradeshiya 
Sabha 
12. Mr Nandasiri Ranathunga, Chairman (UPFA), Suriyawewa Pradeshiya 
Sabha 
13. Mr M.D. Indika Thushara, Opposition Leader (JVP), Suriyawewa 
Pradeshiya Sabha 
Provincial council members: 
14. Rev. Baddegama Samitha Thero, Representative (UPFA), Southern 
Provincial Council 
Administrative officials: 
15. Mr H.G.K. Jagath Kumara, PHI Officer, Matara Municipal Council 
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16. Mr L.H.A.C. Kumara, Assistant Director-Planning, Weligama Divisional 
Secretariat 
17. Ms Rupika Rajakaruna, NGO Coordinating Officer, Galle District 
Secretariat 
18. Mr Saman Pandikorala, Provincial Local Government Commissioner, 
Provincial Local Government Commission, Southern Province 
19. Mr Dileepa De Silva, Technical Officer, Galle Municipal Council 
20. Mrs Nirosha Kumari Herath, Community Development Officer, Weligama 
Urban Council 
21. Mr H.A. Sisira Rohana, Project Manager, Solid Waste Management 
Project, Hambantota Urban Council 
22. Mrs H.I.G. Shirani Pushpakumari, Assistant Director-Planning, 
Baddegama Divisional Secretariat 
23. Mr M.K. Pradeep Kumara, Assistant Director-Planning, Suriyawewa 
Divisional Secretariat 
Eastern province 
Local government representatives: 
24. Mr George Pillai, Deputy Mayor (UPFA), Batticaloa Municipal Council 
25. Mr K. Selvarajah, Chairman (TNA), Trincomalee Urban Council 
26. Mr N. Noormohamad, Representative (UPFA), Trincomalee Urban 
Council 
27. Mr S. Sanoon, Representative (UNP), Trincomalee Urban Council 
28. Mr S.L.M. Jawadullah, Chairman (UPFA), Kinniya Pradeshiya Sabha 
29. Mr Rassaiya Chandrasena, Chairman (UNP), Lahugala Pradeshiya Sabha 
30. Mr J.S.D.M. Ravin Niroshan Kumara, Opposition Leader and former 
Chairman (UPFA), Lahugala Pradeshiya Sabha 
Administrative officials: 
31. Mr Subash Ponnamperuma, NGO Coordinating Officer, Trincomalee 
District Secretariat 
32. Mr Rahuman, Revenue Supervisor, Kattankudy Urban Council 
33. Mr Abul Hassan, Administrative Officer, Kalmunai Divisional Secretariat  
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34. Mr Mohamad Mussil, Assistant Director-Planning, Kinniya Divisional 
Secretariat 
35. Mr A.R. Subair, Secretary, Kinniya Pradeshiya Sabha 
CBO representatives: 
36. Rev. Panama Chandarathana Thero, the Chief Priest of Panama Buddhist 
temple, the Principal of the Panama school, and the Leader of the 
movement to protect Panampaththuwa 
National level 
Parliament members: 
37. Mr Joseph Michael Perera, MP (UNP), Gampaha District 
Administrative officials: 
38. Mr Gamini Gunasekara, Commissioner, Kaduwela Municipal Council 
39. Mr D.P. Hettiarachchi, Retired Administrative Officer, Ministry of Local 
Government and Provincial Councils; and Consultant, EML Consultants 
40. Mr M.L. Sunil Fernando, Advisor, Policy Division, Ministry of Local 
Government and Provincial Councils 
NGOs 
NGO officials: 
41. Mr Lal Induruwage, Project Director, Local Government Infrastructure 
Improvement Project (LGIIP), ADB-Sri Lanka 
42. Mr Rajendrakumar Ganesarajah, Local Governance Advisor, Local 
Governance Project, UNDP-Sri Lanka 
43. Mr Jayantha Wickramanayake, Senior Technical Advisor – Local 
Government Policy Planning, Asia Foundation, Sri Lanka 
44. Mr Abul Kalam, Programme Manager, Supporting Regional Governance 
Programme (SuRG) of USAID 
45. Mr Sisira Wijesundara, Team Leader, CARE International – Hambantota 
Office 
46. Ms Nauli Wimalarathna, Consultant, Transparency International-Sri Lanka 
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47. Ms Sriyanie Wijesundara, Contact Person, Governance and Anti-
Corruption Programme, Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA) 
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Appendix V 
Interview schedules 
Interview schedule I (for political representatives) 
Main issues and question areas: 
Part I: Local government and decentralisation  
1) Respondent’s political history and responsibilities:  
• the length of time the respondent has been involved in local politics  
• the institution with which they are most closely associated  
• the period of time they have been with that institution 
• in what capacity they have been / are involved 
• the scope and range of the institution’s responsibilities  
• the respondent’s role in the institution 
2) Dealing with local matters: 
• the independence in working on local matters  
• the extent to which power has been decentralised  
• the influences of central government  
• independence in decision making 
• respondent’s understanding of good governance and local democracy  
• knowledge of constitution and relevant local government legislation 
• the relations with local administrative bodies 
Part II: NGOs and peoples’ participation 
• respondent’s perceptions of working with NGOs 
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• respondent’s views of their effectiveness, ideas from the local people, the 
funding supplied by NGOs 
• the impact of NGOs on how local people participate in local policy 
process 
• the pathways available to local people to participate in local policy process 
• CBOs in the area and their work 
• the effectiveness of CBOs  
• the impact of external influences  
• the contribution of the ideas of local people on decision making at the 
local level 
Part III: Local development 
• respondent’s understanding about local development 
• sources of funding for local development 
• the capacity to make decisions locally 
• respondent’s understanding of local needs and difficulties 
• the role of central and provincial government in local development 
• dependence on foreign support 
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Interview schedule II (for administrative officials) 
Main issues and question areas: 
Part I: Local government and decentralisation  
• respondents’ perceptions of whether there are sufficient powers for the 
institution 
• ability of the institution to make decisions on local matters 
• relations and links with local government bodies 
• differing approaches to local issues 
• involvement in local policy process 
• respondent’s views on good governance and local democracy  
Part II: NGOs and peoples’ participation 
• respondent’s perceptions of working with NGOs  
• respondent’s views of the work of NGOs 
• the funding supplied by NGOs 
• the impact of NGOs on how local people participate in local policy 
process 
• the pathways available to local people to participate in local policy process 
• CBOs and their work 
• the effectiveness of CBOs  
• the external influences and the impact they have 
• the contribution of the ideas of local people on decision making at the 
local level 
Part III: Local development 
• respondent’s understanding about local development  
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• sources of funding for local development  
• the capacity to make decisions locally  
• respondent’s views on local needs and difficulties  
• the role of central and provincial government in local development 
• dependence on foreign support 
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Interview schedule III (for NGO officials) 
Main issues and question areas: 
Part I: Local government and decentralisation 
• respondent’s institutional contacts with local political and administrative 
authorities 
• ability of the NGO to make decisions on local matters 
• support of the local political and administrative bodies 
• involvement in local policy process 
• respondent’s views on good governance and local democracy 
• the independence in working on local matters 
• respondent’s perceptions on current decentralised power and it’s 
sufficiency to empower local people 
• involvement to increase the local decentralised power 
Part II: NGOs and peoples’ participation 
• relations with the other NGOs 
• CBOs in the area, their work and the effectiveness of CBOs 
• the pathways available to local people to participate in local policy process 
• the ways of empowering local people 
• the contribution of the ideas of local people on decision making at the 
local level 
• suggestions to improve the peoples’ participation in the local policy 
process 
Part III: Local development 
• respondent’s understanding about local development 
• the local development projects which the NGO handle in the area 
• sources of funding for local development projects 
• the capacity to make decisions locally 
• respondent’s views on local needs and difficulties 
• peoples’ participation in local projects 
• the role of central and provincial government in local development 
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Appendix VI 
Foreign-funded projects 
1. Partnership programme between the county councils of the United 
Kingdom and the tsunami-affected local government bodies 
After the 2004 tsunami, several British delegations visited Sri Lanka and became 
involved in rehabilitation within the tsunami-affected areas. Discussions between 
the Ministry of Provincial Councils and Local Government, the Commonwealth 
Local Government Forum and UK city councils and consortia resulted in the 
following partnerships: Colombo district with the Leeds city council; Galle district 
with the Merseyside consortium; Matara district with the Suffolk consortium; 
Ampara district with the Staffordshire consortium; Batticaloa district with the 
Kent consortium; Trincomalee district with the Scotland consortium; and 
Mullaitivu district with the Essex consortium.1083 
2. North East Irrigated Agriculture Project (NEIAP) 
This was a WB-funded five-year (2000-2004) project implemented by the 
Ministry of Provincial Councils and Local Government, and the north east 
provincial council.1084 It aimed to help conflict-affected communities to restart 
agricultural activities, and to build their capacity for sustainable social and 
economic reintegration.1085 The cost of the project was US$32.4 million.1086 
3. North East Community Restoration and Development Project-I 
(NECORD-I) 
The ADB, Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and the 
governments of Germany and Netherlands funded this project. The governments 
of Norway and Finland supplied grants. The project period was five years, 
commencing in 2002. 1087  The Ministry of Provincial Councils and Local 
1083 Performance-2005 & Future Plans-2006, Ministry of Provincial Councils and Local 
Government, Colombo-02, p. 19. 
1084 Ibid., p. 23. 
1085 ‘North-East Irrigated Agriculture Project’ (n.d.) 
http://www.worldbank.org/projects/P058070/north-east-irrigated-agriculture-project?lang=en, 
accessed 20-06-2013. 
1086 Performance-2005 & Future Plans-2006, p. 23. 
1087 Ibid., p. 24. 
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Government was the executing agency of this project. 1088  The goal of the 
proposed project was to contribute to the government’s overall relief and 
rehabilitation programme for the north east of Sri Lanka by improving the living 
conditions and well-being of communities affected by the on-going ethnic conflict. 
The sectors included in the project scope were health, education, water supply and 
sanitation, agriculture (including irrigation and fisheries), shelter, roads to a 
limited extent and income generation.1089 The cost of the project was US$85.4 
million.1090 
4. North East Emergency Reconstruction Programme (NEERP) 
This was WB-funded two-year project (2003-2004) implemented by the north east 
provincial council. This project was launched to assist the north east provincial 
council in carrying out a programme of rehabilitation and reconstruction in the 
war-affected areas, including assisting in the rehabilitation of internally displaced 
persons (IDPs), restoring primary health care and water supplies and building 
institutional capacity within the north east provincial council to implement long-
term reconstruction activities. The cost of the project was US$40 million.1091 
5. Conflict-Affected Area Rehabilitation Project (CAARP) 
This was an ADB-funded four-year project (2004-2007). The Ministry of 
Provincial Councils and Local Government was the executing agency while the 
Road Development Authority (RDA), Ceylon Electricity Board (CEB), National 
Water Supply and Drainage Board and the north east provincial council were the 
implementing agencies. 1092  The objective of the project was to rehabilitate 
essential infrastructure and to improve living conditions in the areas most affected 
by the conflict. The project cost was US$106.9 million.1093 
1088 Sri Lanka: North East Community Restoration and Development Project: Completion Report 
(2009) Asian Development Bank, p. i 
(http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/5C82DE495A6BAF60492576BD000D8D5E
-Full_Report.pdf, accessed 20-06-2013). 
1089 ‘North East Community Restoration and Development Project’ (n.d.) 
http://www.adb.org/projects/34442-013/details, accessed 20-06-2013. 
1090 Performance-2005 & Future Plans-2006, p. 24. 
1091 Ibid., pp. 25-26. 
1092 Ibid., p. 26. 
1093 Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka: Conflict-Affected Area Rehabilitation Project: 
Completion Report (2012) Asian Development Bank, p. 1 
(http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/projdocs/2012/37245-013-sri-pcr.pdf, accessed 20-06-2013). 
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6. North East Community Restoration and Development – Extension Project 
(NECORD-Ext) 
This project was ADB-funded and scheduled for two years (2004-2006). It was 
initiated in the north and east to rebuild and reconstruct the damaged and 
destroyed infrastructure from the war. This programme also monitored 
community restoration in the north and east. The objective of the project was to 
rapidly improve the living conditions and well-being of a significant number of 
people in areas badly affected by conflict. The project initiated mutual 
understanding among communities to support the peace process. 1094 The ADB 
provided US$10,000 thousand loan for this project.1095 
7. Public Work Restoration and Rehabilitation of Line Drainage Systems in 
Tsunami-Affected Local Government Roads 
This was a one year (2005-2006) project funded by the Japan Fund for Poverty 
Reduction (JFPR) and ABD. It was implemented in the northern, eastern and 
southern provinces. The project’s executing agency was the Ministry of Local 
Government and Provincial Councils.1096 The primary objective of the project was 
to improve the quality of life for tsunami-affected poor people through a cash-for-
work programme that generated income for these people. The project also aimed 
to rehabilitate line drainage systems of the tsunami-affected local government 
roads, thereby restoring local road networks.1097 The total fund allocation to the 
programme was Rs.200 million.1098 
8. Establishment of the National Solid Waste Management Supporting 
Centre 
This was established in 2007. With the assistance and technical support of JICA, 
the Ministry of Local Government and Provincial Councils was able to establish a 
central coordination mechanism for solid waste management to address local 
1094 Performance-2006 & Future Plans-2007, Ministry of Local Government and Provincial 
Councils, Colombo-02, p. 50. 
1095 ‘North East Community Restoration and Development - Extension Project’ (n.d.) 
http://www.adb.org/projects/38111-013/main, accessed 21-06-2013. 
1096 Performance-2006 & Future Plans-2007, p. 56. 
1097 ‘Public Work Restoration and Rehabilitation of Line Drainage Systems in Tsunami-Affected 
Local Government Roads’ (n.d.) http://www.adb.org/projects/39183-012/details, accessed 21-06-
2013. 
1098 Performance-2006 & Future Plans-2007, p. 56. 
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government level needs. JICA assisted this with a four-year support to launch a 
capacity upgrading project. JICA also provided support to establish night soil 
treatment units in 77 local government areas.1099 
9. Road Sector Assistance Project (RSAP) – Rural Road Component 
This WB-funded five-year project (2005-2011) was implemented by the Ministry 
of Provincial Councils and Local Government. A pilot project for the maintenance 
and improvement of 635km of rural roads and small bridges about 400m long in 
selected nine Pradeshiya Sabhas in the southern, north central and Uva provinces 
was established with a view to improving rural accessibility through a low cost 
labour base construction approach. The total allocation of the funds for this 
project was US$10.04 million.1100 
10. JICA South CAP Project 
This was a four-year (2007-2011) bilateral cooperation project between Sri Lanka 
and Japan implemented with the support of the Ministry of Local Government and 
Provincial Councils, southern provincial council and the Hambantota district 
secretariat. Under this project nine Grama Niladhari (GN) divisions in three 
divisional secretariat areas were selected to develop programmes with the 
participation of Japanese experts.1101 The objective of the project was to increase 
the income and livelihood of the people in these areas. Identification of 
development needs and priorities of the villagers were to be obtained through 
conducting workshops. This became the Community Approach Programme 
(CAP), for participatory rural development.1102 This project was implemented by 
the southern provincial council with close cooperation with the district secretariat 
of Hambantota.1103 
 
1099 Performance-2007 & Future Plans-2008, Ministry of Local Government and Provincial 
Councils, Colombo-02, p. 13. 
1100 Ibid., p. 34. 
1101 Performance-2008 & Future Plans-2009, Ministry of Local Government and Provincial 
Councils, Colombo-02, p. 26. 
1102 ‘JICA Project on Rural Livelihood Improvement in Hambantota District’ (n.d.) 
http://www.jica.go.jp/srilanka/english/office/topics/press11.html, accessed 22-06-2013. 
1103 Ibid. 
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11. Disaster Response Network Project – Phase-II1104 
The Ministry of Local Government and Provincial Councils and the Ministry of 
Disaster Management and Human Rights implemented this project. This aimed to 
upgrade the disaster response network of 18 local government bodies and 
establish tsunami early warning system under phase-I of the project. Phase-II was 
an extension of phase-I. Under phase-II, additional equipment was provided to 18 
fire stations established under phase-I, and a further two fire stations and 25 early 
warning towers were constructed, and set up with a communication system for 
vehicles and equipment. Established also were 15 district disaster management 
coordinating units and a disaster management coordination operation centre in 
Colombo. Rabobank of the Netherlands provided a loan facility of Euro 24.9 
million for this project.1105 
12. Eastern and North Central Provincial Road Project 
This ADB-funded project started in 2010 and was scheduled to be completed in 
2012. The Ministry of Highways and Road Development, the Ministry of Local 
Government and Provincial Councils, and the Ministry of Finance were involved. 
Through this project, the road network in the eastern and north central provinces 
was improved. The institutional capacity improved in line with the devolution 
process. Provincial roads were reconstructed and improved, and selected bridge 
links were rebuilt or replaced. Project management training and institutional 
development programmes were implemented.1106 For the first and second phases 
of the project, ADB funded US$70 million and the government funded US$8 
million. For the third phase, ADB funded US$800,000 and the government funded 
US$150,000.1107 
 
 
1104 Performance-2009 & Future Plans-2010, Ministry of Local Government and Provincial 
Councils, Colombo-02, p. 5. 
1105 ‘Netherlands helps Disaster Response Network’ (n.d.) 
http://www.priu.gov.lk/news_update/Current_Affairs/ca200912/20091218netherland_helps_disast
er_response_network.htm, accessed 21-06-2013. 
1106 Sri Lanka: Eastern and North Central Provincial Road Project: Draft Design and Monitoring 
Framework (2009) Asian Development Bank, 
http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/projdocs/2009/39619-SRI-DMF.pdf, accessed 22-06-2013. 
1107 Ibid. 
351 
 
                                                 
13. North East Coastal Community Development Project (NECCDEP) 
This was ADB-funded. Following the tsunami in 2004, funds from the Tsunami-
Affected Areas Rebuilding Project (TAARP) were approved and in early 2005, 
were channelled for disbursement through several existing and planned projects in 
affected districts, including NECCDEP. The goal of this project was to reduce 
poverty and meet basic needs in coastal communities in the three districts of the 
eastern province. The project purpose was sustainable livelihood improvement 
and the sound management of natural resources. The most vulnerable 
communities were prioritised for support early in the project. The focus was 
particularly directed at women, given the high number of households headed by 
them in the conflict- and tsunami-affected areas. The total project cost estimate 
was US$28.4 million.1108 
14. Secondary Towns and Rural Community-Based Water Supply and 
Sanitation (STRCBWSS) Project 
This ADB-funded project was approved in December 2002 with an estimated 
project completion by March 2009. The executing agency for this project was the 
National Water Supply and Drainage Board, under the Ministry of Urban 
Development and Water Supply. The goal of the STRCBWSS project was to 
contribute to poverty reduction efforts and promote human development by 
improving access to safe water and sanitation for poor populations, thereby 
decreasing waterborne diseases and related costs which amounted to both 
financial concerns and time spent by women caring for sick family members. The 
project objectives were to provide safe water and sanitation to people in urban and 
rural areas of the north central and north east provinces and to increase the 
capacity of the government to provide safe water by strengthening the water 
sector institutions. The project cost was estimated at US$86.4 million.1109 
15. North East Community Restoration and Development Project-II 
(NECORD-II) 
The ADB-funded NECORD-II was scheduled for a period between 2005 and 
2010. The main objective of the project was to improve the living conditions and 
1108 Thomas, H.T. and Hunt, J. (2010) Gender equality results in ADB projects: Sri Lanka country 
report, Mandaluyong City, Philippines: Asian Development Bank, p. 7. 
1109 Ibid., p. 21. 
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well-being of a significant number of people in the conflict-affected areas of the 
north east by restoring basic social infrastructures, community and public services, 
and livelihood. Components included support to reconstruct or improve facilities 
in the following areas: health and education; water supply and sanitation; access 
roads; village development (establishing community-based organisations [CBOs] 
and general social mobilisation and provision of basic shelter in conflict-affected 
communities returning after displacement); irrigation; livelihood training; 
improvements to agriculture and livestock livelihoods; urban development; and 
institutional development and capacity building. The estimated total project cost 
was US$55 million.1110 
16. Tsunami-Affected Areas Rebuilding Project (TAARP) 
This was ADB-funded and scheduled between 2005 and 2009. The objective of 
TAARP was to improve the living conditions and well-being of a significant 
number of people in the tsunami-affected areas by restoring basic social 
infrastructure, community and public services, and livelihood. TAARP addressed 
the needs of tsunami-affected people through funding numerous sub-projects in a 
variety of sectors selected and formulated in response to requests from 
communities and the government. The estimated total cost for this project was 
US$249.3 million. Both NECORD-II and TAARP were implemented through 
project management units already established under the first phase of NECORD. 
A project coordination committee was established with representation from 
government ministries and agencies responsible for tsunami-related reconstruction 
and rehabilitation, the chief secretaries of the southern and north east provincial 
councils, ADB project directors and others as appropriate.1111 
17. Improving Connectivity to Support Livelihoods and Gender Equality 
Project1112 
This project is supported by a grant of US$3 million from the JFPR through the 
ADB. It is linked to the Eastern and North Central Provincial Road Project 
financed by the ADB, and is implemented in the Anuradhapura, Polonnaruwa, 
Trincomalee and Batticaloa districts in 27 Pradeshiya Sabha areas which have 
1110 Ibid., pp. 33-34. 
1111 Ibid., p. 34. 
1112 Performance-2010 & Future Plans-2011, Ministry of Local Government and Provincial 
Councils, Colombo-02, p. 50. 
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been selected according to set criteria. The project period is from 2009 to 2012. 
The Ministry of Local Government and Provincial Councils is the executing 
agency and the commissioners of local government (CLGs) provide coordination 
at the provincial level. The primary objective of the project is to improve the 
quality of life for conflict-affected and isolated rural poor communities, especially 
women, through a community-driven, participatory livelihood development 
programme linked to the rehabilitation and maintenance of rural access roads.1113 
  
1113 ‘Improving Connectivity to Support Livelihoods and Gender Equality’, 
http://www.adb.org/projects/39619-022/main, 22-06-2013. 
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Appendix VII 
Lists of NGOs provided by the district secretariats 
NGOs and their work in Hambantota district secretariat area 
1. Action Aid: livelihood support 
2. ADRA: provide housing, water and sanitation 
3. Alliance Development Trust: livelihood support 
4. Arbeiter-Samariter-Bund Deutschland: work to relax tensions between 
ethnic groups, promote lasting peace, provide financial support 
5. Basic Needs: mental health care and development 
6. BRAC-Sri Lanka: livelihood support 
7. CARE International: livelihood support 
8. Child Fund-Sri Lanka: child protection 
9. CHA: humanitarian assistance 
10. EMI: disaster management 
11. FORUT: benefits for children, women and the poor 
12. Friends International: establish pre-schools, provide vocational training 
13. Green Movement: environmental protection 
14. Handicap International: establish centres for disabled 
15. Help Age-Sri Lanka: provide livelihood and shelter for elders 
16. Janasuwaya Community Development Foundation: help the poorest of the 
poor 
17. Leads: community development 
18. Malteser International: support vulnerable and marginalised communities 
19. Nawajeewana: provide housing 
20. New Era: eco-agriculture development 
21. OXFAM-Australia: livelihood support 
22. Practical Action: disaster management 
23. Ruhuna Wellassa Area Foundation: livelihood support 
24. Samaja Niyamaka Padanama: micro-finance 
25. Save the Children: child protection 
26. Saviya Development Foundation: community empowerment 
27. Sewa Lanka Foundation: micro-finance, promote home gardening 
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28. Shilpa Children’s Trust: sponsorship, micro-finance 
29. Smile Lanka: establish pre-schools, sponsorship, educational support 
30. Sri Lanka Solidarity: promote home gardening 
31. Sri Lanka Sumithrayo: counselling 
32. Stromme Foundation: educational support 
33. Unity and Cooperation for Development of Peoples: improve children’s 
tools for resilience giving them the chance to express their needs and fears, 
help them to cope with situations and to play their part in the society 
34. VSO: mental health care, help disabled, promote participation and 
governance 
35. Water Mission: water purification 
36. WDF: educational support 
37. World Vision: establish pre-schools, sponsorship, educational support 
38. WUSC: support marginalised women and youth (build skills, create 
employment and generate income) 
39. YES Foundation: assist youth, women and children 
Source: Details provided by the NGO coordinating office, Hambantota district secretariat. 
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NGOs and their work in Trincomalee district secretariat area 
1. ACTED: strengthen CSOs, infrastructure development, livelihood support, 
conflict mitigation 
2. Adventist Development and Relief Agency: provide shelter and sanitation 
3. AHAM: agriculture and livelihood support 
4. Alliance Development Trust: livelihood support, provide sanitation 
5. Assembly of Social Mobilisation: livelihood support, provide sanitation 
6. Child Development Fund: livelihood support 
7. Danish Refugee Council: construct toilets, provide sanitation 
8. Eastern United Women’s Organisation: training programmes 
9. EHED/Caritas: provide shelter, livelihood support 
10. Good Neighbours: community development 
11. Handicap International: help disabled 
12. IOM: livelihood support 
13. KPMCC: child protection 
14. Malteser International: water supply and rehabilitation 
15. Muslim Aid: construct toilets and wells 
16. Norwegian Refugee Council: provide shelter 
17. OfERR Ceylon: provide shelter, livelihood support 
18. OXFAM GB: provide sanitation, socio-economic development 
19. Peace Winds-Japan: provide shelter 
20. Sarvodaya: livelihood support 
21. Save the Children: child protection, livelihood support 
22. Sewa Lanka Foundation: provide shelter, socio-economic empowerment 
23. Trincomalee District Development Association: child protection 
24. UMCOR: provide shelter, livelihood support 
25. Women and Child Care Organisation: support for health care, agriculture 
and education 
26. World Concern: livelihood support 
27. World Vision Lanka: support for health care, agriculture and sanitation 
28. ZOA Refugee Care-Netherlands: provide shelter, promote agriculture, 
livelihood support, construct toilets 
Source: Details provided by the NGO coordinating office, Trincomalee district secretariat. 
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NGOs and their work in Batticaloa district secretariat area 
1. ACTED: socio-economic empowerment of conflict-affected communities 
2. Alliance Development Trust: livelihood assistance, water supply by 
bowsers 
3. arche noVa: clean wells, construct tube wells, water supply systems and  
urinal toilets for schools and  IDP camps, hygiene promotion activities for 
schools and IDP camps, construct wells for schools and public 
4. Arbeiter-Samariter-Bund Deutschland: strengthen CBOs and district 
secretariat staffs 
5. BRAC-Sri Lanka: establishment of a livelihood support programme 
(micro-finance programme) 
6. CARE: promote women-headed households for development and peace 
(relationship building, livelihood assistance such as micro-finance and 
village level small infrastructure renovation, emergency preparedness and 
research and pilot surveys to investigate issues in areas) 
7. CHA: humanitarian assistance 
8. Child Fund: help deprived, excluded and vulnerable children, and child 
rights protection 
9. Eastern Self-Reliant Community Awakening Organisation: post-tsunami 
assistance, provide health care and educational support 
10. EHED/Caritas: disaster relief 
11. FPA Alokaya Resource Centre: provide reproductive health care education 
12. Habitat for Humanity: upgrade permanent shelter for IDPs and poor 
13. Handicap International: establishment of a physical rehabilitation centre, 
and a centre for accessibility monitoring information on disability 
14. Help Age-Sri Lanka: work with elders (provide livelihood and shelter) 
15. IOM: livelihood support, infrastructure development, provide housing, 
agricultural development 
16. JEN: construct agro wells 
17. MAG: de-mining work 
18. MENCAFEP: help children and young people with disabilities 
19. Muslim Aid: micro-finance 
20. Nonviolent Peaceforce: peace awareness programme, human security 
support, train unarmed civilian peace keeping 
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21. Norwegian Refugee Council: provide temporary shelter, construct 
common wells, toilets and houses for IDPs, help for resettle people, 
provide information, counselling and legal assistance 
22. OfERR Ceylon: improve and develop the lives and well-being of refugee 
returnees from India and IDPs 
23. OXFAM-Australia: support for food security, livelihood, community 
capacity building, human security and conflict mitigation 
24. OXFAM GB: water supply and sanitation, livelihood support, support for 
public health care, agriculture and small enterprises 
25. People In Need: train pre-school teachers 
26. Practical Action: livelihood support, infrastructure development and 
disaster management 
27. Rural Development Foundation: support for relief, rehabilitation and 
resettlement, build peace among communities, promote gender equality 
and socio-economic development (awareness programmes on income 
generation, saving and training) 
28. SAREERAM: micro-finance 
29. Sarvodaya: disaster relief 
30. Save the Children: community-based child protection programme, new 
born child survival, basic and early childhood education, and disaster risk 
reduction activities 
31. Sewa Lanka Foundation: build capacities of CBOs, livelihood support 
(fishing and agriculture), infrastructure development, relief, rehabilitation 
and psycho-social development 
32. SOND: institutional capacity building for CBOs and NGOs, development 
programmes for children and elders, peace building  programmes 
33. SOS: help children, establish pre-schools, strengthen families 
34. Surangani Voluntary Services: help children 
35. Terre Des Hommes: promote psycho-social activities and child protection 
36. UMCOR: shelter programme 
37. VoVCOD: livelihood support, provide shelter, construct toilets 
38. World Vision: disaster risk reduction, support for economic development, 
education and health 
39. WUSC: vocational training 
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40. ZOA Refugee Care-Netherlands: emergency response and community 
rehabilitation (upgrade shelter, provide food, livelihood support, 
educational support), tsunami rehabilitation (provide shelter, health 
training, toilet construction), emergency relief and early recovery, address 
food security, build capacities of local NGOs and CBOs 
Source: Details provided by the NGO coordinating office, Batticaloa district secretariat. 
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